Negotiating Resource Access

Institutional arrangements for woodlands and water use in southern Zimbabwe

Nontokozo Nemarundwe
Department of Rural Development Studies
Uppsala

Doctoral thesis
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Uppsala 2003

Acta Universitatis Agriculturae Sueciae
Agraria 408

ISSN 1401-6249
ISBN 91-576-6427-7

Tryck: SLU Service/Repro, Uppsala 2003

Abstract

Nemarundwe, Nontokozo. 2003. *Negotiating Resource Access: Institutional arrangements for woodlands and water use in southern Zimbabwe*.
Doctoral dissertation. ISSN 1401-6249, ISBN 91-576-6427-7.

The last two decades have witnessed a 'paradigm shift' in conservation and natural resource management away from costly state-centred control towards approaches in which local people play a much more active role. The inefficiency of state control over woodland and water use, has partly led to the enactment of decentralisation policies to facilitate participation of local actors in resource management. Within the decentralisation discourse, there is a renewed debate on the role of institutions in community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). Using a case study of Romwe catchment, Chivi district in southern Zimbabwe, this thesis examines the role of local level institutions, both formal and informal within donor supported CBNRM initiatives. Emphasis in the study is on the analysis of informal institutions, a focus that is rare in conventional CBNRM studies. Informal institutions are defined as those institutions that are not legally recognised by the state. These include cultural norms, beliefs and social networks. The study explores how these institutions influence patterns of women's and men's access to woodlands and water resources. The study further examines the gendered aspects of decision-making processes in CBNRM.

The study finds that at community level, there are a multiplicity of institutions and management structures with unclear mandates and jurisdictions. This may partly explain the state's recentralisation of management authority at the Rural District Council (RDC) level rather than devolution to levels below the RDC. While there is often reference to formal and informal institutions in the CBNRM literature, the dichotomy between these institutions is overemphasised in theoretical debates. In practice, there are inter-linkages and overlaps. Relations between the various forms of institutional structures are influenced by a diversity of factors that include power dynamics. These power dynamics influence processes of negotiating resource access by various actors. In the process of negotiating resource access and use, conflicts may inevitably emerge as was found in Romwe.

Although women have historically been sidelined in formal decision-making processes, this study finds that with the emergence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), women have become more actively involved. Women's access to productive resources such as land and water has also been enhanced through garden projects. There is some indication of changes in the institutional framework at the local level, with women playing a much bigger role in formal decision-making processes.

Key words: institutions, decentralisation, CBNRM, gender, woodlands, water, participatory management, conservation, conflict, access, power, Zimbabwe.

Author's address: Nontokozo Nemarundwe, Department of Rural Development Studies, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Box 7005, 750 07, Uppsala, Sweden and University of Zimbabwe, Institute of Environmental Studies, P.O. Box MP167, Mount Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe. E-mail address: nonto@africaonline.co.zw or N.Nemarundwe@cgiar.org

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank all the members of the Romwe community. I wish to acknowledge the mentoring I received from Prof. Kjell Havnevik at DRDS who agreed to be my main supervisor at a time when many students pressured him. I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Prof. Bruce Campbell for nurturing my intellectual development, his dedication and willingness to see me through the PhD even after taking up a very demanding job at CIFOR. My sincere gratitude goes to Prof. Janice Jiggins for supervising and introducing me to relevant theoretical debates when I started the PhD. Thanks to Prof. Sam Moyo for challenging me to analyse institutions within a broader historical context. Dr. Tekeste Negash, thank you for reviving the DRDS seminars. DRDS staff members Dr. Lisbeth Larsson-Liden, Åsa Constanda, Ann-Margret Sveidqvist, Ami Braholm and the late Elisabeth Dressie deserve a special mention for their logistical support. To all the PhD students at DRDS, thank you for your support and challenging views at seminars. Malin Beckman and Åsa Renman thank you for checking on me at the end of each day and encouraging me to take a break from the thesis. Seema and Stefan Jonsson you deserve a special mention for welcoming me to your home – anytime! Most importantly, thank you Seema for being there for me during times when I was feeling low and missing my family.

Intellectual support received from Dr. Bevelyne Sithole who read and commented on the first draft of the thesis is acknowledged. Bev, you worried so much over me being away from home – finally the PhD is done! Alois Mandondo, Prof. Peter Frost, and Prof. Sara Feresu of IES, at the University of Zimbabwe helped me think through some of my ideas. Dr. Wil de Jong of CIFOR, thank you for your consistent support. My sincere gratitude goes to Prof. Godwin Kowero, the Regional Coordinator of CIFOR in Harare for giving me office space with a good working environment. A big thank you to all staff members at the CIFOR regional office in Harare. IES administrative staff members deserve a special acknowledgement for their logistical support during fieldwork. Witness Kozanayi, without your excellent field assistance and thoughtfulness, I would never have been able to gather the same amount and quality of data. Joshua Dambanembuya, CASS Librarian, thank you for your assistance with the literature search. I am grateful to Elaine Almen for the language editing and Peter Madzudzo for assiting with the figures.

To my mentor and role model, thank you for hammering the point home on the difference between a PhD dissertation and a consultancy report and for taking the time to comment on six of my chapters. You have seen me grow from being *musikana wemurungu* (the white woman's girl) to a doctor! Prof. Gordon Matzke, thank you for introducing me to the idea of a PhD, sorry I could not make it to Oregon State University. Karin Gerhardt and Anders, no words can express my gratitude for making me feel at home in

Sweden, taking me on excursions to your summer cottage and introducing me to the Ohlanders. Eva-May and Lars Ohlander, thank you for your hospitality.

To my husband Marcel, no words can express my gratitude for always being supportive. You took care of our wonderful sons while I was in Chivi and Sweden. I look forward to being home for you guys. My sisters Wamutjilani and Cleopatra thank you for taking care of my kids during different phases of my studies. To my grandmother Girlie (one of the first female African teachers in the 1950s), and my mother Christine you are forever an inspiration to me. To my sisters-in-law Laura, Ruth and Alma, this work would not have been easy without your moral support. Pauline Hobane-Maphosa, we have been together on the challenging road of being PhD students and mothers, *Qinisela*, *usuzaqeda* -you are almost there. Zibusiso Silape, Selina Cumba and Grace Chinamora, thank you for checking on my kids during my absence. Barbara Kaim, thank you for believing in me – this kept me going when times were tough. Fortunate and Ben Nyakanda, you made my stay in Sweden during 2001 worthwhile. Thubelihle Mathole, thank you for the support, friendship and time we shared in Sweden. Many people contributed immensely to this work, but I cannot mention you all by name. Your contribution is greatly appreciated.

Funding for this work came from a number of donors. Fieldwork was funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID); the grant from the Swiss Development Cooperation received through the CIFOR office in Bogor, Indonesia, and another grant received through the CIFOR regional office for Eastern and Southern Africa from the European Union for the project on management of Miombo woodlands. The African Academy of Sciences, The Swedish Institute, the International Development Research Centre and DRDS funded me during the different stages of training in Sweden. The views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the funding agencies.

I dedicate this thesis to my loving husband Marcel Nemarundwe and our sons Tafadzwa Ryan and Ayibongwe Marcel (Jnr).

Uppsala, June 2003

Nontokozo Nemarundwe (nee Nabane).

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Maps

List of Figures

List of Annexes

List of Acronyms

Agritex	Department of Agriculture Technical and Extension Services
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resource Management
CEH	Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (formerly IH)
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIFOR	Center for International Forestry Research
CITES	Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species
CPR	Common Property Resources
DA	District Administrator
DC	District Commissioner
DFID	Department for International Development
DNPWLM	Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management
DNR	Department of Natural Resources
DRDS	Department of Rural Development Studies
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FC	Forestry Commission
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IES	Institute of Environmental Studies
IH	Institute of Hydrology (now CEH)
LTC	Land Tenure Commission (1994)
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RDC	Rural District Council
RMS	Rhodesia Mail Services
SEDAP	South East Dry Areas Project
SSCFAs	Small Scale Commercial Farming Areas
TLA	Traditional Leaders' Act (1998)
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
ZFU	Zimbabwe Farmers' Union

CHAPTER ONE: SETTING THE RESEARCH AGENDA

1.1. Introduction

The last two decades have witnessed a 'paradigm shift' in conservation and natural resource management (NRM) away from costly state-centred control towards approaches in which local people play a much more active role in most post-colonial African countries (Murphree, 1991; Shackleton, *et al*., 2001). Colonial natural resource management policies had resulted in over-centralisation because they were designed in the context of conquest and subjugation (Mandondo, 2000a; Ribot, 1999). Much of the colonial legislation was inherited piecemeal and sometimes wholesale by most post-colonial governments, and amendments to the colonial legislation in Southern African countries have not democratised the various legal instruments (Mandondo, 2000a). However, state control over the use and management of natural resources such as woodlands has been largely ineffective because the state lacks the resources and capacity to enforce such controls. This has, since the early 1990s, partly led to the enactment of decentralisation policies to facilitate the participation of local communities in resource management. This development coincided with the general shift in the development paradigm from top-down to the adoption of bottom-up, participatory approaches, aimed at ensuring sustainable use and management of natural resources (Shackleton & Campbell, 2001; Ribot, 1999).

The theme of sustainable natural resource use[1] has been on the international agenda since the first global environmental conference in 1972 in Stockholm, Sweden. Since then, the predominant strategies of privatisation of the common pool resources, enforcement of state regulations and seeking technical solutions to environmental management problems have not prevented further depletion of local and national common pool resources (Steins, 1999). A bleak narrative of resource degradation characterised most countries in the south: soil erosion, declining biological diversity in terrestrial and aquatic resources and increasing desertification (Madzudzo, 2002). This gloomy picture was attributed to the state centred approach to common pool resource management and the exclusion of local communities in resource management. To ameliorate this state of the environment, there has been a shift from seeking technical solutions to natural resource management

1 The concept of sustainability re-emerged in the late 1980s as a key one in the environment field and was defined as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). The call for sustainability not only puts focus on the design of the societal development philosophy itself, but also points at the interlinkages between the natural world and the socio-economic and cultural aspects (Stockholm Group for Studies on Natural Resource Management, 1988).

problems to a focus on social and institutional issues in resource management (Steins, 1999; Sithole, 1999) and this has been spearheaded through donor funded community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) initiatives. CBNRM has been defined as "ideas, policies, practices and behaviours that seek to give those who live in rural environments greater involvement in managing the natural resources that exist in their areas in which they reside (be it permanently or temporarily) and/or greater access to benefits derived from those resources" (Hulme & Murphree, 2001).

In the decentralisation of resource management discourse, there is a renewed debate on the role of institutions in common pool[2] natural resource management in the context of CBNRM. Common pool resources are defined as resources that generate finite quantities of resource units and one person's use subtracts from the quantity of resource units available to others (Ostrom *et al*., 1994). Most common pool resources are sufficiently large that multiple actors can simultaneously use the resource system and efforts to exclude potential beneficiaries are costly (Ostrom, 1999). The literature on institutions in CBNRM argue that actors' practices regarding resource use are shaped and made possible within a set institutional framework: institutions being regularised patterns of behaviour emerging from underlying structures or sets of rules in use (Leach *et al*., 1997; Berry, 1989). An institutional analysis approach in CBNRM generates some understanding of what different actors do and why. Institutions specify the relationship among people regarding access to resources and therefore their effectiveness has implications for sustainable resource use. As the state shifts formal responsibility and rights over natural resources such as woodlands and water to local users' institutional structures (as representatives of the communities), actors in these structures take over the responsibility of controlling access to natural resources in their locality (Meinzen-Dick & Zwarteveen, 2001). It therefore becomes important to examine who within these structures performs what tasks, who controls resource use, decision-making and related benefits.

Within the literature on institutions, some debates have centred on the difference between institutions and organisations. According to North (1990:5), institutions are the rules of the game while organisations are taken to be the "players" or the groups of actors "bound together by some common purpose". Regarding the debates on differences between institutions and organisations, recent views suggest that definitions do not matter, but what matters is understanding their jurisdictions (Murphree, 2000; Clarke, 1997; Folke *et al*., 1998); issues surrounding accountability (Ribot, 1999, 1998 & 1995; Peluso, 1992, Murombedzi, 1992; Matondi,

2 The term common pool resources will be used because, as other studies have shown, the system in the Zimbabwean context, especially in relation to woodlands, lacks key characteristics of a true common property regime (Campbell *et al.*, 2001; Goebel, 1998; Mandondo, 1997; Nemarundwe, 2001).

2001); the form and nature of institutional representation of different actors (Narayan, 2000; Mukamuri, 2000; Madzudzo, 2002; Sithole, 2001) and effectiveness (Narayan, 2000; Ribot, 1999). In relation to issues of representation, power[3] and its related dynamics becomes a key variable in determining whose interests are or are not catered for by the institutions given the diversity of actors involved in CBNRM. Institutions also encompass formal legally constructed and informal rules and regulations. At the local level, institutions are often informal, based on traditional norms and values (Folke & Colding, 2001). Some of the local level institutions may be more directly associated with resource management activities, while others may be more closely associated with cultural belief systems. Organisations, referred to in this thesis as institutional structures (following Pretty & Ward, 2001), can be seen as authority systems, which ensure that rules and access rights are adhered to. They are mechanisms people use to control their use of the environment and their behaviour towards each other (Bromley, 1991). It is often difficult to separate institutions from the structures that ensure that the institutions are adhered to, thus this study examines both where relevant.

In this thesis, institutions are considered within the framework of power, process and participation in CBNRM (Goebel, 1998; Mandondo, 2001). This framework recognises that although actors (as individuals or groups) and institutional structures may wield power, the exercise of such power is usually mediated by a variety of factors including those grounded in the contexts in which power operates (Moore, 1996 & 1993). The wielding of power presupposes the exercise of yielding to it, of recognising the other as powerful (Villarreal, 1994), thus power is a relational concept. The mediation of power through a variety of factors is usually a reflection of the contestation and negotiation of interests between and among various actors in a given context (Moore, 1993; Scott, 1985). The institutional analysis approach adopted for this study also situates contemporary patterns of access, use and control over woodlands and water resources within a historical perspective as argued for by a number of scholars (Berry, 1989; Mandondo, 2000a; Moore, 1993; Moyo, 1995a). Detailed analyses of African agrarian and pastoral conflicts have stressed the embeddedness of struggles over resource use and control within historical patterns of access to critical natural resources (Matondi, 2001; Moore, 1993; Richards, 1983).

A central concern of this thesis is to examine the role of local level institutions, both codified (formal), and non-codified (informal *i.e.* a term often used to refer to traditional, indigenous ones) in CBNRM. In the case of Zimbabwe, the term formal or modern institutional structures refers to governance structures of the state that include the village development

3 Following Foucault (1979), power is considered to be a strategy. Power is exercised rather than possessed (*ibid*: 26) and is constituted in social relationships, such as networks, alliances and conflicts.

committees (VIDCOs) and ward development committees (WADCOs) that are elected. It also refers to technical departments of the state that provide extension services on agriculture and natural resources such as Agritex, the Forestry Commission (FC) and Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Given the existence of a body of civil society organisations (NGOs and research institutes) in the study area, these also fall within this broad categorisation. These can either be locally or externally based. The term 'traditional' refers to locally based institutions such as the *sabuku*, the headman, chief, traditional healer, the spirit mediums and community elders. These positions are inherited through lineage and kinship ties with leadership circulating among families. *Sabuku* is a position that was introduced during the colonial period, but the positions of chief and headman were in place during the pre-colonial period. The role of the *sabuku* was to collect tax and keep 'books' with village records. The term *sabuku* literally means the keeper of the book, *i.e.* records of taxes extracted from the African population by the colonial governments through these leaders. The use of the term 'traditional' is said to be problematic in the literature because it has been applied to practices and institutions that are not static but rather evolving and subject to modification by negotiation between various natural resource user groups and state institutions (Berry, 1993; Havnevik and Hårsmar, 1999). For instance, the property rights regimes often labelled as 'traditional' constitute complex outcomes of cultural and environmental change, and thus should be understood as dynamic phenomena (Ranger, 1993). Most of the so-called traditional authorities were remoulded to extend colonial rule over the African population through a system of indirect rule.

Emphasis in this study is placed on the informal institutions. There is a tendency in the institutional literature to recognise the importance of informal institutions, but nevertheless to concentrate on the analysis of formal organisations (*e.g.* King, 1994; Uphoff, 1986). The emphasis in these studies is often placed on committees and formal property rights as mechanisms for reducing transaction costs and institutionalising cooperative interactions. Such a focus is often prescriptive, with formalised institutional arrangements being considered more likely to be robust and enduring than informal ones (Cleaver, 1998). Contrary to these studies that place emphasis on formal institutions, this thesis investigates the role of both formal and informal institutions within CBNRM with the aim of contributing to the ongoing debates on institutional issues in common pool resource management and the role of institutions in facilitating sustainable use of natural resources. The concept of 'informal' institutions refers to those institutions that are not legally recognised by the state such as cultural norms, values, beliefs and social networks and/or kinship ties. These informal institutions are often upheld by mutual agreement (not written down), relations of power or authority and are enforced endogenously (Cousins, 1997). Leach *et al*., (1999) define formal institutions as rules that require third party enforcement and apply to law courts. Following Leach *et al*., (1999), the term formal institutions is used

to refer to state-related institutions such as those established by rural district councils (RDCs), with legal recognition and theoretically enforced by VIDCOs.

A 1984 Prime Ministerial directive created the VIDCOs and WADCOs, purportedly to give a democratic orientation to the process of planning for local development. In principle, the system is based on the concept of popular representation (Makumbe, 1996). The VIDCO is the lowest unit of government administration, which is expected to identify the needs of the village and articulate them through the development of a village plan that is forwarded to the WADCO. The WADCO draws its membership from the chairpersons of the VIDCOs and it is presided over by an elected councillor. The elected councillor represents the ward at district level. A WADCO purportedly receives the plans of its constituent VIDCOs and consolidates them into a ward development plan. Councillors then forward these plans to the district council where they are submitted to the Rural District Development Committee (RDDC), the district's supreme planning body that is tasked with consolidating the various ward plans into the district annual and five year plans. The RDDC is chaired by the District Administrator (DA) who is a government employee representing the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD). This committee includes heads of sectoral ministries, chairpersons of the Rural District Council (RDC)'s various subcommittees, and district heads of national security organs such as the police (Makumbe, 1998). Membership of the RDDC is predominantly made up of bureaucrats and technocrats at the expense of 'popular' representatives of grassroots structures (Mandondo, 2000a: 11).

The study further investigates the nature of informal institutions, how they relate to other local level natural resource management institutions (*e.g.* those established by non-governmental organisations), their influence on formal institutions, women's and men's access to woodland and water resources and whether this institutional set-up promotes or obstructs the sustainable use of these natural resources in Chivi district, southern Zimbabwe. The specific focus of the study is on woodland and water resources. These two natural resources were selected in order to determine whether the characteristics of the resource itself affects the management institution's influence and/or determines who has access to and control over what resource and in which places. Murphree (1993) suggests that the nature of the resource has a bearing on its management. For instance, trees are fixed to a given land base and can be privatised or remain in the commons with no intrinsic difficulties, yet other resources like wild mammals are generally mobile or fugitive and less amenable to privatisation (*ibid*: 3). Fugitive natural resources are often difficult to claim ownership or have control over as compared to the more fixed resources such as woodlands.

While institutional analysis in CBNRM has put emphasis on the formal institutional structures, there are other informal and often hidden institutions such as social networks that are important for appropriating resources (Matondi, 2001; Sithole, 2001 & 1999). Such social networks include, kinship ties, burial societies, funerals, women's tea drinking gatherings, work parties and informal meetings *e.g.* at the well and other social gatherings such as beer drinking (*ndari*). It is important to understand informal institutions such as social networks functioning at village level as they impact on the formal institutions as well as the sustainable use of woodland and water resources. In this thesis, the term 'networks' is used to refer to either kin or non-kin associations that people establish for particular purposes with others in their locality or in another place. This thesis documents the form and nature of some of these social networks within Romwe and how they relate to and/or influence[4] CBNRM and the sustainable use of woodlands and water. Particular attention is paid to how various cliques may use these hidden institutions to manipulate leaders or appropriate leadership positions. It is therefore pertinent not only to understand which institutional structures are considered more powerful but also which ones are more influential in determining access to woodlands and water.

Gender differentiated impacts of such informal institutions are also explored. Because women and the poor are often excluded from involvement in formal community institutions, they tend to rely heavily on informal institutions that may offer them a hedge in fulfilling their household responsibilities (Berry, 1993; Narayan, 2000:6). The accountability of both formal and informal institutions, especially at the local level, has been questioned in recent literature (Ribot, 1999; Mandondo, 2001; Matondi, 2001).

In the CBNRM discourse, local communities are generally held to be the appropriate institutions for local natural resource management (Murphree, 1991). In theory, a minimum set of conditions is considered to underlie the existence of effective management of common pool resources use (Ostrom, 1990). These conditions that are thought to enhance the success and sustainability of institutions for natural resource management include a clearly bounded user group, clearly defined resource boundaries, a system of graduated sanctions imposed on those who violate the rules, and public conflict resolution mechanisms (Ostrom, 1990). Communities involved presumably share common norms and are bound together by a common interest in achieving collective outcomes (McCay & Acheson, 1987; Berkes & Farvar, 1989). Smaller communities are held to be more organisationally cost effective since their members are expected to be in

4 Sithole, forthcoming, quotes Schmidt (1992) who suggests that some distinction should be made between power and influence because emphasis has been on issues of power and not influence of various actors in CBNRM. Sithole argues that most marginalized groups such as women prefer influence to power. Influence is said to represent the strategies of those without formal power to limit the power of others and the way in which that power impinges upon their lives.

everyday social contact allowing for informal peer pressure to mitigate against high transaction costs. CBNRM initiatives often draw inspiration from the above images of a community. The design and implementation of CBNRM in Zimbabwe and other developing countries have been orchestrated within the resource management decentralisation discourse.

1.1.1. Decentralised institutional arrangements for CBNRM

CBNRM is situated within the theoretical framework seeking to empower local communities through decentralised entrustments regarding the use and management of natural resources in their locality (Mandondo, 2001; Murombedzi, 1994). Entrustment refers to the size and content of the package of powers, responsibilities and authority transferred from one level of social organisation to another (Ribot, 1999; Mandondo, 2000b). Since the 1970s, decentralisation in various forms has been recommended as a way to reduce problems that occur when a highly centralised public agency is used to manage natural resources in different localities (Ostrom *et al*., 1993). The assumption that decentralisation is the answer to sustainability problems has been supported by case studies mainly being drawn from the context of infrastructural development (*e.g.* Cohen *et al*., 1981). It is argued that when local actors, who are the users of the natural resource, are involved in decision-making, they invest substantial resources such as time in ensuring sustainable utilisation of those resources (Cernea, 1985). The concept of decentralisation describes a process by which bundles of entrustments, including regulatory and decision-making powers, responsibility for planning and implementation and administrative capacity, are variously transferred to local groupings such as local governments and/or communities (Mandondo, 2000a; Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). Decentralisation can occur in two forms, either through deconcentration or devolution. In deconcentration, the central government transfers some of the entrustments to lower levels but these remain responsible and accountable to central government (Ostrom, *et al*., 1993). The central government reserves the right to supervise, overturn or withdraw the entrustments. Ostrom *et al*., refer to this form of decentralisation (*i.e.* deconcentration) as 'temporary devolution' of authority within a bureaucracy to lower level officials, combined with enhanced opportunities for citizen participation (*ibid:* 164).

In devolution, the entrustments are transferred more or less completely to the local authorities or users. In this case, there is distribution or redistribution of authority to make decisions and to take action by local governments or local users independently of the central administration of the state. Weber (1962) defines the state as a clearly defined set of institutions with official powers. But, it is not easy to draw neat lines between the state, civil society and civil society organisations. The state is an amorphous entity of elected politicians and non-elected civil servants and other actors with different interests and often conflicting preferences (Hasler, 1993). The central government may retain overall legal control but

local governments are empowered to make decisions unlike in the context of deconcentration (Wunsch, 2001). Most CBNRM initiatives aim at devolution of entrustments to local communities. Devolution is sometimes referred to as democratic decentralisation within the CBNRM discourse (Ribot, 2003; Mapedza & Mandondo, 2001). In the Zimbabwean context the decentralisation process has both elements of deconcentration and devolution. For example, within the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources – CAMPFIRE[5] in which appropriate authority is decentralised to RDCs, the department of national parks retains certain levels of control and also the resource sharing scheme facilitated by the Forestry Commission (FC) – where local users can make certain decisions (*e.g.* on the use of non-timber products) independent of the FC, but cannot make other decisions such as the use of timber or game found in the forest reserve. This thesis therefore uses the term decentralisation because the CBNRM programmes in question are analysed regardless of the form of decentralisation.

The literature on decentralisation in the context of CBNRM has concentrated on defining what should be decentralised, to whom (often groups treated as bounded entities), how and with what effect without systematically exploring the impact of decentralisation policies on institutional and power relations in the community at the beginning of the process (Murphree, 1991; Murombedzi, 1991; Mandondo, 2000a; Mamdani, 1996; Ribot 1999). From the literature that has focused on what is to be decentralised, elements presented in Table 1.1 can be discerned as being transferable by central government to lower levels. The conferment of any of the rights presented in Table 1.1 on specific actors places an obligation on other actors to recognise such rights. In practice, people often use and assert claims to resources that they are neither entitled to nor own.

5 CAMPFIRE is a community-based wildlife management programme that entails community participation in resources management. Economic benefits from wildife accrue to the community and are used for community development projects or are distributed amongst the households.

Table 1.1. *What should be decentralised?*

What can be decentralised?	Characteristics
Access[6]	Ability to derive benefits from the natural resources.
Withdrawal	Rights and ability to obtain units of a resource.
Management	Rights to regulate internal use patterns and to direct day-to-day stewardship. The right of management is a collective choice right authorising its holders to devise operational level withdrawal rights governing use of the resource.
Exclusion	Rights to determine who has access. The right of exclusion is also a collective choice right authorising its holders to devise operational level rights of access.
Alienation	Rights to sell or lease management of exclusion rights. Having alienated those rights means that the former rights holders can no longer exercise their authority in relation to the resource.

Source: adapted from Ostrom & Schlager, 1996.

Like property, which is a relational concept, 'rights' is also a relational concept. Thus rights are only secure to the extent to which others are willing to recognise them (Frost & Mandondo, 1999). In spite of its merits, the emphasis on 'rights' runs the risk of ignoring factors such as ability, capacity, resource endowments and decision-making autonomy, which are all critical components of an effective decentralisation process. Institutional dynamics and patterns of social interaction at the local level also make the decentralisation process a complex one. Similarly, access to natural resources at the community level is subject to multiple and competing interests and institutional arrangements. The formal and systematic transfer of entrustments may therefore at times have limited connection with the source of influence and power at community level. Thus it is not enough to define what is to be decentralised or the mere specification of entrustments (Ribot, 1999). In practice, decentralisation turns out to be a patchy and complex process, operating within arenas characterised by contestation and negotiation of interest between and within various levels of society (Moore, 1993; Mapedza & Mandondo, 2001). More powerful actors in a given context may manipulate the process of decentralisation to their own advantage.

Power imbalances in a given community or among a diversity of actors may translate into inequalities of access to natural resources within the set institutional framework. It is only recently that CBNRM studies have begun to examine the heterogeneity of communities and how decentralisation of resource management has affected the different

6 Access to natural resources depends on an individual's position and power within particular sets of social relationships. The concept of access is here defined following Ribot & Peluso (2001) as the 'ability to derive benefits from things', in this case natural resources. This definition makes the concept of access broader than the classical notion of property defined as 'the right to benefit from things' by emphasising the ability rather than the right to benefits.

community groups, such as women (Shackleton & Campbell, 2001; Shackleton *et al*., 2001; Meinzen-Dick & Zwarteveen, 2001; Sithole, 2001; Nabane, 1997). These studies have shown that decentralisation of resource management to local communities, with multiple and often competing interests and actors, go beyond the mere targeting of appropriate 'communities'. Communities are highly differentiated along several axes that include gender (Mvududu 1995; Goebel 1998; Hunter, *et al*., 1990), wealth, educational levels, ethnicity and longevity of residence in a given locality (Dzingirai, 1998; Nhira, 1994). Decentralisation should therefore be representative of the diverse groups found in the community in order to cater for the multiple interests and aspirations (Ribot, 1999). While these studies highlight the importance of social differentiation within communities and challenge the notion of 'community' as a homogenous entity, they tend to portray the powerful actors as if they exist in a vacuum, yet the concept of power is relational. These studies overlook the fact that the 'less powerful' may devise a variety of strategies to ensure that their interests are catered for (Jackson, 1998; Scott, 1986 & 1985; Villarreal, 1994). Such strategies are often informal and may therefore be viewed as trivial, yet they may influence CBNRM outcomes, sustainable resource use and the institutional framework governing access to natural resources.

Decentralisation coincided with the mainstreaming of participatory approaches in development theory and practice, advocating that local resource users should play a much more active role in the protection and management of natural resources (Chambers, 1995 & 1993; Shackleton & Campbell, 2001). These reforms purportedly aim to increase resource user participation in natural resource management decisions and benefits through the transfer of management authority to local level organisations. Some development practitioners believe that community participation leads to sustainable natural resource use since the local users benefit from and are involved in decision-making processes regarding how resources should be allocated and managed. Community participation in resource management was attractive for CBNRM proponents because of its apparent democratising tendencies enabling local actors to take charge of the natural resources that they have day-to-day contact with. Community participation is believed to promise political, economic, conservation, sustainable use and development desires of a wide spectrum of actors. However, as regards the planning and implementation of the participatory process, there has often been limited concern for patterns of interaction and power relations that impact on (or are impacted upon by) the institutional framework governing access to woodlands and water.

1.1.2. Community participation in CBNRM and institutional development

The philosophy behind the participatory approaches to natural resource management is that these approaches may address inequalities by helping to retain and distribute the benefits of local management initiatives within the community and hence provide new opportunities for broader

community development (Ribot, 1999). Further, community participation in resource management may increase economic and managerial efficiency in three ways:

1. By allowing local people who bear the cost of natural resource management to make decisions, rather than leave decision-making in the hands of outsiders or unaccountable local people.
2. By reducing administrative and management transaction costs via the proximity of local participants.
3. By using local knowledge, values and aspirations in project design, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Murphree, 1991; Mohammed-Katerere, 2001).

Notwithstanding the importance of people's participation in CBNRM, it is argued here that participation is itself an outcome of the institutional framework within which it is embedded. It cannot be seen as something that can bring about the success of CBNRM if only certain actors are sufficiently involved in resource management. Participation itself is a socially embedded phenomenon and not something that can be elicited at will. The implication of this contention is that the participatory approach to natural resource management cannot bypass structural and institutional constraints arising from *e.g.* power relations and patterns of interaction in a given community (Admassie, 1995). Participatory natural resource management also needs to take cognisance of the unequal relations that exist between actors. This is important for understanding patterns of human-environment interaction and possible associated conflicts that may emerge in the process of interaction. These unequal relations need to be assessed in relation to the power that each actor commands and which actors influence the outcome of CBNRM. Furthermore, the central concepts of participatory resource management being applied to most donor-funded CBNRM initiatives in Africa did not originate from empirical and analytical investigation of realities of rural life and power relations in the different countries, but rather they emerged from theoretical constructs, mostly developed in the North. This may have important implications for the manner in which participatory processes are facilitated.

In the context of CBNRM, there is a continuing danger of the participatory approaches being seen by some as a panacea for solving environmental problems. The concept of participation is problematic in that it is variously defined in different contexts. There is little agreement among writers who have theorised on the concept of participation regarding the nature and the range or the means and ends of the participation. Participation may take many forms, it occurs along a continuum from tokenism (nominal participation) to interactive participation. Besides the divergent views on participation, there are also differing perspectives on who is expected to participate, what exactly is to be achieved and how it should be brought about (Pretty, 1995). At its narrowest, participation in a group context is defined in terms of nominal membership and at its

broadest as being a dynamic interactive process in which the disadvantaged have a voice and influence in decision-making (Narayan, 1996). In terms of objectives, at its narrowest, participation is judged almost entirely by its potential efficiency effects and at its broadest by its ability to enhance equity, efficiency, empowerment and environmental sustainability (Uphoff, 1991).

Participation has been described through a range of levels, on one extreme as cooption (which is sometimes referred to as nominal participation) and on the other, collective action (Table 1.2). It is worth noting that there are a number of typologies of participation, *e.g.* Arnstein (1969) and Pretty *et al.,* (1995). Agarwal's (2001) typology was found more relevant for this study because the typologies developed by Arnstein (1969) and Pretty *et al.,* (1995) refer to 'partnership' and in the context of donor-funded CBNRM initiatives, the concept of 'partnership' raises a number of questions regarding the nature of partnership. For example, one could question whether there is a level playing field between the locals (who are often resource poor) and external facilitators (who are endowed with both financial and material resources).

Table 1.2. *Typology of participation*

Form/Level of participation (presented in ascending order)	**Characteristics/Features**
Nominal participation	Membership in the group.
Passive participation	Being informed of decisions *ex post facto*; or attending meetings, listening in on decision-making without speaking up.
Consultative participation	Being asked an opinion in specific matters without guarantee of influencing decisions.
Activity-specific participation	Being asked to (or volunteering to) undertake specific tasks.
Active participation	Expressing opinions whether or not solicited or taking initiatives of other sorts.
Interactive participation (empowering)	Having a voice and influence in the group's decisions.

Source: Agarwal, 2001.

Achieving effective participation would involve a shift from the lower (nominal participation) to the higher levels (interactive participation), with the levels being defined by the extent of people's activeness. While it is noble to encourage community participation in CBNRM, there are limits as to what participation alone can achieve (even interactive participation) in terms of equity and efficiency, given existing socio-economic inequalities and power relations. Studies undertaken to test the degree of power shift and decision-making to the communities through CBNRM, for example, Goebel (1998), Meinzen-Dick & Zwarteveen (2001) and Nabane (1997)

show such shifts generally favour men and rarely women. A relevant question relates to what determines participation in CBNRM.

Participation in the context of CBNRM is found mainly to depend on the following factors:

a) Rules of entry – the criteria for defining membership in the 'community' and institutional structures.
b) Social norms that define, for instance, who should attend and speak up at meetings (*i.e.* the self-images of women and men in that group) and how women and men should behave in public.
c) Social perceptions regarding for example, women and other disadvantaged groups' ability to contribute to CBNRM activities.
d) Entrenched territorial claims.
e) Personal endowments and attributes, for example, wealth status, educational levels, age, ethnicity and marital status.
f) Household endowments and attributes, which define where women fall in the structural hierarchies of *e.g.* class or socio-economic well-being (Agarwal, 2001).

The above factors may disadvantage women and the poor both separately and as groups. Women and the poor group's ability to alter these conditions will depend on their bargaining power vis-à-vis the family, community and the state. For the donor-funded CBNRM facilitators to achieve community participation, there is need to take cognisance of these factors as they impact in various ways on project activities. If such factors are not considered, the concept of participatory resource management may reinforce top-down orientations since most initiatives are defined according to the terms and processes of external agents, usually the donors or their intermediaries who are often the local facilitators (Byron, 1997). Despite the policy commitment to CBNRM, there is accumulating evidence that many CBNRM programmes have led to a shift in the site of conflicts, from community-state to more local power struggles (Dzingirai, 1998; Madzudzo, 2002). Increasing local institutional conflicts and power struggles, for instance between traditional authorities and local government structures as well as other institutional structures established by CBNRM facilitators, are also emerging.

To understand and appreciate the role of power in conditioning patterns of human-environment interaction, it is necessary to adopt an inclusive understanding of power. This implies encompassing material and non-material considerations as well as the apparent fluidity of power itself in the analysis (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). This thesis uses an actor-oriented approach in order to assess the ways and forms that actors seek to exert control over the natural resource institutions in relation to other actors including how weaker actors resist their more powerful counterparts. Weak actors often find ways and means of challenging the more powerful ones (Scott, 1986 & 1985). Weaker actors may challenge stronger actors either

in overt or covert ways because it is rarely the case that one actor possesses overwhelming power over all other actors. As a result, in the relatively fluid circumstances that are associated with multiple power centres, weaker actors are often well placed to assert their interests vis-à-vis more powerful actors (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). Thus the ability for an actor to control or resist other actors is never permanent or fixed but always in a state of flux in CBNRM.

1.1.3. CBNRM facilitation in the Zimbabwean context

A key feature of CBNRM programmes in Zimbabwe is the assumption that institutions and institutional structures for resource management can be engineered (Luckert, 2000). The concept of institutional engineering has been used to refer to cases where external agencies enter a community and introduce new resource management structures, with little consideration for institutions already in place. In Zimbabwe, the newly introduced institutions are parallel to traditional as well as ruling party institutions (Makumbe, 1996). New structures often come in the form of catchment management committees, garden, boreholes, grazing, and dam committees. The structures often have the same membership regardless of their purpose. Such committees typically comprise seven members, the chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary, vice secretary, treasurer, and two committee members. The members are in theory, democratically elected into the office, but the external facilitators often wield advisory powers on the operations of these committees.

The unequal relationship that exists between the external facilitators, with their advisory role and the structures established at the local level, may lead to subordination of democratic processes to bureaucratic control. The outcome may be that some local actors may not view these elected members as ‘community representatives’. This may further reinforce top-down resource management orientations, contradicting the call for participatory and decentralised natural resource management. Furthermore, such structures are most often introduced into a complex organisational framework from which institutions for CBNRM have to be crafted. The new institutional structures are also established and juxtaposed in relation to a multitude of existing social, political and administrative structures that are variously aligned to state or customary forms of legitimacy. In establishing new structures, external facilitators have sought to mould seemingly local institutions, yet they often spearhead what in reality may be viewed as top-down conservation objectives and may therefore have negative implications for sustainable resource use and management at the local level. There is therefore need to examine the relationship of the newly created committees to other resource management structures in place prior to these interventions.

The institutional engineering approach also assumes that resource users, management boundaries and institutional jurisdictions can be easily

defined or redefined. The approach assumes that 'democratically' established institutional structures cater for the interests and needs of their constituency, *i.e.* 'the community'. The communities represented by these structures are believed to have distinct physical and resource use boundaries, a view that has been challenged in recent literature (Campbell *et al*., 2001; Guijt & Shah, 1998; James, 1999; Madzudzo, 2002; Mandondo, 1998). This study argues that the image often portrayed of "community institutions" in the context of CBNRM is incomplete because it overlooks the complex webs of interactions, informal institutions and contestations over resource control within the groups of the participating communities. Recent studies show that resource management structures and the institutional arrangements in place are characterised by heterogeneity, fluidity, and dynamic interactions at community level (Matondi, 2001; Sithole, 2001 & 1999; Steins, 1999).

What emerges from literature on external social and political engineering of institutions (Murombedzi, 1992:46) and current experiences from the Romwe catchment, Zimbabwe, the research site for this thesis (Campbell *et al*., 2001) is that the process of institutional engineering may create further complexities in natural resource governance. Institutional engineering has in some cases been seen as contributing towards weakening of 'traditional' institutions, often key in natural resource management. For instance Fairhead & Leach (1996 & 1995) argue that local community institutions such as the traditional authority were once better capable of controlling environmental resources than they are today. This articulation attributes natural resource degradation to the breakdown of resource management institutions through the weakening of traditional institutions and the historical alienation of local resource control in favour of state structures. Natural resource users may either benefit or lose through the weakening of local level resource management institutions and the creation of multiple institutions in conditions of deteriorating natural resources through *e.g.* deforestation (Matondi, 2001). In other cases, poor households with limited access to land and natural resources have been further disadvantaged. The problem has sometimes been fuelled by 'non-natural' resource related struggles and the nature of power relations within the community (Matondi, 2001; Moore, 1996).

In cases where external facilitators take cognisance of existing informal institutions at the local level, there have been calls for codification of these institutions, the assumption being that codification will make them more effective (Clarke, 1997; Mandondo 2000b; Matowanyika, 1991). Calls for codification tend to overlook the strengths of the non-codified management systems, which include flexibility in determining access to resources at a given time. Arguing against codification, Platteau (1995) uses evidence from land issues in Africa suggesting that formalising, for instance, land holdings through registration increases conflicts over land rights. Similar views are expressed by Havnevik (2000a & 1997) based on experiences from East Africa. Platteau (1995) argues that customary rights over

common pool natural resources and their inbuilt flexibility should be recognised in initiatives that aim to promote participatory resource management at the community level.

The sustainability of the externally engineered institutions is also questionable. Institutional structures established to run CBNRM projects often disappear subsequent to the withdrawal of the facilitating agencies. The majority of external organisations often have funding contracts with a lifespan of three to five years. Furthermore, the existence of a number of actors at the local level often with both conflicting and complimentary needs and interests makes it necessary to promote collaboration. This collaboration should show responsiveness to emerging patterns of interaction and there should be clearly defined institutional mandates, jurisdictions and shared visions for CBNRM. This thesis argues that it is necessary to identify existing institutions and actors at the start of projects in order to be able to develop plans that may cater for the diversity of interests. Theoretically, institutions are relevant for resource management because they create order, reduce uncertainty and make individual action more predictable. This may however not always be the case on the ground as institutions take various forms, which may blur their role in natural resource management. The following section discusses the various institutional forms, referred to as the institutional taxonomy.

1.1.4. Institutional Taxonomy

There are different forms of institutions that regulate access to natural resources at the local level including the state, externally driven and indigenous or traditional institutions. Some institutions have an organisational form and these can be broadly divided into the state and civil society institutions (Narayan, 2000:9). State institutions are located at the national, regional and local levels. Civil society institutions include those facilitated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs). Other institutions found at the local level include social associations (networks) and kinship networks. Table 1.3 presents a typology of institutions that formed the basis for institutional classification during this study, without overlooking the fluidity of the boundaries across these categories. The analysis of this typology of institutions flows out of the Zimbabwean situation.

Table 1.3. *Typologies of institutions*

Broad categorisation	**Definition**	**Institutional structure**	**Sources of legitimacy**	**Analysis/Problematisation of the institutional structures**
Formal (sometimes referred to as modern)	Regularised patterns of behaviour recognised in law Usually refers to the state and state institutions	RDC, VIDCOs & WADCOs Agritex Department of Natural Resources DR&SS Forestry Commission	Statutory instruments Elections (*e.g.* VIDCOs & WADCOs are elected)	Technical fixation of problems Male dominated, VIDCOs & WADCOs have quotas for women. Have superiority complex over informal institutional structures Dominated by civil servants and village elites Often not respected by local people May be biased towards men May be linked to the ruling party
Informal (sometimes referred to as traditional or indigenous)	Conventions and social norms of behaviour Sate often do not recognise them Have fluid boundaries	Chiefs Headmen *Sabuku*s Traditional healers Village elders	Kinship based ties Lineage based ties Spiritual Culture, values and belief systems	Regarded as poor and lacking material and financial resources Fluidity may create conflicts in the community Sometimes manipulated by various actors for their own benefit Structures have men only Predominantly illiterate May be contested in multi-ethnic contexts Often assumed to be static, yet they have responded to changes
Civil society (External) – largely formal	These are mostly donor-funded organisations	CARE International ITDG CEH & IES	Philanthropic & have funding and other material resources	Not resident in the community Time and targets put pressure on community Often male dominated
Civil society (internal) – semi-formal	These are locally-based structures set up by NGOs	Garden, micro-credit, catchment, dam and borehole committees	Elections External civil society Constitutions	Often wait for external instructions Elite villagers, who are often men may hijack these structures
Christian-based	A diversity of church groups	Apostolic Faith Catholics, SDA	Religion and the bible	Sometimes initiate development projects Membership is mainly women

Source: Synthesis from Berry, 1989; Havnevik & Hårsmar, 1999; Matondi, 2001; Ribot, 1999; and own field notes, 1998.

The institutional typology presents a diverse set of institutional structures but it is worth pointing out that these taxonomies are not exclusive of each other. There exist overlaps across categories, for instance local institutions can be either formal or informal. This makes understandable the confusion that can be discerned in the literature on institutions relating to definitions and classifications. Despite these overlaps, this typology can be useful in exploring the basic questions of organisational interactions and be further adapted to consider interactions at various levels such as the household, local, regional and national (Ostrom, 1990; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). In this study the household is defined following Barnes *et al*., (2002) as one or more persons who usually live and eat together, whether or not they are related by blood, marriage or adoption, and the individuals recognize each other as members of the same household. The household is here classified as one of the institutions because relations at the household level often influence what happens in resource governance institutions at the community level. The household is important, especially in the construction of gender identities that determine women's and men's different socio-economic options (Agarwal, 1994a; Goebel, 1998).

Property rights and power relations play an important role in the extent to which people can successfully use institutions for accessing resources. An individual's access to natural resources is influenced not only by his or her position in relation to institutions outside the household but the household plays a significant role in determining gender identity and gender differentiated access to natural resources. Despite the efforts that have been made to improve women's position through processes of empowerment, women's participation in formal decision-making structures remains highly constrained (Rocheleau & Edmunds, 1997; Moyo, 1995b; Agarwal, 1997b; Mosse, 1994; Cleaver & Elson, 1995, Leach, 1994). Recent literature has therefore advocated for the shift from emphasizing women's position in relation to formal institutions to the investigation of the dynamics of women's participation within the informal institutional framework (Cleaver, 1998; Jackson, 1998). This study hopes to contribute to the debates (in the growing body of literature on institutions) on the role of informal institutions that determine access to woodlands and water by various actors and ensure sustainable use of those resources. The understanding of institutional synergies and conflicts in CBNRM is also important as institutions affect women's and men's opportunities by establishing and maintaining their access to social, material and natural resources as well as sustainability of the natural resources used.

While the literature on institutional issues in CBNRM has highlighted issues of social differentiation especially based on class, it is less explicit on the place of women in the institutional framework and how societal institutions influence women's access to productive and reproductive resources (Goebel, 1998; Rocheleau, 1987). Within the institutional framework at the local level, elderly men often have the largest say about who has access to what natural resources. This has resulted in situations

where women have usufruct rights to resources and limited control over use of those resources. For instance Rocheleau & Edmunds (1997) note that throughout Africa, women are much less likely to hold formal title to land than men, yet they do most of the agricultural production. Significant differences between the perspectives of women and men with regards to environmental management are well documented (Agarwal, 1997a, & b, Jiggins, 1994; Jewitt, 2000; Narayan, 1997; Rocheleau, 1987 & 1991; Shiva, 1988). Women's and men's perspectives are conditioned by cultural and social factors and material conditions that eventually affect economic well-being. The differing perspectives of women and men need to be taken into account by policy makers, particularly in an era in which development policies are generally moving toward support of local demand and initiative. The priority problems of women and men, even in the same village, are often different because of their distinct roles and responsibilities.

1.2 Objectives of the study

The overall aim of the study is to examine the role of formal and informal institutions in CBNRM and how they influence access to and use of woodland and water resources by various actors and the management outcomes. The study also investigates the nature and patterns of interaction between formal, informal and the externally engineered community resource management institutional structures and the implications of these interactions for sustainable resource use in the context of CBNRM. The externally engineered institutions may either be formal or informal, depending on the context within which they are engineered. Research objectives and questions are presented below.

Research Objectives and Questions:

***Key objective one*:** To identify the Romwe catchment natural *resource landscape* and *boundaries*, and how natural resources are *used* and *managed* by households in the context of CBNRM.

- What are the woodlands and water resources found in Romwe catchment?
- What are the uses of these resources?
- What are the natural resource use boundaries in the study area in relation to village boundaries?
- How are these natural resource use boundaries defined?
- What are the forms of management? And how do they relate to particular natural resources?

***Key objective two*:** To examine existing *formal and informal* institutions that relate to woodlands and water use, their jurisdictions, conflicts among the various institutions and how this influences management of resources in the catchment.

- What are the local level woodland and water management institutions in place?
- What are the institutional structures and their roles?
- How are these institutions established in the context of CBNRM?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the CBNRM institutional development process?
- Is the jurisdiction of each institution in relation to other institutions clearly defined?
- What are the areas of complementarity?
- Are there areas of conflict? If so, are there any mechanisms in place for resolving conflicts?
- Do these institutions influence sustainable use of woodlands and water resources? If so, how?

***Key objective three**:* To investigate the *role of women* in relation to woodland and water institutions and decision-making processes at the local level.

- What role do women play within the local level institutional framework for woodlands and water use and what impact does this have on sustainable use of these resources?
- Who determines access to what natural resources?
- How do women achieve power within the institutional framework in the community?

The first objective of the study is to generate some understanding of the natural resource landscape in the study site. Understanding local woodlands and water resources management practices and strategies must not be based on biological or statutory definitions, but rather on the way local people define the complete resource system that they use and manage (Fortmann & Nhira, 1992; Leach & Mearns, 1996). The concept of landscape is therefore used in this thesis because the natural resource base is not described from a technical or biological angle, but from the perspective of the local resource users and managers. This concept of the landscape serves usefully to encompass the institutional and ecological dynamics with landscape history referring to the reflexive relationship between environmental and social history (Leach *et al*., 1999:239). In addition, because natural resource landscapes are socially and politically constructed, it is important to understand the power dynamics involved in the definition of landscapes and how they influence the management of resources.

To fulfil the objectives, this study uses a case study approach that focuses on Romwe catchment in Chivi district, Southern Zimbabwe. A catchment is often defined as a physical space where natural resources, people and their livelihood systems are found within space. This study springs from a catchment as defined in hydrological terms as a basis for understanding how people within spaces of this nature conceive their relationship with the natural resources in their physical places. There are a number of reasons

why a case study approach was preferred. First, it provides scope to move from the general to the specific as it allows generating in-depth insights into the issues being examined. Second, CBNRM has been widely discussed in the last decade in Zimbabwe in relation to CAMPFIRE (Lawry, 1989; Murphree, 1991; Nhira, 1994; Dzingirai, 1998; Murombedzi, 1994; Nabane, 1997). Yet, outside the scope of empirical data generated through CAMPFIRE, there are few studies (Derman, 1999; Derman & Nhira, 1998; Lovell *et al*., 1999; Sithole, 1999) that investigate institutional processes in holistic resource management contexts. There has been a concerted effort to spread the CAMPFIRE philosophy to other natural resources such as minerals, forests and water. But the main challenge has been that CBNRM using the CAMPFIRE approach has focused on single resources without consideration of the complex resource set up within physical and social spaces. In contrast, this study focuses on two natural resources, woodlands and water resources. The study should contribute towards understanding of how the characteristics of a resource (*e.g.* the very heterogeneous woodlands versus more homogenous water) affect the form and nature of the management institution.

1.3 Problem Statement

The management of woodlands and water resources at the local level faces enormous challenges partly because of external engineering of political and/or administrative and formal institutions overlooking the traditional, informal and norm-based institutions already in place. The redefinition of village and/or resource use boundaries that often accompanies the formation of new administrative structures further complicates resource management at the local level. The state withdrawal from resource management at the local level, a level without adequate capacity building, which leaves behind a set-up where there are no clearly defined institutional mandates and jurisdictions has added complexity to the implementation of CBNRM initiatives at the local level. State withdrawal is often done under the guise of decentralization and participatory resource management, yet the state may be short of resources to continue policing resource use in the communal areas.

While the state has in some way imposed the VIDCO and WADCO structures, other institutional engineering initiatives have been spearheaded by state based and civil society organisations. These include government extension departments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and research institutions like the Institute of Environmental Studies (IES) based at the University of Zimbabwe and the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH) - UK (the latter led development in the Romwe catchment in the early and mid 1990s). The state institutional structures do interact from time to time with traditional authorities in executing their functions derived from the statutory instruments. State structures that interact with traditional leaders have a tendency to view traditional authority as illiterate and

backward. This is not because of the legal standing of state structures but because of the belief that technical knowledge derived from formal education is superior to traditional knowledge. There is however, a tendency for traditional authorities to delegitimise themselves through, for instance, partisan politics, unfavourable adjudication over natural resource transgressions and unfair allocation of land, unlike state structures such as those linked to the ruling party ZANU PF, which of course, have never engaged in any of these. The introduction of external actors has also tended to add complexity to natural resource management at the local level. These external actors often come with preconceived ideas on what natural resources management "should be", are pressured by time to meet targets and use the elite villagers as the point of entry into the community. This may further marginalize already marginalized groups such as women and the poor.

In CBNRM literature and also other development projects that engineer institutions, there are still questions with regard to the social relevance and legitimacy of the engineered institutions. Throughout history in Zimbabwe, institutions have been established, often with minimal participation of elite villagers, politicians and the more powerful actors (Matondi, 2001, Sithole, 2002 & 1999). Institutional engineering by external organisations sometimes is problematic because it may create uncertainty regarding to access to and control over natural resources such as woodlands and water. This uncertainty may be attributed to the proliferation of "new" institutions set-up by development facilitators with the view to increasing community participation through locally elected governance structures, which has often been done without considering boundaries of the natural resource being managed (Nemarundwe *et al*., 1998). Thus jurisdictions of the 'new' institutions may not match the natural resource use boundaries. The mismatch between organisational jurisdictions and the boundaries of the natural resources being managed may have negative outcomes for community members' access to natural resources as well as on the state of the natural resource base (Campbell *et al*., 2001). In other cases, the opposite may be true, in which case institutional engineering may facilitate disadvantaged groups' access to resources that they did not have access to prior to the external intervention. Using a case study of Romwe, this study therefore examined people's perceptions of the roles and relevance of institutions that are externally engineered.

A formidable task facing local institutions within CBNRM in Zimbabwe is to facilitate sustainable resource use in a context of waning natural resource capital within communal lands. Communal lands are the African smallholders' farming areas, formerly called 'reserves' and 'tribal trust lands' during the colonial period. These were originally created through land alienation by the colonial regime using the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. In drier natural regions such as Masvingo province, within which the Romwe catchment falls, institutions face enormous challenges given the environmental pressures that obtain due to low rainfall, poor soils and

insufficient state support to agriculture. Most of the households have been repeatedly dependent on the state for food security due to droughts (*e.g.* in 1992 and 1995) and also due to floods (*e.g.* in 1999/2000). As a result, people lack the means for their socio-economic reproduction, which then ties them to external agencies in command of material resources. In such a context there has been a tendency by community members to maintain links with external actors because they bring in resources in the form of projects and relief. This often undermines local institutional structures that do not have access to external resources or are not used by external actors as a conduit for distribution of such resources.

1.4 Justification of the Study

Studies of resource management institutions at the local level, have tended to put emphasis on investigating formal institutions for resource management overlooking the importance of informal institutions that affect women's and men's access to natural resources such as woodlands and water. Where women's position regarding resource management institutions has been investigated, the emphasis has been on formal processes giving less attention to the importance of the informal processes and related interactions between and among different actors. There is a need to not only acknowledge the existence of informal institutions but to gain in-depth understanding of their importance and contribution to CBNRM and the sustainable use of woodland and water resources. In a similar fashion, institutional engineering in the CBNRM context has often been done without systematically considering its impact (both positive and negative) on existing institutions as well as on issues of access to natural resources by various actors in a given community.

Where the presence of existing institutions has been acknowledged, external actors have often ignored them citing that if such institutions are strengthened, they may become too powerful and be obstacles to just and equitable development, which many believe the Aid process, ought to promote (Mandondo, 2000a). On the contrary, rural development literature has noted that the proliferation of new institutions in post independence Africa with a view to providing services to rural communities has more often negatively impacted on existing institutions and existing patterns of interactions (Berry, 1993). The study adds to the literature that examines the outcomes of the establishment of new institutional frameworks for CBNRM on community relationships, and existing institutions. External interventions may have both positive and negative effects. On one hand, external interventions may weaken local institutions and create a resource management institutional gap that may lead to resource degradation. On the other hand, external interventions may enhance the position of disadvantaged groups such as women and the poor by improving their access to resources that they historically had limited or no access to.

1.5 Outline of the Thesis

Chapter One has set out the research agenda, while Chapter Two discusses the conceptual framework adopted for the study. The review and critique of global literature presented in Chapter Two reveals that there are a variety of models of common property resource management arising from or as reactions to Hardin's 1968 tragedy of the commons thesis. Hardin's tragedy of the commons thesis critiqued in Chapter Two is used as an entry point to the discussion of the CPRM theory (which has largely informed CBNRM). While a variety of models of common pool resource management institutions have been put forward, the basic critique made of these is that there is still insufficient recognition of the importance of diversity, power and institutional contexts that influence sustainable use of natural resources. Chapter Two further explores the relevance of both the actor-oriented and actor-network approaches in complementing the CPRM theory. The actor-oriented approach was adopted for investigating the place and role of actors (as groups or individuals) in interaction processes while the actor-network theory was adopted because it helps illuminate social dynamics determining common pool resource use and collective management of these resources. Following this, Chapter Three discusses the methodological approach adopted for the study, namely the qualitative approach, highlighting its strengths and the challenges faced during fieldwork. The second part of Chapter Three provides a detailed description of the study setting, the Romwe catchment in Chivi district, southern Zimbabwe. Chapter Four examines the woodlands and water use patterns in Romwe catchment and highlights the complexity of identifying resource use boundaries. The chapter also discusses the institutional framework for woodlands and water use in Romwe and highlights both the formal and informal institutions that relate to the use and management of woodlands and water in the study site. Chapter Five presents and discusses data on patterns of interaction among various institutional structures and conflicts over use and management of woodlands and water resources in Romwe. This chapter identifies and discusses the power bases of various actors, dwells on the nature of interactions and contests. The chapter further explores the role of community gossip and witchcraft beliefs and related accusations in these contests (as pointers to social tension and conflict), the relative influence of various actors and the resistance (in particular the hidden forms) exhibited in some of the interventions that arise from the different power bases. Within this context, historical narratives that reveal local people's perceptions about their history and have relevance for the analysis of struggles to gain access to and control over natural resources are presented and analysed. This is followed by Chapter Six that explores the role of women in decision-making processes and institutional structures and the strategies the women use to gain access to woodlands and water. Finally Chapter Seven presents a synthesis of the findings and offers some reflections on the theoretical and methodological relevance of this study. Themes emerging from the study and areas for further research are also discussed in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING COMMON POOL RESOURCE INSTITUTIONS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter sets the foundation for exploring the nature of interaction of various actors in the management of common pool resources. Power relations and situated practices of different actors such as women and men, rich and poor and people from different ethnic backgrounds, located in specific contexts and mediated by sets of changing institutions, which may lead to different outcomes are analysed. Most analysts dealing with institutional issues in community-based natural resource management make reference to Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons thesis (1968), hence it becomes pertinent to commence the discussion from his viewpoint before exploring the alternatives presented by other scholars. The chapter elaborates the conceptual framework of the study of institutions in relation to the use and management of common pool resources. A focus on institutions leads into a discussion on the dynamics involved in collective management of common pool resources such as woodlands and water, how access rights and control over resources are strengthened or weakened. Such processes are often context bound, with history shaping the evolution of contestations around natural resources.

2.2 Conceptual framework

2.2.1.The commons problem in natural resource management

Interest in the relationship between property and common pool resource management emerged in the 1950s through for instance, Gordon's work on fisheries (1954). Hardin drew the attention of scholars and development practitioners to the issues of population and natural resource use through his paper entitled 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (Hardin, 1968). In this paper, Hardin warned against unrestrained freedom of resource use in a world of finite natural resources and he had two prescriptions, coercive regulation of resource use by the state and/or privatisation. The tragedy of the commons thesis was used to support arguments for the state to play a central role in the management of natural resources and the privatization of common property resources (*ibid*). Hardin used a metaphor of common pasture users who have privately owned animals. The argument in the thesis goes:

> 'Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Ruin is the destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons'. In vying with each other to

> benefit individually from the commons, each one of the users keeps increasing the number of animals he brings into the common pasture even if he realizes that this in the long run will lead to the destruction of the common pasture through overgrazing and bring ruin to all. Each user concludes that abstinence on his part, if he chose it, would only incur private losses without significantly altering the long-term outcome, as others in any case will continue to bring additional animals into the common pasture. Each user therefore decides upon a course that is rational from his or her individual point of view but which leads to the irrational over-exploitation of the common pool resource and its ultimate and unavoidable destruction' (Hardin 1968: 1244-45).

From this metaphor, Hardin draws the conclusion that common ownership of pasture and private ownership of animals leads to a conflict between the group's interest and that of the individual, and it is the group's interest that is overridden. From this argument follows the conclusion that the only way out of such a paradox lies in privatization of common resources or instituting rules and regulations backed by external coercive sanctions (*ibid*: 1245-47).

2.2.2 Reactions to the tragedy of the commons thesis

Hardin's thesis aroused strong criticism, one of which maintained that the characterization of common property as a system that necessarily leads to competitive over-exploitation and the unavoidable destruction of resources is based on unfounded assumptions and dubious conceptual grounds (McCay & Acheson, 1987; Acheson, 1989). The critiques present counter arguments to Hardin's thesis, such as pointing to the fact that privatization, one of the solutions proposed by Hardin, has not solved the problem of overgrazing in countries such as the United States and Australia where the prevalence of private ownership is high (Admassie, 1995). Hardin's thesis has also been criticised on the basis of logic emanating from the notion of *rational choice*, which is rooted in the philosophy of rationality employed in economics. The rationality principle is based on the notion that human actors attribute different utility to different actions and goods and is accompanied by the principle that actors choose actions that maximise their utility (Coleman, 1994). From a rational choice perspective, *social interaction* is essentially an economic transaction that is guided by the actors' rational choices between alternative outcomes of their actions in terms of their costs and benefits (Coleman, 1994; Steins, 1999). Since each actor aims to maximise his own private values, cooperation towards collective objectives becomes problematic. The rational choice theory has been subject to criticism. First, it has been criticised for being a normative theory, since it assumes implicitly that rational choices are the correct choices (Etzioni, 1992). Second, many rational choice theorists tend to

place human behaviour within a framework of *calculated rationality*[7] rather than *bounded rationality*[8] and this does not do justice to the dynamics of people's actions in a changing environment (Steins, 1999, Etzioni, 1992). Third, in the more traditional rational choice approaches, the rational individual is studied in isolation from his/her social and cultural context and society (Shepsle, 1989).

Another prominent criticism on the tragedy of the common's thesis is levelled at the very assumption on which its logic is grounded. Hardin's failure to distinguish between 'common property' and 'open access' regimes is taken to task as a crucial conceptual imperfection. Four broad categories of management regimes are delineated in the literature on common pool resource management: state, private, common property and non-property or open access (Table 2.1). Woodland and water resources can be held under any one of the four property rights regimes and theoretically these property rights regimes should formally determine how the resources should be managed or who the managers are (Murphree, 1993). However what is formal and what actually happens may be different. Therefore, the four property rights regimes may be seen as an analytic typology because in practice, natural resources are rarely managed solely within any one of these types. Property rights regimes often constitute a terrain of struggle, which is not surprising given that 'property' is not an object, but is rather a social relation that defines the property holder with respect to something of value (the benefit stream) against all others (Bromley, 1991).

Because there are no social authorities that define and enforce the rights of individuals or groups to use open access resources, each resource user therefore ignores the consequences of his behaviour on others (Bromley, 1992). The open access condition is therefore neither a property rights regime, nor is it a management regime since people use, opportunistically, the resources, but do not manage them. On the contrary, in a common property regime, an identifiable group controls use rights for the resource and there exist rules concerning who may use the resource, who is excluded from the resource and how the resource should be used (Berkes & Farvar, 1989). A common property regime therefore signifies *exclusivity of rights for a bounded group*, which it exercises over a well-delineated resource, to the exclusion of all outsiders, save for its invitees and therefore no single individual has exclusive rights to the use of the resource (Admassie, 1995). Group members have secure expectations that they can gain access to future use of the resource and there are functioning membership criteria. The bounded group has a social mechanism for regulating the use of the common pool resources and for sanctioning its

7 The concept of calculated rationality assumes that individuals are capable of making rational choices without any restrictions

8 The principle of bounded rationality refers to the idea that actors are incapable of conforming to a model of absolute rationality because they cannot apprehend all the possible choices (Steins, 1999).

regulations (Acheson, 1989; Bromley & Cernea, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Runge, 1981). This view of common pool resource users as *a bounded group having a social mechanism* for regulating use of common pool resources is here referred to as the institution oriented approach and is discussed in the following section.

Table 2.1. *Types of property rights regimes in common pool resource use*

Property rights regime	**Characteristics/Features**
State property	The state has the *right* to determine use and access rules. Individuals have a *duty* to observe use and access rules that are determined by the state or its managing agency.
Private property	Individuals have the *right* to undertake socially acceptable uses and have the *duty* to refrain from socially unacceptable uses. The individual or corporate property owner has the right to control, lease, rent and transfer ownership rights.
Common property	A clearly defined group (owners) has the *right* to exclude non-members and the non-members have the *duty* to abide by the exclusion. Individual members of the management group have both the *rights* and *duties* with respect to use and maintenance of the resource owned. There is regulated utilization by, for example, some institutional framework to ensure that overexploitation of the resource does not occur and there is some enforcement mechanism for punishing deviant behaviour. The property rights are held by an identifiable group of interdependent users.
Non-property or open access	There is no specific group of users or 'owners' and thus the benefit stream is available to anyone. Individuals have both privilege and no right or duty with respect to use and maintenance of the resource. The resource is therefore an open access resource. There is no social authority that defines and enforces the rights of the individuals or groups to use the resources.

Source: adapted from Cousins, 1992:16.

In assessing the attributes of the property regimes found in the communal areas of Zimbabwe, it has been argued that the systems are not strictly common property resource systems but mixes of state, common property and private property (Campbell *et al*., 2001). For instance, communal lands are legally state lands under the Communal Lands Acts (1982), yet in practical terms, communities have traditional freehold tenure over residential and arable plots and usufructuary rights over the surrounding commons. These resource systems also have multiple rules (state, RDC and local) with multiple legitimation bases (*e.g.* legal and customary) and different enforcement structures and processes, often resulting in conflict (Mandondo, 2000a). Thus rather than being referred to as resources held as common property, they are referred to as 'common pool' resources as indicated in Chapter One.

2.2.3 Institutions-oriented approaches to common pool resource management

From the wide range of literature that focuses on institutions, three approaches to institutional analysis can be discerned. First is the approach that focuses on moral codes, traditions and value systems and draws from the Durkheimian tradition. Moral theories view man as *homo sociologicus* whose actions are largely controlled by social norms (Scott, 1976). The moral economy approach puts more emphasis on the power of traditions, social rights, value systems and moral codes in generating and maintaining collective action in resource use and management. According to Scott (1976), collectivity arises from the 'moral economy' that drives communities to cope with risk and dependence on resources. Community actions and needs can manifest themselves in the form of religion, folklore and tradition (Guha, 1990; Shiva, 1987; Matowanyika, 1991). This approach, however, tends to romanticise the value of traditional institutions in managing common pool resources such as woodlands and water. It has been well documented that many institutions that are labelled as traditional were in fact altered by the colonial governments (Matondi, 2001; Mukamuri, 1995; Ribot, 1999). It is also important to note that all institutions change over time, so even institutions that are truly traditional are unlikely to be exactly as they were in earlier times. While these studies make this critique of traditional authority institutions, they do not make suggestions as to which institutions would be more appropriate in common pool resource management contexts, especially within CBNRM. These critics of the current form and nature of traditional institutions also overlook the dynamism of local environments, which have some impact on local institutions as they have to adapt to the changing environments. A question that is not considered by these critics is, if these institutions were 'real and true' traditional institutions (*i.e.* without interference from the colonial regimes), would they have operated differently, and if so, how? This is an issue that is not analysed explicitly in the literature that critiques the current form and nature of traditional institutions.

The second approach to institutional analysis is New Institutionalism, which is premised on rational choice theory and applies methods and postulates of economics to political and other non-market phenomena (Ostrom, 1990). The new institutionalism offers three insights: firstly a focus on the individual decision-maker, secondly an examination of institutional arrangements as they relate to property relations (*i.e.* the rights and obligations associated with property ownership) and thirdly, analysis of how institutional arrangements are affected by transaction costs. Mosse (1997) argues that despite the apparent differences between the moral economy perspective and the new institutionalism, the two approaches give similar images of collective action that are largely interventionist. The interventionist perspective sees development and social change as emanating primarily from centres of power in the form of intervention by state or other external agents or international interests (Long, 1992:19).

Such perspectives have partly informed the institutional engineering approach in CBNRM initiatives. Arguing against interventionist perspectives, Long & van der Ploeg (1989:226) propose an actor-oriented approach that views intervention as a multiple reality made up of differing cultural perceptions and social interests and constituted by the on-going social and political struggles that take place between the social actors involved. Long & van der Ploeg (*ibid*) argue that one has to focus not on the models of intervention as such, but that more attention should be paid to intervention practices. This, they contend, allows one to take into account the emergent forms of interaction, procedures, practical strategies, cultural categories and the various stakeholders present in a specific context (*ibid*: 227). Theoretical paradigms of planned intervention that have to a large extent informed the process of institutional engineering prescribe how institutional development should be facilitated. Yet local communities have their own institutions that might clash with the externally facilitated institutions depending on the nature and jurisdictions of those newly established institutions and related structures and the power relations in which they are embedded.

The third approach to institutional analysis focuses on individual strategies and argues that such strategies are mediated by institutions that are culturally and historically constructed within specific socio-ecological contexts (Long & Long, 1992; Mosse, 1997). This approach, which is here referred to as the actor[9]-oriented approach to institutional analysis critiques the other two approaches as essentialist and divorcing the practices of the people from the contexts in which they act and define meanings. As such the actor-oriented approach is interpretative and centres on symbolism. Two of the three institutional analysis approaches are of relevance to this study, namely the new institutionalism and the actor-oriented approach. These are discussed in greater depth below. While the actor-oriented approach was found to be of relevance to the institutional analysis in CBNRM, its weakness is that it places too much emphasis on the actor, overlooking the fact that the actor does not implement his or her actions in a vacuum. Human action is shaped and regulated by the social order in which it is embedded. In light of this criticism, the actor-network theory, which stresses the importance of actor-networks in shaping the actions of various actors, was adopted to complement the actor-oriented approach to institutional analysis.

New Institutionalism

In new institutionalism, institutions or decision-making arrangements are considered to provide mechanisms whereby individuals can transcend social dilemmas and characteristics of social outcomes are not only explained by individual preferences and the optimisation of behaviour, but

9 The term actor is here used to refer to an individual human being who is actively doing something and/or groups of actors who are capable of performing actions as a cohesive unit (Magadlela, 2000). This concept is used to also draw attention to agency rather than the individual per se.

also on the basis of institutional preferences (Acheson, 1989; Bates, 1995; Ostrom, 1990). In new institutionalism, theorists believe that credible commitments, combined with mutual monitoring and the existence or establishment of certain institutions can motivate individuals to become more engaged in collective action towards the realisation of a shared goal (Ostrom, 1990). According to Ostrom (*ibid*), credible commitments can be made when individuals are presented with rules that meet a number of criteria or design principles that include clearly defined boundaries, congruence between allocation and access rules and local conditions, users being able to modify rules, monitoring by accountable individuals, and non-compliance being followed by graduated sanctions. The commitment is to follow the rules as long as most similarly situated individuals adopt the same commitment and the long-term net benefits are greater than the costs. The core argument made by new institutionalism is that institutions or decision-making arrangements provide the mechanism whereby individuals can transcend the tragedy of the commons.

In contrast to the neo-classical economists who view the decision-maker as a perfectly rational individual who acts on *calculated rationality*, the new institutionalism assumes a situation of *bounded rationality*, and that coordination of economic activities involves more than transactions in markets in which price is the sole consideration. However, there may be deviants in society who go against rules and therefore challenge the notion of bounded rationality. The question that then arises relates to how such actors are dealt with. Institutions play a role in constraining and presenting opportunities to individuals and have a strong influence on the operation of the system (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992).

New institutionalism has informed a large number of empirical studies on collective action in common pool resource management contexts (Bromley, 1992; McCay & Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990) and this body of literature has been referred to as common property theory (Steins, 1999). The common property resource (CPR) theory suggests that individuals will collectively manage common resources when the benefits from the institutional set-up (*i.e.* rules and means of enforcement) are limited to a small and stable community (Berkes, 1993; McCay & Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom (1990) further postulates that spatial boundaries define the terms of exclusion and the terms are monitored and enforced by resource users or by selected individuals representing group interests in institutional structures that are established to monitor resource use. Common property theory has proved to be of great importance in that it has opened the minds of the natural scientists (who emphasise technical solutions to environmental problems) to appreciating the importance of human institutions, while encouraging social scientists to appreciate the ecological context and consequences of the institutions and behaviour that they study. A critical theme that can be identified in this literature focuses on the formulation of conditions or design principles underlying successful collective resource management (Ostrom, 1990).

The design principles for robust institutions

The critical theme in the CPR literature, which focuses on the formulation of conditions or design principles underlying 'successful' collective resource management rejects the prescription of coercion (*i.e.* management by the state or a bureaucracy) or privatisation that is contained in Hardin's thesis (Ostrom, 1990). While there is common usage of the term 'successful' in collective resource management contexts, what is exactly meant by success is rarely made explicit. A question that comes to mind in relation to definition of common pool resource management initiatives as 'successful' or 'not successful' is from whose perspective is this definition drawn *i.e.* resource management practitioners versus local communities and what criteria are used to define 'success'? In the Zimbabwean context for instance, CAMPFIRE has been hailed as a success story of CBNRM and this has been based on the economic and other material benefits that communities participating in the programme realize. Because the success of CAMPFIRE has been attributed to the high economic value of wildlife resources, this has raised questions on the transferability of the model to low economic value products such as woodlands (Campbell *et al*., 1999). Ostrom (1990) is in favour of agreements by the users that can be enforced by many mechanisms, such as external agencies, members of the user community as monitors or users themselves as monitors (Ostrom, 1990:18). Ostrom's design principles approach has its underpinnings in the 'collective choice theory' described above. In this line of thinking, Ostrom (*ibid*) offers some design principles for an effective common pool resource management regime that have some relevance for this study (Table 2.2). A design principle is 'an element or condition that helps account for the success of these institutions in sustaining the common pool resource and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to rules in use' (Ostrom, 1990:90). Ostrom argues that robust, long term institutions are characterised by most of the design principles. Fragile institutions tend to be characterised by only some of these design principles. Failed institutions are characterised by very few of these principles.

Table 2.2. *The Design Principles for CBNRM Institutions*

Design Principle	**Rules**	**Boundaries**
Design principle one	Rules that clearly define who has rights to use a resource	Boundaries of that resource ensure that appropriators can clearly identify legitimate resource users.
Design principle two	Congruence between the rules that assign benefits and costs	Difficulties to judge rule compliance of those outside the boundaries as resources such as wildlife and water are transient.
Design principle three	Modifying the rules	The locale is not a closed unit as external authorities enforce broader agreements.
Design principle four	Monitoring of conformance to the rules	Level of monitoring is significantly related to the extent of the resource in question as well as its form and structure.
Design principle five	Graduated sanctions	Ambiguous rules within catchment.
Design principle six	Conflict resolution mechanisms using clearly defined rules	Third part mediation of conflicts beyond catchment.
Design principle seven	Recognition of rules by external authorities	Boundaries must be recognised by outsiders including the state.
Design principle eight	Application of rules horizontally and vertically	Multiple layers of nested enterprises (appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, and conflict resolution) involving resource sharing.

Source: Adapted from Ostrom, 1990.

The CPRM theory and the design principles have influenced most institutional reform towards CBNRM. Empirical evidence suggests that design principles treat communities as homogenous entities, yet there is diversity in communities, between communities and their surrounding environments (Moore 1996; Campbell *et al*., 2001). This diversity is a result of the socio-economic characteristics of the users of the natural resources such as gender, ethnicity, wealth, education, age and the nature of the resources. Similarly, based on empirical evidence from comparative case studies, many scholars also argue that in many cases, only very small groups can organise themselves effectively in the manner suggested by the design principles because they presume that size is related to homogeneity (Olson, 1965; Murphree, 1991; Campbell *et al*., 2001; Mandondo, 1997). This argument overlooks the fact that communities and their environment are often heterogeneous regardless of their size (Balland & Platteau, 1996). In recent years, Ostrom's design principles have been critiqued by development practitioners and researchers (Campbell *et al*., 2001; Mandondo, 1997; Steins, 1999) as being flawed in that they are based on, "simplistic assumption of single resource use, a static rationality model, the exclusive analysis of internal dynamics of the collective management system and the assumption that collective management outcomes are determined by predefined principles" (Steins *et al*., 2000: 2). A resource

system such as woodlands generally produces a multitude of products with different rules and norms for their abstraction, yet attempts have been made to apply design principles in such complex resource systems piecemeal (Murphree, 1991). Furthermore, even if collective management of a common pool resource revolves around one resource unit, for example, water in an irrigation system, this resource unit can be subject to conflicting multiple uses (irrigation, drinking, livestock watering, and domestic) for which different management institutions are in place. The design principles have largely neglected the role of contextual and external factors in shaping collective action at various institutional levels. Variables that link collective action to gender differentiation are not covered by the design principles. Thus there is a need to complement the design principles with other institutional analysis frameworks that consider key variables in community differentiation such as gender, age and wealth.

The design principles have further been criticised as too limited for analysing dynamic resource management institutions (Steins, 1999). Other studies critique the design principles as romanticising indigenous knowledge systems, yet on the ground these systems have been extensively interfered with and often exist as a shadow of their original form (Balland & Platteau, 1996; Matondi, 2001; Ribot, 1999; 1995). This study found the design principles useful in the analysis of the internal institutional framework and thus they have been used to screen and analyse institutional performance in Romwe. Given the weaknesses of the new institutionalism and the design principles in addressing issues of social difference, and for failing to incorporate political and contextual factors into its analysis, giving more recognition to the 'community' thereby making it difficult to see the possible role of individual agents, the actor-oriented approach was adopted to complement the new institutionalism approach to institutional analysis. The actor-oriented approach has also been criticised for putting too much emphasis on the individuals as if they act in complete freedom. Thus to cater for this weakness in the actor-oriented approach, the actor-network theory was also found useful for this study. Thus in combination, the actor-oriented and actor-network approaches complement the CPRM theory by offering the beginnings of an explanation of local institutional responses to development interventions, local struggles over resource access and control, security of tenure, decision-making, resource allocation and the impact of power differentials in the dynamic of conflict (Steins, 1999).

Actor-oriented approach

The actor-oriented approach is relevant for this study because it places actors at the centre of the natural resource management discourse, with some recognition that there are a diversity of actors. This approach emphasises the meanings that different actors attach to local natural resource systems, thereby defining institutions as concepts, meanings and values that regulate actors' behaviour (Mosse, 1997; Peters, 1984). It is

argued that institutions emanate from the strategic action of human agents in their 'everyday interactions' which enables them to cope with unforeseen and constantly changing circumstances (Long & Long, 1992). It is further argued that for an institutional system to be useful it has to characterise the social relations and categories of meaning and value in a particular value system (Mosse, 1997). The particular value system here refers to the socio-ecological context in which institutions are constituted as well as their being embedded in historically and culturally specific ways. Thus much of the focus of this approach is placed on the actors and the symbolic meanings they derive from a resource system. The derivatives thereby guide their access to resources. This in turn is an expression of social relations, status, honour and prestige of the individual actors (Mukamuri *et al*, 2000). As far as this approach is concerned, the persistence of local institutions is not explained by rational calculations of individuals, but rather it is through structures of power that natural resources are managed and that institutions tend to produce relations of dominance and dependence, and provide the context for political strategy and competition (Mosse, 1997). A review of literature from Zimbabwe shows that the above scenario exemplifies the situation that obtains in many woodlands and water resources in Zimbabwe today. These natural resources are largely described as a physical medium on which conflicts are acted out. More often these conflict emerge among various groups such as *sabuku*s versus VIDCOs, indigenous people against migrants, the rich and the less well off (Madzudzo, 2002; Mandondo, 1997; Matondi, 2001; Moore, 1993; Sithole, 1999). The various actors and their patterns of interaction therefore constantly shape institutions.

The actor-oriented approach generally treats actors as 'active participants who process information and strategise in their dealings with some local actors as well as interveners' (Long, 1992:21). The approach stresses the dynamic interaction between social agents and institutions. The agents act and interact within the framework of these institutions but also shape and reshape them through these interactions. Human action and interaction is socially embedded and takes place within particular historical and contextual institutional arrangements and resource conditions and distribution. Actors structure their position in relation to one another, their opportunities as well as their constraints. There is therefore what Admassie (1995:13) refers to as *bounded agency and bounded constructionism*, bounded in the sense that institutions and material conditions matter in making up the given frames for action. Through synergies and struggles, actors engage in maintaining, reproducing and changing social rules and institutional arrangements. The actor-oriented approach provides a set of analytical tools useful for describing and analysing changes in patterns of social action and interaction, and institutional arrangements, where such changes are a function of human agents, the social and material conditions under which they act and interact and agency-structure dynamics (Admassie, 1995:13). The approach was also found useful in this study, not only because it is designed to address questions of social change and social

difference but because it provided specific concepts and analytical tools for the study of institutions, their production and reproduction, the role of human agency in these processes and the context dependency of social interactions as they shape access to natural resources.

A major factor in institutional dynamics is human agency. Actors (individuals or groups) interact in ways that shape or are shaped by institutions and these processes often entail conflict and the exercise of power. Admassie (1995: 14) argues that human agency and social interaction processes are *context dependent* and institutional arrangements constitute a significant part of the context of social action and interaction. In addition, *resource conditions and distribution* make up part of this context, setting constraints but also providing opportunities. Key concepts in this approach of relevance to this study include the concepts of *access*, *agency*, *power*, and *conflict* as they relate to the institutional framework for resource use and management. These concepts will be elaborated below.

Within the actor-oriented framework, actors may find themselves unable to pursue their own interests or agendas within the confines of existing institutions. In such cases, actors (as individuals or groups) may devise strategies to evade these rules, *e.g.* bending the rules to suit their interests and/or needs. It is worth noting that the power to bend or evade rules is not distributed equally across all actors. In any given situation, some actors have limited or no power to bend rules. In such cases actors may react to constraints in a radical manner or shift their action to other arenas of struggle *i.e.* shifting from the arena of the overt to that of the covert (Admassie, 1995:17). This is what Scott (1995) refers to as the weapons of the weak or everyday forms of peasant resistance. In other cases, actors may switch between institutions in favour of the institution that supports their interests at a given time. Actors, who are involved in a given setting such as natural resource management, enter into a relationship constituting a spectrum of different types of interactions. The relationship often oscillates between power, struggle, conflict, and compromise over the making, changing and maintenance of institutions. The actor-oriented approach was useful as an analytical tool for this study in that it facilitated the following:

i) Identification of key individual actors and groups of actors participating in institutional processes relating to the natural resource landscape.
ii) Investigation of internal factors facilitating or constraining the decision-making capability and action of the various actors.
iii) Analysis of external factors facilitating or constraining the decision-making capability and action of actors (*e.g.* role of external CBNRM facilitators – NGOs, research institutes and the RDC).

iv) Investigation of various actors' access to and control over resources and power relations within the community as they relate to resource management institutions.

v) Analysis of various actors' strategies to gain access to resources, synergies and conflicts between and among individuals or groups, as well as institutional synergies and conflicts.

The actor-oriented approach has been criticised as focusing too much on actors without explicitly showing the relationships between and among various actors, which have implications for who has access to and control over what resource. No social actor acts in complete freedom as if existing in a vacuum because all purposeful human action is shaped and regulated by the social order in which it is embedded (Admassie, 1995). For instance, in the CBNRM context, actors find themselves playing out their roles within the institutional framework that forms the foundation of their action. The study therefore found the actor-network theory useful in moving us beyond the focus and emphasis on actors to the analysis of the relationship between the actors and the group within which actors undertake their actions.

Actor-network theory

The actor-network theory is one amongst a number of approaches that can be categorised as 'social constructivism'. Social constructivism entered sociology through Berger and Luckman's work entitled 'The Social Construction of Reality' (1968). From a social constructivist perspective, society, the object of sociological inquiry, is perceived as 'part of a human world, made by men, inhabited by men and in turn making men in an ongoing historical process' (Berger & Luckman, 1968:189). Thus human reality is conceived as socially constructed reality, rather than naturally given or merely taken for granted. In current literature, Berger & Luckman's use of 'men' has been changed to 'social actors' (Steins, 1999). What distinguishes the actor-network theory from other social constructivist perspectives is that it studies the state of affairs in an action arena as the *effect* of interactions amongst social actors and non-human entities (Steins, 2002:413). Human beings are not considered as mere organisms but as social actors who have material properties and a history of social relations over which they may have some control, but on which they depend. At the core of the actor-network theory is the concern with how actors and organisations mobilise, juxtapose and hold together the bits and pieces out of which they are composed; how they are sometimes able to prevent those bits and pieces from following their own inclinations and making off and how they manage to turn a network from a heterogeneous set of bits and pieces, each with its own inclinations, into some identifiable entity (Law, 1992).

The actor-network theory considers natural resource management arenas to be ordered networks of heterogeneous materials that are constantly being shaped and reshaped as new human and non-human entities enter the arena. Within the actor-network theory, agency is a property that emerges through interactions of people and through relational networks. The social context therefore emerges as a site of struggle, a relational effect that recursively generates and reproduces itself (Law, 1992; Steins, 2002). Interaction is not only by local actors, but there are other external actors involved. Judgements and perceptions about sustainability are not only constructed by the local actors, but also by the external actors involved in resource management at the local level and other external actors who are not involved, but have opinions and may try to influence local management, for example, the Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the Biodiversity Convention. Thus, while for local actors, certain patterns of resource use may be considered as sustainable, external actors might not necessarily share the same opinion.

In relation to this study, the actor network theory is a useful way of thinking about how natural resource landscapes come to be wrapped up into complex social networks. The actor-network perspective cannot readily co-exist with the notion of space[10] as fixed and absolute in its coordinates (Murdoch, 1998). Space itself can be understood as a system of relations rather than a fixed entity. Natural resource spaces continually change shape and form within differing sets of relations and the malleability of space has been a recurrent theme in recent human geography analysis. Echoing actor-network theorists, Massey (1991:29) argues that local interactions are tied into networks of relations which are constructed on a far wider scale than what we happen to define for that moment as the resource space. Natural resource landscapes can thus be imagined as 'articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings' (*ibid*: 28). Similarly relationalism disavows any fixed, absolute conception of landscapes. From an actor-network perspective natural resource landscapes are seen as emerging from processes and relations and concern here is with the topological textures, which arise as relations configure the landscapes.

What the actor-network theory adds to the more commonplace understanding of relational landscapes and actor-dynamics is a concern with *networks*. While the term network is commonly used in the social sciences to describe technological relations, economic forms, political structures and social processes, the actor-network theory bundles all these network applications together for it concerns itself with the *heterogeneity* of networks (Murdoch, 1998:258). The actor network theory seeks to analyse how social and material processes become seamlessly entwined within complex sets of association. This leads on to an interest in network typologies, with the ways that landscapes emerge as socio-material

10 Referred to as natural resource landscapes in this thesis.

relations that are arranged into orders and hierarchies. Networks are fundamental to the actor-network theory because it sees stable sets of relations or associations as the means by which the world is both built and stratified (Latour, 1986). Landscapes are seen as constructed within networks and the concept of time is also forged within these network configurations. Thus the actor-network theory explicitly links the relational view of landscapes to a relational view of time.

The actor-network theory is highly critical of studies which are concerned with only social relations as it argues that such relations count for little unless they are held together by durable and resilient materials, which allow networks to both endure beyond the present and remain stable across space (Murdoch, 1998). It is the very heterogeneity of networks, which allows them to become in some sense structural; social order, power, scale and hierarchy are consolidated and preserved by material objects. Materials (*e.g.* woodland and water resources) solidify social relations and allow these relations to endure through space and time. Networks consist therefore of both subjects and objects.

From an actor-network perspective, actors can only do things in association with others (Latour, 1986) and it is only by enlisting heterogeneous others in sets of stable relations *i.e.* relations that allow for the transmission of action and make things happen. Thus the conception of the term actor-network which Law (1997:3) claims is deliberately 'oxymoronic' for it refers to a centred actor on the one hand and a decentred network on the other hand. Actor-networks are thus both 'individuals and collectives'. Although networks are forged for a variety of purposes, they are always a means of acting upon space and it is the sets of associations that define and constitute spatial qualities. Space, although partly physical, is therefore wholly relational.

Two main types of networks can be discerned from the literature on the actor-network theory: standardised networks (referred to in the literature as spaces of prescription) and networks of variation and flux (referred to as spaces of negotiation). Firstly, standardised networks are those networks in which entities are effectively aligned and the network is stabilised. Despite the heterogeneous quality of any previous identities, these entities work in unison, thereby enabling the enrolling actor (the centre) to 'speak' for all. As the network settles into place, so the links and relations become standardised *e.g.* heavy with norms and therefore relatively highly predictable. Examples of these in the Zimbabwean case would be burial societies that have increasingly become standardised due to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. Some burial societies now have constitutions, yet they evolved based on loose arrangements. In the case of the standardised networks, spaces are strongly prescribed by a centre (which may be an individual or group as in the case of committees) as norms circulate, imposing fairly rigid and predictable forms of behaviour. In these standardised networks, the degree of individual autonomy depends on the

scope for negotiation and this will vary according to the kinds of actions and actors involved in the network. Secondly, networks of variation and flux are those networks in which the links between actors and intermediaries are provisional and divergent, where norms are hard to establish and standards are frequently compromised (Murdoch, 1998). In this case, the various components of the network continually renegotiate with one another, form variable and revisable coalitions and assume ever-changing shapes. These networks are fluid, highly interactional and unstable. This study examines both standardised networks and networks of variation and flux. While these two broad categories are often treated separately in the literature, the separation is only useful for analytical purposes as in reality the boundaries between the two may be quite fluid. For instance, while standardised networks strongly configure actions in particular locales, even within them, there is some scope for negotiation as in the case of the networks of variation and flux. Sometimes these two types of networks co-exist or flow into one another.

The actor-network theory stresses that it is the heterogeneity of actor-networks, which allows them to remain durable in space and time. It is the seamless mixing of social, technical and natural objects within networks, which ensures that they frame social interactions, shape activities and direct movements. Focusing on the negotiation capabilities of humans, however, raises a number of questions, for instance, are all actors in heterogeneous networks able to negotiate in similar ways? Are all the actors able to conform or resist in the same way?

A criticism that has been raised against the actor-network theory is that it seems to bring us close to Giddens notion of 'duality and structure' (Giddens, 1984). There are close parallels between enablement/constraint (Giddens, 1984) and standardisation/negotiation networks (Murdoch, 1998). Giddens' structuration theory refers to the enabling and constraining effects of structures, to the ways that structures are both a medium and outcome (1984). The main distinction between the work of Giddens (*ibid*) and the actor-network theorists lies not in the notion of duality, but in the notion of *structure*. Actor-network theorists argue that because Giddens neglects the heterogeneous composition of the social, he employs a weak conception of structure, thereby allowing a certain voluntarism to mar his conception of action. The actor-network theory on the other hand, ties structure (*i.e.* those stable arrangements which frame and shape action) into the deployment of durable materials and can thus account in intimate detail, for collective and individual action simultaneously.

In reflections made by the author, it was found that the actor-network theory also places too much power on the role of networks in shaping patterns of interaction when it argues that 'actors can *only* do things in association with others' (Murdoch, 1998). This downplays the role of human agency that exists in social interactions. While actors may find themselves unable to pursue their interests within the confines of the social

networks, they will attempt to use in-built ambivalence within the social system. There is always ambivalence between the *idealised* system and the one pursued *in practice*, which actors often exploit. One strategic resource is power. Yet power to influence the actor-network dynamics is unequally distributed. In any given situation, some actors have limited power to change or maintain the system, and these actors may react to the constraints either in more radical ways or in more subtle ways described by Scott (1985) as the 'everyday forms of peasant resistance' or the 'weapons of the weak'. Secondly, the actor-network theory talks about 'sets of *stable* relations' but is not explicit by what is meant by 'stable' *i.e.* what criteria are used to determine whether a relationship is stable or not. Thus it is imperative to examine concepts that may help unravel the nature of relations among the different actors. These actors constitute various networks that emerge in the process of negotiating access to and control over woodlands and water resource.

2.2.4. Key concepts in institutional analysis in CBNRM

This section discusses key concepts in relation to institutional analysis within the CBNRM discourse. Key concepts considered relevant in the analysis of institutions as they shape and are shaped by processes of social interaction include access, agency, power, and conflict. The discussion centring on these concepts demonstrates how they have been historically derived, developed and applied to issues relating to CBNRM.

Access to natural resources

Access to natural resources such as woodlands and water occurs under conditions of both formal and informal regulation of property rights[11] in relation to tenure regimes that specify the conditions under which natural resources are used. Ribot (1998:310) defines access as the freedom or ability to obtain or make use of natural resources. While theoretically 'ability' to obtain a resource may lie in the individual actor or given household, its articulation lies in wider community institutions and relations. It is worth highlighting that not all actors or resource users have the same abilities to obtain a particular resource. Ostrom (1992 & 1990) defines access as a right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy non-subtractable benefits. According to Ostrom (*ibid*) and Bromley (1991:5), right implies an acknowledged claim that society (including the state) supports through law, custom and convention, yet ability is dependent upon one's capacity to extract the benefits. Access evolves as well through social relations that include friendship, family, lineage and kinship ties (Matondi, 2001; Platteau, 1996). In exercising the right of access, resource users operate within an institutional framework that determines the nature, location, duration and intensity of their activities. Ostrom & Schlager (1996) argue that the distinction between the individual and collective

11 'Property' is defined as a social relation that defines the property holder and indirectly, those that are excluded as well with respect to a particular object or thing (Bromley, 1991:2) and a 'right' is seen as the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one's claim to a benefit stream (*ibid*: 5).

rights is crucial in that collective choice rights are powerful in relation to individual rights as they involve management[12], exclusion[13] and alienation[14]. Access to natural resources such as woodlands and water evolves over time and is influenced by the character of the resource, availability and the type of uses (*e.g.* domestic versus commercial uses).

One of the arguments for the need to pay attention to patterns of access to and control over natural resources is that secure tenure encourages investment in a resource, which leads to higher productivity and efficiency in its use (Meinzen-Dick *et al*., 1997:1304). If actors know that particular investments and increases in productivity will lead to loss of access to natural resources, their insecurity of tenure can be a barrier to sustainable resource use. Given that the woodland landscape is complex *i.e.* has multiple resource units governed by different institutional arrangements and has multiple resource users using the resource at different times, the understanding of which institutions govern what resource needs a careful analysis of contextual and tenure issues.

The concept of tenure has been used to refer to conditions under which a resource is held, used and disposed of (Bruce, 1986). In the context of access to natural resources such as woodlands and water, the form of tenure regimes in place define the boundaries of the decision-making rights for the different resource users. Security of tenure is particularly important in situations where the management of the same natural resource system is shared by two or more categories of users, such as individuals, households, communities and a government regulatory agency, for instance the RDC. In such contexts, the type of tenure guides and regulates social action and interaction of the actors governed by the regime in the sphere to which it applies (Admassie, 1995). When a tenurial system fails to specify who does what, when, how and where, ambiguous situations arise, paving the way for conflict. In some cases such ambiguity exists within bounds and can be a basis of the system's flexibility and not a matter of system failure (*ibid*: 23). Tenurial ambiguities may be exploited by better-placed actors such as individuals with political power who may use the situation to their advantage and increase their level of control over natural resources such as woodlands and water.

In a communal area setting, access to natural resources is most often based on rights held by a male household head without recognition of how these rights are differentiated between individual actors based on gender, wealth, age or other intra-household characteristics. There has been

12 Management is here defined as a process with both technical and social control functions (Abercrombie, 1988).

13 The right to determine who will have access to a particular resource and how that may be transferred. Individuals or groups who hold rights of exclusion have the authority to define the criteria that actors must meet in order to access a given resource.

14 Exercising a right of alienation means that an individual or group can sell or lease the right of management, exclusion or both.

considerable work that describes gender as an important determinant of how rights, responsibilities and resources tend to be allocated within households, communities or institutions (Poats, 1991; Moser, 1993; Thomas-Slayter & Rocheleau, 1995). Yet CBNRM is still being implemented with little or no consideration of gender issues. Focusing on gender does not imply that women and men are opposed to each other because there is often a great deal of complementarity of interests, roles and resource uses (Meinzen-Dick *et al*., 1997:1304). But these differences and complementarities are easy to overlook if a gender-blind conceptual and analytical framework is used. Gender analysis within CBNRM institutions can lead to a better understanding of complexity, and open our eyes to a broader range of shared, complementary and conflicting rights and uses (*ibid*).

On agency

Central to the debate about actors and the actor-oriented approach is the notion of human agency, which attributes to the individual actor the capacity to process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under extreme forms of coercion (Long, 1992:22). Individual and collective actors carry out intentional and purposeful action, but their action is rarely played out as planned nor does it always lead to the intended outcomes (Admassie, 1995). Individual or group action is influenced and modified by each other's action as well as by the institutional arrangements forming the context of their action. Likewise, individual or group action affects and influences existing institutional arrangements and actions are not totally determined by or predictable on the basis of contextual factors. For instance, local natural resource user groups such as livestock owners (for grazing) and social networks are active not only in influencing the farmers' livelihoods but also in influencing farmers' choices regarding what resources to use. The term 'social networks' is used here to refer to either kinship or non-kinship associations that people establish for particular purposes with others in their locality or in another place.

The networks examined in this study are those that can be treated as mutual benefit relationships among local woodland and water resource users. Networks do not necessarily represent equal relations; they can be unbalanced and sometimes more like client-patron relations. The strategic bargaining character of resource users' networks gives them the attribute of 'group agency' as they actively and consciously organise themselves into a body that interacts with other organs in the process of transforming their lives. The outcomes of institutional frameworks for natural resource management in specific contexts are to a large extent shaped by the manoeuvring of networks by various actors in the struggle to gain access to and control over natural resources.

By placing emphasis on agency in actor-oriented approaches, this means a person, for instance a woman, is treated as a social actor with a capacity for willed and voluntary action that is not simply determined by social structures. As has often been argued in the literature on gender and development, women have no formal or legal access to woodlands and water. Their rights to these resources are often attributed to male individuals only (Zwarteveen, 1995). The question that one could raise related to this view is, if women are so much disadvantaged, why do they appear to go along with a deal that appears to offer them so little (Jackson, 1998)? This question highlights the need to consider how women experience woodland and water access and control as a particular part of the lived livelihoods and gender relations in the community. One approach to addressing this issue is suggested by Zwarteveen and Neupane (1996) based on their findings from a study carried out in Nepal. In their study, they describe a situation in which women find non-participation in formal water management groups offers advantages. For instance, they have greater freedom to break rules and 'steal' water and they find discourses of vulnerability, as female headed households, effective in securing water access. Similarly, a study by Roark (1984) in Burkina Faso also shows that although women were formally excluded from committees that were in control of water resources decision-making, in practice, decisions about digging new wells were made in informal meetings held by women prior to community meetings. Such findings suggest that Foucauldian notions of power as fragmented and dispersed are more useful in understanding relations between women and men than the dualistic opposition of powerful men versus weak women, a common view in much of the structuralist gender analysis (Jackson, 1998:317).

The issue of visibility in relation to access to and control over natural resources within a given institutional framework is complex because, both women and men tend to devalue and make invisible women's roles. It is desirable to make women's roles in natural resource management more visible, and to make their rights to resources more formal, and less conditional on their relations with men. However, there is also need to recognise that invisibility and ambiguity may arouse less male resistance and yet provide subtle forms of influence and power for women (Jackson, 1998). 'Silences speak and invisibilities can be an excellent camouflage' (*ibid*: 317). The focus on agency in institutional and gender analysis is therefore part of a larger redirection of thinking more seriously about women as actors and dynamising gender analytical concepts towards better understanding of why women do what they do in relation to access to natural resources and related management institutions.

The concept of power

The concept of agency is indelibly tied to power. Weber defines power as the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his or her own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber, 1957:152). While Weber's definition sheds some light on what power is or does, the definition does not address how it is constituted. For one to understand social interactions in relation to institutions for natural resource management, one needs to examine how power can be conceptualised. Following Foucault (1979), power is here considered to be a strategy. Power is exercised rather than possessed (*ibid*: 26) and is constituted in social relationships, such as networks, alliances and conflicts. As Clegg (1989) notes, power is not a thing nor is it something that people have in a proprietorial sense. People possess power only in so far as they are relationally constituted as doing so (*ibid*: 207). Thus power is a relational concept, shaped by the different types of relationships that actors engage in and negotiate around each other. Power is viewed as a resource that can easily change hands or be influenced by different actors at the same time. No one particular actor has power at a particular time to the extent that others with whom he or she relates are lacking. In other words, in power relations, a powerful actor depends on other actors yielding power to the powerful actor (Villarreal, 1992). Power can also be seen as related to issues of identity, especially in cases where a particular identity seemingly attributes to an individual a higher status and thus a more powerful position relative to other actors. This however does not mean that the 'weaker actors' are completely without power.

More often village elites are perceived to be powerful in a given context. This however is an expression of their relations with other community members. Village elites may be individuals who own larger pieces of land, livestock, have broader networks and have better access to a diversity of income sources or can be those who hold leadership positions in the village. The term village elite does not only refer to actors who are physically resident in the village. Those living outside the village who are economically and politically influential in making local decisions are also included in this group of actors. Their social identity is not only constructed through their position in the kinship hierarchy, but also through social and economic achievement and networks that may be used in gaining access to key resources such as land, woodlands and water. With the introduction of formal education in colonial times, followed by modernisation and economic transformation, access to land and other natural resources can no longer be seen as the *only* important source of power. More often when wealth ranking is done in the communal areas context of Zimbabwe, traditional leaders, who often have bigger land holdings than most ordinary villagers, are ranked in the below average to poor categories. This reflects that land is not the only source of power, yet historically, land was the most important source of power. In addition to

access to land and other key natural resources such as woodlands and water, access to capital, labour and non-material goods such as information, knowledge and education is increasingly becoming more important in influencing power relations in a given community.

In summary, power is not inherent to a position, a space or a person, it is not possessed by any other actors, and it is not a zero-sum process whereby its exercise by one of the actors leaves the others lacking. In this light, the concept of power is a useful analytical tool for understanding leadership and other struggles among community members. These may emerge between immigrants and groups endogenous to the areas, between livestock owners and the young couples who encroach into the grazing areas as a result of land shortage, between formal and informal institutions. Power relations can either emanate from application capacities or through discursive strategies that entail knowledge use or domination (Matose, 2002). Understanding and unsettling processes of power and exclusion that disadvantage some groups of actors in relation to others (*e.g.* women and the poor), require that attention be paid to struggles over meaning as much as struggles over resources as Peters (1984) has demonstrated. Peters (*ibid*) arguments were substantiated by Carney and Watts (1991) drawing from a study in the Gambia. Woodlands and water are not only material assets; they are effective arguments and symbolic constructs, which are as significant to gendered natural resource rights as titles and tenure (Jackson, 1998).

Conflict analysis in CBNRM

The interaction of various actors with diverse interests in a particular resource may result in conflict regardless of the institutional framework guiding the actions of various actors with regards to natural resource use. Rubin *et al*., define conflict as 'perceived divergence of interest or a belief that the parties current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously' (1994 quoted in Matondi, 2001). Matondi (*ibid*) notes that this definition is important in that it puts emphasis on the strategic choice and outcome of negotiations in the context of natural resource management. However the definition does not offer much insight into conflict between individual actors and institutions that should cater for their interests. A more relevant definition is that used by Grimble and Wellard (1997) who view conflicts as situations of competition and potential disagreements between and among actors and related resource management institutions. More often disagreements may be due to competition over scarce resources.

Conflict is not always negative in natural resource management contexts as it can be an important feedback mechanism revealing how past efforts or projected future efforts affect the interests and behaviours of different participants (Ostrom, 1992). Institutional structures vary to the extent to which they use conflict creatively for gaining information about problems perceived by different actors. If conflict is suppressed, key information

about the effects of past action is lost. From this proposition, conflict is often seen from a positive point of view in natural resource management contexts. On the contrary, if conflict is encouraged, valuable resources may be spent in potentially harmful disputes. Thus development of effective conflict resolution or management mechanisms is an important aspect of its capacity to achieve efficient and equitable performance of resource management institutions.

Conflicts are expressed in a variety of ways such as confrontational, 'hidden transcripts' or 'the everyday forms of peasant resistance' (Scott, 1985 & 1990) and social tension that is played out in gossip and witchcraft accusations. Confrontational conflict is often violent (Matondi, 2001; Matose, 2002). Examples include encroachment of certain individuals into grazing areas, land occupations, for instance in the case of commercial land occupations and settlement in state forest reserves in Zimbabwe, and closing off people's access to a resource such as woodland or water sources. Scott (1985) argues however that studying the 'everyday forms of peasant resistance' *i.e.* the subtle struggles waged by the less powerful is very revealing. The lack of confrontational approaches among the subordinate groups does not imply that they conform to the dominant discourses[15] and practices, as they have their own 'everyday forms of resistance', which become public in rare moments. Scott's (1985) field study in Southeast Asia particularly looks into how poor peasants may resist authority even under the most oppressive conditions. The various forms of resistance identified by Scott (*ibid*) include, passive compliance, subtle sabotage, evasion, pilfering, feet dragging and deception. These forms create a symbolic meaning of peasant resistance, challenging the assumption that the poor are victims of the prevailing ideology. The 'everyday forms of peasant resistance' according to Scott (*ibid*) have both material and symbolic manifestations: they are part of a struggle over both resources and meanings (also in Peters, 1984). Scott (1985) further explains that there is often a 'front-stage' dominated by the elite or those perceived to be powerful, but 'back-stage' this control often falls away.

Scott (1985) also contends that the 'everyday forms of peasant resistance' require little or no coordination or planning and make use of implicit understanding of informal networks. While Scott's study provides useful insights of peasant forms of resistance, his analysis remains simplistic in that it portrays the rich and the poor or the powerful and the weak, in clear-cut categories that act according to pre-established sets of interests. It presents an evolutionist picture whereby the poor gradually develop power in an effort to destroy the system that oppresses them (Villarreal, 1994:28). Yet in real everyday life, there are flexible webs that configure power relations (Moore, 1993). These engender new forms of interaction and therefore have multiple faces. Scott has also been criticised

15 Here discourses refer to an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena (Magadlela, 2000).

for failing to ask how gender might interact with class or other forms of social hierarchy in specific ways and to determine the forms that resistance might take if analysed through a gender lens (Agarwal, 1994a:83). Analysing 'everyday forms of peasant resistance' from a gender perspective, Simbolon's (1998) study in North Sumatra, Indonesia, found that if women's everyday forms of resistance did not succeed, they resorted to non-governmental agencies for assistance. In my study Scott's concept of 'everyday forms of peasant resistance' provided a useful analytical framework for conceptualising the various forms of conflict and resistance, but a gender analysis framework was used to explore gender-related conflicts over access to woodlands and water resources.

Witchcraft and related accusations have also been conceptualised as expressions of social tension or conflict in a given society. The belief in supernatural forces is still deeply rooted in many African societies regardless of education, religion and social class (Kohnert, 1996). The incidents of witchcraft accusations are said to be increasing due to social stress caused by resource scarcity and harsh macro-economic and political environments. Most often witchcraft accusations work to the disadvantage of the poor and deprived. However, under particular circumstances, they may become a means of the poor in the struggle to gain access to natural resources or a counter weight against oppression by the existing institutional framework (*ibid*: 1347). Development interventions, which constitute arenas for strategic groups in their struggle for power and control over project resources, are likely to further endanger a precarious balance of power, causing witchcraft accusations to flourish. Common to the belief in witchcraft is the perception that certain community members may harm their fellow women or men illicitly by recourse to supernatural means (Abrahams, 1985).

Theories of witchcraft that have been implicitly or explicitly put forward fall into three main categories:

a) Historical or ethnological
b) Psychological and
c) Sociological – which may be divided into:
    (i) those theories that emphasise normative aspects of social organisation and
    (ii) those centring on tension and social change.

The sociological theories on witchcraft are most relevant to this study. Of the two variants, that focusing on social norms is encountered more in literature but of more relevance to this thesis is the theory that centres on tension and social change within a given community. This theory treats witchcraft accusations as indices of social tension and as vehicles of social change. The relative frequency of accusations in various social relationships provides a set of social strain gauges for locating the tensions and role conflicts in a particular society. Abandoning a static functional

model, in favour of a more dynamic view of social trends and processes, this theory is undergoing modification. Greater attention is now being paid to the part accusations play in manipulating social situations and in involving the community as a whole in issues hitherto confined to those persons directly enmeshed in the conflict or quarrel from which the witchcraft accusation stems (Abrahams, 1985). These theories of witchcraft are important in that they raise the study of witchcraft from the level of travellers' 'entertaining tales' and 'straight' ethnography to that of scientific analysis aimed at making generalisations about repetitive social situations and processes (*ibid*; Krige, 1947).

Although much social science research has been done on CBNRM institutions, very little work has focused on the role of witchcraft and related accusations in influencing resource management institutions. Methodologically, it is quite complex to investigate issues surrounding witchcraft and related accusations. Thus rather than seeking more exact knowledge of witchcraft, the key question reflected upon in this thesis regarding witchcraft accusations as expression of social conflict relates to *whether witchcraft accusations have any significance for CBNRM institutions* and gendered access to woodlands and water resources at the local level. Events create a special anxiety when they are termed unnatural or are seen to run counter to the ordinary course of things. For example, if a woman becomes excessively powerful *e.g.* taking control over decision-making processes, this may be considered unnatural in a patriarchal society where male dominance is prevalent. In such circumstances, community members begin to seek explanations and often witchcraft accusations come into play. As Krige (1947) found among the Lobedu of north-east Transvaal in South Africa, it suffices to ground an imputation of witchcraft when a man (woman) menaces you with the words *udobona* (you will see).

At the manifest level, witchcraft stories have the value of the dramatic – an exciting story. As an analytical concept, witchcraft can be considered to be a force in social relations – something that can make or break a community. The witch does not exist in his/her own right; it is the judgement of society that creates him/her. Society creates this image of a witch and pins this image down to a particular individual. The question is, in a given society who is most likely to accuse whom and why? Possible answers given in the literature are:

a) Witches and their accusers are nearly always people closely intertwined together; belong to one neighbourhood, community or even one household (this is common in polygamous households). This principle is expressed in the witchcraft myth by the notion that witches cannot harm you from far away, but only if you are close by.
b) Witchcraft accusations nearly always grow out of some personal antipathy or hostile emotion. Frequencies of witchcraft accusations

may be interpreted as pointers to weak spots in the social structures (Mayer, 1954).

c) Those suspected of witchcraft in a given community do not constitute a random sample of the population generally. A large majority consists of certain groups of people such as the rich, the old and the powerful (Clyde, 1962).

As Clyde (1962) observes, the effectiveness of leaders is sometimes increased by the fear that they are witches and that if they are disobeyed, they will use witchcraft against those who fail to follow them. While this sometimes doubtless has the consequence of perpetuating bad leadership (*e.g.* people fearing to remove community leaders from their positions even if they are not performing as expected), it has its good side too in that if a community lacks strong leadership, this may make it vulnerable when facing 'outsiders' (*ibid*). In many cases witchcraft accusations do more to promote fear and timidity than to relieve aggressive tendencies. The fear consequent upon witchcraft tends to restrict the life activities of some persons, to curtail their participation in certain arenas, while at the same time it may have negative implications for trust and the building of community networks, social capital and reciprocity.

Within the context of conflict analysis, the intent of this study is to examine and provide insights into how the different types of conflict affect institutions for woodland and water resource use as well as sustainable use of these resources. Matondi (2001) identifies three levels at which conflicts occur, namely the micro, macro and meso levels and analyses conflict at these three levels. This study mainly focuses on institutional conflicts at the micro level and where relevant this is related to the other two levels. A variety of factors have been identified that can cause conflict within a community or among a variety of actors in the context of natural resource management. These include, historical factors *e.g.* the colonial land policies, resource scarcity due to population pressure, fuzzy resource use and user boundaries, and the nature of relations among actors regarding access to woodland and water resources. These are summarised in Table 2.3.

In any group sharing a common pool resource such as woodlands and water, conflicts are often inevitable as actors may have different views on authority, institutions, and interpretation of rules, trust and reciprocity. In general, managing communal landscapes is a complex process because within these landscapes, there are multiple resources, with multiple uses and users. The analysis of conflicts as they relate to institutional issues would be incomplete if conflict mediation mechanisms are overlooked. Thus conflict mediation or management mechanisms in place are analysed as well as institutional synergies from the community members', and other relevant actors', perspective.

Table 2.3. *Factors that may contribute to institutional conflict*

Colonial policies	**Resource scarcity**	**Institutional overlaps**	**Fuzzy resource use boundaries**	**Nature of relations between actors**
- Colonial land alienation[16] - Insecure natural resource tenure -Population pressure in communal lands - Resettlement leading to mixed ethnic groupings	- Shortage of arable land (both in quantity and quality) - Shortage of settlement land - Low agricultural productivity -Limited livelihood sources *e.g.* following retrenchments partly attributed to ESAP[17].	- Formal versus informal institutions - Modern versus traditional - Contested institutions - NGO and externally engineered versus other community institutions - Legal control vested in institutions that are upwardly and not downwardly accountable[18]	- Cross village resource sharing - Fuzzy definition of 'legitimate' resource users - Multiple users of multiple resources in the same landscape	- Lack of trust - Social tension (often expressed in witchcraft accusations) - Socio-economic differentiation by gender age, and wealth - Skewed power relations - Differential access to natural resources

2.3 Summary

This chapter has discussed the conceptual framework that guides the study. The literature review began by discussing Hardin's (1968) tragedy of the commons thesis that has been applied in the analysis of the 'problem of commons'. Criticisms levelled against Hardin's thesis were discussed leading to the analysis of the institutions-oriented approaches for analysing common pool resource management situations. Four broad categories of institutional analysis approaches were identified: the moral economy approach, new institutionalism and the actor-oriented and actor-network approaches. The latter three were found more relevant to this study and were therefore discussed in greater detail. The chapter went on to define and discuss key concepts that can be used as analytical tools in the analysis of common pool resource management institutions, the concepts of access, agency, power and conflict. The discussion on these key concepts centred on their utility within the context of actor-oriented and actor-network approaches in institutional analysis in CBNRM. The next chapter will discuss the methodological framework adopted for the study and the description of the study site, the Romwe Catchment in Chivi district, Southern Zimbabwe.

16 Land and related natural resources expropriation by colonial governments resulted in peasant farmers being overcrowded in areas of low agricultural potential.

17 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme.

18 See Matondi, 2001 & Ribot, 1999.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will describe the methodological framework adopted for the study as well as presenting the background and context of the study setting, the Romwe catchment in Chivi district, southern Zimbabwe. The study was located within a broader inter-institutional development project. The qualitative research methodology forms the basis of this study, although some quantitative research methods were also used. The majority of quantitative data presented in the thesis is drawn from a household survey that was done between late 1998 and 2000 in collaboration with the Institute of Environmental Studies (IES), CARE International and the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH). In the methodology section, a description is given of the research strategies adopted, methods of data collection and analysis, field procedures, experiences and the challenges faced during fieldwork. The second part of the chapter provides general background to the study site.

3.2 Research methodology

As discussed in Chapter One, the major question the study seeks to answer is what role formal and informal institutions play in determining patterns of access to and control over woodland and water resources by women and men. By answering this question, the study hopes to contribute to the debates on the role of local level institutions, in particular informal ones, in influencing and facilitating sustainable natural resource use in the context of CBNRM. The study attempts to broaden knowledge on the scope of actors, social interactions and informal processes with some relevance to the framework for the study of institutional dynamics in CBNRM. Before going into the details of the fieldwork process, the qualitative research approach is discussed.

3.2.1 Qualitative research methodology

Social research in a development project context (as in my case) on institutional dynamics and how they affect different actors is complex and therefore requires that one use methods that will bring out the dynamism of the numerous intricate processes of social interaction. Qualitative methods were suitable for my study as they aim at capturing the myriad perspectives of participants in the social world. Qualitative research is inherently multi-method in focus (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Flick, 1998). The use of multiple methods, or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question. Objective reality can never be captured, we can know something only through its representations (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000:5). The multiple qualitative methods available to

the researcher include, case studies, situational analyses, network analysis, participant observation, dialogue, visual methods, group discussions and key informant interviews. The majority of these methods played a crucial role in the process of data collection in the study.

3.2.2 Data requirements

Given the diversity of actors that influence or are affected by institutions in CBNRM, the identification of various actors involved in shaping institutional processes becomes key to the institutional analysis process. Various actors, *i.e.* women, men, rich, poor, local and traditional authorities and individuals or groups' relationship to institutions are often shaped by their experiences and other social relationships (both formal and informal) within local and external spheres. Their actions need to be interrogated in the context of their history, economic activities, ethnicity, age and gender so as to understand how action observed at a particular time at the local level is a product of and has some effect on the wider political, economic and social systems and institutional framework (Long, 1977). Thus, there is need to analyse historical processes and social relationships and how they impact on institutions for woodland and water use and management. Socio-economic differentiation data is required for the understanding of how institutions influence or are influenced by actors belonging to various socio-economic categories that can be defined along wealth, ethnic, age and gender lines. Five broad data sets can be discerned from the foregoing discussion:

a) development of an institutional map;
b) data on the nature and characteristics of the natural resource landscape;
c) identification of actors involved and related social networks;
d) information on historical processes that shape or influence institutional dynamics;
e) data on socio-economic differentiation as it relates to institutions and issues of access to woodland and water resources;

Identifying institutions and their membership is a major methodological challenge in a context where there are both formal (visible) and informal (often hidden) institutions. This study maps out institutions and related structures in the Romwe catchment in an effort to understand the significance of local and external institutions on defining patterns of resource access, use and management. Identifying major institutions in the area makes it possible to define a typology of institutions, the resources they are managing and how they have included or excluded others. Romwe residents to some extent have an interest in natural resources beyond their own catchment, for example, gold panning. Within the institutions, actors have different interests, beliefs and agendas. In mapping the institutions, attention is paid to who participates in the formation or maintenance of

which institutions, who are the members of which institutional structures and why?

Other methodological issues relate to how boundaries have been defined within the context of a catchment through the CEH and IES catchment management projects. The biophysical boundaries of the Romwe catchment were defined by the CEH in 1991/92 and taken up by IES in 1998 as a frame for their common property resources management project. The author participated in the Romwe catchment management project in her capacity as a Research Associate at IES. While the biophysical catchment was defined by CEH, this study attempts to define the social boundaries related to multiple and single resource use within the confines of the Romwe catchment. It is assumed that defining the precise biophysical boundaries of Romwe catchment as was done by CEH limits the understanding of how people in communal areas share natural resources within and across villages.

Defining resource use boundaries was found to be a challenging task as it involved identifying the social and resource units, and multiple resource uses by various actors. These actors who are in themselves differentiated according to gender, ethnicity, age and wealth have different perceptions of the resources in question, how they be should be used and managed. A second challenge relates to how others are included or excluded in utilization of water and woodlands. Those excluded tend to mobilise both the local and outside institutions to gain access to such resources and in some instances through illegitimate means or through informal networks.

3.2.3 Research strategy

A case study approach was adopted in order to produce detailed analyses of various actors' strategies in influencing or getting around both formal and informal institutional constraints and how this influences women's and men's access to woodlands and water. The idea of selecting critical cases is encouraged in the actor-oriented perspectives (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983; Long & Long, 1992; Steins, 1999) and the approach is an appropriate way of capturing context specific detail (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Yin, 1994). The case study was central to my empirical investigation because it allowed me to be at the site where institutional interactions occur as well as observe actors in the context of processes at play and events taking place.

Given that the data generated from case studies is largely qualitative in nature, the narrative approach is employed to present that data (Carr, 1986; Roe, 1995; Fortmann, 1995; Scott, 1985). Data from the case study does not always come in quantifiable form, although it can be quantified, for example, through content analysis. However, the objective of my study is to show processes of institutional interactions and relationships as they influence access to woodlands and water resources by women and men.

Where relevant, quantitative data was drawn from the household livelihood survey that was undertaken in 1998-2000 (Campbell, *et al*., 1998: Household Livelihood Survey Questionnaire for Romwe and Mutangi Catchments).

3.2. 4 Identification of the study site

The case study site was selected within the confines of a broader research project of IES on common property resources management. The project emerged from a perception that there were more studies on catchments that concentrated on biophysical and hydrological issues, with little emphasis on socio-economic issues. The broader question for the IES project was on whether the Integrated Resource Management approach is a means to eliminating rural poverty. Beginning in July 1998, IES, together with a non-governmental organisation, CARE International, RDC officials and community members have been exploring the role of an integrated approach to the management of micro-catchments in semi-arid areas of Zimbabwe in poverty alleviation.

A question that often arises in relation to case studies is their representativeness. Rainfall received in Romwe catchment, located in hilly areas, ranges between 600-800 mm per annum while most other parts of Chivi district receive between 400-600 mm per annum. If other characteristics are considered, the Romwe catchment is not very different from the rest of Chivi communal lands. The Romwe catchment is typical of communal areas in Chivi district in many respects: it has a history of population movements, has a relatively high population density, infertile soils that are characterised by low agricultural productivity, high risk of droughts and crop failure, shortage of arable land, has had an influx of researchers and development organisations and has had a fair share of empty promises by the government on land resettlement. In this respect findings from the Romwe catchment may be applicable to other parts of the Chivi communal area as well as other communal areas in Zimbabwe that have similar characteristics.

3.2.5 Research methods

Multiple research methods and sources of evidence were used in order to capture the discourses and practices of the different actors. Triangulation was built into the data collection process so as to verify data collected. Specific research methods used include participatory rural appraisal exercises, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, historical narratives, case histories, participant observation, gender analysis, the actor linkage matrix and secondary data review. Participation in community gatherings such as funerals, weddings and church services was also important in the data gathering process. Residence in the study village was important in building rapport with community members and developing extensive social networks. Research methods used are presented in Table 3.1, followed by a detailed description of each of the methods.

Table 3.1. *Research methods, sources of data and unit of analysis*

Method	**Variables**	**Sources**	**Unit/level of analysis**
Resource and institutional mapping	Woodland and water resources Grazing land Boundaries Tenure and access to resources Legitimacy Gender	Participants at village PRA workshops Young men Village leaders RDC offices	Village Household
Transects	Boundaries Conflict spots *e.g.* sacred areas Land holdings	Village members	Village Household
Pairwise ranking	People's priorities	PRA workshops	Village
Wealth ranking	Wealth indicators	PRA workshops Health workers Traditional leaders	Village Household
Historical trends	Resource availability	PRA workshops Archival records RDC Aerial photos Traditional leaders	Village
Key informant interviews	Tenure Access Conflicts and conflict mediation Gender	Village RDC Provincial level NGOs	Village Household
Focus group discussions	Tenure Conflict Gender	Ordinary village women, men, youths Traditional leaders	Village Household
Historical narratives	Tenure Settlement history Conflict	Traditional leaders Community elders	Village
Case histories	Settlement history Resource availability Leadership	Village *i.e.* traditional leaders	Village Clan
Participant observation	Local practices Interactions Gossip	Community gatherings *e.g.* funerals, churches, parties	Village Household Individual
Gender analysis	Division of labour Tenure Access Leadership	PRA workshops Community gatherings Households NGOs	Village Household
Actor linkage matrix	Organisational interactions	Traditional leaders NGO and extension officers WADCOs & VIDCOs	Village

Workshops and group interviews

Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) workshops were facilitated to learn about the perspectives on natural resource use boundaries and institutional issues with relevance to the three study objectives. The PRA approach was found relevant because it emphasises recipient influence on problem definition and solution design and has gained popularity as a means of improving project performance (Chambers, 1993). In the PRA workshops, separate women's and men's groups worked on similar tasks designed to describe their patterns of access to and use of woodlands and water resources, and their perceptions of institutions regulating access to these natural resources. Women and men worked in separate groups so that women could freely express their opinions since, culturally, women tend not to speak in the presence of men. Plenary sessions often followed group work to ensure the sharing of information generated from different groups and also to get feedback on each group's results from the larger community. Follow-up interviews were made after large community meetings to get a more in-depth understanding of issues raised at the meetings.

In recent years, field experiences have suggested that PRA tools and techniques should be used with caution as they may not reveal power dynamics and other power relationships that influence common pool resource governance (Mosse, 1997; Goebel, 1998). These problems include production of a falsely homogenised view of village perspectives, static and misleading pictures of social practices and beliefs. Despite such weaknesses of the PRA methodology, this study found that PRA generates data that provide a picture on general trends and perceptions. Taking the weaknesses of PRA methods into consideration, this study therefore used other research methods such as key informant interviews and case histories to complement the PRA tools and techniques as well as triangulate information gathered through the PRA process. PRA tools and techniques employed include resource and institutional mapping, pairwise ranking of institutions with a focus on how local people perceive and value different institutions, transect walks, historical trends and wealth ranking.

Resource mapping was used to generate data on woodlands and water resources available in the area. The maps generated are different from the 'official' maps, since they reveal local people's perceptions about resources available in their area. Resource areas and units used by different community members were identified in the process of mapping. Though the resource mapping exercise was useful in identifying different resource spaces and products, it was difficult to have clear boundaries shown on the maps as participants preferred to leave boundaries open. Further investigations through transect walks with key informants revealed that the issue of boundaries is contentious and therefore people prefer not to discuss it in public fora. Transects turned out to be useful in verifying resource use boundaries and areas of conflict over boundaries that had not

been clearly articulated during the mapping exercises as well as identifying problem areas. Issues relating to conflicts over certain areas such as sacred areas and grazing areas that had not come out during resource mapping exercises were raised during transect walks. Tenure issues were discussed during the resource mapping exercises and this generated information on how access to these resources is determined by the various institutions found in the village. Data on access to natural resources and resource use boundaries was gathered cautiously because access to resources in the study site is mediated through kinship based and other social networks, relationships that it may be sensitive to discuss in public. Other studies carried out in different parts of the country have also made similar observations (Matondi, 2001; Sithole, 2000 & 1999). *Wealth ranking* was used to determine indicators of wealth as defined by community members. Wealth categories were derived from an exercise undertaken with key informants from the village. Because of the sensitive nature of the wealth ranking exercise, identification of criteria for defining the wealth categories was done in a larger community context, while the placing of individual households under each of the wealth groups was done by key informants (Annex 2). These wealth indicators give important social and economic information in themselves and were used for sampling purposes for the key informant interviews.

During the PRA workshops, observation of interactions and flow of discussion gave pointers to the existence of allegiances between and among various actors, for example, which actors were allied to which individuals or institutions, which individuals tended to support each other, which people made attempts to suppress information and what types of information were being suppressed. Groans, grunts, and facial expressions are also quite revealing as they often manifest reactions to something that people do not agree with or otherwise. These reactions were taken note of during community meetings and discussions.

As part of the PRA process, *historical trends* were used to gather information on changes in the natural resource base that have occurred over time. The underlying philosophy has been commonly referred to as indigenous technical knowledge (ITK), that communities are informed by past experiences and make decisions based on the interpretation of this experience and its relevance to the present. To identify changes in resource use patterns and resource availability from the local people's perspective, historical trends were developed by the participants. Scoring was used to highlight resource availability for different time periods agreed upon by both women's and men's groups, but the scoring was done separately so as to capture any gender differences in perceptions.

Key informant interviews

The purposive sampling strategy was used for identifying key informants. Variables taken into consideration in the sampling of key informants are

gender, wealth, ethnicity, age, leadership position, and in-depth knowledge of the area. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key informants including older members of the community, people active in community institutions and those active in natural resource management in general. Because of the sensitive nature of information about natural resource use conflicts and village boundaries, this information was gathered through key informant interviews as it was deemed too sensitive to be discussed in a group setting. A tenure survey was also undertaken with key local leadership that includes the *sabuku*, VIDCO chairman, the former and current councillor and one headman (see Annex 1). The tenure surveys were used to explore and characterise the diversity of rules that make up property rights systems associated with different resources and resource areas identified during the mapping exercises (Kundhlande & Luckert, 1998). The tenure surveys were intended to give a finer analysis of the concept of property rights that transcend conventional notions of property rights broadly categorised into state, private, common property and open access regimes (Berkes & Farvar, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). Hence this study adopted a method used by Kundhlande and Luckert (1998), which describes property right systems in a much broader way than is the case in the CPR literature. In this approach, the characteristics that are hypothesised to have systematic effects on natural resource management include: comprehensiveness, exclusiveness, use designation, duration, allotment type, size, transferability, fees payment, operational requirements, operational control and security. These characteristics are described in Table 3.2.

The standardised interview schedule presented in Annex 1 was designed and administered to key informants. Because the tenure survey sought to describe the village level context and resource use rules, village heads such as the headman, *sabuku*s, and councillors were interviewed over several visits so as to avoid respondent fatigue as the survey took up to three hours of interview time per respondent.

Table 3.2. *Characteristics of tenures influencing resource management*

Tenure characteristics	**Description**
Comprehensiveness	Refers to the set of natural resources over which a household has control. Comprehensiveness may include management rights as well as harvesting rights.
Exclusiveness	The ability of a property holder to prevent other parties from freely enjoying the benefits of a resource. Lack of exclusivity may erode incentives for investment in management since there is no guarantee of capturing the return.
Use designation	Use designation limits the types of activities that tenure holders can carry out on a given type of tenure. *E.g.* cultivating in areas with indigenous woodlands may be prohibited to promote sustainability of the woodlands.
Duration	In most cases, tenures specify the period over which property rights may be exercised. *E.g.* under private ownership, a perpetual duration is usually implied, yet leases of agricultural land can be for one or more cropping seasons. Curtailed time horizons may create incentives to push forward benefits and postpone costs.
Allotment type	Refers to whether the tenure specifies an *area* over which a household possesses rights, or whether the tenure specifies *volumes* of natural resources that may be collected by the household at a given time.
Size	The spatial or volume specification of the tenure.
Transferability	The ability of a resource owner to sell, bequeath, or give an asset to others at mutually agreed upon terms. Asset or resource transfer can take the form of a sale or lease. For example agricultural land may sometimes be inherited or sold while woodland products may sometimes be sold.
Fees payment	Fees may be payable by households harvesting products, *e.g.* persons wishing to collect and sell firewood may be required to purchase a permit. Fees may be paid in cash or kind.
Operational requirements	Society may require that resource users adhere to certain regulations during the use of an asset, for resource management and in their harvesting practices. Such regulations may be designed to ensure that management and harvesting practices are consistent with the community's management goals.
Operational control	Mechanisms for enforcing the conditions for resource use. This may involve policing by appointees selected by villagers and a system of penalties against those who break the rules.
Security (assurance)	The perception of a right holder concerning his/her ability to capture benefits generated by the resource in future and whether changes in tenure will occur that increase or decrease the derived benefits.

Focus group discussions (FGDs)

Facilitated FGDs generated data on institutional relationships and the role of women in institutional processes. FGDs were undertaken with small

groups of women in leadership positions, women active in natural resource management issues and projects, and members of institutional structures such as the *sabuku*s, VIDCOs and the catchment management committee. Focus groups have been commended for allowing access to research participants who may find one-on-one, face-to-face interviews intimidating. By creating multiple lines of communication, the group interview offers participants a safe environment where they can share ideas (Madriz, 2000). The FGDs conducted were quite stimulating and the majority of the participants were actively involved. At the end of our discussions, people always made statements such as 'When are you going to invite us again? We really enjoyed ourselves today; We learnt a lot from other group members that we didn't know before'. Other studies conducted on focus groups show that group participants find the experience gratifying (Madriz, 2000). Focus group discussions also allowed for the observation of interactions amongst the participants and they exposed the researcher to the diverse views, preferences and priorities of different groups in the village. Divergent views noted during the discussions were used as foci for further investigations on process and relationships between and amongst various actors. While the focus group discussions have these advantages, they can also be arenas for contestation and may be biased by power relations in the group (Mosse, 1994; Goebel, 1998). If not facilitated carefully, views of powerful members of the group may be the dominant ones. To avoid this bias, individual interviews were also undertaken to complement data generated from group discussions.

Historical narratives

Historical narratives were generated from key informants, mainly the traditional leadership. Central to the analysis of narratives, apart from temporal unfolding of events, is the relation among the points of view on those events belonging to characters in the narrative, the narrator, and the audience to whom the narrative is delivered (Carr, 1986: 5). The narrator may oscillate between the '*I* that is *We* and the *We* that is *I*' *i.e.* the idea of a social and collective subject of action, experience and history. Taking note of this is important in moving beyond individual subjectivity without leaving behind altogether the idea of subjectivity itself (*ibid*: 6). A story can be told by an individual or individuals on behalf of the *We*; indeed using the *we* as the subject not only of action and experience but also of narration itself. Such is the social function of leaders and spokespersons. The use of *we* is rhetoric that unites the group and expresses what it is about, where it came from and where it is going. The individual narrator may tell the story but it is presented as 'our' story. But such a narrative should be shared if it is to be constitutive of a group's existence and activity. Other participants not have to tell the story, but they must believe it or accept it as the genuine account of what the group is and what it is doing. It is worth noting that there can be rival versions of the same story, but these different versions may also be the basis for factions so sharply divided that they threaten the unified existence of the community from

which they spring. Basically, the focus of a historical narrative is a story being told about the past. In analysing the historical narratives, there is need to examine the *motive* for constructing the narrative. The motive is sometimes to establish 'moral authority' and in other cases a narrative seeks to fulfil a cognitive motive. In some cases, a narrative can be used to put across a moral view of the world in the interests of power and manipulation.

As Fortmann (1995) points out, narratives are crafted in an attempt to legitimise present claims (*e.g.* claims to leadership positions) in terms of the past recognition of their access right. The historical narratives presented in this thesis illustrate the role of 'stories' in institutional and property relations and resource claims. Institutions and institutional arrangements are constantly negotiated and renegotiated and narratives therefore constitute part of what Fortmann refers to as a "discursive strategy" that is a crucial component in the process of renegotiation. Historical narratives are an important oral manifestation of a local discourse seeking to define and claim local resources and assert institutional legitimacy (Peters, 1984). Thus, this study draws on local historical narratives in the attempt to understand and explain current local institutional frameworks for woodlands and water resources use and management.

Case histories

Case histories were used as a basis for understanding natural resource use and access struggles in the study area. Elderly people deemed knowledgeable of the area and the history of settlement were interviewed to generate case histories. The snowball method together with the experience of the IES full-time field research assistant, who lived in the study area for the four-year project period, participated in the identification of key informants. The snowball method involves identification of *e.g.* one respondent deemed knowledgeable on a particular topic. After discussions with him/her, he/she is asked to identify other potential respondents on the topic being discussed and the same is done with each of the later respondents. During this study, after three or four case histories, the same names would come up when a respondent was asked to identify other potential respondents. The study took into consideration observations that have been made about the challenges of using case histories. The challenge of using case histories as a research method is that recollection is selective and filtered. When recollecting the past, it is seldom that the past is reconstructed in accordance with present ideas. In most cases, important episodes or worst experiences are easily remembered. This approach was advantageous for my study because the struggles over property rights stories or narratives constitute a crucial component of the process of negotiations. Narratives are an important oral manifestation of local discourse that seeks to define claims on local resources (Roe, 1991; Fortmann 1995; Moore 1996). Claims by different actors over resource

ownership often emphasise aspects of truth since rights in a resource are highly ambiguous and contextual.

Participant observation

The power relations of actors, which may have a direct or indirect impact on natural resource institutions, are embedded in contested and contrasting discourses[19]. Institutional arrangements often symbolise contested terrains between and among various actors (as groups or individuals), communities versus state, settlers versus immigrants, women versus men and rich versus poor (Moore, 1996). Such contestations are often not expressed verbally by the actors or discussed publicly, but observations of interactions may yield important insights into how such relationships impact on resource management institutions and patterns of access to woodland and water by women and men. Participant observation was therefore found useful in this study. Given that some information was received through gossip and rumours spreading in the community, *e.g.* claims of certain strong personal relationships influencing decision-making processes and outcomes, the observations that were made in community meetings, at the *dare*,[20] generated insights that were useful in determining whether the gossip or rumours had some basis on which they were founded. Observations of patterns of resource use and the role played by institutions (*i.e.* which institutions were adhered to or not) were also made.

While participant observation is sometimes romanticised, it is worth noting that a stranger very rarely becomes fully part of the society he or she studies. The 'social distance' based on class, race, education, culture, language and power is never really closed (Cheater, 1986: 22). Cheater (*ibid*) notes that the romanticised idea of participant observation naively denies the differences that exist in all societies. This social differentiation makes total participation impossible, given the researcher's ultimate objective of understanding that society comprehensively as a whole. Furthermore, participation in community activities by itself does not yield much usable information and thus, to elicit why people do what they do, it was necessary to ask questions in addition to observing the various activities. The asking of questions during participant observation was opportunistic and therefore informal and unstructured. Considering that there is often some disparity between what people say should be done and what they actually do, conceptualised as the difference between the ideal social structure and the empirical social organisation, the author recorded both what was said and what was done. In the majority of social gatherings attended, such as funerals and church gatherings, it was improper to take notes and thus documentation was done at the campsite immediately after the gatherings when information was still fresh in the mind. While the

19 A discourse can be defined as an 'ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena'.

20 Attendance at the *dare* is open to the public and each person who attends is free to make his/her contribution, as the circumstances may allow (Gombe, 1995).

research campsite is located within the study area, the study would have benefited if the researcher had lived with a family, as it would have brought the researcher much closer to the reality of village life through participating in household activities, *e.g.* household chores.

Gender analysis

The gender analysis framework adopted for the study was meant to especially generate data on how institutions affect women's and men's patterns of access to woodlands and water. Gender analysis entailed understanding the nature and representation of both women and men in the institutional structures and the actual decision-making processes as these have implications for women's and men's access to and control over natural resources as well as the sustainable use of those resources. Resource management literature has highlighted the fact that women are frequently not represented or have token representation on the committees, which make decisions about natural resources (Nabane, 1997; Goebel, 1998). Investigating gender issues in resource management institutions is an attempt to understand power relations and an effort to challenge the construction of rural institutional structures as representative structures. These power relations often influence resource management institutions either positively or negatively.

Actor linkage matrix

The actor linkage matrix (adapted from Biggs & Matsaert, 1998) was used to assess patterns of organisational interaction. This exercise was done with key informants mainly the *sabuku*s and the VIDCO chairman. In using this method, the first step was to list major organisations down the page in rows and then the same organisations were listed across the page in columns. The cells in the matrix represent the frequency of interaction between the organisations. Analysis of patterns of organisational interactions was done using three scenarios:

1. The official picture - who is supposed to interact with whom?
2. Who is actually/currently interacting with whom?
3. What would be the ideal situation?

Discussions were facilitated around the matrix regarding the nature of interaction. The discussions helped explain high or low level of interaction between the various organisations. Constraints on or factors hindering the ideal situation were discussed. While the actor linkage matrix generated useful insights on patterns of organisational interaction, it was a long process and needed patience from both the participants and the researcher. Focusing on the three scenarios could have resulted in the process taking a long time, but at the same time, the researcher felt if only one component was addressed, a full picture would not be generated from the exercise. The actor linkage matrix was also useful in that it was used to think and talk through alternative scenarios about possible organisational interactions in

CBNRM. Discussions were made regarding how the ideal situation could be achieved and some insights on policy-related reflections were drawn from the results of this exercise. While in practice it may not always be necessary to construct an actor linkage matrix to think through all institutional options for addressing CBNRM related problems, the matrix however helps ensure that implications of each option are thought through and that a wide range of options are kept open (Biggs & Matsaert, 1998:12). The actor linkage matrix is also useful in identifying some institutional linkages that are strong, but might be weakened if the project is to contribute to changing the form and nature of interactions of the different institutional actors or vice versa. A challenge in using this matrix relates to its political sensitivity – because the matrix deals with relationships between various institutional actors, it may highlight weak or strong relationships, which are politically sensitive and might be unpopular for this reason. Because of the realisation of this challenge, the study used key informants rather than work with groups.

Secondary sources of data

Secondary data sources were reviewed, such as records at the rural district councils and other relevant organisations such as NGOs working in the area, for example, CARE International, and the CEH, South East Dry Areas Resource Management Project (SEDAP), Intermediate Technology Development (ITDG) and from government departments such as Agritex and the Forestry Commission.

Information on the history of resource management institutions was collected from the National Archives, although this was not an easy process. Information on Romwe catchment history generated from the archives was very scanty although, based on what could be accessed, some thread was developed by linking it to some of the narratives by the elderly people interviewed in the village. Rural district council reports and documents were reviewed to gain some understanding on resource management perspectives at the RDC level. It is worth noting that a number of PhD dissertations have come out of Chivi district (*e.g.* Butterworth, 1997; Cavendish, 2000; Moriarty, 2000; Scoones, 1996) but none could be found at the district council or district administrator's offices. When the researcher mentioned that she was carrying out research for a PhD programme, both the chief executive officer, the head of the RDC and the District Administrator (DA) expressed their hope that unlike previous researchers, results of the research would be made available to the RDC and the DA's offices.

The questionnaire survey

Where relevant quantitative data was drawn from the household livelihood survey. The survey was conducted as a quarterly income, expenditure and activity survey over a fifteen-month period from late 1998 to early 2000. Focus of the household survey was on tracking how households use their

available resources in the pursuit of livelihoods and the returns they receive from these activities. Because of the seasonal variability facing these villages, data was collected quarterly to capture the variations. There were several visits made to each household in the sample each quarter in order to gain sufficient observations regarding data that was likely to be accurately recalled within short time spans. Information collected during the survey that is relevant for this study includes:

1) Background information on the household (housing, land size, demography).
2) Agricultural production for the 1998/1999 growing season.
3) Remittances, wage employment, dryland crop production, livestock dynamics.
4) Woodland harvesting.
5) Water resource use.
6) Organisations involved and access to collective gardens.

At least 20% of the social catchment[21] population was sampled for the household livelihood survey out of a population of 417. A stratified random sample was done in proportion to the total number of households in each village.

3.2.6 Data analysis and interpretation

The qualitative data generated by the study was analysed using a thematic approach. This thematic approach entailed coding of data from in-depth interviews, group interviews and focus group discussions and informal discussions according to emerging themes. It has been argued that themes are abstracts and often constructs that the researcher identifies before, during and after data collection. In this case, themes were developed based on both relevant literature reviewed for the study and from text recorded during interviews. During the process of identifying key emerging themes, the preliminary analysis involved looking for evidence on institutional conflicts, informal methods for social control, social conflict, ways by which people acquire and maintain achieved and ascribed status and information about how people solve different resource use and management problems.

Preliminary results of the analysis were shared with local people at a community meeting held in September 2001. Romwe catchment residents, local officials such as the *sabuku*s, headman and councillor, RDC officials, CARE International fieldworkers and other IES staff participated in the feedback workshop. This workshop contributed to the process of data analysis as participants reflected and commented on the result presented. Local peer review of research findings was an important component of the

21 The social catchment includes seven neighbouring villages that are located outside the biophysical catchment, but use woodlands and water resources in the biophysical catchment in one way or another. This has implications for the institutions regulating access to these resources.

analysis and write up on some of the findings of this study. This was done through presentations in national workshops as well as sending out drafts papers to colleagues for peer review. Research papers were also presented at international conferences that included a writing workshop held in Bogor, Indonesia in November 2001 and a regional conference held in Tanzania in October 2000, in addition to presentations at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.

3.2.7 Field procedures and processes

Initial boundary setting was accomplished through periodic field visits to the study site from July 1998 to May 1999, using mapping, transects, key informant interviews and semi-structured interviews to generate information on the biophysical, social, natural resource use, administrative and institutional boundaries, from different actors' perspectives. This information is presented in papers prepared for the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) as part of project reporting and milestone requirements (Nemarundwe, 2001; Nemarundwe, forthcoming; Nemarundwe *et al*., 1998; Nemarundwe & Kozanayi, 2003; Campbell *et al*., 2001). During this exercise, which was done with assistance from an IES research assistant, the complexity of identifying resource use boundaries emerged.

I resided in the village for an extended period with frequent two-week visits to the field between July 1998 and August 2002. In total, I spent approximately 18 months in the village during the four-year period. The research assistant based in the field on a full time basis for four years gathered additional information. During the research process, I developed extensive social relationships with individuals from wide ranging socio-economic backgrounds.[22] Making friends with people from both rich and poor households, Ndebele and Shona speakers helped me interact with a variety of informants and the everyday interaction revealed complex webs of power relationships in the community, as well as helping explain why certain decisions are taken and adopted.

While based in the community, I attended both formal and informal gatherings. During formal village meetings, I documented the process and deliberations during the meetings, *e.g.* who says what and whose ideas are adopted and recorded the nature of attendance by women and men. Informal gatherings included spending some time with groups of women watering vegetables at the garden projects, socialising at someone's home as well as informal community gatherings where an invitation was not required such as at church services and funerals. This created opportunities for me to engage in informal discussions with community members. In both Ndebele and Shona cultures, if a family member dies, other households in the village have to contribute some money to assist the

22 In November 2000, I was asked to pray at one respondent's home because she was excited that I had paid her a visit yet other field workers in Romwe often visit certain "rich" households only.

bereaved family in covering funeral and related expenses. I also had to make contributions, which were not much, from an outsider's perspective, about Z$20.[23] I also made other non-monetary contributions such as transport to the business centre to buy funeral items such as food. Given the distance to the nearest clinic (approximately 15 km away), occasionally I provided transport to sick people to Ngundu clinic especially if it involved emergency cases. This brought me much closer to the community members and interaction with community members greatly improved over the period spent in the village. These interactions allowed for observations of interactions between women and men as well as providing information of relevance for this research topic.

Participation in informal gatherings opened up access to information otherwise not talked about openly. For example, in previous interviews women had been asked about the use of medicinal plants in the area and people said they were Christians and therefore not using any medicinal plants. At one funeral I took a walk into the bush with the women, as there are generally no toilets in most households. During the process women were showing each other some plants that are used by pregnant women to relax the muscles of the birth canal and other plants that are used to enhance sexual pleasure. If it had not been for such an opportunity, the research would never have had access to such information.

Flexibility was an important component of this research. There were times when we (myself and my research assistant) would plan to do interviews and the plans would be disrupted by a social visit to our campsite by some community members and we felt it would be impolite for us to excuse ourselves. For instance, one day we planned to do some interviews and just as we had left the camp we met three women who wanted to visit us. We had to go back and started chatting with them. First we thought they would leave early, since they had met us close to the gate, but they appeared very relaxed. About 30 minutes later a fourth woman joined us. Because we became a sizeable group, we were an hour later joined by one of the *sabuku*'s policemen, probably to spy on us. While this small gathering had not been planned for, nevertheless, it was a useful social event that generated insights relevant to the study. It was only possible to excuse ourselves without people being offended in cases where we had to attend formal meetings.

3.2.8 The Challenges faced during fieldwork

A methodological challenge that was faced relates to the investigation of witchcraft and related accusations. Although investigating issues surrounding witchcraft was not one of the original study objectives, its relevance to the study emerged during the fieldwork. The first challenge was that information on witchcraft is often not discussed in public – it is

23 The official exchange rate of the US dollar to the Zimbabwean dollar was US$1 =Z$55 at the time of the study.

one of those 'open secrets' in the community – everyone knows or talks about it privately but it is rarely talked about in public arenas. To address this problem, casual consultations were made with informants non-systematically. Episodes of accusations and cases of people visiting traditional doctors were also documented. It was common that when someone became very ill, they would be taken to traditional healers outside the community, with the belief that a traditional healer not known to the accused could solve the problem at hand. In cases involving illnesses and subsequent death, it was common to hear people saying they had tried everything they could, including different traditional healers, clinics and hospitals but nothing had worked. Incidences where such comments were made were recorded. In one case, a village member even came to the research camp after a snake spit into his eyes and pleaded that my research assistant[24] give him some traditional medicine to cure his eye because he believed that 'the snake that had spit into his eyes was not just a snake from God'. Listening to the gossip on witchcraft, each speaker would say 'people say or people think' as if they themselves were not part of the process.

Another challenge faced was being viewed as a 'girl' (*musikana*) by community members when I first went to the village in 1998 and this could have been because I did not fit their view of a 'development woman'.[25] While I had experienced similar challenges in the early years of my career as a researcher beginning in 1992, where I was often referred to as *musikana wemurungu* (the whitewoman/man's girl, depending on the sex of my research colleagues, who coincidentally happened to be all white), I thought this time it would be different. I was coming into the village as team leader and also having my marital status changed from single to married woman. When I introduced myself as *Mai* (Mrs) Nemarundwe, first the community members did not believe it as they thought physically I looked too young to be married. Thus it took some effort for me to get the respect of a married woman. The status of being a married or single woman in both the Ndebele and Shona cultures has important implications as to who you can associate with and what kind of information people can or cannot give you. More importantly, your marital status as a woman may also influence the nature of interaction with men in general and male leaders, especially traditional village leaders. It also influences your possibility to attend meetings where cases are tried, such as the *dare* (traditional village court). For the benefit of understanding institutional

24 My research assistant comes from a part of the country that is believed to have 'strong' traditional medicines. Once his clothes were stolen but were returned anonymously and people believed this happened because he comes from the part of the country where *vanhu veko havasi vekutamba navo* (people from that part of the country are not to be tampered with).

25 Women working in development projects are locally referred to as *madzimai ebudiriro* (women working in development). These women are often conceptualised as physically big. Because at the time of the study, I did not fit the communities' picture of *mudzimai webudiriro* I was therefore seen as *musikana* (girl). After developing rapport with the Romwe community, some women jokingly told me that I should eat a bit more so that I would look like a *mudzimai webudiriro*.

issues in woodland and water use and management I needed to attend such meetings if they took place during my time in the village. Thus my status as perceived by community members was quite important.

A third challenge faced relates to IES having taken over a project from the CEH. The Centre for Ecology and Hydrology had been working in the area between 1991 and 1998. Key CEH researchers were mainly white who were seen in the village as representing *dura reruzivo* (the granary of knowledge). It took a long time for community members to believe that a young black woman could have "knowledge" that could benefit them. This in a way reveals villagers' perceptions of what a researcher should be (in the Zimbabwean case often assumed to be white male of non-Zimbabwean origin). This point ties in with the challenge of raising expectations. While we explained that we were there to learn from the community members and not to teach them, they still expected us to 'teach' them something. In their own perceptions, we were also supposed to bring material resources and knowledge that would help develop their community. As one woman put it across to my Swedish supervisor, "If Nonto is just going to do her studies, and not return to us and share her findings so that we can use the knowledge in our projects, then we would not have benefited anything from her four years of stay with us in the village".

A fourth and final issue that will be discussed relating to challenges faced was the changing political context in Zimbabwe following the commercial farm occupations in February 2000 and the June 2000 parliamentary elections. The tension mounted toward the presidential elections held in March 2002 and this further constrained fieldwork, as villagers sometimes were afraid to interact with 'outsiders' as they could be viewed as supporting the political opposition. Fortunately by this time I had collected most of my data. The ruling party, ZANU PF, had unleashed violence against supporters of the opposition party and therefore people feared to be associated with outsiders especially from urban centres like Harare, where the University is based, because urban dwellers were believed to be supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Fieldwork activities were also constrained by fuel shortages during 2000 and 2001.

3.3 Description of the study site

3.3.1 Background to Chivi district

Topography, climate and agricultural potential

This study was undertaken in Romwe catchment, Chivi district, southern Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is divided into four relief regions. These are, the Eastern Highlands, that comprise agro-ecological natural region I with very low temperatures, high rainfall and high topography that allows agricultural production of coffee, tea and horticultural produce. The second

relief region is the Highveld that falls into agro-ecological natural regions IIa, IIb and III suitable for crop and livestock production. This is followed by the Middleveld comprising agro-ecological natural regions III and IV suitable mainly for dryland farming and cattle ranching. The last is the Lowveld comprising natural region V suitable for cattle ranching and wildlife production. Chivi District falls in agro-ecological natural regions IV and V. The study site falls under the communal lands (formerly Tribal Trust Lands). Communal lands make up forty-nine percent of the country's land area and approximately seventy-five percent of the communal lands are located within natural regions IV and V. These regions are characterised as being unsuitable for intensive agricultural production due to low and variable rainfall and poor soils. Romwe catchment, in a hilly area, receives rainfall of approximately 600-800 mm per annum and is characterised as being wetter and more suitable for farming compared to the rest of the district. Land use typical for communal areas in this region is rain fed agriculture and livestock grazing.

Risk and uncertainty are endemic to dryland farming systems, as is the case in Chivi district, where rainfall is the key resource (Scoones *et al*., 1996). Thus when the rain arrives, how much rain falls, how it is distributed between and within seasons and when the seasons end are critical to the level of production achieved (Campbell, *et al*., 2002). Research undertaken in Romwe has shown that too much rain can do as much damage as too little rain and when the rain arrives can be as important as how much falls (Moriarty & Lovell, 1998). Crop failure in the Romwe catchment, on the gneissic soils, is as likely to follow from water-logging due to too much rain as from drought. Rainfall is not the only component of risk and uncertainty in agricultural production in Chivi. Others include, fluctuations in input and commodity prices, pest and disease outbreaks for humans (as in the case of HIV/AIDS), livestock and crops, and the condition of the country's macro-economy. The latter determines amongst other things, levels of remittances and availability of off farm employment. For an area where off farm work and remittances are critical, a sudden decrease in remittances to a household can have as devastating effects as droughts or floods. Given these uncertainties, productive water points and reliance on woodlands is important for livelihood sustenance. This is one of the reasons why this study chose to place more emphasis on institutional arrangements for woodlands and water resources in the study site. In relation to water use, vegetables and other garden produce are important to people's livelihoods.

History of settlement in Chivi district

The early part of the colonial period in Zimbabwe was characterised by apportionment of land along racial lines with colonial settlers being allocated the best land (currently termed commercial farming areas), forcing the bulk of the increasingly marginalized and impoverished black community into heavily populated communal areas. The relocations that

occurred during the early 1950s followed further land expropriation that took place after the Second World War. The government needed land to give to ex-servicemen who were returning from war and was also encouraging immigration which had slackened between 1920 and 1940, to boost the European population. The land allocated to the settlers was acquired by removing Africans from their areas that received high rainfall and resettling them in semi-arid areas such as Chivi district. It is estimated that in order to settle about 7 900 white immigrants who came to Rhodesia between 1946 and 1953, the government expelled about 110 000 Africans from the areas that had been designated European farming areas (Kriger, 1992; Ranger, 1985). The Africans were resettled amidst discontent, which not only arose from the fact that their collective rights to land and other natural resources had been terminated, but also because of the manner in which they were relocated. Historical narratives from Tamwa village, one of the villages that fall under the Romwe catchment, show how people were badly treated during the relocations. The government often used mounted police to beat out people who refused to move out of the designated areas, their homes were burnt and people were often unilaterally transported to places that they had never known or wanted to live in (Dzingirai, 1998).

The country's colonial legacy of land and resource alienation laws taken together with other regulatory systems introduced to regulate the use of resources within areas in which peasants were relocated (*e.g.* the Native Husbandry Act of 1951 discussed below), resulted in what Murphree & Cumming (1990) refer to as 'double expropriation'. Double expropriation is an idiom expressing the manner in which peasant communities were victims of a double loss through laws that stripped them of their pre-colonial land entitlements together with the loss of control over natural resources in areas in which the peasants were relocated. Several Acts were enacted, which reinforced the double loss through variously removing control over resources in peasant areas from the local communities. Ironically, most of this colonial legislation was adopted piecemeal and sometimes wholesale by the post-colonial government.

Following the relocations of the Africans, which led to overpopulation in the Tribal Trust Lands (now communal areas), the Native Husbandry Act (1951) was introduced with the aim of controlling allocation and use of land occupied by the native population to ensure efficient landuse by the Africans. Each African was to have no more than five head of cattle and eight acres of land. Unlike previously where traditional leaders allocated land, the Native Husbandry Act gave the District Commissioner (DC) the powers to allocate land, although traditional leaders largely remained *de facto* land allocators. As part of the destocking process, Africans were forced to sell their cattle, which supplied the much needed manure for the poor soils and also the government bought the cattle at very low prices and this intensified animosity towards the government among the peasants (Herbst, 1990). The inequitable distribution of land was a major factor

behind Zimbabwe's war of liberation and continues to be an important factor in Zimbabwean politics. This pattern of land distribution remains the same to this day. Though the recent (post-February 2000) fast track resettlement programme[26] and the general anarchy prevailing in the commercial farming areas has however led to some breakdown of the pattern (Campbell *et al*., 2002). Chivi communal land is thus a product of the colonial and post-colonial history.

During the liberation war, the guerrilla movement had grand plans about land redistribution at independence (Lan, 1985). A common view expressed during the war of liberation was that land would be forcibly taken away from Europeans to be given back to the peasants, but this was not to be after the signing of the Lancaster Agreement (Moyo, 1995a). At independence in 1980, the government established a new Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, which was tasked to deal with resettlement issues. The original plan of this Ministry was to resettle 162,000 families by 1985. Ex-combatants and former refugees would be given first priority in the resettlement process because of their role during the war of liberation. The government was not successful in acquiring land for resettlement and by 1987, only 52,000 families had been resettled (Moyo, 1995a; Herbst, 1990). Two main reasons have been suggested as to why the government failed to resettle more people: a) the government had no money to purchase land that was being sold at current market rates (willing buyer willing seller) and donors were not forthcoming with funding the land redistribution programme, which they perceived as being racist (Moyo, 1995a: 9), the government lacked the requisite resources for a viable land resettlement policy, for instance there were not many competent administrators to run the programme. Thus with few people having been resettled by 1987, this did little to relieve population densities in the communal areas.

Frustrated by the lack of support from the international community, the government enacted the Land Acquisition Act of 1992. According to the Act, the government could now acquire underutilised land from the white commercial farmers and each farmer was to own only one farm. In terms of the Act, any farmer wanting to sell land was to give first priority to the government and the government would determine the price of the land. Farms that were designated after the Land Acquisition Act (1992) were mostly taken over by the black elite, which comprised top government officials (Dzingirai, 1998). Thus land has not been forthcoming for the poor landless ordinary Zimbabweans leading to the farm occupations following the February 2000 referendum. Even in the post February 2000 fast track resettlement programme, there has been negligible impact of resettlement on population densities in Chivi district as well as communal

26 The fast track resettlement programme's 'intention is to speed up the process of land acquisition and resettlement and is seen as the quickest way of transferring land to those who have been disadvantaged for a long time' (ZERO, 2001).

areas in other districts. This historical background shows that some of the issues emerging in this study are an outcome of the policy frameworks that have operated since the colonial period. Considering that the government has adopted piecemeal some of the colonial legislation that was crafted in the context of conquest and subjugation, it is not surprising that access to land and related natural resources has been at the centre of many conflicts around utilisation of these resources, even within CBNRM (Mandondo, 2000a).

The socio-political context

Chivi communal area covers 3534 square kilometres (Campbell *et al*., 2002). Its administrative centre is Chivi business centre, an old settlement established in the early part of the 20th Century. At the turn of the century, the estimated population of Chivi district was only around 15 000 (Scoones *et al*., 1996). By 1930, the population had grown to an estimated 28 500, in part due to population movements in the reserves. The southern parts of Chivi, such as the Romwe catchment were only settled during the 1950s, with the arrival of displaced people. Census figures in 1962, 1969 and 1982 showed district populations of 57 220, 80 580 and 103 656 respectively (Campbell *et al*., 2002). The 1992 census shows a total population for the district of 157 428, with a growth rate of 1.98% and a population density of 44.5 persons per square kilometre (CSO, 1992). Calculations done by Campbell *et al*., 2002 for the Romwe social catchment in 2000 show population densities of 86.1 persons per square kilometre. The high population density may have important implications for both formal and informal resource management institutions. Research in Chivi district has shown that there is much sharing of woodland and water resources across village boundaries (Nemarundwe, forthcoming; Nemarundwe *et al*., 1998; Nemarundwe & Kozanayi, 2003), thus the use of the concept of social catchment to encompass the broader community of users of resources in the biophysical catchment. While the biophysical catchment is about 4.6 km^2 in size and is home to thirty-two households, the social catchment covers 31.6 square kilometres and is home to approximately 417 households.

3.3.2 The Romwe catchment

Location

The Romwe catchment is located south of Masvingo town, which is the capital city of Masvingo province, under which Chivi district falls (Map 3.1). The turn-off to Romwe catchment is 86 km on the main road to South Africa and there is a 5 km gravel road to the catchment. Homesteads are spread along the base of the bounding hills that run west to east along the catchment. In 1995, there were 32 households within the biophysical catchment and an estimated 200 to 250 people (Mapaure *et al*., 1995).



Map 3.1. Map Showing Location of the Romwe Catchment in Zimbabwe

Historically, ten villages had some informal natural resource sharing arrangements for resources such as water, grazing and forest products and these villages are shown in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3. *Biophysical and social catchment villages using resources in Romwe area*

Traditional Villages	**Traditional Units**		**Local Government Administrative Units**	
Biophysical catchment (referred to as the Romwe area)	Headmanship	Chief	VIDCO	Ward
Dobhani village	Puche	Madzivire	F[27]	25[28]
Sihambe village	Chikanda	Nemauzhe	D	23
Tamwa village	Chikanda	Nemauzhe	D	23
Social catchment villages				
Chikanda	Chikanda	Nemauzhe	A	23
Matenhese	Chikanda	Nemauzhe	D	23
Ndabaningi	Chikanda	Nemauzhe	D	23
Munikwa	Joni	Nemauzhe	D	23
Joni	Joni	Nemauzhe	D	23
Magomo	Joni	Nemauzhe	E	23
Puche	Puche	Madzivire	B	25

The three villages *i.e.* Sihambe, Dobhani and Tamwa that fall within the biophysical catchment are referred to as the biophysical catchment villages. The other seven neighbouring villages with historical resource sharing arrangements with the three biophysical catchment villages are referred to as the social catchment villages. Table 3.3 shows that the ten villages that use resources in the biophysical catchment area in Romwe fall under different traditional and administrative units, yet they have long-term relationships as regards natural resource sharing.

Vegetation

Vegetation resources are of great importance to rural communities in Zimbabwe's communal lands. Rural populations are almost entirely dependent on wood as a source of fuel, and woodlands are important as sources of timber for construction, wood for making implements, fruits, medicines and as a habitat for both wildlife and cattle (Whitlow, 1988). A vegetation survey for Romwe catchment was done in 1995 focusing on species composition, structure, ecology and condition of the vegetation (Mapaure *et al*., 1995). Findings from the study show that the vegetation of the catchment area can be divided into three zones conforming to the geomorphological features of the area, namely hills, water courses and low lying areas consisting of cultivated land (Mapaure *et al*., 1995:3).

27 The 6-7 VIDCOs that constitute a ward are referred to by letters from A to F unlike in the case of traditional villages that are referred to by the name of the traditional leader.

28 Numbers are used to refer to wards and the study villages fall under wards 23 and 25

Vegetation on the hills predominantly consists of miombo woodlands dominated by *Brachystegia glaucescens*, as well as a mix of *Julbernardia globiflora* and *Kirkia acuminata*. The miombo woodlands are the main vegetation type in the catchment. In the hill areas, the woodland is generally intact and unlike many communal areas in Zimbabwe, shows relatively little impact of woodcutting and other causes of deforestation except the degraded areas on the lower slopes. The vegetation on the hills accounts for 55% of the catchment vegetation (*ibid*). Vegetation along the watercourses falls into three main categories, namely the *Bauhinia galpinii* dominated thickets, *Acacia polyacantha* dominated open woodlands and *Acacia combretum* mixed woodland thickets. Vegetation along the water courses accounts for approximately 7% of the catchment area. Much of the area in this zone has been cleared of trees for brushwood fencing and to make way for agricultural land. Vegetation in the low lying areas consist of remnant trees on cultivated and settled land and this accounts for approximately 38% of the vegetation cover in the area. Within the cultivated land, trees are often left standing for fruit and shade and some are usually left on termite mounds. Main tree species found in the cultivated and settled land consists of *Azanza garckeana*, *Ficus spp*., *Diospyros mespiliformis*, *Piliostigma thonningii*, *Sclerocarya birrea*, *Combretum adenogonium* and *Adansonia digitata*. Overall, the vegetation of the area is still in relatively good condition despite a long history of settlement from the early 1950s. The woodland area appears large enough for most fuelwood needs to be met from dead wood. However, there is some cutting of live trees especially on the lower slopes of the hills, mainly for construction timber.

The socio-cultural context

There are two ethnic groups found in Romwe, namely the Shona[29] and the Ndebele. The pre-colonial history of the Shona and the Ndebele ethnic groups describes their relationship as having been based on war and conquest. The Ndebele emigrated from South Africa and arrived in present day Zimbabwe, with the powerful military organisation developed by the Zulu of the Shaka legacy and were able to conduct occasional raids deep into the Shona country, collecting women and cattle from defeated peoples (Bourdillon, 1987; Beach, 1973 & 1971). By the time the British arrived, there were indications that a number of the southern Shona chiefs were coming together in a concerted resistance to the Ndebele (Bourdillon, 1987). The relationship between the Shona and the Ndebele during the pre-colonial period is discussed in detail by Beach (1973), who points out that accounts of isolated Ndebele raids became exaggerated to the view that the Ndebele were continuously raiding their Shona neighbours. Nevertheless,

29 As Bourdillon (1987:16-17) writes, the derivation of the word Shona is uncertain. It appears to have been first used by the Ndebele as a derogatory name for the people that they had defeated, particularly the Rozvi, now referred to as the Karanga and also the dialect spoken in Masvingo province, including the study site. The term Shona is used to refer to people who speak different dialects that include Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru, Korekore and others.

such historical information is of some relevance to the current study because the current relationship between Shona and Ndebele in the study site may be a result of such historical relationships and processes. The formation of current institutional arrangements, especially those that are considered traditional or indigenous may have been influenced by the historical processes occurring both during the pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial periods.

From the local people's perspective, CEH coined the name "Romwe catchment" in 1991 when defining the 'community' for their research and project-related activities. The name Romwe is derived from a sacred mountain located on the western side of the catchment. The mountain draws its sacredness from the traditional rituals carried out on the mountain by the Shona speaking people. Prior to this naming, the area was commonly known as *KumaNdebele* (meaning the area of the Ndebele speaking people). The Ndebele people were moved into this area during the early 1950s. The definition of the Romwe micro-catchment by CEH considered the biophysical characteristics, which were important for their research on hydrological issues in the catchment area.

The boundary of the biophysical catchment corresponds with neither the traditional nor the modern village boundaries. The households in Romwe fall into three traditional villages, each presided over by a village head known as the *sabuku*. These are Dobhani in ward 25, and Sihambe and Tamwa both in ward 23 (Map 3.2). The former two are largely in the physical catchment while the latter is largely outside. Two of the villages are made up of the Ndebele ethnic group (Dobhani and Sihambe) and the third village, Tamwa, is Karanga, a sub-group of the Shona ethnic group. At the time of the household livelihood survey in 1999, Dobhani kraal had a total of 33 households, Sihambe 36 and Tamwa 58 households respectively. Only 32 of the total of 127 households in these villages fall within the actual biophysical catchment area while the rest of the households fall in the periphery. *Sabuku*s Dobhani and Sihambe are brothers who were relocated from Shurugwi district in the Midlands area in 1952. When they arrived in the area, there were few families and they built their homesteads close to each other on the northern side of Mawunga stream, which forms the central division of the biophysical catchment.

During the late 1950s, the government engaged in a villagisation exercise, which separated the two brothers´ homesteads, with Dobhani shifted to the southern side of Mawunga stream. The two brothers now fell under two different Chieftainships, yet prior to the villagisation exercise, they were under one Chief. The third *sabuku*, who is covered by the catchment management project, Tamwa, was relocated from another part of the Midlands. Although 95% of Tamwa village households fall outside the biophysical area of the catchment, his village was included in the project because he is believed to be influential in decision-making in the area and is more respected by the neighbouring Shona speaking villages because he

is also of Shona origin. Historically, 10 villages, including the three catchment villages had some informal natural resource sharing arrangements for resources in the physical catchment, such as water, grazing and forest products. The other seven villages are, Ndabaningi, Joni, Munikwa, Chikanda, Puche, Matenhese and Magomo (Map 3.2). With the exception of Ndabaningi and Munikwa, which were relocated from Chiredzi district, to create space for the creation of Gonarezhou National Park, under Masvingo province, the rest of the villages are endogenous to the area.

Classification of settlers in the Romwe catchment

Differentiation is a key feature of the communal areas of Zimbabwe. Criteria for differentiation used include wealth, gender, age, ethnicity, historical factors and length of residence in an area and other forms of social construction of groups. Based on social differentiation, different categories of households or individuals within households often pursue different patterns of woodland and water resource use. While immigration has had an important impact in shaping the local history, classification of settlers appears to be an ongoing process. The settlers fall into four broad chronological categories as can be seen from Table 3.4.

Table 3.4. *Categorisation of settlers in Romwe*

Type of settler	Characteristics
Pre 1950s settlers	Groups living around the confines of the Romwe area prior to 1950. These include headman Chikanda and his people, Chief Nemauzhe and other social catchment villagers.
1950s settlers	These are divided into two groups: *MaNdebele* - the Ndebele speaking people who came from Shurugwi district, namely those who fall under Sihambe and Dobhani villages. *MaRhodesdale* – Shona speaking people who came from the Rhodesdale area in Kwekwe district such as those who fall under Tamwa village.
Pre 1980s (during the liberation war) settlers	During the war of liberation, there was also some movement of people in the rural areas, some displaced by the war, others taking the advantage of the war to seek 'greener pastures'.
Post 1980 settlers (after independence in 1980)	These are people who changed settlements under the spirit of *mazvakezvake* (each man for himself at independence). There was a general belief that no one (mostly referring to *sabuku*s and chiefs) should deny someone a place to settle.



Map 3.2. Romwe Catchment Villages

It is worth noting that while community members refer to these categories of settlers, these categories are not fixed but are rather very fluid and contextual and often emerge in relation to issues of access to different natural resources or when there is a particular issue at stake. Depending on the context and issue at stake, some people may be included or excluded. It is common to find community leaders such as the *sabuku* and VIDCO chairpersons having more than one list of households and each of the lists is used where deemed appropriate. Thus if an 'outsider' comes to the village and asks for a village register, normally the leader concerned would want to know why the person or agency wants the list. This information is useful to the community leader because it helps them decide which list to give out at a particular time.

The distribution of arable land, in terms of size and number of holdings appears to be underlain by a strong historical influence. Compared to more recent immigrants, those clans who migrated into the area in the 1950s or have resided in the area for longer periods, tend to have either a greater number of fields or fields that are bigger in size. Within the after 1950 settlers category, inequities in land holdings also exist and in this case the inequities are partly influenced by access to political power and influence. Within the three study villages defined as falling under the physical catchment, people are divided into a four-tier social hierarchy based on socio-political status, namely *Voho* (the ruling clan), *Zvidza zvepo* (those closely related to the ruling clan but not direct descendents), *Vawuyi* (newcomers) and *Vechirudzi* (aliens especially of Malawian origin). According to this social hierarchy, chiefs, headmen, and *sabuku*s and their direct dependants constitute the *Voho* category, who theoretically should be included in all local meetings and decision-making processes. *Zvidza zvepo* comprises closely related kinsfolk of the ruling clans but are not their direct dependents, for instance, people whose mothers derive from the ruling lineages. Daughters from ruling lineages wield considerable influence when they get married and are normally referred to as *Vatete* (big Aunt). The *Vatete*, whose bride wealth is often used to obtain a wife for their brothers are more special and influential than the other women in the family who are normally referred to as *Chipanda* (those who have not generated bride wealth).

People who settled into the area during the 1990s are referred to as *Vawuyi* (the newcomers). They generally have less privileged access or influence and less land because of their latecomer status. Aliens from other countries, especially those of Malawian origin wield the least influence and status and they are referred to as *Vechirudzi*, a term that has negative connotations. In practice, those perceived to be less privileged often have tools, referred to by Scott (1985) as weapons of the weak, with which they incorporate themselves into the positions of influence within the local social fabric. For instance one woman of Malawian origin was elected into the position of treasurer for one of the community projects because it is believed that those people belonging to the *Vechirudzi* class are more

trustworthy with money since they generally have fewer relatives or friends in the community who may want to borrow money from the project coffers. It is worth noting that this social classification is by no means static and inflexible. Rather, it is an examination of one of the bases of justifying resource claims and related contestations. This social classification is based on very abstract notions of differentiation that have a mix of cultural foundations and longevity of residence in the area.

Livelihood sources

A number of livelihood sources were identified through the household livelihood survey and these are presented in Table 3.5. Rainfed cultivation is the major source of livelihood in Romwe and this is done along the valley floors. Major crops grown include maize, groundnuts, finger millet, sorghum, sunflower, rice, round nuts and increasingly people are growing cotton. Livestock rearing is the second major source of livelihood and grazing occurs in the densely wooded miombo woodlands on the hills. Households have small garden plots either close to their homestead and fed by wells or located near to key water points such as the dam and stream that runs through the village. Starting from 1991, households also own plots in community gardens that utilise water from communal water sources such as the collector well as in the case of Chidiso garden. A second community garden was established in 1998, which utilises water from Barura dam, located outside the biophysical catchment. Remittances from people working in towns and the sugar estates contribute significantly towards livelihood sustenance (Campbell, *et al*., 2001).

Table 3.5. *Analysis of household livelihood source and activities*

Livelihood source	**Activities**
Dryland agriculture	Production of maize, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, cotton and sunflower.
Gardening	Production of tomatoes, beans, okra, green leafy vegetables that include rape, choumolia and cabbage.
Livestock production	Rearing of cattle, donkeys, goats, pigs, and chicken.
Woodland use	Wood and non-wood products including timber, firewood, thatch grass, small game, fruits, fibre and mushrooms.
Home industry and wage labour	Cash paying jobs including carving, brick moulding, fixing bicycles/implements, making household utensils from scrap metal.
Remittances	Cash sent from family members not living within the village, *e.g.* working in urban centres or elsewhere outside the village.
Domestic related	Maintenance of basic household health and nutrition including preparing meals, housekeeping and construction, attending community meetings, leisure and education.

Source: Household Livelihood Survey, 1998-2000.

Woodlands provide an abundance of wild products that include wild vegetables, fruits, mushrooms and honey as these supplement household dietary requirements. People also use leaf litter from the woodlands as

manure in their crop fields and vegetable gardens. During times of food crisis such as 1991/1992 and the 2001/2002 droughts, other livelihood strategies are explored and these include migration to neighbouring areas to engage in gold panning and to South Africa to work on the commercial farms. It is often men who migrate to engage in these activities. The majority of those who move to South Africa in search of jobs are often considered illegal immigrants as they do not have work permits and therefore this is a risky enterprise. If caught by South African police they are often deported leaving behind the few belongings they would have acquired. If not caught, they are often underpaid because they do not have legal work permits and hence cannot bargain for better pay. In recent years, given the fluctuating value of the Zimbabwean dollar and the emergence of the parallel market, the little that people earn in South Africa makes a difference if converted to the Zimbabwean dollar at the parallel market rates.[30]

Access to markets

The Romwe catchment is relatively well positioned in relation to markets by Chivi district standards. Garden produce is largely traded at Museva business centre and Ngundu growth point[31], located about 5 km and 14 km respectively from Romwe catchment. Women and children generally walk to the points of sale, carrying what they will try and sell on a particular day. There are occasional trips by bus to Masvingo to sell tomatoes and other vegetables that have a market there and these trips are often needed as well to purchase commodity items and farm inputs. For the major cash crops such as cotton and maize, farmers sell their crops at Ngundu Halt where there are depots or where traders come to buy.

3.4 Summary

This chapter has discussed the qualitative methodology adopted for the study, and the various methods used for data collection in order to triangulate the information gathered. The methodological approach adopted for the study builds on the conceptual issues discussed in Chapter Two. In addition to data collected from the field, the chapter discusses the data collection process based on secondary sources such as archival records and documents kept at the RDC offices. The discussion on the historical narratives as a method for generating information on local perceptions of historical processes points to the importance of such narratives as tools for justifying individual or group claims over certain resources or leadership positions in a given context. The conclusion of the discussion on the importance of historical narratives is that they are part of deliberate discursive strategies of the various narrators to articulate and assert the

30 The official exchange rate of the South African Rand to the Zimbabwean dollar is R1=Z$6 yet on the parallel market it is R1 = Z$30 as of May 2002.

31 Growth points are centres that were initiated by the post-colonial government to spearhead development in rural areas through having such centres that could attract investors in the rural areas. These centres have access to electricity, telephones and sometimes banking facilities.

basis and legitimacy of their own claims to the woodland and water resources found in the area. Narratives are therefore used in this thesis as an analytical tool for understanding property relations and claims. The chapter also presented background information to the study site highlighting information relevant to the process of institutional analysis in the study area. This section outlined historical processes and policies that have influenced the institutional framework for natural resource management in the context of CBNRM. Historical data presented in the chapter is drawn from a combination of secondary sources and oral histories that were generated from key informants and archival data.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESOURCE MAPPING AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE ACCESS IN ROMWE

4.1. Introduction

This chapter provides background for understanding the relations that develop amongst various actors regarding access to woodlands and water. Woodlands and water use in Chivi district are critical for livelihoods because of the unreliability of rainfed agriculture. The patterns of access and use are illuminated through the actor-oriented and actor-network approaches. Situating use patterns within community livelihoods enables a proper understanding of who uses what resources, when and how. Exploring the importance of resources for different users provides an opportunity to identify potential impediments or challenges to the existing institutional framework for resource access. This chapter critically analyses local level institutions and authority systems relating to woodlands and water resources from the perspectives of the various actors and user groups. Access to resources is complex, embedded in social and power relations and also highly dynamic due to the constant interplay between agency and structure. Power relations are manifest in the various actors' quest for accessing natural resources for the sustenance of their livelihoods. These power relations may often lead to contestations and conflicts over resource access, use and/or over the way resources are managed.

Blanket categorisations of property rights into state, private, common and open access conditions discussed in Chapter Two often mask the complexity that occurs within each of these broad categories. Given the widespread use of the term 'common' in describing property relations under communal area settings, this may be misleading in that it often portrays an image of communal area landscapes as those of uniformity. These classifications hide considerable complexity especially with regards to who can access and harvest what range of resources, across sub-categories of communal area property relations. Access to natural resources such as woodlands and water takes place under conditions of both formal and informal regulation of property depending on the nature of tenure regimes that specify the conditions under which land is held and used (Matondi, 2001). The patterns of access evolve over time and tend to be determined by abundance, availability and the types of uses, *e.g.* domestic versus commercial purposes (Berry, 1993; North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). It is therefore a complex process to clearly define the manner in which access is determined because resource management and related institutions often have inbuilt dynamism that enables them to respond to changing policies, and socio-economic and environmental conditions (Matondi, 2001; Sithole, 1999).

Natural resource products such as those found in woodland areas have a diverse set of property regimes and are not necessarily accessible to every member of the user community. Access and user rights to such products tend to be embedded in household relations and sanctioned by community rules and regulations. The institutional framework guides and regulates social action and interaction of the actors that have rights to use these natural resources. While this is the case, individual actors create room for manoeuvre within the system so that they are able to meet their interest within the existing institutional framework. More often, access to natural resources shifts depending on the season or time of the year. For instance, during drought, rules of access may be more inclusive of actors who would normally be excluded from resource access or vice versa. Similarly, resource use boundaries across villages may be ignored during times of abundance to allow for resource sharing. Considering this flexibility in definition of resource user boundaries, it is argued that institutions exist to ensure sustainable use and management of natural resources in a given locality, although there may be some actors that transgress rules for a variety of reasons including holding a powerful position in the community and/or resource scarcity. It is therefore pertinent to understand how the institutional framework that governs access to woodlands and water also handles complexity and potential conflicts among the various resource users such as women, men, the rich, poor and people with different ethnic affiliations.

4.2 Woodlands and water resource mapping in Romwe

To understand the Romwe natural resource landscape, resource mapping exercises were undertaken, the results of which are presented in this section. Natural resources found within catchments have multiple uses and different management regimes that allow for access or denial of access. The use of resources also depends on one's ability to extract the resource and in some cases the ability to pay fees or pay in kind for extraction. Yet in some instances, it is rather one's talent that determines the ability to use the resources. Within the Romwe catchment there is multiple use of resource areas by different actors, who may compete over various uses of resources and employ various institutions to gain access to them. Access to the various resource areas is not open. There are restrictions regarding access to certain areas and/or certain natural resources both by the state and traditional leaders who use diverse cultural idioms to manage the resources (Mukamuri, 1995).

4.2.1 Woodland resource mapping

During the participatory rural appraisal workshops, the participants identified a number of woodlands resource areas and units. While five major resource areas were identified by separate groups of women and men, specific areas mentioned differed by group. Thus results from the two groups are presented in separate tables. Rules determining access to each of

the resource areas were also discussed by both groups as can be seen from Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Related rule enforcement structures are indicated in the tables.

Table 4.1. *Resource areas, products and rules identified by the women*

Resource Area	**Products/Uses**	**Rules governing access**
Mountain areas	- grazing - honey - thatching grass - mushrooms - indigenous fruit - fibre - grinding stones - timber for construction - firewood - leaf litter - *urimbo* for snaring birds	- for fruit, leaf litter, mushrooms, fibre, grinding stones, and *urimbo* there are no restrictions - thatching grass has to be cut when ripe but amount cut is not limited - to collect honey, ask for permission from *sabuku* if one plans to cut the tree - grazing during cropping season - collection of dead wood not restricted - get permission from *sabuku* for cutting poles and practice selective cutting - settlement restricted by *sabuku* - no starting of wildfires - Romwe mountain *sacred* and should be respected
Vleis (*mapani*)	- broom grass - thatching grass -vegetable gardens - wells - fruit - grazing - few fields	- not allowed to cut thatch grass near other people's fields or gardens without permission from owner - land for vegetable gardens is allocated by *sabuku* - free access to indigenous fruits except in gardens - grazing is open during dry season but cattle have to be guarded during cropping season - only Romwe residents use resources in these areas - wells are privately owned and access is determined by individual owners
Riverine areas	- water - fish - reeds for making baskets - gold - worms for use in fishing - river sand	- no use of nets and sacks for fishing - no use of poison to catch fish - gold panning is illegal, but is done especially during drought years - no rules given for river sand - people are free to dig as many worms as they want
Fields	- indigenous fruit - thatching grass - ground crickets - termites - locusts - crops	- trespassing during cropping season is an offence - free access to anyone during dry season - fruit collection limited to owner during cropping season - for thatching grass and ground crickets, field owner controls access - locust collection free for other village members - sale of indigenous fruits prohibited by *sabuku* - no field extension without consulting *sabuku* - no work in the fields on *chisi*, every Wednesday.
Homestead areas	- exotic and indigenous fruits - livestock - shelter - indigenous trees for shade	- parents restrict children from collecting fruits before they are ripe - neighbours are given fruits by homestead owner or they buy

The five resource areas identified by men include grazing land, homestead, and woodland areas, Romwe mountain, and other mountains. Products collected from the various resource areas and rules regulating access to these areas are presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2. *Resource areas, products and rules identified by the men's group*

Resource Area	**Products/Uses**	**Rules governing access**
Grazing land (in mountains, near fields, along contour ridges and waterways)	- grazing livestock - collection of wild fruits	- do not cause veld fires (a local DNR officer fines offenders Z$500[32] (US$9.00) while *sabuku*s charge two goats instead of one as is the case with other offences. - communities neighbouring Romwe catchment have access to grazing areas
Homestead areas	- crop fields - indigenous fruits - exotic fruits - private wells	- no harvesting of indigenous fruits from homestead trees without permission from owner. - no work in crop fields on *chisi*
Woodland areas	- indigenous fruits - wood for carving - timber for constructing - cotton loading ramps - poles for fencing and for construction - fuelwood - wood for firing bricks - medicinal plants (by herbalists).	- no cutting of fruit trees - no sale of indigenous fruits - *Afzelia quanzansis* should not be cut for carving - offenders should be reported to FC or DNR - people from neighbouring villages not allowed to cut poles/timber - no sale of firewood and poles outside Romwe area - certain tree species should not be used for firewood - seek permission from *sabuku* to cut wet wood for firing bricks
Romwe mountain	- traditional rituals - source of medicinal plants for traditional healers - leaf litter from parts not considered sacred - indigenous fruits	- no collection of firewood, timber for construction, poles and thatching grass - mountain should not be climbed for no reason - elderly men who carry out rituals here should not engage in sex the night before - no use of soap in sacred pools on the hill
Other mountains	- fibre - grazing - timber for construction - fruits - mushroom - leaf litter - honey - firewood	- no cutting of wet wood for fuel - no use of fire to fell trees or harvest honey - people from neighbouring villages are not allowed to collect large quantities of fire wood in one trip *e.g.* using scotchcarts - poles should be cut selectively

32 As of June 2002, the official exchange rate for the US$ to the Z$ was US$1 = Z$55.

While the women grouped all mountains together, the men separated the Romwe mountain, which is considered sacred, from the other mountains. But the women discussed the Romwe as being distinct from the other mountains. Riverine areas were categorised under grazing land by men, while women did not identify grazing areas as a separate resource area. The men's group placed fields under homestead areas, but women preferred to treat the two areas as separate resource areas. There were also differences relating to products mentioned that people collect from the various resource areas. For instance it is only the women's group that recorded collection of thatching grass and also mentioned grinding stones and broom grass. Differences in perceptions of women and men may be related to the way in which they value particular resource areas or products collected from the various areas and the nature of the division of labour in the household. Three main factors affect the values different resource users attach to woodlands products. Firstly, there is the general availability of the resource, which may be a function of the management regime or level of usage of that particular resource. Secondly, the value attached to a resource may be related to accessibility, which is often influenced by the institutional framework governing access to these resources. Thirdly, this may be related to the transaction costs of collecting the resource in terms of labour, time and effort that an individual or household has to put into collecting a particular resource. The relative need of a particular resource by an individual or household may also influence the way they value a particular resource. The needs of a particular individual or household may reflect livelihood strategies of the household, and the manner in which basic needs such as food, shelter and health are satisfied. It is worth noting that other factors that may influence how an individual or household values woodland resources may be associated with cultural identity, history and the symbolic nature of the resource.

It was noted that the majority of the woodland resource areas comprise fruit trees. The types of fruits differed from area to area, although some types could be found in more than one area. Indigenous fruits collected from the various resource areas are presented in Table 4.3. Some of the fruit trees in the homestead are predominantly exotic such as mango, guava, pawpaw, orange, banana, nartjies, lemon, *mexican* apple, peaches, grapes and avocado.

Hills and mountain areas are reported to have a wider variety of woodland resources that people prefer to use as compared to the other resource areas. People from neighbouring villages (beyond the social catchment villages, *e.g.* Maringire – about 15-20 km away) often come to the Romwe area to collect woodland products such as fibre, mushrooms and honey. These 'outsiders' are not allowed to cut timber, poles or firewood from the area. Asked how residents of the catchment felt about people coming to their area from other villages to collect woodland resources, they indicated that this is a tradition and besides most of the 'outsiders' often have relatives or friends residing in both the biophysical

and social catchment villages. Also the outsiders often make one-off collections and therefore local residents felt such collection might not have a negative impact on the resource base in a major way.

Table 4.3. *Important indigenous fruits found in the area*

Botanical name	**Local name**	**Where found**
Azanza garckeana	*Mutohwe*	Mountains, vleis, river banks and fields
Bauhinia thoningii	*Musekesa*	Mountain areas
Lannea discolor	*Mugan'acha*	Mountain areas
Ximenia caffra	*Munhengeni*	Mountains
Berchemia discolor	*Munyii*	Mountains and in fields
Strychnos spinosa	*Mutamba*	Fields and grazing areas
Adansonia digitata	*Muuyu*	Grazing areas and mountains
Cucumis anguria	*Mugaka*	Mountain areas
Ximenia Americana	*Mutsvanzvabere*	Mountain areas
Syzigium guineense	*Mukute*	Vleis and river banks
Diospyros mespiliformis	*Mushuma*	Vleis, river banks and fields
Ziziphus mucronata	*Muchechete*	Homesteads
Sclerocarya birrea	*Mupfura*	Fields, vleis and mountains
Fiscus spp.	*Muonde*	Fields
Parinari curatelifolia	*Muhacha*	Fields (considered sacred species)
Ziziphus mauritiania	*Musawu*	Homesteads

Villagers from the Romwe area, especially men, also go to other villages for resources, such as gold panning during drought years as well as fishing. Thus there is resource sharing across villages. Problems may arise if 'outsiders' break resource use rules. Then they are often taken to the headman or the chief because the *sabuku*'s *dare* (traditional village court) can only try people under his village. Beyond his 'book' (village) it is the responsibility of the headman. If the offender belongs to a village that falls outside the headman's jurisdiction, then the Chief tries the case. Asked about when this last occurred, none of the participants could remember. It is something that rarely happens. This point highlights the need to take cognisance of the challenge that Cheater (1986:22) refers to as the 'perennial problem of trying to close the gap between what people say should be done and what they actually do' which is conceptualised as the difference between the ideal management scenario and the actual management system in place. For instance, if examples of cases that had been taken to the chief for adjudication had not been solicited, one would get the impression that this often happens, yet respondents were in actual fact articulating what should be done.

The exclusiveness[33] of property rights generally varies between the resource areas. In household plots, resources tend to be domesticated exotic species and exclusivity is generally within the household. However, in communal woodland and riverine areas, resources are generally indigenous

33 The term exclusiveness is used to refer to right of harvest *i.e.* who is allowed to harvest a product.

species, that are for use by all village members. In sacred areas such as the Romwe mountain, the resources that can be accessed have traditionally been limited and in the past villagers feared any unapproved resource use. Fear of resource use in the sacred areas was rooted in the culture[34] of the indigenous people, the Shona, which has a strong belief in the spirits and the spirit world. The spirit world is believed to provide guardianship over the living, and thus should be revered. The basis of the sacredness of areas under ritual designations therefore arises from their role as homes of the spirits or places where offerings are made to the spirits. Sacredness has traditionally had ecological benefits for the environment as it resulted in the maintenance of biodiversity in those areas designated as sacred (Matowanyika, 1991).

Grazing resources in woodlands and riverine areas could be taken to constitute open access resources, but villagers often put in place systems of controls designed to curtail open access and unrestricted use. In Romwe, many of the villages have grazing areas, which they can relatively clearly define, without numerous differences of opinion regarding boundary definition. In practice, grazing in the commons constitutes privatisation of such resources by livestock-owning households. This is because non-livestock owners have less claim over and use of the grazing areas. In addition to the grazing areas, stover left in the fields in the post-harvest period also constitutes a common pool resource for all livestock owners. However, some households secure such resources as private property, either through fencing or through storage of the stover on elevated wooden platforms (*matara*) from which they can control the off take.

The main woodland management problems include reduction of indigenous trees available in the woodlands, settlement and cultivation on fragile areas (such as stream bank cultivation), less respect for sacred areas as compared to the past (the exception being the sacred pool in Romwe), starting wildfires and general population pressure on the resources. Historical trends show that resource availability patterns have changed over the years, although relative to other communal areas in Chivi district, Romwe is viewed as having abundant woodland resources (Mapaure *et al*., 1995).

4.2.2. Historical trends in woodlands resource availability

This section discusses changes in woodland resource availability in Romwe, from the local people's perceptions. One of the conclusions from the baseline vegetation survey carried out by the CEH in 1995 is that 'the vegetation of the Romwe catchment is still in relatively good condition despite the long history of settlement by people in the early 1950s' (Mapaure *et al*., 1995:12). Community members also indicate that

34 In this study culture is treated not just as something embodied in values, beliefs or accepted practices, but as both an issue of representation and a process that goes beyond the reified and static traditions to include everyday social processes, practices and experiences.

woodland products are still relatively abundant. Although there have been changes in quantities of woodland resources available over the years, the only problems of scarcity reported during this study were land for cultivation and settlement for younger couples. Table 4.4 shows women's and men's perceptions of resource availability trends beginning in the 1950s.

Table 4.4. *Perceptions of historical trends of woodland resource availability in Romwe*

	1950s & 1960s		**1970s**		**1980s**		**1990s**	
Product	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Firewood	25	20	17	16	5	10	3	4
Grazing area	30	30	14	10	4	7	2	3
Timber for construction	25	35	15	10	7	4	3	1
Sacred areas (level of sacredness)	20	47	15	1	9	1	6	1
Sale of wood for carving	6	5	10	5	15	20	19	20
Tree species for carving	28	45	16	2	4	2	2	1
Crop fields availability	30	40	10	7	8	2	2	1
Gardens	2	2	9	3	12	10	31	35
Wild fruits	30	45	11	3	5	1	4	1
Game	30	N/A	10	N/A	7	N/A	3	N/A

Source: PRA workshop, January 1999.

Four key time periods were defined by the participants and were used to discuss changes in the use and availability of different resources found in the catchment area. A total score of 50 was used for each product. Scores were distributed across the time periods agreed upon by the group. A higher score means higher availability except in the case of woodcarving where a higher score shows that the activity is more prevalent. The results presented in Table 4.4 reveal women's and men's perceptions regarding resource availability. From the group discussions, it became apparent that availability is not only measured in terms of the quantity of the resource but also in terms of the quality of the resource. Regarding quality of the resource, this relates to whether the preferred species is available or not, although there may be alternatives. Crop fields and gardens are included in the table because they are closely linked to availability of woodland resources and clearing land for fields may negatively affect availability of woodland products.

From the local people's perceptions, the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by abundance of natural resources when the people had just settled in the area. During the mid to late 1960s, the government initiated a

villagisation programme, which resulted in centralisation that located villages in straight lines, leading to the demarcation of land into grazing, farming and residential areas. This process had some negative impact on the natural resources as people had to clear new land for settlement and crop fields. During this period, firewood could be collected *pose-pose* (everywhere) *e.g.* around homesteads, in crop fields. There was very little crossing of village boundaries because each village, including villages neighbouring Romwe, had abundant resources.

Regarding grazing, during the 1950s/60s, the area that stretches from Mapande mountain to the present day Ngundu growth point was used as grazing land. Livestock also grazed in the vleis (*mapani*). There were no boundaries as far as grazing was concerned. Livestock were free to graze anywhere, except in crop fields during the cropping season. Certain areas were considered sacred. For instance, Siyawaraira mountain was considered sacred and no 'silly talk' was allowed while on the mountain as this could result in one getting lost on the mountain for a day or two. The *Parinari curatellifolia* (*muhacha*) tree that is located at the present campsite for researchers (referred to as 'Patrick's house'[35]) was considered sacred and the place where it is located used for traditional rainmaking ceremonies. This *Parinari curatellifolia* is no longer considered sacred and local people say this is because *wakafumurwa nevarungu* (it was undressed by the researchers) when they built their campsite where the tree is located. Informants claimed that during the 1950s/60s, these areas were very sacred and local spirits would mete out mysterious punishment to violators of the rules. The original Karanga inhabitants of the area strongly believed in the powers of the sacred areas but the immigrants of the 1950s, especially the Ndebele speaking ones, did not strongly believe in the supernatural powers of the sacred areas. Elderly men in group discussions accused the young generation of causing decay in the sacredness of the areas. The youth said that since the spirits were said to have traditionally protected the sacred areas, why were they not doing the same now.

The 1970s period is classified as the 'war period'. This period witnessed some minor downward trend in resource availability. This was related to lack of enforcement of government conservation laws while at the same time the traditional leaders on the ground were ignored and threatened by the liberation fighters because they were seen as an extension of the colonial government. During this period crop fields began to expand into grazing areas. Firewood and timber were still relatively abundant during this period. The 1980s saw natural resources, especially woodlands, being used indiscriminately because of the spirit of independence (*madiro* – do as you like). This period is referred to by the community as *mazvakemazvake* (each man for himself). During the 1980s, there were severe droughts, *e.g.*

35 The campsite continues to be referred to as '*panogara varungu* (where the white men live), or kwaPatrick' – a former CEH researcher from the UK, even four years after no white person has permanently resided there and the IES researchers of African origin resides at the site full time.

the 1982 drought, erratic rains and an increase in human population, partly due to returning refugees and people strategising to get land during the peak of the spirit of independence. This resulted in pressure on the woodland resources. Crop fields were further expanded into grazing areas to accommodate young couples and the fields came to take up substantial portions of the grazing areas. It was noted that scores in Table 4.4 show that areas originally designated for crop fields are becoming scarce and this explains the expansion of crop fields in areas originally designated for livestock grazing. There was also a shift from the traditional pole and dagga houses to brick houses and this resulted in wet wood being cut for firing bricks. Some fruit tree species began to be used for firewood. This is when the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the RDC came up with rules prohibiting cutting of live trees.

The 1990s was seen as the worst period in local history. In addition to increased pressure on the available woodland resources, many households also lost access to remittances that had traditionally been a major source of income for them. This was a result of companies closing down, often associated with the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) launched in 1990. Some retrenchees came back home and engaged in farming. This further reduced grazing land available in the area. While grazing areas were shrinking as a result of encroachment, the 1991/92 droughts reduced the livestock numbers, thereby reducing pressure on grazing land. Firewood collection extended into the hills and some of the traditionally sacred tree species were being used for cooking. Preferred timber species are now scarce and farmers have switched to using less preferred species including eucalyptus trees. Given that access to timber is restricted for 'outsiders', people from villages outside the social catchment villages such as Museva and Maringire hire locals to cut timber for them since it is relatively available in Romwe as compared to other villages. While the men's group indicated that 'outsiders' (people from outside the social catchment) only come to collect fibre, women differed from men on this point. From the women's perspective, the so-called fibre collectors do not just collect fibre but also a host of other woodland products such as mushrooms, *mopane* worms and wild fruits. In the majority of cases, these 'outsiders' to do not consult local leaders before they collect the products, but go to the mountains and collect whatever resources they want. It was claimed that it is often not easy to monitor resource use in the mountains, as these areas are secluded. It is easier near settled areas where there is always movement of people and it is therefore easy to spot any offenders.

During the 1950s and 1960s, certain tree species were preferred for timber and firewood while some were regarded as sacred, as shown in Table 4.5. It is important to note that the tree species presented in Table 4.5 do not constitute an exhaustive list of all tree species used in the area, but rather it is made up of tree species considered relatively more important than other tree species found in the catchment for use as firewood, timber and those considered sacred.

Table 4.5: *Firewood, timber and sacred species*

Botanical name	Vernacular	Use/Comment
Julbernardia globiflora	*Mutondo*	Timber for construction
Brachystegia glaucescens	*Muuzhe*	Firewood, bark for fibre, fodder
Dichrostachys cinera	*Mupangara*	Firewood: produces good charcoal. Also used to test luck
Pseudolachnostylis maprouneifolia	*Mushozhowa*	Sacred - will cause family fights if used in for firewood
Peltophorum africanum	*Muzeze*	Sacred – used by traditional healers to cleanse evil spirits
Euphorbia confinalis	*Chikondekonde*	Sacred – not to be used for firewood
	Chizhuzhu	Sacred – used as brushwood to cover graves
	Chitarara	Sacred – causes fights in the home if used for firewood
Lonchocarpus capassa	*Mupanda*	Sacred- used during burial ceremonies
Burkea africana	*Mukarati*	Sacred – not to be used for firewood
Terminalia serecea	*Mususu*	Timber, firewood and leaves for cough medicine, yokes
Dalbergia melanoxylon	*Murwiti*	Timber for construction
Colospemum mopane	*Mupani*	Timber and firewood and hardwood for furniture
Afzelia quanzensis	*Mukamba*	Carpentry, carvings (high value). Said to be the chief's shade

For tree species believed to be sacred, misfortunes were believed to follow people who failed to observe the traditional beliefs relating to these sacred tree species. Fruit trees could not be used for firewood because wild fruits constituted a big proportion of local diets especially during times of drought. Traditional leaders, in collaboration with religious/spiritual leaders formulated the rules that determined access to different resources. Timber for construction was collected in the valleys and lower parts of the mountains.

4.2.3. Enforcement of rules for access to woodlands

A wide array of rules and regulations governing access to woodlands were highlighted during group discussions and key informant interviews. Although rules and regulations can be of recent origin, rules outlined by villagers in Romwe appear to be rooted in the Shona culture, having been inherited from ancestors, for instance those rules relating to sacred areas. The Ndebeles therefore often ignore such rules. Rules narrated by people do not necessarily relate to the RDC by-laws. A few rules such as restrictions on cutting live trees are similar to those found in the by-laws, but it is not clear whether they have been received from the RDC, because in the villages, these were associated with either the traditional authorities or DNR. Contrary to Mandondo's (2001) findings in Mutangi catchment,

where people clearly articulate RDC by-laws, in Romwe there was vague knowledge of the by-laws except in the case of the councillor and VIDCO chairman. Even other members of the VIDCO were not conversant with the RDC by-laws and subsequently there is limited enforcement. The VIDCO chairman suggested that there is no incentive to enforce the RDC by-laws because 'we do not benefit anything from them'. From the VIDCO chairman's perspective, councillors try to enforce them because they are paid monthly allowances by the RDC but other VIDCO members do not receive any remuneration. In addition, there was a general feeling that paying fines at the RDC is not fair because 'the tree would have been cut from our area'. From the local people's perspective, the fine should be paid locally to the *sabuku*. If an individual breaks some traditional rule, he/she is first given a warning if it is considered a minor offence. If the offence is repeated then the *sabuku* would usually make him/her pay a fine of a goat and this goat is consumed at the *dare* (village court). Thus local people tend to benefit in the case of justice meted out by the traditional leaders, unlike paying fines at the RDC.

The rules that are enforced by traditional authorities and are usually adhered to include those for not starting bush fires and for not harvesting restricted tree species such as *Afzelia quanzensis* (*mukamba*). Cases were reported of individuals who had started bush fires and were fined a goat by the *sabuku*s. Villagers confirmed they had 'eaten the goats' at the *sabuku*'s *dare*. One man was made to pay a fine of Z$500 (US$9.00 at the official exchange rate of US$1 = Z$55) by Chief Madzivire for starting a bush fire in 1997. More cases of people fined for cutting *Afzelia quanzensis* were reported during the study. For instance one woman said her son was caught cutting an *Afzelia quanzensis* tree near her homestead in July 2000 by the *sabuku*'s police. He was taken to the *sabuku* and was made to pay a fine of Z$50 (US$0.90). Another case reported was that of two brothers from Sihambe village who were found cutting an *Afzelia quanzensis* tree in Tamwa village by the *sabuku*'s police in November 2000. Because the case involved two villages, *i.e.* Tamwa and Sihambe, it was taken to headman Chikanda. The two brothers were earlier fined Z$500 (US$9.00) each. Their mother claimed that this was an unfair judgement partly because the court had been held in the absence of the boys' father who worked in town. Rather than waiting for the father to return home and resume the case, the headman decided to reduce the fine from Z$500 to Z$50 (US$9.00 to US$0.90) each, subsequently their mother paid the fine. It is worth noting that there are discrepancies in the amounts reported as fines during the group discussions and the actual amounts that people pay. During group discussions, reference was made to fines of Z$500 (US$9.00) or a goat, but data on people who have actually been fined show that the majority were made to pay not more than Z$50 (US$0.90). Enforcement processes are also complex in that judgement is often made case by case, not according to some standard procedure, but rather based on norms that are applied in a flexible manner.

Another rule that is often flouted relates to restriction on establishment of homesteads in woodland and grazing areas. In practice, the establishment of homesteads in woodland areas does occur, regardless of the restrictions against such practice. Such restrictions are part of the national land allocation laws that are geared to controlling illegal settlements. The Communal Lands Act of 1982 vests the custodianship of land in the communal areas in the President, but it devolves the administration of such land to RDCs (prior to the enactment of the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998). The RDCs in Zimbabwe are therefore *de jure* land authorities that oversee the allocation of land and establishment of new settlements in communal areas, a role that was played by chiefs during certain periods of the colonial era. Theoretically, a land allocation committee comprising local councillors, (mostly from the ruling ZANU PF party), war veterans of the liberation struggle and in some cases self-proclaimed war veterans, and officials from the RDC and Department of Agriculture, Technical and Extension Services (Agritex -the national agricultural extension agency) is vested with powers to evaluate and approve new settlements in Chivi district, but in practice, this committee is inactive. *De facto*, it is the *sabuku*s who appear to have the most say in land allocation. Sales of land are prohibited but in practice, people often sell arable and residential units under the guise of charging only for improvements made on the land. Gardens in riverine areas can also be exchanged in the same manner.

Locally, encroachment into grazing and woodland areas is blamed on the poor government resettlement programme. Consequently, offenders are often not tried because it is believed they are trying to make a living for themselves and their families. The fast track resettlement programme initiated in 2000, gave some farmers, especially the young generation some hope to 'own'[36] (have access to) land. Currently in Romwe, the majority of the young men have been allocated some plots within their parents' fields and some have encroached into the grazing areas or are leasing land on an annual basis from other farmers. Given the opportunity to 'own' land under the fast track resettlement programme, some Romwe farmers moved to the new areas (the commercial farms) with mixed results. Two of those who moved to Chinhoyi (about 500 km to the north west of Romwe) have managed to secure land and it is believed they got it because they are related to a government official. Their elder brother works as a central intelligence officer in Chinhoyi town, the district centre under which the two brothers got land. As one farmer summed it up, 'it all depends on who you know and not what you know'. For those who tried their luck, without any links with government officials or other influential people, they were back in the village by June 2002, most with feelings of betrayal as can be

36 Legally, in Zimbabwe, all land belongs to the head of state. Theoretically, in rural areas, the RDC, through the ward councillor, is mandated to allocate land. However, traditional leaders such as the *sabuku*, are the *de facto* land allocators. Once allocated a piece of land, be it for farming or settlement, farmers assume 'ownership' of that land. They can develop it, pass it on to their children or relatives and lease it out.

seen in cases 4.1 and 4.2 of Mr. C. Lunga's[37] and Mr Charewa's experiences. These two cases illustrate what a number of other people in the catchment have experienced. Given the above scenario, local institutional arrangements may not be able to deal with cases of encroachment into woodland and grazing areas because the underlying problem of land shortage has not been dealt with. The cases also illustrate the point highlighted earlier that institutions for woodland and water management are not only meant for the management of these particular resources but also cater for various other community concerns such as securing arable land for the young generation. Encroachment is not restricted to grazing areas, but extends to other landscapes as well, for instance sacred areas.

Two cases of farmers' experience with the fast track resettlement programme

> **Case 4.1:** *Fast track resettlement: A window of opportunity for the landless or just a wild goose chase*?
>
> Mr C. Lunga is one of the young farmers in Romwe who is landless because he and his wife do not 'own' land for cropping. Each cropping season, he leases land from other farmers within the catchment area or in the neighbouring social catchment villages. His parents also live in the catchment. Unlike him, they have land, but not enough to subdivide and allocate him a small piece, as in the case of other parents. In September 2000, Lunga was enticed by the government's call for applications for land for resettlement and applied. The process of applying was very costly as he made several trips to Masvingo town (about 90 km away) to get application forms, complete the forms and he also paid for technical advice on developing the cash flow budgets needed in the forms from Agri-business departments of commercial banks. When he submitted the forms, he thought the process of approving the forms would be 'fast tracked' as that was the message they were receiving from government departments. This was not to be and in January 2001, he decided to join war veterans who were taking over some farms in Shurugwi district (coincidentally where his parents were relocated from in the early 1950s). The war veterans were allocating plots to interested individuals. He was allocated a piece of land on a commercial farm that had been 'acquired' by the government. Lunga started to look for a buyer for his old homestead in Romwe, but before he could find a buyer, he and other farmers who had been allocated plots at the Shurugwi farm

37 Where people's names are used in the cases, these are pseudonyms used to protect the privacy of the respondents.

were chased away by government officials 'because they had not followed the right procedure' in acquiring that land. Lunga came back and started renovating his houses that he had earlier deserted. Asked about his view on the fast track resettlement programme, he could only say '*zveminda ndezvekungovharana chete, hapana nyaya apa*!' (Fast track resettlement is a joke; they are not serious about it.) From Lunga's perspective, the farm was taken over by a government official.

Case 4.2: *Even war vets get trapped by their own trap*

Mr Charewa is one of the locals who claims to be a war veteran. He 'owns' about 6 hectares of arable land in Romwe. In May 2000, at the height of farm occupations, he went to occupy a 'very fertile' farm in Zvishavane district. The farm owner was asked to leave the farm by the war veterans. The whole of 2000, Charewa was at the farm where he claims that he had been made the 'base commander'. When the cropping season came, he grew maize and cotton and he claims that he spent more than Z$7000 (US$127.00) to have the land cleared, tilled and to buy inputs. Meanwhile his entire family remained in Romwe where they continued cropping their Romwe field. Rumour was rife in Romwe that Charewa had married a second wife to assist him on the farm plot in Zvishavane. However, before the crops were ready, a political heavy weight cum-business man in the district literally chased them away because 'that farm was part of his estate'. The businessman owns a farm adjacent to the farm Charewa and others had occupied. He claimed that he was leasing the farm to the former commercial farmer and if the land occupiers kept 'squatting' on his farm, it was against the government's black empowerment policy. His comment on the whole process after returning to Romwe was '*Paya takatambwa, ndakarasa mari yangu yakawanda chaizvo. Ndezvenyika izvi, hapana zvekuita*' (We were cheated in Zvishavane I lost a lot of money on that farm. It is all politics, there is nothing I can do about it.)

Source: Key informant interviews with returnees from the farms, June 2002.

During the early stages of the research, villagers indicated that rules relating to sacred areas are still adhered to, in particular for Romwe mountain and that these areas are highly revered. Later follow-up key informant interviews revealed otherwise. There is now less respect for sacred areas as evidenced by the collection of products from areas traditionally regarded as sacred. Reasons given for loss of respect for sacred areas in recent years include the presence of fewer elderly people in

the community who are conversant with the rites and ceremonies that should be undertaken at sacred sites. Church members are also accused of contributing towards the loss of respect for the sacred hills as some of them go and hold night prayers in those hills considered as sacred. This is regarded as *kufumura panoyera* (undressing the sacred site). In other cases, the sacred areas have been redefined or renegotiated, shifting the original boundaries of the sacred spheres, as illustrated in case 4.3 on the encroachment into the Romwe mountain. Encroachment into sacred areas is also blamed on resource scarcity in the area.

Case 4.3: *Encroachment into sacred areas: The case of Romwe mountain*

The Romwe mountain was cited as one of the sacred areas in the catchment. Traditionally, rain making ceremonies and other rituals were done on this mountain under the guidance of cultural and traditional leaders who are the original inhabitants of the area. Prior to independence in 1980, the mountain was said to have been so sacred that spirits would mete out severe punishment to all offenders. Fruits, timber for construction and firewood could not be collected from the mountain then. Due to scarcity of certain resources in the area that can be found in Romwe mountain, farmers have started to encroach on the mountain area. It started with collection of fruit and firewood from the periphery of the surrounding hills, then onto the mountain itself. The villagers reclassified the smaller hill into a less sacred area and coined a new name for that hill – now referred to as *ChanachaRomwe* (literally meaning Romwe's child). Thus *ChanachaRomwe* is not viewed as sacred anymore. As resources get depleted from *ChanachaRomwe*, villagers are beginning to encroach on the big Romwe mountain. The new view is that the only sacred area on the mountain is the pool where traditional ceremonies were performed. Fruit, timber for construction and firewood are being collected on Romwe mountain, a thing that was unheard of in the 1950s-1960s.

When invading the sacred areas, there seems to be a certain pattern followed. In most cases, it is the young boys who take cattle for grazing in the sacred areas. The boys in the process, harvest fruits from the sacred areas. Next they collect fibre to make whips to drive cattle, and then pick up a log of dead wood at the end of the day to assist their parents with firewood. Women and girls follow, collecting head loads of dry wood. Finally, men will follow with the axe cutting poles for construction and wet wood to stockpile at home for use during the rainy season. Once men have joined in, the whole sacred area becomes what can be termed an open access

resource because the resource management regime appears to have broken down.

The Romwe mountain case shows that there has been gradual undermining of the sacredness of Romwe mountain and this is attributed to resource scarcity and/or the distance that people have to walk to areas that are not sacred to collect products such as firewood. The traditional leadership who are the custodians of culture do not punish those who encroach into the sacred areas. This could be influenced by the presence of immigrant leaders who do not recognise these places as sacred. The Romwe mountain is located in an area that falls under *sabuku* Sihambe. When asked about the sacredness of the Romwe mountain and why there was encroachment onto the mountain, the *sabuku* had two explanations for this. First was that, in their former area of settlement in the Midlands province, they knew that the only sacred mountain was eNjelele (named the Matopos Hills during the colonial period) and it was not the case that every small hill was sacred. Thus when they moved into this area and were told by the headman and Chief that the Romwe mountain was sacred they did not understand why, but decided since they were 'visitors' in the area, they would respect these areas anyway. Second, when foreign-based researchers started working in the area, they would climb the mountain and do whatever they wanted with nothing happening to them. Yet they were told that if one engaged in an activity that violated the sacredness of the mountain such as cutting a tree, they would disappear. People started encroaching onto the mountain and when nothing happened to the first offenders, others followed suit.

Although rules and rule-enforcement structures exist for woodland use and management, there appears to be mainly opportunistic enforcement of such rules. In cases where rules and regulations are enforced, this sometimes gets entangled in contestations arising from different standards of rulings made in the past and in differential treatment of different people *e.g.* differences in power, interests, values and inconsistencies in the enforcement of the rules. An example of inconsistency in rule enforcement is the case of the two brothers from Sihambe discussed earlier. The existence of a variety of bodies with overlapping and competing claims to authority *e.g. sabuku*s versus VIDCOs, as will be shown later in the chapter, may also add complexity to the enforcement of the rules and regulations relating to woodland use and management. This may in the long run have negative implications for the sustainable use and management of the woodland resources.

4.2.4 Water Resources Mapping

Few studies exist that have focused on institutional arrangements for water management in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. Key studies by Sithole (2001 & 1999), focused on water sources found in wetland areas in communal areas. Another recent study by Matondi (2001) focused on

institutional arrangements as they relate to irrigation schemes. My study focuses on all water sources found within a catchment, including wetlands and those sources used for garden irrigation. The study also investigates reciprocity between well owners and non-well owners. Two broad categories of water sources were identified during the resource mapping exercise; community owned and privately owned water sources. Community owned water sources include boreholes, dams (in particular Barura dam), streams, and deep wells. There are 36 privately owned wells in the biophysical catchment with various uses and users. Privately owned water sources are mainly in the form of deep wells. These have different institutional arrangements compared to community water sources. Institutional arrangements governing use of community water sources differ depending on the type of the source. Women, the main collectors of water, spend a lot of their time collecting water largely because of the volumes needed for domestic use, as can be seen from Figure 4.1.



Figure 4.1. Contribution (%) of household members to domestic water collection 1999-2000 (Source: Sullivan *et al*., 2001[38])

A variety of water sources are used to meet domestic water requirements. These include boreholes, riverbed wells, river, wells and the dam. Wells are used more frequently for domestic purposes during the wet season and boreholes are used more frequently during the dry season as some wells have low water levels during the dry season. Although a well may be privately owned, a number of households other than the well owner have

38 Drawing from results of the 1999-2000 Household Livelihood Survey carried out in Romwe.

access to the well. While wells are the major source of water for domestic purposes, other water sources provide a diversity of sources providing livelihood options and security.

The diversity of household water sources increases household food security as members engage in a variety of activities including irrigated gardening. The success of irrigated gardening in semi-arid regions, as is the case in Romwe, largely depends on access to reliable water sources. The need for consistent water sources may explain why many households sink their own wells where feasible or maintain good relations with relatives or neighbours who own wells so that they can access water for vegetable production, especially during the dry season.

Community owned water sources

Different villages use community-owned water sources for various purposes and during different times of the year. Boundaries of water resource use, though known, shift depending on the type of the water source, the use of that particular source and the season. A variety of rules and regulations apply to the different community-owned water sources. Some rules are generic whilst others are specific to the type of water sources. Table 4.6 shows the water source, uses and the rules that apply to each of the sources. Overall, the rules and regulations that apply to community-owned water sources are not written down but they are known in the community. The following sections discuss each of the water sources presented in Table 4.6.

Boreholes

Whereas a borehole may be located in one village, that village allows neighbouring villages access to it. This is not a written contract, but an informal arrangement. In years with good rains (*e.g.* above about 650 mm per annum), rules relating to the use of boreholes apply equally to locals and outsiders (Table 4.6). These rules are enforced more vigilantly during times of water scarcity. Examples of rules that have been agreed upon by the community relate to general hygiene around the boreholes *e.g.* not to do laundry at the boreholes. In low rainfall years communities may institute rules that regulate the amount of water collected, frequency of collection, the uses to which the water is put and the number of villages that can use a particular borehole. The use of 200 litre drums for collecting water, for example, is strongly discouraged if there are signs that underground water reserves are running out. In addition, during times of water shortage farmers are not allowed to use borehole water for watering fruit or other trees being grown. In all cases these rules are not written down but community members seem to know them well and appear to follow them.

Table 4.6. *Community water sources, uses and rules regulating access*

Water source	**Uses**	**Rules and regulations**
Boreholes	Domestic purposes (drinking, cooking and laundry) Watering project garden	Cleanliness should be maintained around the boreholes. The borehole pump should not be hit against the ground. No one is allowed to do laundry at the boreholes. Brick moulding is not allowed at the borehole. No use of drums to fetch water unless there is a funeral or big function. Every borehole user should contribute money for repairs. If children "play" with the pump, parents are fined Z$10 (US$0.18).
Barura dam	Livestock watering Brick moulding Laundry Community garden project	Livestock to use designated gates to control soil erosion. Every household that uses the dam should pay a yearly subscription fee of $5 (US$0.09). No cattle grazing around the dam to prevent soil erosion and dam siltation. No brick moulding at the dam site, individuals should fetch water and mould at some other location. No cutting of wet wood near the dam for firing bricks. Laundry should not be done near the dam, it should be done at least 30 m from the dam. Tamwa village is allowed to do laundry throughout the year while Dobhani uses the dam during the dry season. Privately owned vegetable gardens should be established far from the dam. No cultivation in the immediate surrounding of the dam.
Deep wells (Type 1, closed)	Laundry, cooking	Laundry should be done at least 50 m from the well. No brick moulding. No gardening. The *sabuku* and his subjects set rules. No one has been fined so far as people observe the rules due to close kinship ties.
Deep wells (Type 2: open)	Brick moulding House construction	No rules in place -*chero vanochaya zvidhina zekutengesa ndipo pavanoenda*- even people who mould bricks for sale use water from this well. Drinking water from the open well is discouraged as it may be contaminated.
Mawunga stream	Livestock watering Laundry Bathing Make bricks Irrigation	Free access- no controls/rules.

If there is a critical shortage of water in some villages, especially during the dry season, rules regarding who can have access to water are relaxed to accommodate unfortunate neighbours. Similarly if a neighbouring village's borehole breaks down, access is given to them to collect water from a catchment borehole. As one old man put it, 'if the borehole in Vhudzi village breaks down, how can we let them suffer? We allow them to fetch

water from our borehole'. In the case of the boreholes in Romwe, management committees have been set up with the assistance of external support agencies such as the CEH of the United Kingdom, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and the District Development Fund (DDF). In theory, their mandate is to enforce the rules regulating access to these water sources, but in practice these committees were found ineffective. For instance, the Chidiso borehole committee failed to repair a borehole during a four-year period, yet only a bolt costing less than US$5.00 was needed. The committees are made up of five members, namely, the chairperson, vice chairperson, treasurer, secretary, and pump minders or borehole police. The composition of these committees was found to be gender balanced. While there are different committees for the different community owned water sources, some individuals are found in more than one committee. Sithole (1999) reports that to avoid leadership conflicts, villagers may elect the same people into different committees. If the borehole committee tries a case and the offender refuses to comply with the ruling of the committee, the *sabuku*s (who constitute the bulk of the Catchment Management Committee[39]) are requested to intervene. This arrangement is meant to ensure that people respect the committees in place as they have the backing of the local leaders.

Access to water sources is constantly negotiated and renegotiated depending on the nature of water use at a particular time. This point is illustrated by the case of Chidiso borehole. The Chidiso collector well (commonly referred to as a borehole by community members), was constructed in 1994. The borehole is located in Sihambe village. It has two hand pumps. Originally one was meant for household consumption while the other was meant for irrigating crops in the Chidiso vegetable garden. Unfortunately due to frequent breakdown of the hand pumps, only one of the hand pumps is usually working at any one time, and serves both of the purposes for which the well was designed (household consumption and irrigation). The three biophyisical catchment villages are the main users of this borehole. Two other villages, from the social catchment, Matenhese and Puche, normally collect water for domestic use from the Chidiso collector well if their boreholes are not functioning. The catchment villages use water from the collector well mainly for irrigation purposes in the community garden (Chidiso) and for domestic purposes such as cooking and washing.

All users of a particular borehole are expected to pay a yearly contribution (*e.g.* Z$5 for Tamwa borehole). The money is in theory used for repairing the borehole if it breaks down. However it is difficult to mobilise all the users, as some people are less frequent users than others. For instance, at Chidiso borehole some farmers use water from the borehole specifically for domestic purposes while others use it for both

39 This committee has the overall mandate to oversee use and management of all natural resources in the catchment area.

domestic and gardening purposes. The latter is a more important economic use than the former. Thus when it comes to paying yearly levies, community members who use the borehole for gardening usually pay the money as the borehole is more important to them than it is to the other group, which can look for alternative water sources. For domestic use only, people can rely on wells, most of which do not have enough water to sustain vegetable production at the village level. Women predominantly engage in vegetable production.

Barura Dam

Barura dam has a large sphere of influence in terms of the people who use it. The CARE-supported garden that is irrigated using water from the dam adds an extra dimension to the users and uses of the dam. The three catchment villages use the dam mainly for irrigating their crops in the community garden and for watering their livestock. Other villages, shown in Figure 4.2 use the dam, mainly in the dry season. Many committees influence the operation of the dam. The number of committees (dam, agronomy, conservation committees) related to the dam in one way or another indicates the different stakeholder groupings at the dam. The committees, in consultation with farmers, set rules that regulate the way farmers use the dam. It is worth noting that the jurisdictions of the committees tend to overlap. and this could potentially cause conflict amongst the various committees.

As can be seen from Figure 4.2, the ten social catchment villages have access to Barura dam. While members of the social catchment villages can use the dam water for watering livestock and other domestic uses, they are not accorded the right to use the dam for purposes such as fishing or collecting large volumes of water. However, during droughts, use rights for specific purposes may be extended to other villages (outside the social catchment villages) for example, for watering livestock and for domestic use. The decision to accord access to the dam during droughts to villages that would normally not use the dam during a normal rainy season is often spearheaded by the *sabuku*s after consultation with village elders and other community members. Often the *sabuku* of a village needing water makes a request to the concerned catchment village *sabuku* and then the request is discussed with the other two catchment villages' *sabuku*s, and then forwarded to the village elders. Following that, a community meeting is called to inform other community members about the request and a resolution is passed as to whether or not the village requesting access to the dam should be granted the permission to do so. Because water is considered *hupenyu* (life), there has been no case of denying another village access to water during drought, although rules of use are enforced more stringently during drought periods.



Figure 4.2. Uses of community owned water sources and user villages

Closed deep wells

There are closed deep wells that are used as community water sources. These are dug and protected with labour contribution from community members through the traditional work parties (*nhimbe*). Rules relating to access to these wells are set by the *sabuku* in consultation with his advisors. The rules include not doing laundry near the well and no brick moulding and gardening. In practice, there was no evidence that these rules are enforced, but the rules are adhered to. The study found that some rules are not enforced because of the transaction costs involved such as getting shouted at, time needed to track offenders and the fear of being bewitched. There are also close social ties in the catchment as the majority of the families are related in one way or another and thus there is fear that penalizing another person may work against the long established social capital. This was quite evident in conflict management situations discussed in Chapter Five. If a resident violates agreed upon rules, often he/she may just get cautioned by the *sabuku* and not made to pay any fine.

Open wells

The open wells found in the catchment are not protected and are used as an open access resource. Some of these wells are natural while others are wells that were abandoned when the owner moved to settle in another area outside Romwe. The wells are used mainly for brick moulding and house construction, but not for drinking purposes. People therefore have free access to these open wells.

Mawunga stream

During the dry season households water their livestock in the perennial Mawunga stream. Some mould bricks along the Mawunga stream as well. This stream is accessible to almost everyone in the adjacent villages. Use of the stream tends to be dictated or determined by the distance of the household to the stream. For example those who live near the stream can do gardening because they 'own' land near the stream while those who live far away can only use the stream for watering livestock. In addition, during the cropping season, farmers who live far from the stream find it difficult to water their livestock because the stream is surrounded by crop-fields, which are out of bounds to livestock. Key informants indicated that this has not been a source of conflict because during the cropping season in years with normal to high rainfall, there are water puddles all over the village. Thus not all livestock has to be watered at the Mawunga stream.

Privately owned water sources

With regards to private water resources, these are predominantly wells dug by specific households close to their homes or in their fields and they are regarded as belonging to that household. Ownership ranges from zero to three wells per household. The wells are usually dug by individual households through mobilising their own labour, hired labour or assistance from neighbours. In some cases the wells are inherited, together with fields, from parents and grandparents. Most of the wells are located in crop fields and vegetable gardens while a few are located close to the houses. Household members dig or drill private wells for a variety of reasons but most of them said they do so for convenience. Ownership of a private well lessens the amount of time spent walking to fetch water. Exclusive use of a well by a single household is highly unlikely. Water is regarded as *hupenyu* (source of life). It is considered that 'it is un-African to deny a relative or neighbour water, a God given resource', thus access cannot be denied outright to other users. Wells are often open to use by other households following a basic set of norms. Wells are shared with relatives, neighbours, church colleagues and friends, such that eventually, everyone in the village has access to almost any well located within a reasonable distance from their homestead (Figure 4.3).

The well owners attach certain conditions to the use of wells. For instance, permission has to be sought from the well owner before collecting water from a private well. Someone may be granted access to water for domestic purposes, such as for drinking, cooking and laundry, where larger amounts are needed, for example for beer brewing, permission has to be sought for that specific activity. In general wells in crop fields are more accessible to the whole village, unlike wells near homesteads, which are usually fenced off.

When they are identifying a well from which to collect water (if given permission from the owner), an individual considers the following: distance to the well (*i.e.* nearness of the well to their own homestead); closeness of their relationship with the well owner (*unotsvaga waunofarirana naye* - you go to someone you are in good books with) and people whose well they have helped to construct. Some well owners may turn down a request by another community member to collect water from their wells if the well is located in a garden. In this case, permission may be withheld out of fear that the people coming to collect water may steal vegetables or leave the gate to the garden open allowing animals to invade the garden.



Figure 4.3. Social networks for accessing private wells

Restrictions may also apply if the well owner invested a significant amount of money in developing the well. Some well owners pointed out that if they had not spent a lot of money or had not hired someone to dig the well for them, they would willingly allow other villagers to have access to their well. Other cases of denial of access come into play if the person wanting to collect water from the well never assisted the well owner to dig the well or if the person is renowned for being unhygienic (*uchapa*). The social contract to collect water from another farmer's well may be terminated if a person proves to be unhygienic, steals from the well owner's garden or crop field, or collects water from the well for purposes other than those for which they originally sought permission.

Individual well owners institute rules governing access to privately owned deep wells. These rules are similar to those governing access to community owned water sources, and are not written down. They are well articulated by community members because the well owners make sure the users and potential users know the rules. These rules are communicated informally to potential well users. The following rules were identified for private wells:

1. Use of drums (200 litres) for fetching water before getting permission is not allowed even if the individual wanting to fetch the water has been granted permission to collect water from the well for drinking. Permission to collect large volumes of water for different purposes has to be sought separately.
2. Washing clothes closer than 50 metres from a well is not allowed. Washing must be done down slope from the well.
3. Containers that have been used on a fire cannot be used for fetching water from a well.
4. Leaking tins cannot be used to draw water from a well.
5. Seventh Day Adventist Church members do not fetch water from their wells on Saturdays, nor do they allow others access them.

Gates must be shut after fetching water, especially where there are gardens, or else vegetables may be lost to livestock.The well owners set most of the rules, but the local village health workers enforce some of the rules such as those relating to general hygiene. The village health workers make frequent visits to different wells to monitor cleanliness around wells and ensure the wells are properly protected. If conflicts on the use of a private well arise, the complainant can take the case to the local kraal head for arbitration. In most cases, however, conflicts are resolved amicably between the well owner and the community members. Usually the well owner first threatens to ban the offender from taking water from his or her well and then withdraws the permission to collect water if the person continues to be a problem. Bans against accessing water are generally resented in the community. For example, a well owner who prevented others from accessing his well found a dead dog in the well two days after he locked the gate to the well. The well owner later unlocked his gate.

People also believe that wells at which punitive rules are in force often dry up or collapse even if they have a strong lining made of cement.

The foregoing discussion emphasizes what well owners 'give' to other community members and not what they themselves 'get' from the other community members. The process of water access is reciprocal, thus well owners also derive some benefits from people who use their wells. Benefits that can be realized by well owners include:

a) Access to arable land: as discussed earlier, there is general land shortage in Romwe, but land is comparatively abundant in the neighbouring social catchment villages such as in Matenhese village. However, people in Matenhese village do not have reliable water sources, even for domestic purposes as their borehole often breaks down, probably due to pressure. Residents from Romwe often lease land from farmers in Matenhese village. Whether one gets land or not in the neighbouring village depends a lot on the nature of the relationship between the concerned parties. Prices for leasing land vary from one person to another, for instance, if the farmers are close friends, user rights to the land can be given for free or for a very nominal fee. These arrangements are not fixed but are negotiated on an annual basis. Thus getting land from one person during one cropping season does not guarantee the person the same piece of land the next cropping season. Some well owners therefore allow villagers from Matenhese to access their wells in order to benefit through access to arable land. These are mutual arrangements. There is no guarantee that by according someone access to your well they would automatically lease land to you. Thus the reciprocity is based on trust. At the time of the study, the cost of leasing land ranged from Z$500 to Z$800 per acre per annum.

b) Access to draught power: some well owners do not own sources of draft power and therefore give access to their wells to fellow farmers who have draft power in anticipation that when the rainy season begins, they would be assisted with draught power at a 'reasonable' price. Often the well owners do get assistance with draught power from neighbours, friends and relatives who use their well.

c) Access to labour: well owners may get assistance from those who are allowed to collect water in the form of help in the fields to weed, harvest and process farm produce. Although the well owners do not ask openly for such favours, based on cultural norms of reciprocity, the water collectors reciprocate the access they are given to a well in one way or another. For instance, in cases where an individual has been given permission to use a well for vegetable production, when the vegetables are ready, they give some to the

well owner, even if the well owner may have his/her own vegetable garden.

d) People who share the same water points have a higher chance of engaging in other projects together because they can easily mobilize each other. The flow of information is also fast among people who share the same water source. This is true especially as regards communally owned water sources such as dams. Cattle herders for example, come to know each other as they interact at the dam when watering livestock. During such interactions, there is sharing of information about cattle diseases, key dates on the cattle calendar *e.g.* when the next dipping date is going to be. Vegetable producers at community gardens, for instance at the Barura and Chidiso gardens, also interact at the gardens and share information on ideas for vegetable production. Other social issues are also discussed during such interactions and resolutions can even be made in such arenas prior to a formal community meeting to resolve a particular issue. Networks that emerge around issues of access to water are formed and nurtured over long periods of time through continuous interaction and are valuable for the analysis of local institutional arrangements for natural resource use.

Natural springs (Zvitubu)

Only two privately owned natural springs were identified. Given that springs are natural features, private ownership of springs is an example of privatisation of a potentially common pool resource. Individual claims are made over springs partly because they are localised and can be easily defended or based on claims of inheritance from forefathers. Water from natural springs is used for drinking, watering livestock, laundry, brick moulding and vegetable production for sale and home consumption. The owners of homesteads and fields located near the springs determine the kind of access to and use of the spring by other community members. There are no committees that monitor the way the springs are used. There are some rules, however, that have been inherited from generation to generation and enforced by *sabuku*s and chiefs. The most common rules are: no bathing at the springs, no laundry, no soap should be used at the spring. Livestock should not drink from the same point of the spring as people because springs are normally left unfenced and would be trampled by livestock, thus spoiling the water and also making the spring dry up. Some rules are inherited cultural practices (*yagara ingoritsika yamadziteteguru edu* – traditional beliefs inherited from our forefathers). The DNR also encourages people to protect springs. Generally people observe the laid down rules, because they ensure the availability of clean water to people.

4.2.5 Historical trends in water resource availability

From the local people's perspective, historical trends for water resource availability in Romwe starting from the 1950s to the 1990s show a decline in abundance of water for rainfed agriculture and livestock watering (Table 4.7). There has been an increase in the development of garden irrigation and the number of private wells. The increase in the number of privately owned wells may be explained by the decline in availability of natural springs and other open water sources that were used between the 1950s and 1970s. Although there are differences in scores allocated by women and men, the trends portrayed are similar.

During the 1950s, the area received high rainfall referred to as *machakwi, jakuchichi*, (very heavy rains). Perennial springs were quite common, both sacred and non-sacred. Use of metal utensils and those that had been used on the fire was a taboo, as this was believed to cause the sacred spring to dry up. No individuals flouted this rule, as mysterious things were believed to befall all people who breached the rule. Examples of sacred springs identified include Chimwandau spring in the Mapande mountain where use of metal utensils and bathing in the spring were prohibited and the sacred pool at the top of the Romwe mountain. The 1970s period received good rainfall except for 1972, which was reported to have been a year when the area received below average rainfall. During the 1980s, rains became more erratic and more farmers started digging individual wells as existing water sources became unreliable. The DDF also came in and drilled a borehole and established a committee that was tasked to maintain the borehole in good working order.

Table 4.7. *Perceptions of historical trends of water resource availability in Romwe*[40]

Nature of the resource	**1950s & 1960s**		**1970s**		**1980s**		**1990s**	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Traditional drinking water sources	20	20	20	20	6	5	4	5
Livestock watering	19	21	15	18	10	9	6	2
Irrigating gardens	1	0	10	5	15	15	24	30
Crop production (rainfall)	20	20	25	20	3	5	2	5
No. of private wells	5	3	10	8	15	15	20	24

Source: Group discussion, December 2002.

40 A total of 50 scores were allocated for each resource and distributed across the different periods.

Rainfall is said to have become even more unreliable and unpredictable during the 1990s as was referred to as *mvura yemakasi* (rainfall is now like a card game). The metaphor of a card game was used to illustrate the level of unpredictability of rainfall and variability from one year to the next. These perceptions concur with the data gathered by Frost (2000/2001) for the last fifty years (Frost, database at IES). More private wells were dug and rules governing access were enforced more stringently. Vegetable growing as a livelihood option has accompanied this shift towards improving availability of water resources. In addition to growing vegetables for household consumption, surplus vegetables are sold to generate income. A number of NGOs such as CEH and CARE International came into the community to assist farmers with provision of water for irrigation through the collector well and dam rehabilitation respectively. Farmers have also received training in water and soil conservation as a drive towards ensuring sustainable use of natural resources in the catchment.

4.2.6 Enforcement of water rules and regulations

Department of Natural Resources (DNR) representatives *vanajengetavhu* (those who look after the soil), theoretically, enforce rules on the use of streams, a condition of use of land beside streams and wetlands in the Natural Resources Act (Chapter 26.) For instance, there is the 30 metre distance rule is meant to curb soil erosion along the riverbanks. According to this rule, farmers are not supposed to use the land within 30 metres of a stream. Once worked, the soil along the riverbanks may become loose and be easily eroded by the running water during the rainy season. The eroded soil often causes siltation in the river and the dams downstream. It was noted during the study that this DNR rule was ignored by most of the participants because the soils close to the riverbanks are very fertile and it is easy for them to water their gardens close to the water source.

Land shortage in the area is also forcing people to ignore the 30 metre rule. This challenge for DNR also emanates from the fact that the department designs technical fixes for natural resource problems with little consideration of the local people involved in resource use. DNR polices natural resource regulations in rural areas of Zimbabwe and has the power to fine rule breakers. Despite backing by statutory instruments, of late, DNR rules and regulations have been ignored by communities, partly due to lack of efficient monitoring mechanisms by representatives and staff members of the department. For instance, there is often only one DNR officer per district and over the years government budgets have been dwindling, making it difficult for the officers to fulfil their enforcement role. As part of the shift towards more participatory approaches, there has been a gradual shift in the way DNR operates on the ground, from an enforcement role to a more community-based advisory role. This to some extent has been confusing the local communities who are used to DNR

being an enforcing agency. Similar findings on the changing role of DNR are reported by Keely and Scoones (2000).

Unlike for woodland resources where discussion centred on enforcement of rules and regulations, in the case of water the term 'enforcement' may be misleading. 'Compliance' would be a more appropriate term to use in the case of institutions regulating access to water resources. The concept of compliance has as much to do with 'public good will' at the level of the individual, as it has to do with explicit social arrangements designed to ensure conformity to the rules (Mandondo, 2000b). The term 'enforcement' appears to emphasize only explicit social arrangements for regulating behaviour. There could also be 'voluntary compliance' as was seen in Romwe regarding institutions for water use and management. The term 'public good will' can also be misleading as it suggests the notion of compliance as being perfectly voluntary. The wish to act in accordance with 'public good will' is often rooted in a background of sustained moral conditioning that involves systems of subtle (and often coercive) incentives, which are often coded into the local language and beliefs. For water resources in Romwe, much of the enforcement appears to be left to 'voluntary' compliance to social norms, mores and other social arrangements that are agreed upon by the parties involved. Unlike the case of woodlands where several cases of rule violation were cited, cases of flouting of institutions regulating access to water resources were hard to come by. This raises an important question relating to why this is the case. Is it something to do with the characteristics of the resource or are there other factors at play? What implications does this have on the sustainable use of woodlands and water resources?

Considering that water resources are more discreet, with resource user boundaries more clearly defined as compared to woodlands, this could explain why institutions for water management appear to be more effective. Both communal and private water sources are clearly defined and claims to a particular water source are recognised by other users. In the case of woodlands, there are competing resource claims, which could be a result of the fuzziness of resource use boundaries and also having diverse woodland products with different users located in a particular landscape unit. For example, the Barura mountain has resources that include fibre, timber, mushrooms, fruits, medicine and leaf litter, all with a different set of users, whose use jurisdictions are not clearly defined. On the contrary, while a particular water source may have many users and different types of uses, there is clear definition of who should use what water source and for what purposes. Also, because most water sources are considerably smaller than woodlands geographically, water sources are therefore more easily monitored. For instance there is no big river that passes through the village that could have competitive upstream or downstream users. Thus users in both the social and biophysical catchments seem to understand and respect their rights of access to the water resources. Water resources are therefore

more likely to be used and managed in a sustainable manner as compared to woodlands.

In Romwe, private water source institutional arrangements are products of social networks of actors created through the family, extended family, kinship ties and other social networks. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3, which shows how various members of the community gain access to privately owned water sources. Thus interpersonal relationships are important in determining the degree of compliance with existing rules and regulations governing access to water resources. Networks surrounding water use appear to be much stronger than for woodlands. These are based on criteria including kinship ties and sharing of totems. In some cases, there may be no blood relations but good neighbourliness is important in the development of these networks. Such networks are not apparent for woodland management.

Furthermore, there is individual and group investment in the establishment of the majority of water sources, *e.g.* digging private wells, participation in dam rehabilitation and maintenance of communal water sources, which could be influencing use, and management of water resources. For woodlands there is less investment and the woodland products are considered as God given and therefore are managed in open-access-like manner. The concept of open-access-like is borrowed from Mandondo *et al*., (2001), referring to a situation where a resource is not managed as common property, yet the management regime cannot be fully described as open access. The management regime in this case has elements of both common property and open access regimes. These findings challenge one assumption that CPR management may be classified into four property regimes, namely common property, private property, state property and open access. CPR typologies categorising management regimes into these four broad categories remain a central feature of the CPR literature that has largely informed CBNRM (Berkes & Farvar, 1989; Bromley, 1991). In strict technical terms, open access denotes lack of a management regime, yet the woodlands in Romwe have some management regime, though not effective. It therefore makes it difficult to describe access to the woodlands as being open access. In more recent publications, CPR advocates have shied away from the use of the term 'common property' and rather refer to common pool resources (Arnold, 1998). This however, does not take away the fact that the property right conditions of any resource managed communally, are of critical importance in that they influence the kind of collective management that will be applied to a resource.

The multiple uses of a water source also involve a balance between allocating water for domestic and other uses. In most cases, priority is given to water for domestic use, over irrigation or gardening activities. A good example is the Chidiso borehole, where originally two pumps were allocated for domestic and irrigation purposes but due to frequent

breakdowns the irrigation pump is often used for domestic purposes. This balance also allows for flexibility. People do not rigidly stick to the original uses of a particular water source. Findings of the analysis of water institutions contradict the literature on collective resource use, which assume that economic incentives drive self-interested behaviour in CPRM (Ostrom, 1990). This study found that management of water as a common pool resource is facilitated more by the nature of interpersonal relationships rather than being driven by economic incentives. These social relations provide social bonds that are key for the attainment of collective outcomes for resource management and sustainable use of those resources.

4.3 Defining resource use boundaries

In seeking to describe patterns of access to woodlands and water resources at the village level, some insights may be drawn from observing how local people think about and describe their resource areas. An attempt to map out village and resource use boundaries revealed that traditional villages (under the headship of the *sabuku*) and administration boundaries do not match up. Resource use boundaries also do not match with administration and other village boundaries. Even traditional village boundaries that have a longer history of existence are not a hundred percent clear. Similar to village boundaries, resource use boundaries are fluid and often influenced by changing resource status.

Results on the identification of resource user groups for woodlands and water are presented separately as there are differences, while the discussion draws on findings from both resources. Resource use mapping revealed that woodland resource use boundaries do not coincide with any of the administrative, political, and traditional or project defined boundaries. The boundaries were found to vary depending on the type of natural resources in question. Figure 4.4 on the use of resources found on Mapande mountain is used to illustrate this point. As can be seen from Figure 4.4, the woodland resources from Mapande mountain area, the mountain south of Dobhani village, have different communities or groups of users for different resources such as grazing, firewood, timber, fibre and mushrooms.



Figure 4.4. Villages that use woodland resources from Mapande mountain.

Resource use boundaries vary depending on the resource in question. The boundaries are negotiated between and among the various actors, both on an individual basis and/or on a village or group level basis. Conflicts may emerge during the negotiation process. Another complicating factor is that the use of resources from that same area or the same product changes over the year and during different seasons. The fluidity of the resource use boundaries may have negative implications for sustainable resource use, especially if there are no clearly defined institutional jurisdictions regarding management of the woodlands. The shifting of resource use boundaries does not apply to woodland products only, it also applies to various resource areas and/or units. For instance, for each of the different mountain areas in the catchment area, there is a different constellation of villages for different resources. The shifting of resource use boundaries was found to be more common for woodlands than for water resources. While water users may change depending on the type of use, season or during a particular year, the definition of users of various sources of water appears to be relatively fixed or much clearer than for woodlands.

While there is general fuzziness on the geographical extent of each village, boundaries are also not fixed. They are often defined and redefined depending on the issue at stake. For instance, boundaries may shrink if the issue at stake relates to access to resources considered key to livelihood sustenance, yet they can expand during a drought year in relation to external food aid. That the *sabuku*s have different lists of households for different purposes illustrates, as was described earlier, the fuzziness of the 'village' concept. For instance, the household lists (which were much longer) that the research team was given in 1998 during the first visit to the village were different from lists given out by the *sabuku*s during later stages of the research. Asked to explain the differences, the *sabuku*s indicated that the longer list, that often includes young men above the age of eighteen but not yet married and residing with their parents is often used when material benefits are expected from a project. The household lists that the research team used in later sampling purposes are the shorter ones comprising household heads who have their own separate homestead and/or young men who are married but may still be residing in their parents' homestead due to the shortage of land for settlement in Romwe.

Shifting of boundaries is sometimes in response to perceived imbalance between available natural resources and human population. In some cases, villagers, rather than claiming an area that originally did not belong to their village, settled in neighbouring villages perceived to be under populated, without relinquishing their allegiance to their former village leaders. An attempt to identify village geographical boundaries was found to be even more complex as membership in the villages is fluid and amorphous as illustrated in case 4.4. The amorphous nature of community membership generally translates into shared ownership and shared use. For instance, some people may reside in one village, and consider themselves under the jurisdiction of a leader of another village, whilst their crop fields are

located in yet a third village. These cases involve strategic choices by the individuals involved regarding who they should align with or whom to support in a conflict over resources such as land.

Case 4.4: *Cases illustrating the fluid and amorphous nature of membership of villages within Romwe area*

- Mr I. Zirehwa physically resides in Matenhese village. He 'owns' two fields, one is located in Sihambe village while the other is in Matenhese village. Yet he considers himself to be under the jurisdiction of *sabuku* Dobhani and for purposes of village records his name is under Dobhani village. Mr. Zirehwa can use his position to benefit from the three different villages depending on which position suits him most at a particular time.

- Mr Lukasi is registered and resides in Tamwa village. His fields, vegetable garden and perennial well are located in Sihambe village. He leases part of his vegetable garden to a member of the *Zvidza zvopo* kinship group from Sihambe village.

- Mr M. Dube resides in Tamwa village but his fields are located in Sihambe village. Mr Dube inherited his field from his father. Originally their household was also located under Sihambe village but during the villagisation exercise in the 1960s their new homestead geographically fell under Tamwa village.

- Mr. I Tawona is registered under Sihambe village, has his crop field in Sihambe but his homestead is located in Dobhani village. He claims his allegiance is to *sabuku* Sihambe even though he resides in Dobhani village because his fields, that are a major source of livelihood for his family are located in Sihambe.

Source: Key informant interviews, September 2001.

The above cases of farmers residing in one village, with fields in a different village and paying allegiance to a leader of yet another village illustrate that individuals have multiple membership. Thus they are able to play multiple roles by drawing at will on different sources of legitimacy. These multiple roles may inflate the status of an individual.

Although clear resource use boundaries are often considered a pre-requisite for successful CPR, results presented in this section show that in practice, it is not easy to define these boundaries. The question is, in what context can CPR be possible given this fuzziness? This fuzziness of village and resource use boundaries challenges the notion of clearly defined

boundaries said to be desirable if collective resource management arrangements and related institutions are to be effective (Murphree, 1991).

4.4 Institutional framework for woodlands and water use in Romwe

The institutional policy framework has changed dramatically in Zimbabwe during the last two decades, moving from state centred approaches towards decentralisation and participatory resource management. There are many studies on the institutional framework governing natural resources in Zimbabwe including work done by Helmsing (1991), Makumbe (1996), Moyo (1995a), Scoones & Wilson (1989), Cousins (1989), Fortmann & Nhira (1992), Scoones & Matose (1993), Mandondo (2000a), Sithole (1999), Mukamuri (1995), the Land Tenure Commission of 1994, Murombedzi (1991), Murphree (1991) and Wekwete (1990). Themes running across these studies include: the nature of the tenure system in the communal areas as it relates to resource management, the legitimacy and effectiveness of existing authority structures.

Since this thesis focuses on woodlands and water, only the legislative framework relevant to these resources is revisited. The principal legislative provisions governing woodlands in the communal areas are the Forest Act (1982), the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (1987) and the Rural District Councils Act (1988), while the Water Act (1998) governs water resources. The Forest Act (1982) governs the establishment and protection of state forests while the Communal Lands Forestry Produce Act (1987) prohibits the commercialisation of forest products in all communal areas. The Rural District Councils Act (1988) vests district councils with powers to act as the local planning and development authorities and enact legally binding landuse and conservation by-laws that apply to areas under their jurisdiction. The Water Act (1998) allows for water abstraction using permits and is also the basis upon which catchment councils are established. It has been observed that these pieces of legislation focus on regulation and policing and therefore do not promote local proprietorship of resources (Nhira, 1994). Recent developments in the water sector have attempted to foster the concept of community participation, but as in the case of woodlands, forestry and wildlife sectors, a number of challenges have emerged. Some of the challenges relate to the identification of resource use boundaries, establishing conflict management and/or resolution mechanisms.

Four major areas of concern can be discerned from the literature on the policy and legal framework for NRM in Zimbabwe that are relevant to the sociological understanding of institutions in CBNRM:

(i) Land alienation and land use provisions (this relates to alienation from other natural resources found on the land such

as woodlands and water) that alienated pre-colonial resource management institutions.

(ii) Government policies and extension approaches that were predominantly top-down.

(iii) Tenure, administration and legislative interventions that alienated pre-colonial tenure systems in favour of the colonial policies and legal framework.

(iv) The changing resource use and management strategies adopted by communal dwellers in their various capacities as individuals and/or groups in response to changing socio-economic and political conditions.

The literature on the institutional framework for resource management in Zimbabwe also highlights issues relating to the existence of a multiplicity of, parallel and often ineffectual institutions (Mandondo, 2000b; Matondi, 2001; Mukamuri *et al*., 2000). A number of other studies discuss issues of contestation and legitimacy for some of the institutions (Moore, 1996 & 1993; Mukamuri, 1995; Sithole, 1999). There is no general agreement in this literature regarding which institutions are effective in natural resource management, as their influence and effectiveness appear to be contextual. The process of institutional engineering in CBNRM by NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) has added another dimension to the institutional framework for natural resource management at the local level by adding another set of institutions often regardless of other institutions that are already in place.

Another key feature in the post-independence policy framework for natural resource management in Zimbabwe relates to the decentralisation of local governance following the Prime Minister's directive in 1984. The major objective of the decentralisation process was to 'involve local communities, both horizontally and vertically in the process of planning and effecting their own development.' (The Herald, February 28, 1984 cited in Murombedzi, 1994). The Prime Minister's directive outlined a new local government hierarchy from the central government to the village level. The directive provided for the appointment and duties of Provincial Governors, the composition and functions of provincial councils, the provincial development committees (PDCs), district councils and district development committees (DDCs), WADCOs and VIDCOs. The VIDCO was conceived as the primary organ for development at the local level and was to comprise 100 households. A ward consists of six or seven VIDCOs[41], representing 600-700 households at the time of establishment. The actual sizes of both the VIDCOs and WADCOs rarely correspond to the theoretical demographic imperatives of 100 households for the VIDCO and 600-700 for the WADCO. Since the delineation of these VIDCOs and WADCOs in 1984 up to the present, there has been population increase in the communal areas, due to either natural increases or immigration, which

41 The term VIDCO is used to denote both the village in spatial terms and the committee.

was not considered in the original VIDCO/WADCO delineation. It is worth noting that the VIDCOs and WADCOs were created without taking cognisance of existing traditional authority structures and villages such as a *sabuku*'s village (*bhuku* - kraal), headman's ward (*dunhu*) and Chief's district (*nyika*).[42]) This created a situation, in which VIDCO villages differ from the *sabuku* villages that were created during the colonial period, often based on lineage and kinship ties. The VIDCO/WADCO and traditional systems of leadership rely on different systems of legitimation, which makes conflict between them inevitable (Murombedzi, 1994). This institutional framework at the local level has important implications for CBNRM institutions and sustainable resource use.

Although resource management initiatives that involve decentralisation of management authority to local levels are increasingly finding significant legislative support in the post independence institutional framework for natural resource management, their implementation is not without problems. Natural resource management power has remained centralised in the state or its bureaucracies as the little power shifted towards local communities gets re-centralised at the RDC level and no legislation as yet gives legal mandate and fiscal autonomy to structures below the RDC level (Mapedza & Mandondo, 2001).

The various institutional structures found in the Romwe catchment are presented in Figure 4.5. In addition, there are also several external agencies such as NGOs and research institutes that have facilitated the establishment of resource management institutions. Project related committees such as garden, dam, grazing, catchment management committees have been established by the NGOs to oversee the management of different projects that are facilitated by these NGOs. Except for the catchment management committee that comprises the three *sabuku*s in Romwe catchment, all the other committees have a standard structure made up of seven members, comprising a chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary, vice secretary, treasurer, and two committee members. Unlike the case of VIDCOs and WADCOs, the NGO facilitated committees have received training in leadership, book keeping and training for transformation.

42 Historically, land and people were the property of a Chief, whose district (*nyika*) was divided into wards (*matunhu*), which were governed by headmen and under these were villages (*mabhuku*) headed by a kraalhead (*sabuku*). In most cases these villages were conceived to be people or households belonging to the same clan or lineage grouping.



Figure 4.5. Institutional framework for woodland and water management in Romwe

Following the recommendations of the Land Tenure Commission (1994), and the subsequent enactment of the Traditional Leaders´ Act of 1998, there are experiments with local government reforms through a system of village and ward assemblies. This may further confuse the VIDCO-WADCO and traditional authority systems already in place. The village and ward assemblies are to be constituted through a mix of nominee leaders and elected representatives. Membership of the village assembly is open to all adults in the village and presided over by hereditary traditional leaders, whose nominations and appointments are approved by chiefs and the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD). A ward council comprises village heads of its constituent village assemblies, a councillor of the ward and a cohort of headmen nominated by chiefs and endorsed by the relevant minister. The ward assembly is headed by a headman, elected by members of the assembly from among themselves. Village assemblies elect VIDCOs, supervise and approve development plans from VIDCOs, whilst ward assemblies oversee all the roles and activities of their constituent VIDCOs. With the headman heading the ward assembly, this elevates a system of nominee lineage leaders over elected representatives. Furthermore, the village head to headman to chief to minister line of approving hereditary nominees

potentially creates a system of patronage in spite of the appointment of such leaders in accordance with culture (Mapedza and Mandondo, 2001). This framework of ward assemblies may result in what Mamdani has referred to as 'decentralised despotism', in which case oppressive powers are transferred to lower tiers of governance with the objective of controlling people, rather than motivating them to develop their own management systems. Local structures become the eyes and ears of the central state and this may result in their loss of legitimacy from the local communities. These structures may be seen as representing state interest and not local interest as they become upwardly accountable and not downwardly accountable. The introduction of village assemblies and ward councils in the face of existing VIDCO-WADCO and traditional leadership systems could be a recipe for further conflict between these systems. The likelihood of conflict is further aggravated when external CBNRM facilitators seek to enlist local support for woodlands and water conservation through the creation of new committees (*e.g.* catchment management, grazing, dam, and garden committees). These various structures often have overlapping, ever-changing membership and patterns of networking.

The Chivi RDC, being the legal overseer of natural resources within the district enjoys legal support from several legal instruments presented in Table 4.8. The state policies governing access to and control over woodlands do not enable sustainable use and management of the resources at the local level. For instance, the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (1987) restricts commercialisation of woodland products by local people, yet outsiders are allowed to exploit the resources for commercial purposes through obtaining permits from the RDC and state agencies such as the Forestry Commission, by passing village resource management structures. Such restrictions constrain the range of income sources available to local communities, who have otherwise become highly integrated into the broader national economy. The Act also confers control of hardwood timber occurring in communal areas to the RDCs, which exploit these resources through a system of concessions, with fees accruing to the RDC and not to local communities from which resources are extracted. The national legislation is therefore not empowering to local communities in the decentralisation process. Enabling legislation could stimulate effective local resource management providing incentives for management through clearly defined mandates and jurisdictions for local management structures within the decentralisation framework. Decision-making surrounding resource use should lie with local communities rather than Acts that give powers to state bodies such as the RDC and the forestry department. The Environmental Management Bill seeks to rationalise the country's fragmented environmental laws by integrating them to ensure that they are consistent with each other. While the first draft of the Environmental Management Bill gave hope of decentralisation of resource management beyond the RDC, *i.e.* to local communities, the second version of the bill appears to focus on the RDC as the lowest legal entity of local governance.

Table 4.8: *Legislation guiding decentralised resource management*

Legal instrument	**Rationale**	**Effect/Impact**
The Rural District Councils Act of 1988	Merging of the rural and district councils, which were separate authorities during the colonial government.	Reinforced the powers that a variety of other laws vested in the RDCs.
The Communal Lands Act of 1982	Defines the RDCs as land authorities with powers to allocate land under their jurisdiction in conjunction with district administrators.	Conflicts between councillors and traditional leadership over land allocation. Legally the RDC allocate land, but in practice *sabuku*s allocates the land.
Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 (amended in 1982)	Designates RDCs as 'appropriate authorities' over wildlife resources in their areas of jurisdiction.	Re-centralises wildlife management authority at the RDC level rather than devolution to local communities.
Natural Resources Act of 1941 (being amended through the Environmental Management Bill	Designated local government authorities as the authorities for the conservation of resources within their districts and the Environmental Management Bill seeks to grant them appropriate authority status over a broad range of natural resources.	Restrictions on dambo/wetland cultivation impacted negatively on women who were the main users of the dambo areas, growing vegetables for both household consumption and for sale, when there was surplus.
The Communal Areas Forest Produce Act of 1982 (amended in 1987)	Vests RDCs with the power to grant licenses for timber concessions in communal areas.	Restricts use of woodland resources to own use by local people, while allowing outsiders to exploit resources for commercial purposes.

The Rural District Councils Act of 1988 also vested powers in councils *e.g.* to raise revenues through taxes, levies and tariffs from their areas, act as local planning and development authorities, and to enact legally binding landuse planning/conservation by-laws that apply to areas under their jurisdiction (Mandondo, 2001). The process of formulation and enforcement of these by-laws has been critiqued by Mandondo (2001) and Kundhlande (2000). In his review, Mandondo (2001) points out that the process of by-law formulation is not 'participatory' and as communities are not involved in this process there is poor enforcement of the by-laws on the ground. Furthermore the review of the by-laws carried out for this study revealed that there is no specific reference to water in the by-laws. The lack of specific reference to the use of water resources in the RDC by-laws is intriguing given that water is an important source of livelihood in semi-arid regions such as Chivi district.

Community members in Romwe were asked for their views on the RDC by-laws and whether there is adherence to the by-laws. There was in

general poor knowledge of the existence of the RDC by-laws in Romwe and the majority of the key respondents in group discussions had only a vague idea of the by-laws. At the community level, emphasis was on local level rules associated with traditional management systems and not necessarily with the RDC by-laws. The findings of this study differ from Mandondo's (*ibid*) from Mutangi catchment, a site also located in Chivi district, where he found that there is high level of knowledge of the RDC by-laws even though they are not adhered to. Yet in Romwe, when people were asked to describe the by-laws, it was only the councillor, VIDCO chairman and a few people holding leadership positions who were able to articulate the RDC by-laws. The proximity of Mutangi village to Chivi town centre where the RDC offices are located, may explain the higher level of knowledge people have of the RDC by-laws (*i.e.* the village is more accessible to RDC officers as it is located about 20 km away yet Romwe is located about 60 km away). While this may be the case, portrayal of ignorance of the by-laws in Romwe could also be a tactic used to ignore or reject the rules.

4.5 Summary

This chapter has shown the nature and patterns of woodland and water resource access. Given the diversity of values attached to woodlands and water by different resource users, this means that there may be different practices employed to gain access to different resources. Differences of values attached to different resources may provide the basis for conflicts amongst the various resources users, as individuals or groups. Resource management institutions often mediate such conflicts. Resources valued for livelihood sustenance by different users may become sources of conflict if the institutional arrangements governing access become untenable. In other cases, various resource users, especially disadvantaged groups such as women and the poor, may devise strategies for ensuring their continued access to the resource.

Differentiation between common pool and privately owned resources was more distinct for water resources than for woodlands. Access of different users to various water sources, both communal and private, may shift during different times of the year but generally rules are consistently enforced. While access to woodlands is not defined in specific relational terms such as kinship ties, for water resources, access, especially to privately owned water sources, is defined based on kinship and other social ties as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Both implicit and explicit institutional arrangements govern communal and private water sources in Romwe. In the majority of cases, the rules and regulations are generally not written down, but community members appear to know them well. In most cases these institutional arrangements are defined only in a very general way, giving conditional access based on appropriate use. The importance of this non-specificity is that it allows for flexibility in resolving particular cases (Berry, 1993; Cleaver, 2000). Some authors have argued that it is important

to codify rules and regulations for resource use, for instance, through community organisations (Clarke, 1997; Mandondo, 2000b; Matowanyika, 1991). Codification should, however, only be done when community needs and priorities justify switches to more managerially costly and intensive management systems. It should be demand driven rather than be prescriptive or supply led.

Calls for codification overlook the fact that the existing system allows for flexibility in determining who has access to woodlands and water resources at a given time. The codified rules that do exist, *e.g.* the RDC by-laws and DNR rules and regulations, do not seem to work. Arguing against codification, Platteau (1995), using evidence from Africa on land issues, suggests that formalising land holdings, through registration, increases conflicts over land rights. This is more so for groups, who customarily had informal access to natural resources such as land, and in this case, water. In Platteau's view, customary rights over common pool resources in local communities and the value of flexibility in these arrangements should be recognised. In this respect, external agents should limit themselves largely to facilitating and coordinating the informal management systems operating at the local level. In some cases, these arrangements may no longer be appropriate. In such cases, there is a role for external agents to be more proactive.

There is reciprocal access to woodland and water resources with neighbouring villages, as seen in the case of Barura dam and woodland products. This overrides the traditional and administrative boundaries in favour of flexible social boundaries. This in a way challenges one of Ostrom's design principles (1990), which suggests that resource use boundaries should be clearly defined. This fuzziness of resource use boundaries also challenges recommendations for exclusion management, as espoused in the Land Tenure Commission report (1994) and the new Traditional Leaders Act of 1998. The legal framework for woodland management has been decentralised from central government, but re-centralised at the RDC level and does not provide incentives for sustainable use and management of woodlands at the local level. Although some Acts have explicitly sought to move control over resources closer to the direct resource users, *i.e.* the local communities, for example, the Parks and Wildlife Act (1982), much control remains at the RDC level. Considering the bureaucratic nature of the RDC, local communities are not effectively represented in council decision-making processes (Mandondo, 2000b). In principle, planning local development is bottom-up starting from the VIDCOs to WADCOs and then to the RDC, but in practice, most planning and approval, along with the implementation of such plans, is carried out at RDC level, and not at the community level. This top-down framework is reinforced by the fact that no legislation as yet gives effective legal authority or fiscal autonomy to units that are below the RDC level.

At community level, there exist diverse stakeholders, often with those ostensibly on the fringes of formal systems of power and authority significantly inserting themselves into local social and political processes. Encroachment to gain access to resources and ignoring the RDC by-laws are examples of such instruments used by local actors to assert their resource claims – what Scott (1986) refers to as the everyday forms of peasant resistance. Focusing only on legal instruments that guide resource management may be misleading as the analysis portrays the natural resource arena as exclusively pitting the state against local actors. Resource management is an arena in which heterogeneous local interests are argued out simultaneously together with the overbearing interests of local alliances. Given this complex resource management scenario, the key question that arises is: What institution or institutions are appropriate for CBNRM and could ensure sustainable use of woodland and water resources as well as equitable distribution of these resources to different user groups? An attempt is made to answer this question in chapters five and six, which show that maybe the issue for policy makers is not a question of either this or that institution, but rather that there is need to focus of ways of facilitating collaborative resources management processes that would ensure views and interests of different actors are considered.

CHAPTER FIVE: PATTERNS OF INTERACTION AND CONFLICTS OVER RESOURCE USE AND CONTROL

5.1 Introduction

Chapter Four described the Romwe natural resource landscape and further examined the institutional framework that regulates access to woodland and water resources. The Romwe natural resource landscape provides a setting for social action but is also a product of such action. Processes of interaction may result in situations of conflict among the various actors, but there also exist areas of cooperation. From an actor-oriented perspective, natural resource use conflicts are an outcome of the interaction of different actors pursuing often quite distinctive aims and interests (Long & Long, 1992). The actor-oriented approach has been found useful in other contexts in analysing how patterns of interaction may result in conflict situations. Examples include studies by Bassett (1988) and Toure (1988) exploring conflict between pastoralists, farmers and the state in the Ivory Coast and Senegal. Peluso (1992) and Bryant (1997) use the approach to examine how forest politics in India, Indonesia and Burma have been conditioned by the struggle of different actors with the state as well as struggles between the state departments. The actor-oriented approach therefore relates an understanding of actors to the political-ecological processes (Bryant & Bailey (1997), and was found relevant in this study in the analysis of conflicts related to woodland and water resource use. The chapter further analyses historical narratives as they relate to resource and leadership claims by different resource users.

The research findings show that whilst networking, negotiations and dialogue are a pervasive feature of social interactions, the incidences of conflict over access, especially to woodlands and grazing areas, have been on the increase in recent years. As various actors negotiate and network to secure their access to natural resources, conflicts are inevitable and therefore often viewed as part and parcel of the negotiation process. By analysing the role and interaction of various actors such as women and men, this study highlights the importance of micro-politics in CBNRM. The concept of micro-politics is used after Moore (1993), referring to the politics of resource access and control at the local level There are two major issues central to the understanding of micro-politics in the context of CBNRM, namely, an appreciation that politics is about interaction relating to natural resource use and access and secondly, recognition that even weak actors possess some power to act in the pursuit of their interests. The ‘power of the weak´ highlights the need for a full appreciation of the role of agency in human affairs (Bryant & Bailey, 1997).

5.2. Organisational interactions in Romwe

Much literature on CBNRM in Zimbabwe highlights the multiplicity of organisations involved in natural resource management at the local level (Hasler, 1993; King, 1994; Madzudzo, 2002; Matondi, 2001; Sithole, 1999). These studies place emphasis on conflicts between and among the various organisations and individuals, and focus less on areas of cooperation. The complex and shifting alliances within and among these resource management structures are both complimentary and conflicting and therefore need to be examined from both perspectives. Recognition of the multiplicity of resource management organisations at the local level raises questions about which organisation or combination of organisations resource management authority should be decentralised to, who decides and how might such decision be implemented. This chapter explores the interactions of different organisations involved in woodlands and water management in Romwe and highlights the constant flux, as power shifts among the various organisations. Perceptions of community members regarding the roles and responsibilities of the various organisations were also sought. There is a complex maze of organisations at community level as can be seen from Table 5.1. These organisations can be classified into five broad categories: traditional, local governance, technical government departments, NGO facilitated structures and interest groups. Many are based on social and kinship ties. Roles and responsibilities of each of the organisations involved in woodlands and water resources management in Romwe, drawing from the local actors' perspective, are outlined.

The majority of the local level organisations such as the catchment management, dam, agronomy, conservation, garden, and micro-credit scheme committees were established by NGOs. While these committees do not necessarily have legal backing, they draw the allegiance of people due to the material and financial support they receive from the NGOs. These NGOs are dependent on donor-supported projects with a timeframe, often ranging between three to five years. Once the donors withdraw support, most NGOs withdraw and these structures often lose their vibrancy. Community members often act in calculated rationality, for instance, when the Barura garden was established in 1998, most members from Chidiso garden moved to Barura garden, hoping that material and financial support would be higher there. Some former committee members in Chidiso garden hold positions in Barura garden committee and only two members of the Chidiso garden committee were active at the time of the study. The Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU) supports smallholder farmers. Because membership is through payment of annual fees, the less privileged cannot afford to join and thus it is seen as an elitist organisation in the study site. With the exception of *madzoro* (traditional cattle herding arrangements), all interest groups were found to be very active. *Madzoro* are now defunct partly because richer households prefer to use hired labour rather than group herding arrangements.

Table 5.1: *Village level organisations involved in CBNRM in Romwe*

Category	Structure	Constitution	Status	Mandates/comments
Traditional authorities (informal)	*Sabuku*	Inherited and chief confirms	Active	Allocate land Enforce resource use rules Resolve village disputes
	Headman	Lineage nominee, chief confirms	Active	Resolve cross village disputes Allocate land
	Chief	Lineage nominee, and State confirms	Active	Custodians of the land Spiritual guidance
	Traditional healers	Spiritual censure	Active	Diviners Cure ailments
Modern, statutory administrative (formal)	VIDCOs	Elected	Inactive, except chairman	Spearhead development Legal mandate for land allocation
	WADCOs	Elected	Councillor active	Spearhead development Link community to RDC
	RDC	Elected and statutory	Not active at village	Legal local authority in the district.
Technical government departments	Agritex	Statutory	Active	Pegging of fields Extension services Advise on disease control
	DNR	Statutory	Formerly active	Restrict stream bank cultivation Prevent tree cutting
	FC	Statutory	Inactive	Enforce forest use rules
	DDF	Statutory	Inactive	Provision of infrastructure
NGO and researcher facilitated committees	Catchment mgt	Nominated	Dormant	Manage use of resources in the catchment area
	Chidiso garden	Elected	Two people active	Management of garden Resolve internal conflicts
	Barura garden	Elected	Active	Management of garden Seek potential markets
	Dam committee	Elected	Active	Management of dam water and control use of dam
	Borehole committees	Elected	Inactive	Borehole maintenance Collect annual user fees
	Agronomy	Elected	Inactive	Tree planting for catchment conservation
	Grazing	Elected	Inactive	Monitor grazing areas use
	Micro-credit	Elected	Active	Manage village credit scheme
	Tree enthusiasts	Voluntary and *ad hoc*	Active	Indigenous tree planting Action research on trees
Interest groups	ZFU	Joining fee	Active	Improve access to inputs
	Church	Voluntary	Active	Spiritual and moral support
	Burial societies	Voluntary, subscriptions	Active	Moral &material support during bereavement
	Madzoro	Voluntary	Inactive	Labour pooling for livestock herding
	Cotton growers	Voluntary	Active	Sharing knowledge on cotton

Traditional authorities were said to be the more active by community members as compared to modern structures. As one villager put it, 'we get most of our information from the *sabuku*s, the other leaders are just doing their formal job' (*zvizhinji tinozvinzwa kubva kumasabuku*, *vamwe ava kungoitawo basa ravo*). The Forestry Commission (FC) is not active in the Romwe area, although it was noted that it is active elsewhere in the district. This is partly explained by the fact that there is only one forestry extension officer covering the whole district. The mandate of the FC is to promote sustainable use of forest resources and enforce rules regarding use of forest products. NGO facilitated structures tend to interact more with the traditional structures. In cases where NGO facilitated structures such as garden committees cannot resolve conflicts, they refer cases to the *sabuku*. In other cases where local actors are not happy with decisions taken by the *sabuku* regarding projects, they sometimes seek the intervention of NGO officers to resolve such differences.

While there is a maze of organisations at the local level, there is no formal definition of which organisation should be doing what. There is often poor communication among the various organisations sometimes leading to competition, duplication of roles and services. Existing legislation to a large extent fosters competition rather than a spirit of cooperation and collaboration between resource management organisations. For instance, DNR insists on maintaining the 30 metre rule, restricting cultivation along the stream bank, yet Agritex officers more present on the ground, sympathise with local people and allow vegetable irrigation along the stream banks. There is thus need for harmonisation of legal instruments relating to resource management at the local level.

Rather than being independent entities, local level structures are often made up of the same individuals, operating in different capacities in the different structures. Thus while there may be conflicts in the objectives and interests of different organisations, this may be neutralised by having the same individuals sitting in the various committee structures. Figure 5.1 serves to illustrate the multiple leadership positions that one individual may hold. Similar findings are reported by Sithole (1999) in a case where villagers decided to elect traditional leaders into VIDCO and WADCO positions following the Prime Minister's declaration on decentralisation of the local governance system in 1984.



Figure 5.1. Multiple leadership in institutional structures

It is important to analyse the characteristics of those individuals who hold positions in different leadership structures, as this would generate some understanding on a number of factors that influence power dynamics in the community. In the case of Vakuru, he is a respected *sabuku* in the area and is of Shona speaking origin. Because the other two Romwe area *sabuku*s are of Ndebele origin, Vakuru is accorded more respect by the headman, the Chief and other Shona speaking *sabuku*s as compared to his Ndebele speaking counterparts. During the wealth ranking exercises, Vakuru was ranked in the well off category because he has a sizeable herd of cattle, owns agricultural implements such as an ox-drawn plough and cultivator, he also has comparatively big fields, all of which he ploughs during good rainy seasons. Yet the other two *sabuku*s for the catchment villages were ranked in the poor categories. In the majority of cases where individuals hold multiple leadership positions, other criteria for their selection besides their wealth status include their level of education, being eloquent and well connected politically, like the former councillor.

The former councillor, who was also a teacher, for example, held both the councillor and VIDCO chairperson position, a situation that is very unusual. Kinship ties may also influence who holds what positions. For instance the former councillor, appointed one of his wives to be the village community worker (VCW), yet other community members should elect a person into this position. Because the councillor was well connected politically and influential in decision-making processes, his decision to appoint one of his three wives as the VCW was not challenged. At the time of the study, another of the former councillor's wives also held multiple

positions that included being the chairperson of the Barura garden project, secretary for the village micro-credit scheme and representing the community at training workshops such as the Training for Transformation course, food processing, crop husbandry and look and learn visits to other projects sites that were organised by CARE International and IES. One of the sisters of the former councillor also held multiple positions that included being the vice chairperson of Chidiso garden (where she was said to be very influential), a member of committee for the Barura garden project and member of the cotton growers' committee. Having almost the same members hold positions in different committees raises questions regarding the quality of these leaders' input in the committees. This may help explain why some committees are inactive as shown in Table 5.1.

While there may be differences in the mandates and objectives of the various organisations, Murphree (1994) argues that this does not necessarily imply incompatibility and can create a productive synergy among different institutional actors. Similarly, Murombedzi (1992) argues that the success of CAMPFIRE can be attributed to bringing together various interest groups and actors and thereby having instituted multi-party wildlife management involving local communities. However, despite the institutional collaboration between local authorities, government departments and NGOs involved in the implementation of the programme, Murombedzi (*ibid*) observes competition for resource control between local communities and their local authorities and that the RDCs do not necessarily represent the interests of the local communities. Rather, they function as extensions of central government, accountable to the centre rather than to the community. In Romwe there has also been re-centralisation of resource management authority at the RDC level through various legal Acts that include the RDCs Act of 1988 rather than devolving management authority to lower levels. For instance, in Chivi district, resource use by-laws that have legal recognition were developed by the RDC without the involvement of the local communities (Mandondo, 2001). As a result, local actors tend to ignore the by-laws and in some cases claim that they do not know about these by-laws.

The current set up is confusing as organisational interaction is on an *ad hoc* basis. There is also some strategic switch by external agents between parallel institutional structures. The external agents may interact with one structure at one level and at another level switch to a different structure. For instance, at village level, Agritex officers interact more actively with the *sabuku*s, yet at ward level they interact more with councillors and not the headman. NGO officers are said to be selective in their interaction with local level organisations that they interact with, probably depending on which organisation they feel is more supportive of their goals. For instance, while CARE International, CEH and IES have a bias towards traditional authority structures, the South East Dry Areas Project (SEDAP), a project introduced in 2000, works closer with the VIDCO. The challenge villagers face is that all projects being implemented in the area come through the

RDC, yet on the ground the external facilitators appear to choose at their own discretion which local level organisation to work with. Since projects come through the RDC, the local authority, villagers claim that it is difficult for them to reject the projects if their local authority has given a project the go ahead as who are they to say no to the projects. The strategic switch of external facilitators among local level organisations may contribute towards fuelling conflicts between and among various organisations and actors involved in woodlands and water use and management at the local level.

5.3. Foundations of resource and leadership claims: local historical narratives

Berry (1997) finds that historical narratives may be used to lay claim to land and/or other natural resources. Similar views have been expressed by Fortmann (1995) and Peters (1992 & 1984). The production of history may therefore be a social process whose value depends on the social dynamics of production. Historical narratives often serve not only to establish a person's claim to property and power, but also to constitute or reaffirm relationships with other people whose actions or recollections may help in the defence or exercise of such claims (Berry, 1997: 1237). Historical narratives tend to proliferate over time rather than converge toward a single, dominant version. Berry (1997) argues that in communities where property rights and institutions are defined through a process of negotiation, people are more likely to gain reasonably secure access to resources by participating in the negotiations, and the accompanying proliferation of historical precedents, than by settling on a single story which secures some people's rights at the expense of others. This argument was found to be relevant for Romwe as key informants gave different historical narratives regarding the process of settlement in the area, depending on their social position in the community. Narratives have the power to frame and create understanding to establish, maintain and validate current actions to empower the narrator.

'Official' history and local narratives provide general consistency on the dates of relocation from the Midlands in the 1950s province during the land expropriation period. At the local level, however, there are different narratives relating to the *actual process* of relocation, who came into the area first and how. These narratives were the foundation for conflicts over woodlands and water use, institutional conflicts and strategies used to access natural resources by various actors in the catchment. The local historical narratives vary according to the narrator and/or the clan that the narrator belongs to. From key informant interviews, four different historical narratives emerge that relate to four dominant kinship groupings found in the study site; the Mhlanga family (Ndebele without traditional leadership position in the area), the Sihambe clan (Ndebele, one of the

traditional leaders comes from this clan[43]), the Dobhani (also Ndebele, one of the three catchment traditional leaders comes from this clan) and the Tamwa (Shona, the traditional leader, perceived to be the most powerful of the three kraal heads in the catchment comes from this clan). The narratives of these four dominant groups are presented below.

5.3.1 The Mhlanga Narrative

My father Mbeleki Mhlanga was born in Plumtree. Then he moved to Bulawayo and later to Shurugwi through his job. He used to work with wagons pulled by oxen and these transported agricultural produce for a company called Fox and Bucklos Transporters. I was born in 1927 in Shurugwi (then Selukwe) under Chief Mabhazule. When I was born my parents lived in the rural areas, which were converted to commercial farms in 1930. However, no farmer took up the land immediately, thus we continued to stay there. Farming started in 1944 on these farms but we remained and worked on the farm. When the area where our parents (we were very young then) resided was designated as a commercial farm, the new farmer at first was very kind to us. He allowed us to remain on the farm and gave us small plots where we grew maize. Every member of the family worked on this white man's farm. The elderly people worked in the fields while children were made to look after sheep and cattle. Because our individual plots were very small, the farmer would give us some maize after harvesting his crop to supplement our food. My father Mbeleki Mhlanga was a foreman at the farm. All these people you see here like *sabuku*s Sihambe and Dobhani were under him since he was the foreman. In 1951, when the farmer started growing tobacco rather than maize, it became difficult for us to get food. Some people decided to leave the farm to go to other places such as Tugwi (closer to Masvingo town). We asked the farmer what we should do and he advised us to go and ask for land from the District Commissioner (DC)'s office. My father and Sihambe (who was not *sabuku* then) went to the DC's office. They were told that there was no more land around the Shurugwi area and advised them to consult the DC for Chivi district as he had heard that there was land available there.

Mbeleki, Sihambe, Dobhani and one Mr Malamba left for Chivi district in search of land. Mbeleki Mhlanga is said to have been Sihambe and Dobhani's brother-in-law because he had married their sister – the mother of the seven Mhlanga children, six of whom were still residing in the catchment at the beginning of this study.[44] Mr Malamba was not a blood relative of these three but they came along with him because they had all been residents and workers on the farm. When the four men got to the DC in Chivi they were advised that land was available under Chief

43 *Sabuku* Sihambe is estimated to be in his eighties, and no longer active in his position. One of the Mhlangas has taken over the duties of the *sabuku* but people in the area claim he is self-appointed.

44 Two of these, one being the former councillor died in May 2000 while his younger brother died in August 2001.

Nemauzhe's area but they had to go there first and confirm it before their papers could be processed. The four went to Chief Nemauzhe and they were shown the area to the north of Mawunga stream that runs across the biophysical catchment and now forms the boundary between Sihambe and Dobhani villages. They liked the area and went back to inform the DC. Because Mbeleki Mhlanga was foreman at the commercial farm, they decided he should be registered as their *sabuku*, but when the DC asked for his national registration identity card, he noticed that under the section for tribe it was recorded as Ndebele.[45] Although Sihambe and Dobhani were also of Ndebele origin, they had received their identity cards after they moved to the Midlands area, thus their tribe had been registered as Shona. The then Chivi DC said it would complicate matters if Mbeleki was made *sabuku* with ethnicity recorded as Ndebele in a predominantly Shona speaking area. Thus it was advisable that one of those whose identity cards was registered as Shona become the *sabuku*. Because Sihambe was the older of the two brothers, they decided that he be registered as the *sabuku*.

After moving into the area in 1952, they realised that the land on the northern side of Mawunga stream was not enough for all the families and approached Chief Nemauzhe again for permission to utilise the land on the southern side of Mawunga stream. Chief Nemauzhe advised that the stream formed the boundary between his *nyika* (land) and that of Chief Madzivire; therefore they had to ask the permission from Chief Madzivire. The two brothers, Sihambe and Dobhani approached Chief Madzivire and they were granted the right to use the land. The two brothers decided that since Dobhani was the younger of the two, he should move to the new area across Mawunga stream with his family and become the *sabuku* for this new settlement. This explains the present settlement where Sihambe families are settled on the northern side of the stream and the Dobhani area is across the stream. Although they are brothers, they report to different Chiefs because of the nature of their settlement. When we arrived in this area, we were told that *intaba iRomwe ayikhwelwa, ikhwelwa ngabanikazi bendawo kuphela abanjengenkosi uNemauzhe* (that Romwe mountain is sacred and we should not climb it except for the 'owners of the land', such as Chief Nemauzhe). Where we grew up no area was said to be sacred except the Matopos where we were told there was 'God' and people would go there to worship him. Thus we did not understand what they meant about a local area being sacred. They would say if you go up the hill you will get lost, but one can get lost even walking along the road.

We moved to this area in a decent manner as compared to people in Tamwa village. After identifying where we wanted to settle, we were offered transport by the Shurugwi DC. But those people under Tamwa and

45 Archival records reviewed show that when a person was appointed sabuku or headman during the colonial period their details *e.g.* tribe, totem, language spoken, and genealogy were recorded at the DC's office (National Archives File S2929/8/2 – Report on Makovere Headmanship and Community Chief Nemavuzhe – Chibi Tribal Trust Land and District).

Vudzi (one of the social catchment villages), they were moved in a rough manner. They were packed in lorries and driven to this place from Rhodesdale, this was not the case with Sihambe, Dobhani and us (the Mhlangas). Because we chose the land we wanted, we have good arable land in the valley unlike Tamwa and Vudzi who were just dumped in the area.
Source: Interview with Jani Mhlanga – who has usurped his uncle's position of *sabuku*, November 2000 and supplemented by information generated from an informal discussion with Joel Mhlanga, February 2001 and interview with Mr Monday Malamba, February 2001.

5.3.2 The Sihambe Narrative

The farm where we lived and worked was called Washblock and was owned by Shabani Mines. Residents on the farm were a mix of Ndebele and Shona and our Chief was Ngungu Dlodlo. People started being moved from the farm in 1948 and we moved in 1952 and came here (Romwe). Before the whites came we always had *izinduna* (headmen) who were under *inkosi* (Chiefs), but when the whites came they introduced *osobhuku* (*sabuku*s) to whom we had to pay head and hut taxes. The whites wanted to know where we lived and it was easier to do so through the *sabuku*s – thus the *sabuku*s were like our home addresses. The District Commissioner (DC) helped us to move from Shurugwi and settle here. When the people who were asked to look for land for us to settle came here, they first went to headman Chikanda to seek permission. Chikanda took them to Chief Nemauzhe because Chikanda could not allow new people into the area without the Chief's knowledge. The land seekers had brought with them a letter from the DC. After being granted the rights to settle, we went back and brought our belongings. The DC provided us with transport. When we came here, this area was not settled – we don't know whether any people had lived here before. The whole area was heavily forested and it took heavy labour input to clear the fields. During our first days here our standard of living went down because we had no experience with the area. The knowledge we had about cropping and livestock management in Shurugwi was not directly applicable here. We had to learn the new environment. Life started getting better around 1960. Then around 1962 the white men came and said we should destump our field and dig contour ridges. We did not like it because it was hard labour. Those who failed to construct the contours ridges were arrested and made to pay fines, but I cannot remember how much they were made to pay. Our villages were also reorganised during that time into linear settlements. When we look back we appreciate having constructed the contours because they curbed soil erosion.

When we first settled here, cattle from my area could graze in the neighbouring villages and theirs would come to my area too. We were not allowed by the DC to graze cattle along the Mawunga stream, they would go there for watering only. Nowadays we have demarcated village

boundaries but cattle can still cross over to other villages because they do not know about boundaries. Even firewood we collect anywhere and neighbouring villages come here because the hilly areas still have a diversity of tree species and wood products are abundant.
Source: Interview with *sabuku* Sihambe (age - in his late 80s), July 1998 and November 2000.

5.3.3 The Dobhani Narrative

We came here in 1952 from Shurugwi area. Our homes were originally located between Gweru and Shurugwi near the Bulawayo railroad on the Matebeleland side. We originally belonged to the Ndebele tribe. We were settled on Washingbrook farm in Shurugwi and at first there was an agreement with the farm owner that people would work on his farm for three months a year to raise money needed to pay taxes. But when the farmer started growing tobacco, he needed more labour and wanted us to work more than the three months and we were not willing to do so. Thus we were asked to look for alternative land to settle. Our fathers worked together at the farm with Mbeleki Mhlanga. Although Mbeleki was a foreman, he was just a worker like anyone else. My father was the elder brother of the sitting *sabuku* Sihambe. Later Mbeleki married the sister of *sabuku* Sihambe.

After the owner of Washingbrook farm asked us to leave, we came here. Chief Madzivire gave us this area (referring to the area that forms Dobhani and Sihambe villages) after we came through the District Commissioner (DC- *mudzviti*). At first we were settled to the north of Mawunga stream and the DC appointed my father to be the *sabuku*. When my father moved to the southern side of Mawunga stream, Sihambe became the *sabuku* for the households located on the northern side of Mawunga stream. I was appointed by my father to inherit his position in the late 1960s when he said he was too old to rule. Beginning in 1961 we were forced to dig contours by the agricultural extension workers. Since we came here, there have been some changes in terms of resource availability. Significant changes have been influenced by population growth. We were few when we arrived but now there is a shortage of arable and grazing land. Now we have a shortage of grazing land because people are settling randomly in our original grazing areas. It has become difficult to control them because they say we are now independent – thus implying they are free to do what they want. There is cross-village use of woodland and water resources. It has always been the case since we settled here, but then it was not a problem. When we moved into this area, the Chief told us about the traditional rules that applied to natural resources, such as respecting sacred areas and rainmaking ceremonies and we followed them. Sacred areas were spared even when the whites pegged our homes and fields during the early 1960s. People under Tamwa were ‘deported’ from Rhodesdale in the Midlands province after the area was taken over by the government for distribution to soldiers who had fought during the Second World War on the side of

Britain. '*VanaTamwa vakatamiswa zvakaipa mhani – mombe dzakazosara dzotevera neRMS'* (People under Tamwa were relocated in a huff – their cattle had to follow after they had already been dumped in this area).
Source: Interview with *sabuku* Dobhani (in his mid 70s), July 1998 and informal discussion with same informant in November 2000.

5.3.4 The Tamwa Narrative

Originally, we lived in Rhodesdale, which falls under Kwekwe district in the Midlands area. Then we heard that our area was now a farm. Some of our relatives were relocated to Gokwe, but myself and Vudzi were moved to this area (Romwe). We could not do anything because we were told it was an order from the government. *Takazokandwa kuno nemota dzeHurumende kwataigara kwatorwa kuita mapurazi emasoja aHitler* (We were driven in government trucks and dumped into this area when our land was turned into commercial farms for the soldiers that had fought during the war with Hitler). Our livestock came after we had already been moved into this area. My father had 45 head of cattle, and some of them got lost during the relocation process. We had good land for agricultural production in Kwekwe, the soils were fertile and rainfall was very reliable. Fortunately when we got here, people who were already settled here like Chikanda received us well and also told us about *zviyera zvaivako* (the sacred areas that were found in the area). We respected *zviyera zvavo sevaenzi vawuya munzvimbo yevaridzi* (their sacred areas since we were the newcomers in the area, we had to follow their beliefs) and that people should not work in the fields on Wednesday (*chisi.*[46]) *Chisi* is a day that is traditionally revered and viewed as a day for resting and therefore people are not supposed to work in the fields. We also found Sihambe and Dobhani people here but we all became one since we had all been resettled in the area. They (Sihambe and Dobhani) told us that they had also been moved from an area that was turned into a farm like us but they say they were not forced to come here. It is difficult to say whether their story is true or not *asi isu takadzingwa* (but as for us we were forcibly relocated). Now we have lived here for many years and we are used to the area.
Source: *Sabuku* Tamwa in his mid 70s interview, July 1998 and informal discussion in November 2000.

5.3.5 Observations from the narratives

All the four narratives concur on a number of issues such as having found already established leadership structures in the area, *i.e.* the headman Chikanda and the Chiefs Nemauzhe and Madzivire. While they had their own *sabuku*s and villages created through the District Commissioner, at the time they respected the existing leadership structures. The narratives also concur on the fact that they were informed about existing institutional

46 Sithole (1999) finds that in Eastern Zimbabwe historically, this day was dedicated to the King or Chief and people would contribute labour on fields where grain for communal granaries was grown.

arrangements such as sacred areas in Romwe, but the Ndebele seem to have failed to appreciate these, given that they came from a cultural context that recognised mainly one area, the Matopos, as sacred. It is only the Mhlanga narrative that highlights how the new *sabuku*s got their positions when they moved into the area. As will be seen later in the chapter, one of the Mhlanga brothers has appointed himself heir to the Sihambe *sabuku* position because the current *sabuku* is too old to be actively involved in village activities. The narrator may have told his story in a way that justifies his action of taking over the *sabuku* position. In other community projects, members of the Mhlanga family have also been found to be dominating in decision-making and leadership positions as illustrated above through the case of the former councillor and his wives and sister holding multiple leadership positions. Sithole (2002) also describes the dominance of members of the Mhlanga kinship group in the village micro-credit scheme. In the micro-credit scheme, members of this family hold key positions in the committee, have taken bigger amounts of loans and the majority of them have defaulted on repayments (*ibid*). These narratives are important for understanding social interaction and current patterns of institutional interaction in the community, and struggles over property rights relating to woodlands and water. The creation of narratives is part of the process of negotiating and renegotiating arrangements for resource use, property rights and they play an important role in the social, institutional and cultural transformation process. It is worth noting that all narratives appear to deliberately use the term "we" as a way of portraying that it is not just the individual narrator's perceptions that are described, but an experience shared by the group (see Carr, 1986). It is therefore important to take note of the narrator's oscillation between the 'I' and the 'we' in narrating the story. The following section discusses conflicts that were identified in Romwe.

5.4 Conflicts over woodlands and water access and control

Corell (1996:21) defines conflict as a social situation in which a minimum of two parties strive at the same moment to acquire the same set of scarce resources. While this definition is of some relevance to this study, it emphasises situations of resource scarcity as fuelling conflicts, yet there could be other situations where conflicts are not related to scarcity, for example conflicts over leadership positions. Leach *et al*., (1999) note that resource availability and access are often interconnected and conflicts over access often intensify when the resources in question become scarce in absolute terms. This definition also highlights the issue of scarcity; although unlike Corell (1996) Leach *et al*., (1999) make reference to 'absolute scarcity' as a key factor in the emergence of conflicts. This line of argument is common in the CBNRM literature. While this study shows that conflicts often emerge as a result of resource scarcity, it is also shown that resource scarcity is not always the only source as there are other patterns of social interaction that may lead to conflict situations. Historical claims to resource access and control are also a source of conflicts in

Romwe. Common themes that run across most definitions of conflict in the literature on CBNRM and were relevant for this study contain the following elements:

- Perceived divergence of interests between different beliefs and values.
- Different interests, goals and ambitions between and among various actors.
- Incentives that force the actors involved to both compete and cooperate.
- Negotiation and tradeoffs between goals, interests and aspirations of the various actors.
- Strategic behaviour that is often expressed as power practices.

In any form of social interaction, conflicts are constantly present but to differing degrees. In the context of CBNRM, community participation is often seen as a means to decrease the risk of resource use conflicts or a way of enabling constructive management of existing conflicts. As discussed in Chapter Two, conflicts over resource access and control are expressed in various forms and these vary in space, time and level. The intensity of conflicts depends on the nature of the resource in question, the relationship of the parties involved and the history of natural resource access. The emerging conflicts in CBNRM are about what Moore (1993) and Sithole (2001) call 'micro-politics' of resource access and management. In addition, they claim that conflicts relate to various actors strategising to gain control over key natural resources such as woodlands and water and conflicts can therefore not be restricted to issues surrounding resource scarcity as often emphasised in the CBNRM literature. Conflicts over access to and control over woodlands and water resources are also about survival, leadership, institutions and the politics of livelihood today and for the future of households. Conflicts emanating from encroachment into woodlands and consequently grazing areas heighten people's insecurity over access to natural resources and therefore raise concerns about the sustainability of the natural resource base. Some contestations have historical underpinnings and are influenced by factors such as length of residence in a given community or area and these are taken up in this chapter. The discussion on resource conflicts begins with the presentation and analysis of the foundations of resource and leadership claims that have a bearing on who can have access to and control over what resource. An overview of conflicts identified in the study site is then presented followed by a discussion of each of the areas of conflict and analyses of conflict mediation strategies.

A variety of conflicts relating to resource use, access and control were identified during this study. These conflicts occur both at household and community level, with some occurring between and across villages. An overview of conflicts identified during the study is presented in Table 5.2. Areas of conflict identified include, organisational conflicts, land conflicts

related to encroachment into grazing areas and other common pool woodland areas, commercialisation of woodlands products, boundary disputes, villagers' and leaders' conflicts, squabbles over water, spiritual issues and those between 'outsiders' (*e.g.* external project facilitators) and 'insiders' (community members).

Table 5.2. *Overview of conflicts over woodlands and water*

Nature of conflict	**Causes**	**Major characteristics**	**Most affected**
Organisational conflict	- Overlapping legal instruments (*e.g.* RDCs Act and Traditional Leaders' Act) - Sectorial legislation (*e.g.* Natural Resources Act, Forest Produce Act, Parks and Wildlife Act)	- Poor relations between VIDCOs and *sabuku*s. - Lack of clear institutional jurisdictions - Poor rule enforcement - Inconsistent judgement of rule breakers - Local leaders lack of motivation	-Traditional leaders - VIDCOs
Land and grazing area conflicts	- Population pressure -Low agricultural productivity - Colonial land policies - Poor implementation of resettlement programmes - Unemployment	- Expropriation of individual arable land for community projects without 'fair' compensation - Self allocation of land *i.e.* encroachment into common pool resource areas *e.g.* grazing areas - Squabbles over land inheritance.	- Landless, *e.g.* young men - Landowners for land taken for projects - Livestock owners
Sale of woodland products	- Unemployment - Limited livelihood options	- Sale of firewood - Use of common pool areas that are normally not used to collect *e.g.* firewood for sale	- Young men - Women
Boundary disputes	- Fuzziness of boundaries - Land shortage	- Residence in one village with fields in a different village - Encroachment of settlement in other villages - Lack of specific village boundaries	- Men - Traditional leaders
Villagers versus Leaders	- 'Unfair' adjudication - Perceived favouritism - Interaction with 'outsiders' - Inefficiency of leadership	- Questioning legitimacy of a leader - Witchcraft accusations - Villagers seeking external intervention or mediation - Leasing of garden plots - Vandalism or theft of equipment.	- Traditional leaders - VIDCOs -Project committees
Water related conflicts	- Unreliable water supply at Barura dam - Competing water uses	- Closing off water supply - Witchcraft accusations	- Women - Livestock owners
Conflict over spiritual matters	- Different traditional belief and value systems - Christianity	- Encroachment into sacred areas - Witchcraft accusations - Breaching of *e.g. chisi*.	All community members
Between 'outsiders' and 'insiders'	- Perceived favouritism of certain actors - Job allocation	- Vandalism or theft of equipment - Feet dragging - False compliance	- Researchers -Village leadership

5.4.1 Organisational conflicts

Main organisational conflicts emanate from overlapping legal instruments and sectorial application of resource use rules and regulations. Conflicts that emerge also relate to the interpretation of the law, how it should be applied, enforcement mechanisms and its relevance in a context in which resource scarcity is increasing. Legally the RDCs have the authority over natural resources in the district based on the RDCs Act of 1988. VIDCOs and WADCOs are the extension of the RDC's legal authority at the local community level. Although the traditional system was weakened during the war of liberation and subsequently in the early 1980s, post independence period, it has endured through all these trials and tribulations. As part of their roles to manage social relations in the community, traditional authorities were historically mandated to look after the land and instil stewardship over natural resources. For this task, they were believed to receive assistance from the spirits of the land (*vadzimu*) who would mete out justice when the majority of the people desecrated the land (Matowanyika, 1991). Whereas the official authority for land allocation and natural resource governance lay in the RDC up until 1998, when the TLA was enacted, the traditional authorities were the *de facto* land allocators and resource managers on the ground.

The Land Tenure Commission (LTC) of 1994 marked the build up to the enactment of the Traditional Leaders Act (TLA, 1998. The LTC recommended that 'traditional' villages under village heads were the legitimate and appropriate units for local natural resource management in communal areas. In line with the recommendations of the LTC, the Traditional Leaders Act (1998) recognises the 'traditional' village as the lowest unit of social organisation, in contrast to the VIDCOs. The TLA provides for the granting of registration titles to village assemblies that are based on adult village suffrage and presided over by a village head appointed by the chief. A registered village is to consist of a clearly mapped spatial unit with well-defined boundaries. The policy espousing clearly defined villages is aimed at ensuring that costs and benefits directly accrue to clearly defined members who can then be tasked with the management of natural resources in their locality. The practicability of implementing the LTC recommendations in line with the TLA (1998) may face challenges, as the place and role of the VIDCOs and WADCOs are not clearly defined in relation to the traditional authorities that are being accorded legal recognition.

The lack of clear jurisdictions for VIDCOs and *sabuku*s has to a large extent created a resource management vacuum at community level which villagers tend to take advantage of by oscillating between these organisations in times of crisis – depending on which one is seen as the more favourable to their individual needs and actions. These recent legal reforms may further conflate the VIDCO-WADCO in relation to the traditional authority system. According to the TLA (1998), village heads

and headmen are charged with the enforcement of all environmental planning and conservation by-laws on behalf of the chief, the RDC and the state. Traditional authorities are therefore empowered to enforce rules that exact fines that end up with the RDC. This provides a typical case of higher level authorities decentralising the costs of natural resource management but retaining control of benefits. As shown in Chapter Four, current enforcement of by-laws at community level is weak partly because communities feel the fines should be paid to the traditional authorities for their direct benefit. In addition, the VIDCOs and WADCOs were and are still undertaking some of the roles that have been legally allocated to the traditional authorities, and it is not clear how these two structures would co-exist within the new organisational framework.

Different judgements passed by the formal and informal resource management structures for the same case as well were said to result in conflict between resource management organisations. This can be seen in Case 5.1. In this case, the traditional authority system judged in favour of the defendants while the formal/modern system (*i.e.* the RDC) favoured the accused. Such conflicting adjudication also creates loopholes in the natural resource management systems in place.

5.4.2 Conflicts over access to land and grazing areas

Grazing lands are held in common by all villagers and in some cases they are shared with neighbouring villages. Theoretically, the user community utilises the grazing lands according to agreed rules. The rules define membership, *i.e.* who can and who cannot graze in the pastures; the times and seasons members can use the grazing lands; and specify the nature of penalty or fine that various infringements incur. Poor enforcement of rules regulating access to grazing areas has occurred due to increased land shortage that has led to intensified competition and conflicts over access to these resources. Conflicts over access to land (where woodlands are found) and grazing areas reflect a constant struggle over control of resource use spaces. Resource use landscapes and spaces are arenas where competing private and collective interests are expressed and played out, reflecting the hierarchy between different actors on the 'front-stage' as well as the 'back-stage'. The concept of 'front-stage' and 'back-stage' is borrowed from Goffman, cited in Villarreal (1992). 'Front-stage' represents the public process and patterns of interaction whereas the 'back-stage' represents the more private or subtle processes that may not be seen at face value and also may not just be taken for granted. Common pool resource landscapes provide ground for mobilisation and self-empowerment while remaining open to struggles for resource access and control. This may unite or fragment, create, reconfigure and transform social interactions of the various actors. This process shows the physical as well as symbolic shifting of boundaries that shrink or expand depending on the issue at stake. For instance, at one time the catchment villages include only three villages, Sihambe, Dobhani and Tamwa, yet in other contexts, the catchment

villages include all ten villages that use resources in the biophysical catchment area. A variety of factors contribute towards the emergence of conflicts over land and grazing areas and land inheritance emerged as one of these factors. Land inheritance conflicts and those related to encroachment into grazing and other common pool woodland resource areas are on the increase. The land shortage in the area has also fuelled conflicts through the expropriation of individual (private) arable plots for community projects such as gardens without 'fair' compensation.

Conflicts over land inheritance

Under customary law, which is operational in the majority of the communal lands in Zimbabwe, men inherit land along the patriarchal lineage. Although legally all lands under communal lands belong to the state (under the Communal Lands Act of 1982), on the ground individual landholdings are often registered under the head of the household, often male. Conflicts over land inheritance may arise in cases where a couple gets married and decides to settle in the woman's home area as can be seen in Case 5.1.

Case 5.1: *Inter-household conflict over arable land: The case of Mafeha*

Mafeha met his wife in the Chiredzi sugar estates during the 1970s and after getting married they moved to Romwe in the 1980s, his wife's home area. Mafeha was born in Nkayi district in Matebeleland North. In Romwe they settled in Tamwa village and they were given a field that belonged to his wife's clan. Mafeha being the household head, their landholding was registered in his name. They later divorced and his wife moved to her sister's homestead, still in the Romwe area. Mafeha continued to reside in their homestead, ploughing the field and producing vegetables from his garden that has a very productive perennial well. In 1999 his ex-wife fell ill and she died in 2000. After her death, her relatives demanded that Mafeha give back 'their' field. The ex-wife's family reported the case to the *sabuku* who supported their claim. Realising that he was going to lose the field, Mafeha leased it to an 'outsider' - one of the researchers - hoping that his ex-wife's relatives would be embarrassed to demand the return of the field from an 'outsider'. Mafeha also leased part of his garden to a member of one of the powerful families in the village. The 'outsider' was later told by the *sabuku* that the following cropping season he should not use the field. The following year when his ex-wife's relatives backed by the *sabuku*'s ruling insisted he should give back the field, Mafeha went and reported his case at the district administrator and RDC offices. Subsequently the council officials told his ex-

wife's relatives that they did not have the right to take the field away from him because '*murume ndiye samusha* - the man is the owner of the homestead'. With the backing of the RDC officials, Mafeha won 'his' field.

The Mafeha case raises a number of institutional questions relating to conflict resolution and issues of access to land in the study area. The multiplicity of institutions related to natural resource access and management provides local people with room to choose to recognise a particular authority when it suits them most. For instance, when the *sabuku* made a judgement that Mafeha felt was not 'fair', he instead sought external adjudication from the RDC and thus took advantage of the poor relations between the traditional and the RDC (modern) authority systems. Villagers juggle across the various authority structures depending on the circumstances. The Mafeha case also illustrates the complexity of land inheritance. Conflicts over inheritance issues may heighten in contexts of resource scarcity. Given that land is traditionally inherited through the male lineage and that women have relatively weaker rights to land, this could partly explain why Mafeha was able to retain the fields. The advantage of having land owned and inherited through the male lineage system is that it reduces the loss of land to people considered as aliens, such as sons-in-law.

Conflicts over privatisation of common pool woodland and grazing areas

Population pressure in Romwe has also seen individuals privatising common pool resources such as grazing and woodland areas. Case 5.2 illustrates this. There are many other similar cases where young men enclose areas for either settlement or crop production due to land shortage.

Case 5.2: *Privatising common pool resources: Farai' s case*

My father settled in this area in 1963 when land was abundant. When I got married, my father gave me part of his crop fields. This is what happens here for most families because there is limited scope for opening up new land. Currently there are few households that own more than 3 acres of land because of population growth and land redistribution. Because of this, there is increasing temptation especially for the youth to encroach into areas originally reserved for purposes other than crop production. While one may want to uphold traditional values, one finds oneself caught up between economic demands and the need for social conformity. As hopes of a better life continue to dwindle, the tendency is that economic demands are given more weight. Encroachment into common pool resource areas is bound to increase if no alternative solutions to the land shortage are found.

In 1993, I felt I could not live on such poor soil and decided to go and work on the farms in South Africa. Because I did not have a work permit I was deported in 1995. When I came back I asked the *sabuku* to allocate me a better piece of land but he could not get good land for me. Thus I decided to fence off a small piece of land in the grazing area for my garden. I dug a well in the garden to ensure I had a reliable source of water throughout the year in order to produce vegetables. Other villagers complained that I had fenced off a route that was used by many people to meet my own needs. A village tribunal was called which the *sabuku* and the VIDCO chairman attended and they resolved that I should keep the garden because I was doing it for the survival of my family. When we were young, life was easy because there were fewer people, soils were much more fertile and there was no pressure to seek alternative sources of livelihood.

Source: Adapted from Nemarundwe *et al*., 1998.

Both the traditional and modern authorities find themselves having to deal with cases of encroachment in an environment of growing resource scarcity. Being forced to balance people's need for survival and good environmental management, community leaders are forced to prioritise the survival of people over environmental management goals. Local resource management authorities are increasingly being criticised for nepotism and corruption through letting people settle randomly or annex common pool resource areas as seen in the above case as well as in Case 5.3 below.

Case 5.3: *Mbuya Simba's field expansion*

Mbuya Simba is the wife of one of the *sabuku*'s brothers. Because she is in a polygamous union and the eldest wife, her husband allocated her separate fields that she calls her 'own' fields. The younger wife uses their husband's field. Mbuya Simba subdivided one of her fields between her two sons when they got married. As a result her land holding became smaller. In October 2001, she decided to expand her field up the hill located near her field and in doing so, encroached into the grazing area. Both the *sabuku*s and Agritex do not allow farming on steep slopes due to soil erosion problems. Asked how she got land, her response was, '… land is not a problem here. You just talk to the *sabuku*. I told him my land was not enough for me and he asked me if I had any suggestions as to what could be done. I told him that I wanted to expand my fields towards the hill and he said I should go ahead. If asked by other community members, he would pretend that he is not aware of it'. During the interview, when asked how she managed to get the field, her response was that, 'these *sabuku*s

can be "talked" to; you should not suffer in silence. Even yourself (referring to the researcher), if you want a field, you should go and talk to the *sabuku*'. A month after she had extended her field, no one had questioned or challenged her actions.
Source: Interview with Mbuya Simba, September 2001.

Such cases appear to challenge both the traditional and modern authorities and sometimes weaken their position in terms of adjudicating village cases related to natural resource use. They are therefore viewed as having nepotistic tendencies. The *sabuku*s are also accused of accepting gifts from people who later ask for favours from them (the *sabuku*s).

Conflicts over land for community projects

Conflicts have also been reported relating to conversion of private landholdings for community projects such as the Chidiso and the Barura gardens. In both cases, the original landowners protested against their land being taken for the garden projects arguing they would not be fairly compensated. By 'fair' compensation, reference was made to the quality of the land in terms of agricultural productivity as well as the size of the land. The two cases were resolved differently. In the case of Chidiso the land taken up by the garden was a field belonging to a widow. At first she resisted and claims are that one of the garden committee members threatened her for thwarting development efforts in the community for her individual benefit suggesting that if she continued to refuse she 'would see' (see Table 5.5). In the study site, such threats are greatly feared, as it is believed the person will harm their opponent with mystical powers associated with witchcraft. After experiencing some mysterious 'pulling of her eyeball' the widow gave up her fields, as she feared losing her eyesight. She was later given another piece of land, which was located relatively far from her homestead as compared to her former field.

The conflict resolution in Barura garden was different. In Barura, the man who owned the field where the garden is located also resisted even after several meetings. The NGO officers and *sabuku* could not convince him to give it up. Then the NGO approached the district administrator (DA) to intervene. The DA and the RDC chief executive officer (CEO) came to the village. A meeting was called and the case was concluded with the decision that he should give up the field. The district officers used the existing legal instruments, which designate the RDC as the legally recognised land authority in the district to support their adjudication giving the field owner no choice but to move to another location. He was promised a plot in the garden as part of the compensation package. This case highlights the fluid nature of decision-making processes involving both internal and external actors depending on the issue at stake. In cases of stalemate in the community, external intervention is often sought. In this

case final decisions were made referring to existing legal instruments that give the RDC authority to allocate land in communal areas.

5.4.3 Commercialisation of woodland products

A contentious issue in the community is the commercialisation of woodlands products, especially by young men. This has increased in recent years due to the prevailing economic conditions *e.g.* loss of formal employment and remittances resulting in limited livelihood options in rural areas. Several cases were reported of people involved in the woodland products commercialisation such as the case of Peter, which illustrates firewood sale. Peter is a former employee in the CEH and IES research projects. He was employed as a groundwater monitor but when the research emphasis shifted to socio-economics, he was laid off. In early October 2001, Peter sought permission from the *sabuku* to sell firewood. After considering Peter's case, the *sabuku* granted him permission to do so. Peter began selling firewood to Museva business centre, Ngundu growth point, researchers based in the village and to other villagers in the Romwe area at an average price of Z$300 per scotchcart load. The price is negotiable and depends on the relationship between the two parties involved. Often for outsiders such as researchers, the price is much higher than for other community members. In mid November 2001, two members of the village approached the *sabuku* and complained about Peter's enterprise. These two asked the *sabuku* to ban Peter from selling firewood. The *sabuku* responded by banning Peter from selling firewood. At the end of November, Peter went to Museva business centre and bought the *sabuku* some sugar and tealeaves. After the *sabuku* accepted the gifts, Peter renegotiated permission to sell firewood. The *sabuku* granted permission on condition that he would only sell the firewood locally. In December, the two members who had earlier complained to the *sabuku* threatened to denounce him publicly if he did not stop Peter from selling firewood. The *sabuku* then asked Peter to stop the sale of firewood completely. In January 2002, after the *sabuku* had banned him from selling firewood, Peter indicated when interviewed that he had decided to stop temporarily and would start again once 'the dust has settled down'.

With commercialisation of woodland products, local leaders are finding it difficult to ban people from engaging in 'survival strategies' that involve commercialisation of woodland products. Braedt and Standa-Gunda (2000) report similar findings referring to production and sale of woodcarvings along the Masvingo-Beitbridge road in Chivi district. Village leaders find themselves accepting gifts such as sugar and tea from individuals in the community for getting permission to, for instance, generate income through the sale of woodlands products. Traditional leaders are prone to accepting such gifts partly because they also want to 'survive'. During the wealth ranking exercise (see Annex 2), some of the traditional leaders were classified in the poor category. Accepting bribes could hence be seen as a source of survival for them, especially during a drought year. As villagers

raised complaints relating to the sale of woodland products outside the village, a resolution was made that they be sold locally only. The reason was that the activity should not be completely banned, as it is one of the important livelihood sources in the village. Despite this resolution, two months later, some young men had resumed the sale of firewood as illustrated by the case of Zimuto.

Zimuto is unemployed and the son of one of the *sabuku*'s brothers. He embarked on selling firewood from Romwe to a businessman at Ngundu growth point who owns a butchery. The businessman comes once or twice a month to collect firewood from Zimuto using his five tonne truck. One man complained to the *sabuku* and his response was, "you can also do it as long as other people do not see it. What do you think I can do when he is doing it for survival? If he was spending the money on beer, I would ban him, but he is buying food for his family". Asked about their views on this case, some villagers indicated that this *sabuku* is known for being very strict but appeared to be lenient with Zimuto probably because he is a relative of his. If it had been an 'ordinary' person in the village who had broken the rule, he or she would have been made to pay a fine. A young man whose parents settled in the area during the 1970s asked the researcher, 'Have you not heard that blood is thicker than water? It is us aliens (*Vawuyi*) who suffer while those of the ruling family (*Vowushe*) are at liberty to collect anything they want from the forest'.

5.4.4 Boundary disputes

As discussed in Chapter Four, village and resource use boundaries are very porous and often shift depending on the issue or product at stake. Because village boundaries are socially constructed by the various actors, they are fluid and conflicts over boundary definitions are frequent. While people have only a general idea as to the location of village boundaries, cases of disputed exact locations of boundaries were common. Instances of households who have fields or wells in neighbouring villages were noted, demonstrating as well resource sharing across villages. Examples of contestations over boundaries are presented in Table 5.3.

Contestations over boundaries involve both leaders and villagers claiming and reclaiming resource use areas especially common pool woodland areas. Village boundaries are shifting and contested, thus villagers often do not want to discuss village boundaries in public fora as this may raise tempers. The contestation of village boundaries is not a new phenomenon. Bourdillon (1987) documents that historically, natural features such as hills and rivers well known to the inhabitants usually defined boundaries of chiefdoms, but precise agreement over these boundaries was not always shared with inhabitants of neighbouring chiefdoms. Despite the diverging views on the village boundaries, there appear to be 'give and take' arrangements regarding resource sharing across the villages.

Table 5.3. *Village boundary contestations*

Case	Explanation/Description
Dobhani village versus Pedzisayi village	The boundary between these two villages, Mapande mountain, is contested. Informants from Dobhani claim that the whole of Mapande mountain, which is located between the two villages, lies in their village. Those from Pedzisayi village argue that the crest of the mountain is the 'legitimate' boundary. As shown in Chapter Four, Mapande mountain is an important source of a diversity of woodland products.
Tamwa village versus Magomo village	*Sabuku* Magomo has used in-migrants as a tool for annexing part of Tamwa's area. Magomo did this by tacitly approving illegal settlements, thus in turn securing the allegiance of the settlers.
Ndabaningi village versus all other social and biophysical catchment villages	The low status of *sabuku* Ndabaningi[47] makes his village more vulnerable to expropriation by neighbouring villages that are headed by leaders who consider themselves 'original' settlers. For instance, a farmer in Tamwa village fenced off some land in the adjacent Ndabaningi village, thus effectively privatising it. Headman Chikanda has also approved and supported the settlement of one of his relatives in Ndabaningi area and the new settler in turn encouraged the subsequent settlement in Ndabaningi village by his own relative. They both owe allegiance to headman Chikanda and not *sabuku* Ndabaningi.

5.4.5 Conflicts between villagers and leaders

The leadership and villagers conflicts in Romwe were found in NGO facilitated projects, if constitutions were not abided by and also in relation to inheritance of traditional leadership positions. Responses to such conflicts reflect what Scott (1985) calls the weapons of the weak or everyday forms of peasant resistance. These include passive compliance, strategic lesser involvement in a particular project, witchcraft accusations and theft of project equipment. Other conflicts between leaders and villagers relate to the legitimacy of certain traditional leaders in the community based on historical claims to a particular position.

Conflicts between project leadership and members

In the analysis of conflicts between leaders and villagers, patterns of interaction at Chidiso garden project are used to illustrate such conflicts as well as contestations of traditional leadership positions based on historical reasons. The conflicts at Chidiso emanate predominantly from dissatisfaction with the project leadership that was elected into power after the construction of the Chidiso collector well in 1991. The project was named *Chidisochamwari*, which means 'God's will' and the reason given by community members for such a name is that the project was offered to them when no one, not even the *sabuku*s or the councillor had made any application to get such a project. From the researcher's analysis emphasis on the name and its history, which is always repeated at the garden and

47 Ndabaningi is not very highly respected because when the sitting sabuku died, he and another relative fought over who should take over the position until Chief Nemauzhe intervened and because they could not reach an agreement, the village was divided into two and Ndabaningi became sabuku for one of the two new villages.

other related community project meetings, is to ensure that powerful actors in the community do not monopolise the project or claim more credit for its initiation. The project has gone through different processes of development. In the early 1990s, the project was highly productive (Lovell, *et al*., 1999). The late 1990s saw production in the garden going down due to an array of factors. These factors are discussed below. Table 5.4 traces key events, as defined by community members, in the history of the project since its inception, some of which triggered or were a response to dissatisfaction with project leadership.

Conflicts between Chidiso leaders and project members have increased over the years and the committee is accused of not abiding by the project constitution. Meetings called by project members to discuss problems are ignored by the committee, while meetings called by the committee have an agenda set by the committee and in most cases the meetings start 2-3 hours later than the scheduled time. Because of fear of being seen as challenging the committee given previous illnesses faced by those who openly challenged the committee, members sit and wait until the meetings start. Often members just endorse the decision of the committee because of the fear noted above. The committee is said to be generally inactive. For instance one of the hand pumps at the collector well went without grease for three years despite minor costs of such accessories (about US$0.50 per month). The second hand pump at the collector well broke down in 1997 and had not been repaired by June 2002, yet only a bolt costing less than US$5 was required. One community member commented that, ‘what is needed to fix the pump is just a simple bolt, even if we contribute a cent per person, the money would be more than enough to buy the bolt’. Ironically, members pay an annual levy of approximately US$1 per member, and this money is meant for maintenance costs but it is never accounted for. Members still pay the annual levy to retain their claim to the plot – otherwise they would forfeit it. In response to the behaviour of the committee and fear challenging the committee openly partly due to witchcraft beliefs, a number of non-confrontational strategies have been adopted by project members and these include, leasing of plots to non-members referred to as ‘lodgers’ (tenants), pilfering, and false compliance.

Table 5.4. *Key events in the history of Chidiso garden project*

Date	Key event(s)	Conflict situations	Impact/Comments
1990/ 1991	- CEH constructs Chidiso collector well - Garden begins with a total of 50 members from the 3 biophysical catchment villages - Z$50 Joining fee - Committee elected	- Disagreement over the location of the garden as the identified site is one widow's field. The widow first refuses to give up her field. One of the powerful members of the committee threatens that she should give up the field, otherwise 'she will see' and fearing for her life she gave up the field.	Some members disgruntled that they could not join the project, as they did not have the joining fee required at the time
1991	August 1991, official opening of the garden by the British High Commissioner	- Petty disagreements *e.g.* over what crops should be grown and watering times resolved by the Agritex officer - Project running smoothly	- Timely payment of the Z$5 per member annual levies - Transparent accounts - Income generation
1994	Resignation of one committee member	Two committee members clash over the way the project is being run. One of them falls ill, resigns.	Witchcraft accusations against some leaders.
1995	Resignation of project secretary	- Clash between vice chairperson and secretary over record keeping. - Secretary falls ill & resigns. - Sister-in-law to the vice chairperson is appointed new secretary	Illness of the secretary instils fear in project members.
1997/ 1998	- One of the collector well hand pumps breaks down - Garden tank cracks -Agritex withdraws due to budgetary constraints	- Problems with marketing of produce and leadership blamed for forcing every member to grow the same crops - Watering taking time since tank is not in use – people have to walk 500 m to the well	- Increased workload - Lack of advice on cropping, marketing and pest control after withdrawal of Agritex
1999	- Establishment of Barura Dam - IES fulltime in Romwe - Disgruntled members join Barura garden	- Passive resistance as more than half of the members move to Barura garden leasing their plots - Project members suggest that committee be changed but committee refuses - No transparency in use of annual levies	Production levels reach the lowest in the history of the project
2000	Training for transformation and leadership courses run by IES	- Reduction in conflicts after training for transformation - More cries from members for the need to change comm. ittee	Production increased as a result of facilitation
2001	Expansion of garden by IES to accommodate new members	- At first resistance by committee to have new members, preferring to give old members more plots - New entrants vocal at meetings -A few weeks later extension wire stolen and thieves not identified	No action from both project and other community leaders on theft of wire

The major form of passive resistance to the project leadership in the case of Chidiso is the leasing of plots to tenants. These tenants do not have power to vote or influence decision-making regarding operations of the garden. Thus, the committee runs the project the way they want. The official registered number of members at Chidiso before the garden extension in 2001 was 50. The garden was divided into four working groups, namely A, B, C and D and each has a membership of 12 or 13 members. This was done for management purposes and also to instil some spirit of competition among the four groups so that production can be maintained at higher levels. As of November 2000, more than half of the people actively involved in production in Chidiso garden were tenants (see Table 5.6.). The arrangement of tenants is an agreement between the two people involved. Some tenants pay a fee to the plot holder while others do not pay a fee but pay in kind, for example giving some of the produce to the plot holder. Table 5.5 illustrates the level of tenancy in Chidiso based on an assessment of one of the four working groups found in the garden.

Table 5.5. *The level of tenancy in Chidiso garden*

Bed Number	**Status of user**	**Comment/observation**
1	Lodger	Bed belonged to Tom who moved to some resettlement area in Midlands province in 1997. He gave the plot to his nephew's wife but she is leasing the plot to another community member.
2	**Owner**	Has used his plot since 1991.
3	**Owner**	A widow – has used her plot since 1991 and never leased it out.
4	Lodger	Owner joined Barura garden in 1999 and is leasing the plot to her daughter-in-law.
5	Lodger	Owner moved to Barura garden. Her daughter, a divorcee, is using the plot but it is still registered under the original owner.
6	Lodger	Owner moved to Harare to join her husband and is leasing plot because she did not want to give it up – for future security.
7	Lodger	Owner moved to Barura in 1999 and is leasing the plot to her neighbour.
8	Lodger	Between 1996 and 1998 the owner leased it to her neighbour but she took the plot back because the tenant was not paying according to their agreement and sometimes they would fight over the payment. She used the plot for a while and leased it again to a different person at the beginning of 2000.
9	Lodger	Owner's husband was ill at the time of the survey and she did not have time to work in the garden, as she had to look after her husband. Thus she was leasing her plot.
10	**Owner**	She still uses her plot but she has a more vibrant garden near her husband's private well.
11	**Owner**	She still uses her plot but spends more time at her other plot in Barura garden.
12	**Owner**	Has never had any tenant since 1991.
13	**Owner**	Has never had any tenant, but has another plot in Barura.
	54 % tenants 46% owners	Those who hold plots in Barura garden or have other private gardens spend more time in the other gardens and less time in Chidiso. Even some of the committee members have moved to Barura garden.

As a result of the social tension in Chidiso garden between the project members and leadership, witchcraft accusations have emerged as an explanation given by members as to why there is fear of dissolving the old committee and electing a new one. Examples are given by project members to substantiate fear of being bewitched if one challenges the leadership. The two examples of committee members who resigned and the experiences of the original owner of the land where the garden is located appear to reinforce witchcraft beliefs and accusations surrounding leadership issues in the project. It is claimed that the secretary of the committee who resigned had suggested that to keep the project vibrant, the committee should be changed every two years. It is understood that one of the longstanding committee members indicated to him that '*wavakuda kuwona manje, tichaona kuti unosvika kupi* – now you are becoming too big for your boots, we want to see how far you will go' and a few days later the secretary fell ill and he immediately resigned.

When interviewed, the former secretary indicated that he had resigned following the argument with one of the committee members. He indicated that after he fell ill, he thought it was best to resign, fearing that he could have been bewitched. Following the Training for Transformation and Leadership course organised by IES in July 2000, participants of that workshop felt they had gained confidence from the course and they would call for elections for a new committee at the Chidiso garden project. Claims are that when one of the powerful members of the committee heard this, she announced that 'this committee is not going to change, we want to see those people who think they are clever, especially the one who will initiate the process' and after she made that statement, no one ever talked about wanting to change the committee. Such statements are often taken to mean unspecified action would be taken against those who dared raise the issue or challenge the leadership. This illustrates the embeddedness of natural resource management institutions and related structures within the cultural and belief system of a given society. Leaders may take advantage of the traditional belief system to cement their positions. As discussed in Chapter Two, traditional beliefs such as witchcraft and related accusations may perpetuate bad leadership to the detriment of the project. Besides witchcraft accusations, the two powerful members of the committee who are feared belong to the *Voushe* (the ruling clan) and *Zvidza zvopo* (the powerful ones). This also makes it difficult to challenge them publicly.

Other forms of passive resistance by project members that were observed occur through pilfering of project equipment. For instance some project equipment just disappeared without explanation and also wire from the Chidiso garden extension was stolen, with the leadership not reacting to such actions. False compliance was also a common strategy as members would just attend meetings called by the committee and endorse whatever the committee would suggest without any protest even if they did not fully

agree with the decision or were unhappy with the decision. Project members would then raise complaints after the meeting. For instance during the extension of the Chidiso garden, a time was set as to when people would meet to put up the fence. The majority of the members arrived on time except two key members of the committee. After waiting for an hour, those present decided they should go ahead and start digging holes for the poles since the new boundary had been discussed and agreed upon in a previous meeting even though it had not been physically marked. After putting up the poles, the two members of the committee arrived and said they had put the poles in the wrong place they should remove all of them and start afresh. The poles were removed and new holes dug. It was only afterwards that some of the members complained to the researcher about the whole incident as one man put it, 'we worked so hard yesterday and only when we were about to finish, those two came and said remove all those poles and start afresh. *Zvinogwadza mhani- unoshaya kuti vaivepi pataiita basa rose* – its really painful and you wonder where those two had been when we were doing all that work'. A few weeks later the wire on that extension part was stolen, yet since its establishment in 1991, no theft had been experienced at the garden.

Asked as to why sometimes conflicts emerged between leaders and community members, reasons given include:

1. Community members sometimes just comply or agree with certain decisions taken by leaders without seriously reflecting on them (*ndivanamutendazvose*), thus when problems arise, instead of working together to solve them, people start pointing fingers.
2. In cases where leaders are elected, community members just rush to vote for leaders without reflecting on the leadership qualities of the person they are electing.
3. Pressure of time from external project facilitators. Often external project facilitators come for a meeting, having given the community no agenda in advance and then at the end of the meeting they say elect a committee for this or that project.
4. Some project or community leaders are not clear of their roles – thus they may under-perform.
5. Having the same people in different leadership positions. These people end up being too powerful and sometimes no longer listen to other community members during deliberations on important community issues.
6. *Chikama* – Nepotism by leaders, *e.g.* in resource allocation sometimes they favour their relatives.

While conflicts were generally viewed as being negative, the villagers said sometimes conflicts have positive impact on leaders as it challenges them to think and reflect on the reasons for the emergence of these conflicts and therefore may change their leadership style. This ensures that leaders do not become the 'we know it all' type of leaders and this may

improve communication between leaders and other community members. Bourdillon (1987) notes that traditionally, leaders such as the chiefs and headmen's power lay in their ability to listen to the members of their community's views. Given this historical background, it is not surprising that people would resist leadership that makes independent decisions without considering the community members' view. As Bourdillon notes (*ibid*: 142) according to traditional ideals, a chief could not force people to do what they did not want to do; he was a leader rather than a ruler, relying for his position on influence rather than force. This was also the case in judging cases in the traditional court where ideally the chief was a chairman rather than a judge and through allowing the court elders and other people to speak their minds before giving his own summing up, which depended largely on expressed public opinion.

Questioning the legitimacy of traditional leadership

Conflicts between leaders and villagers were also noted relating to the questioning of the legitimacy of leaders, in particular traditional leaders. Often contestations surrounded inheritance of the *sabuku* position. In both the Shona and the Ndebele inheritance systems, the eldest son usually inherits his father's position. In cases where the leader has more than one wife, a son from the first wife theoretically inherits the position. Bourdillon records that it is not uncommon for leadership in the traditional authority system to be inherited by what are considered junior lineages. Sometimes there can be disputes about seniority and in most cases after the death of a leader there are usually a number of claimants to succeed him. It appears that succession to traditional authority leadership has always given rise to some debate and historically, many chiefdoms had traditions of feuds between branches of the ruling family with rivals including brothers murdering each other over the position (Bourdillon, 1987:107). Such leadership wrangles were identified in the study site and often had some effect of weakening decisions made by a particular leader whose position was contested. Two cases are discussed here to illustrate these leadership contestations, one involving the position of *sabuku* Dobhani and the other involving the Sihambe position. *Sabuku* Dobhani's position is being challenged by his brother who claims he was the rightful son to inherit the position because his mother was older than the current *sabuku*'s mother in terms of polygamous union. The relationship between the two is illustrated in Figure 5.2.



Figure 5.2. Contested Dobhani village headship

The contestant to *sabuku* Dobhani claims that since his mother was the second wife and the current *sabuku*'s mother was third wife he should have been the one to inherit the position. Key informants indicated that the late *sabuku* announced before his death the heir to the position. Asked why he was challenging a decision made by his father when he was alive but had not challenged it when it was made, the incumbent indicated that at the time the announcement was made he was too confused because he did not understand why his father had made that decision, although according to tradition, he was the 'legitimate' heir. Views from other community members were that the contestant to the *sabuku* position in Dobhani village, had alcohol problems and therefore his father felt he would not be a good leader. There is often fear to go against the will of the dead as it is believed their spirit will torment you and for this reason the contestant conceded that his brother should inherit the position. During this study some key informants claimed that most encroachment into the grazing areas was happening in Dobhani village and this was associated with this conflict between the two brothers over the leadership position as the current *sabuku* does not want to take decisions that would be controversial and might therefore raise more questions about his legitimacy.

The second leadership contestation involves *sabuku* Sihambe's position. The sitting *sabuku* is now very old and therefore inactive. A nephew of the sitting *sabuku* who is also a member of one of the *Zvidza zvopo* families is currently the self-appointed acting *sabuku*. Considering that the current *sabuku* has sons who are supposed to inherit the position, other villagers are questioning the current acting *sabuku*. In August 2001, the acting *sabuku* presided over a case of four boys from the same village who had cut down an *Afzelia quanzensis* tree and fined them Z$50 each, the usual fine for offences relating to illegal tree felling in the area, but their parents

did not pay and officially they said they were still trying to raise the money. Yet in informal circles they were saying they would not pay the money because, 'who is he to make other people pay fines?' Talking to one of the boys parents, she said, 'we are not going to pay the fine because this acting *sabuku* gave himself this position. No one appointed him'. Usually if an offender is made to pay a fine and does not do so within a stipulated time of approximately two weeks, they are charged again for contempt. In this case the acting *sabuku* called another *dare* which was poorly attended and said the four boys should pay Z$100 each after the stipulated period had expired, but still their parents did not pay. The acting *sabuku* later threatened to take them to the headman, but people knew he could not do that because he was self-appointed and the headman would question him on who gave him the power and authority to call for a *dare* in the first instance.

The sitting *sabuku* Sihambe's sons were all in formal employment, which could be one reason why the *sabuku*'s nephew appointed himself acting *sabuku*. Key informants claim that one of the current *sabuku*'s sons indicated in 2000 that he was planning to resign from his formal employment so as to take over his father's position and shortly after that he fell ill and died in February 2001. This raised a lot of suspicion in the community and the remaining brothers are now afraid to take over the acting *sabuku* position, as it is believed the brother who died may have been bewitched in connection with the position. Witchcraft accusations often occur when a person dies regardless of the fact that he/she has been ill for a long time. According to the village health worker in Romwe, witchcraft beliefs have been found to hinder progress on HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns as people attribute death to witchcraft and not to HIV/AIDS. There is a saying commonly used by the people that *chiripo chariuraya, zizi harifi nemhepo* (something must have caused the death, an owl does not die from wind). Normally witchcraft accusations spread in the form of gossip. But witchcraft is strongly believed in by those involved, thus influencing the patterns of social interaction among the various actors. The study found that there are intricate networks which are used for gossiping and one has to know who to talk to first about something they have heard, and who to tell last and what stories can be shared with who. This is more often the case where witchcraft accusations are involved as this is considered sensitive information and also one can be legally charged for making such accusations on the basis of the Witchcraft Suppression Act.

While witchcraft is theoretically considered as non-existent in some observable physical form but rather a component of the belief system, in recent years there has been an increase in the number of witchcraft confessions in Zimbabwe (The Chronicle, 21 August 2002:4 -5). A case worth noting is that of a man in the same province where this study was undertaken who went to a police station indicating that he wanted to surrender his 'tools' as he was tired of being a witch and the police

dismissed him as being in an unstable mental state (Police Outpost, January 1999). The man decided to demonstrate to the police his ability to control lightning and a bolt of lightning struck a tree and the tree immediately withered and the police pleaded with him to take his 'tools' back to his home. This raises some questions on the effect of witchcraft beliefs on community relations. For instance, if an individual is believed to be a witch, how does this belief influence their position in the community regarding decision-making processes?

Witchcraft accusations and related gossip shape the way people relate to each in the community, the way individual and communally owned resources are used and managed as well as the nature of leadership in the community. In the case of the Sihambe village headship, a person viewed as not being the 'legitimate' leader, a nephew of the current village head took over the position, yet the village head has his sons who are supposed to inherit the position, but now they cannot challenge him because of their fear of witchcraft. In the meanwhile, the relatives of the nephew believe he has the right to be acting village head because when their parents first settled in the area in 1952, the father of the acting *sabuku* was supposed to be the legitimate village head because he had been the foreman at the farm when they were relocated (see the Mhlanga historical narrative in Chapter Four). It would be interesting to establish what will take place after the old *sabuku* dies, since his position is already being contested while he is still alive. Usually, contestations occur when the leader has died and not when they are still alive (Bourdillon, 1987). The general lack of clarity on inheritance criteria for traditional authority positions may contribute to contestation over the inheritance of the position. Unlike for VIDCOs where a leader is elected traditional authority positions are still inherited with no clearly defined criteria for inheritance.

5.4.6. Water related conflicts

Much historical and political analysis of natural resource access in Zimbabwe has tended to focus on resources such as land, forests and wildlife, neglecting a crucial resource, water. A few sociological studies on water issues have been undertaken following the enactment of the Water Act (1998) such as those by Matondi (2001) and Sithole (2001 & 1999). Other studies on water use and management have been undertaken by Cleaver (2000; 1998 & 1994). These studies show how access to water has been critical in shaping interactions of water users and emerging conflicts over access to water. Attempts to access and control water resources have been observed to be an integral part of the struggles for political power amongst various actors in the community. As outlined in Chapter Four, much access to water resources in Romwe is based on informal relationships and networks. Unlike the case of woodlands, conflicts over water resources in Romwe appear to be very minimal and more often these are expressed in the form of passive resistance. The example discussed in Chapter Four regarding a well owner who closed off his well from other

users and later found a dog in the well is one form of resistance noted in the study. Besides this example, a case of conflict over water recorded during the study relates to the multiple use of the Barura dam. The multiple uses of Barura dam include livestock watering, garden irrigation, brick moulding and laundry. While there are multiple uses of Barura dam, under years of normal rainfall (ranging between 600 mm – 800 mm), the multiple uses are viewed in a complementary way. It is only when water levels become low, especially following a year during which low rainfall has been received where the multiple uses and users' interests conflict. Below is a case that illustrates how perceptions of water scarcity following poor rains resulted in conflict between livestock owners and those participating in garden irrigation. Otherwise no other conflict situations relating to access to and control over water were observed or recorded during the study.

The water conflict at Barura dam involved the chairman of the dam and members of the Barura garden project. Following a drought year, the water level in Barura dam sank low in early 2001 such that people believed that by the end of October the same year, when rains are expected to come, if it did not rain, there would be water shortage in the community. The villagers agreed that they should reduce the area under irrigation in the community garden so that water for watering livestock was assured until the following rainy season. The number of livestock that were getting water from the dam had increased because a number of surrounding villages, from the social catchment, were now watering their livestock at this dam after other water sources in their respective villages had dried up. Contrary to the plans of garden project members to reduce the area under irrigation, the dam chairman suggested that all gardening activities should stop to ensure that there was enough water for livestock in the dam. Garden project members protested indicating that such a move would disadvantage poor farmers who after all do not own livestock and depend on the irrigated plots for their livelihoods. The dam chairman proceeded to seal off (with the assistance of two other villagers) all outlet valves at the dam so that no water could flow to the garden. In response members of the garden project threatened to remove the plugs. Because he is used to people complying with his decisions, the dam chairman got angry at being challenged publicly by the garden members. One night he went to the dam and opened the outlet valve so that water could flow out and therefore there would be no water to quarrel about. The water flowed out until it was below the outlet valve. When garden project members discovered that this is what the dam chairman had done, they mobilised themselves and agreed that they had to fix him as they equated his behaviour with 'bewitching one's neighbour'. They secretly sent a delegation to the RDC and the NGO supporting the project and some officials from these organisations came to the village and convened a tribunal with the dam chairman and reprimanded him for his behaviour. The villagers called for him to resign from the dam committee, however he apologized to the project members and promised to co-operate with other farmers in conserving water

resources in the area. After the apology, he was able to retain his dam chairmanship.

The conflicts over dam water further demonstrate how local community members strategically switch their allegiance from the informal to the formal institutional structures (or vice versa) depending on which decision benefits them the most. In this case the conflict was with a local traditional village leader who happened to be the chairman of the dam, project participants sought external assistance in resolving the case.

5.4.7 Conflicts over spiritual issues

Historically, sacred controls were used to protect certain areas or certain tree species (Fortmann and Nhira, 1992; Matowanyika, 1991). Sacred controls are here defined following Fortmann and Nhira (*ibid*: 3) as norms of natural resource use and protection that are based in folk or traditional religious beliefs and that are enforced by individual internalisation of the norms, community sanction and/or by religious and/or traditional leaders. There is a long history of traditional religions among the Shona, which Schoffeleers (1979) characterised as profoundly ecological as they issue and enforce directives with regard to a community's use of its environment. These kinds of sacred controls are still found in most communal areas of Mashonaland and are part of the evolving natural resource management systems. Traditional religious beliefs with ecological functions are often communal institutions involving the entire population of a geographic area in a system of common obligations (*ibid*). Given the historical movement of populations in Romwe, resulting in people holding different religious beliefs residing in the same geographical locations, there has been a steady weakening of sacred controls. Matowanyika (1991) argues that because immigrants have less knowledge of sacred areas, they often violate rules relating to these sacred areas. In such situations the emergence of conflict is inevitable. Christianity has also been blamed for the violation of sacred controls in the communal areas of Zimbabwe (*ibid*).

Different views exist among the Ndebele and Shona speaking villagers and between the old and young over cultural beliefs, in particular those relating to sacred areas. Claims by the groups endogenous to the area residing in the social catchment at the time of the study are that historically, every year in September old people responsible for the traditional rain making ceremonies would brew beer and go up the Romwe mountain (*kunopira*). Now it is no longer happening and the mountain is no longer viewed to be as sacred as it used to be because of the Ndebeles who came into the area who did not believe in the sacredness of the mountain. The Ndebele speaking groups do not deny this. One village leader indicated to the researcher that '*amazilo lawa ayisiwo esiko lethu* – this is not part of our culture'. Among the Shona, there is a belief that ancestral spirits mete out justice on their own if people flout rules regarding sacred areas. For instance in 1998, a leopard in the Mapande

mountain killed a number of goats in the area including one of the *sabuku*'s. This was believed by the Shona to be a 'spirits leopard' punishing people for violation of rules associated with sacred areas. The case was reported to the chief who suggested that something wrong had been done in the catchment area and sent his representative to appease the ancestral spirits *pamarinda evadzimu* – at an historical gravesite located in Dobhani village. After the chief's messengers carried out their ceremony, cases of people losing goats to the leopard stopped. The older Shona people believed that the spirits had been appeased while young men believed that it was just a coincidence that this stopped and did not associate the whole leopard story with any mystical powers. Another contentious issue regarding traditional beliefs emerged following the death of Chief Madzivire under whose jurisdiction Dobhani village falls. Dobhani villagers were instructed not to go to the fields for a week as part of the tradition that should be respected, yet those in Sihambe and Tamwa continued working in their fields as they fall under a different chief. Chief Madzivire died on a Wednesday and by Saturday some women in Dobhani village were complaining that the weeds in their fields were affecting crops and that a week was too long to stay away from the fields. As one woman put it 'we will end up 'stealing time' to go to the fields, what else can we do?' It was observed that, even though the women complained about not going to the fields, they could not break such a rule for fear of being reprimanded by the *sabuku* and headman.

5.4.8 Conflicts between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'

Outsiders, however neutral they would like to be, are often involved in village conflicts. External facilitators find themselves in a position where they must not only learn from the local people, but must also negotiate consensual definitions and reappraisal of common goals and interests. The negotiation process itself is not power free. Views and objectives of the 'outsider' may dominate the process despite the inclusion of local voices. The interaction of local actors (insiders) and external actors (outsiders) such as NGO, research and extension officers provides ground for a complex process of local actors, as individuals or groups fighting to position themselves strategically in relation to the external agents. A variety of strategies are used to gain advantage over other actors that include, frequent visits to research campsite, giving gifts such as vegetables to officers and being links for leaking village gossip to the external agents. In cases where conflicts emerge between the 'insiders' and 'outsiders' these are often expressed in the manner described by Scott (1985), as the everyday forms of peasant resistance because open confrontation may deny the village future donor assistance. The strategies that could be interpreted as resistance by some sections of the community to external officers' initiatives include vandalism and theft of project equipment with no response by community leadership, gossip about male officers having love affairs with some women in the village, especially widows or single women holding key positions in project committees, probably used as a

strategy to demoralise project participants. Table 5.6 illustrates some of the cases involving vandalism or theft of project equipment.

The catchment traditional leaders' views regarding the thefts fall into five categories. First, the traditional leaders suggested that considering that the people involved or the suspects are young men, it could be that young men are forced to steal because they are unemployed and therefore this is a survival strategy. Some of the local youths have completed four years of secondary education but have failed to secure formal employment, or places at colleges for tertiary education. Secondly, proximity to Ngundu growth point, which offers a diversity of services and forms of entertainment, could be a temptation for young men. Two highways, the Masvingo-Beitbridge and the Triangle-Masvingo meet at Ngundu growth point. There is high commercial sex activity partly because of the prevalence of long distance truck drivers. Local young men are said to participate in the commercial sex activities and also want to out-do the spendthrift long distance truck drivers. Youths may therefore be tempted to steal items for resale in order to raise money to spend at the growth point. Third, the traditional leaders claim that the said culprits are often from the neighbouring villages that may be jealous of the developments in Romwe and the support the villagers in Romwe are receiving from NGOs and other organisations. From assessing all the cases where the individuals involved in theft cases were identified, this view from the traditional leaders can be disputed because those individuals involved were from within the three study villages. A fourth view was that it is common to find mischievous people in any society and therefore the individuals involved could fall in that category of mischievous people. Last but not least, the traditional leaders' explanation was that individuals involved could be disgruntled members of the community who may be feeling left out of projects and therefore as a way to register their anger to the larger community, they steal and vandalise project and research equipment.

While the cases presented in Table 5.6 could be interpreted as the 'weapons of the weak' highlighting the problematic nature of the relationship between project officers and some actors in the community, especially young men (all the cases where the person committing the offence was identified involved young men), Mandondo (personal communication, December 2001) suggests that cases of theft occur in any community and there is always a group of *nhire* (deviants) found in any given society.

Table 5.6. *Cases of vandalism and theft of project equipment*

Case and date	**Nature of case**	**Response by community members/leadership**
Victor Chitora (November 2000)	Disconnected solar panel from research equipment to charge a battery	*Sabuku*s expected to try the case but there was no action taken. Reason given by key informants is that Victor's mother, a single woman was having an affair with one community leader, thus hesitancy to try the case.
Researcher's clothes (January 2001)	One of the researcher's clothes and money stolen	No action taken by community leadership but the researcher's clothes were secretly brought back a few days later without the money.
Mr. Chabiwa (April 2001)	Stole one of the research equipment solar panels for resale	Research team offer reward of Z$1500 for anyone with information on the panel without success. The thief was later caught but *sabuku*s took no action despite the researchers suggesting that he be sent to the police. The *sabuku*s said if they sent him to the police, it may negatively impact on social relations in the village.
Chamanyoka solar panels (July 2001)	Two solar panels stolen from Chamanyoka hill	Suspected thief was one of the local young man hired to assist with mounting the solar panels. Police and community leaders not of any help. Research team offered reward of Z$5 000[48] for any information leading to the arrest of the culprit but even though reward money was much higher, no one provided any information.
Chidiso garden wire (October 2001)	Wire for the new Chidiso garden extension stolen	No action from both the Chidiso garden community and other community leadership.
Mr Gudo (December 2001)	Stole another solar panel	No action by community leadership despite the letter written by one of the research directors threatening that project would pull out if this continued. Also reward offer of Z$10 000[49] ignored by community despite being relatively high.

Views of people from other social catchment villages, who are predominantly Shona speakers, including the headman suggested that

48 The research team increased the reward money assuming that the first reward offer might have been too low.

49 The average net income in Romwe was reported to be Z$11 179 per household per annum (Campbell, *et al*., 2002:90).

Ndebele speaking people are always a problem and it is not surprising that *varikuzvibira vega* (they are stealing from themselves). While this may have some element of truth, stigmatising of other groups is also common. Scott (1986) suggests that it would be a grave mistake to romanticise these 'weapons of the weak'. In the first instance, it is not easy to differentiate what may be viewed as resistance or otherwise. For instance one may question why theft of a few solar panels or cases of witchcraft accusations be considered as some form of resistance. In this study, the non-reaction of project and community leaders to instances of project equipment theft suggests that these may be covert forms of resistance by 'insiders' towards some actions of the 'outsiders'. Although community leaders gave the above reasons regarding vandalism or theft of project equipment, it appears that there is general unwillingness to identify and punish the offenders. This is intriguing as in a number of cases punishing the offenders would seem to be in the community's interest as this would facilitate the smooth running of community projects. At one community meeting called to discuss vandalism of project equipment, a woman who was also the former secretary for the village micro-credit scheme suggested that if anyone had a suspect, they should let the whole community know. One member from the a *Zvidza zvopo* kinship group who was fired by IES from his position as local project manager responded indicating that people should be careful as to what they say because 'you will be at loggerheads with your relatives if you do that. These project people are not going to be here forever, they will go and you will remain here with your relatives being hostile to you for trying to please project people'. Probably, as a result of such threats, no community member could say it out loud even if they had a suspect in mind.

5.4.9 Conflict mediation mechanisms

A variety of strategies and platforms are used for conflict mediation. To reduce organisational conflicts, community members may assign the same people to different leadership positions in the village as illustrated by the case of Mr Vakuru in Figure 5.1. While this may be a strategy for reducing organisational conflicts, power is centred on a few people, which may lead to undemocratic tendencies. Sometimes the few leaders may be overloaded and therefore not be able to fulfil their mandates in a satisfactory or efficient manner. Considering that the same people may be found in different institutional structures, both formal and informal, the relevance of the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions in community-based projects is questionable.

For conflict mediation in the context of woodland resource use, sometimes a *dare* (village court) is convened if the problem is deemed to be relatively complex. The village court is open to the public and attendance may be fairly large, ranging from forty to one hundred people. Each person who attends the *dare* is free to make his or her contribution as circumstances allow. The term *dare* has a wide application in Shona

society. It denotes both the place where the men of a village meet and the court where cases are judged (Gombe, 1995:5). The latter denotation also has two meanings attached to it, the court as the place where cases are tried and the people who take part in the deliberations. In this study, the term is used to refer to the people who take part in the village court deliberations. The *dare* is often convened for the purpose of settling cases or disputes between any two people or groups of people. The *sabuku*, headman or chief presides over the deliberations at the *dare*. The chief's *dare* is the highest court of appeal under the traditional authority system. In trying cases brought before him, the leader presiding over the case is assisted by *machinda* or village elders. Other village men of no rank are also free to contribute to the deliberations (*ibid*).

The traditional village courts are characterised by the use of token fees. There is no fixed amount for each particular token. The importance of the tokens does not lie in their face value at all, but in what they stand for. Before the hearing, the complainant and the defendant have to pay a hearing fee referred to as *badza*, (hoe), *marime* (the ploughing) or *mahwandauswa* (the sitting on the grass). The people who constitute the *dare* will have absented themselves, at least temporarily, from the day's work in their fields and the hearing fee is to compensate them for this lost time. Both parties traditionally listed this fee in the form of a goat produced jointly or individually. The goat is slaughtered and eaten by the dare. Normally, people labelled as lacking wisdom were asked to skin the goat while others tried the case. Nowadays, the hearing fee is normally produced in the form of money and this money is shared among the *sabuku* (or the person presiding the case) and the *machinda*s. The chief's court demands a higher fee than the *sabuku* and the headman, thus people prefer to have their cases judged at a lower level court, if possible, than be referred to the chief's court. The defendant is also asked to pay fees known as *mari yomupurisa* (money for the court messenger who brought the summons). Thus even before the case has been tried, the defendant would have been made to pay something. Women are often not represented among the people that try the case, although they are allowed to attend the court and express their views where possible. The women are specifically allowed to speak where they come in as witnesses, the defendant or complainant.

For cases that are easier to handle, rather than taking the case to the *dare*, the parties involved often discuss the problem and reach an agreement without consulting the community at large. Local conflict mediation arenas are presided over by the traditional authorities and if one traditional leader feels that he cannot handle the case by himself, he often enlists the services of other traditional leaders in the catchment area despite the fact that they fall under different administrative and chieftainship boundaries. Only in rare circumstances are cases forwarded to the headman or chief's court. Where cases cannot be resolved locally, external assistance such as the

services of the RDC or NGOs is sought, as in the case of the water conflicts experienced at the Barura dam.

For community projects, especially those initiated by external facilitators, constitutions are often established that are supposed to guide the interactions among the various resource users. These constitutions are formulated at a meeting convened by the project committee, often with an officer from the NGO that supports the project. Consensus has to be reached before the constitution can be passed. While the process of developing the constitution is open and involves all project members, power dynamics in the group may influence the outcome of the process. Similarly, the patron NGO officer may also influence the constitution formulation process. The Barura and Chidiso garden project constitutions are presented below to illustrate issues that are normally found in the constitutions that are important for reducing conflicts among the group involved.

Barura garden constitution, January 1999:

1. All project members shall abide by the garden project constitution.
2. Project members can work from Monday to Friday if there is need to.
3. No payment will be received by members for doing some work at the dam if need arises.
4. Working time is 8 am to 11am.
5. Members who arrive for group work later than 9:30 am are considered late and therefore will be liable to pay a fine of Z$2.00.
6. Any member absent from group work without a satisfactory reason will pay a fine of Z$5.00.
7. Joining fee at the garden is Z$50 per person and this fee will be increased to Z$150 from the end of July 1999. Beginning January 2000, the joining fee will be Z$1000.00 because new members would not have contributed their labour at the start of the project.
8. Every member shall pay a dam user fee of Z$5 per annum.
9. All garden tools are kept at the chairperson's home.
10. Dropouts get no refunds for the joining fee or any other payment they will have made.

Chidiso garden constitution, enacted in 1991:

1. Fighting not allowed in the garden.
2. Plots should be watered on the designated day but members are free to come any time of the day.
3. Theft of other people's vegetables is forbidden.
4. Gate to the garden should always be kept closed to prevent animals straying into the garden.
5. The garden committee tries offenders and chronic offenders will be taken to the *sabuku*.
6. Garden committee should work closely with the collector well committee.

7. Agritex officer should pay frequent visits to the project to give advice on crop rotation, pest control and management and record keeping.
8. Members will pay an annual membership fee agreed upon by all project members.
9. A new committee will be elected every two years.

Source: Garden projects records.

While the content of constitutions may vary from project to project, they serve the same purpose, that is, ensuring order in the operations of the project. Project committee members monitor the enforcement of the constitutions. This may be problematic if committee members who are supposed to enforce the constitution are the ones who violate the constitutions. In such cases, where action is taken, external project facilitators are often consulted and their assistance sought in mediating or the attempt to resolve conflicts.

5.5 Summary

CBNRM remains an arena of conflict, expressed in either overt or covert forms. Conflicts that emerge are often group based although some cases that involve individuals in relation to other community members exist. Some of the conflicts involve both internal and external actors. Because local communities are dynamic and internally differentiated, various actors tend to shift alliances depending on the nature of the conflict and what resource is at stake. The environmental priorities and natural resource claims of social actors positioned differently in power relations may be highly contested (Leach *et al*., 1999:226). This points to the importance of having diverse institutions operating at multiple scale levels from micro to macro, which influence who has access to and control over what resources, and who arbitrates contested resource claims. To date poor understanding of the dynamism of institutional arrangements and the nature and patterns of local level organisational interactions appear to have impeded the implementation of CBNRM initiatives. Various actors shift their allegiance from one institution to another as part of the strategies of ensuring security of resource access. The institutions that provide positive response at a particular time are favoured at that time. While local government institutions may endure because of the legal backing by the state, they may also collapse in spite of this support or may function as a shell as discussed in Chapter Four. Yet local level informal institutions' survival is dependent on the trust local people have in them as a result of how they cater for their needs and interests. Local level informal institutions are generally more accountable to local people as compared to the formal local government institutions and therefore the former tend to be more popular, although they are sometimes entangled in local level micro-politics.

Historical processes, especially in immigrant communities as in Romwe, have a key role in shaping power relations regarding access to woodlands

and water resources. These also influence institutional development as well as laying the foundation to leadership claims. Local historical narratives show how historical processes such as longevity of residence in the area are used to justify power relations in the community. These historical narratives also influence people's perception regarding the legitimacy of certain leaders such as the *sabuku*s. While there may be diverging views on historical processes that have impacted upon institutional development in the community, these narratives still influence the form and nature of power relations in the community.

At the local level, institutions are very much embedded in local history, culture and traditional beliefs as well as in patterns of social interactions. This influences the nature of control over access to natural resources and how rule flouting is handled at a particular time. For instance, judgement of cases of rule breaking is done on a case-by-case basis with no standard procedure to be followed. While the traditional institutions are viewed as being more powerful than modern institutions, they are increasingly losing their legitimacy partly as a result of external intervention and partly emanating from nepotistic tendencies regarding access to woodland resources and adjudication of cases. Traditional institutional authorities are also losing their legitimacy because the role they play in arbitrating cases or resolving conflict is no longer perceived as neutral. At times local community members feel that the traditional authorities are no longer operating according to their historical mandates and what the different community members expect of them. This has increased challenges to the legitimacy of some traditional leaders' positions and sometimes to the breakdown of interpersonal relationships. Because of the embeddedness of institutions in local culture and traditions, they are entangled in broader community processes and social interactions and therefore influenced by a diversity of factors such as power relationships, and the agency of various actors differentiated by gender, age, wealth and other socio-economic criteria.

Formal institutions appear to emphasise the management of the natural resource in question, for example woodlands, while the informal institutions appear to be there to manage actor-relationships that influence different actors' access to the natural resource. Furthermore, traditional institutions straddle across many spheres of social life outside the sphere of woodlands and water use and management and this gives them a holistic approach to resource management, yet many formal institutions tend to be sectorial in their approach. The mandates of the formal institutions are defined by legal instruments that are very sectorial by design and therefore lack the holistic approach to resource management vis-à-vis the traditional institutions. Considering the complexity and dynamic nature of power relations in the community as well as conflicts that emerge in relation to how these power relations influence different actors' access to woodlands and water resources, the following chapter explores strategies that are used by those actors considered to be weak such as women, to gain access to

natural resources. Strategies for influencing decision-making processes are also explored in relation to how decisions made influence who has access to and control over what natural resource as this has implications for the sustainable use of woodlands and water.

CHAPTER SIX: WOMEN'S ROLE IN DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

6.1 Introduction

Patterns of interactions and conflicts that may emerge in the process of negotiating access to natural resources such as land, woodlands and water were discussed in Chapter Five. In analysing access to woodlands and water resources where there are competing interests and conflicts over resource use and control, gender and power emerge as important themes. Gender relations are viewed as socially constructed through meanings and practices, which invest them with particular significance in everyday social interaction. The institutional fabric of society cements these gender relations. Community institutions influence women's and men's access to and control over natural resources and their participation in decision-making processes. In the communal land context in Zimbabwe, the role of institutions that determine who has access to and control over which natural resources is often influenced by formal and informal relations between women and men as well as numerous other factors, both internal and external. From the actor-oriented approach, gender relations and roles are perceived as being constructed in everyday interactions between and among women and men.

A variety of approaches contribute to the exploration and interpretation of elements of gender and power relations in the CBNRM institutional framework. One approach that was found relevant for this study has its roots in the political ecology framework. This framework has two strands to it, the feminist environmentalists (Agarwal, 1992) and the feminist political ecologists (Rocheleau, 1995). Both strands stress that gender differentiation can be traced to a societal division of labour, property rights and power. On one hand the feminist environmentalists highlight women's close relation with nature due to the gender division of labour, although they have little formal role and negligible decision-making authority over natural resources. The feminist environmentalists therefore argue for women to have a place in community resource management structures and committees and they see the presence of women in these structures, as important in bringing about change in their favour (Agarwal, 1997a). Participation of women in management structures is said to be vital in ensuring women have a voice in the management of natural resources. On the other hand, the feminist political ecologists emphasise property rights and power relations in the analysis of women's and men's roles in resource management. The feminist environmentalist approach is used to analyse the role of Romwe women in institutional structures, while the feminist political ecologist approach is used for the analysis of gendered access to

woodlands and water resources and the power dynamics that influence decision-making processes.

Historically, women have generally been viewed as materially poor and excluded from decision-making processes and structures, though they are usually rich in local knowledge (Cleaver, 2000; Muchena, 1994; Rocheleau, 1995). Studies portraying women as disadvantaged groups in decision-making processes lack detailed analyses of daily lives, struggles and negotiations that characterise various social interactions of women and men in rural contexts. In order to go beyond the focus on structural oppression of women, this study identifies the spheres of the women's influence, strategic networking and negotiations which women engage in to ensure access to woodlands and water resources as well as influencing decision-making processes. The negotiation processes are not always visible and public, and some negotiations are low visibility processes that may be difficult to identify (Fortmann, 1995). The low visibility negotiation processes do not occur in public and thus the challenge for the researcher is to use research methods that can get at these hidden negotiations (*ibid*). Little attention has been paid to private domains of decision-making, the main focus being on public forms of participation (Cleaver, 2000). As will be discussed in this chapter, informal arenas and networks often play an important role in the process of negotiating resource access and decision-making. While it is desirable to make women's work, their rights to resources more formal, visible and less conditional on relations with men, there is also need to recognise that the invisibility and ambiguity may have strategic advantages for women as they may arouse less male resistance and yet deliver subtle forms of influence and power (Jackson, 1998:317).

This chapter explores how power relations in Romwe influence the role of women within both formal and informal CBNRM institutions and related structures with the aim to contribute to the on-going debate on the role of women in natural resource governance. The chapter provides empirical material to highlight the fact that while women may not always be formally represented in formal institutional structures and their views not reflected in the formulation and enforcement of formal resource management institutions, they develop a variety of tactics and strategies that they use to influence the resource management structures. With the emergence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), where women cannot employ informal strategies, they seek assistance from such organisations.

6.2. Gendered access to and control over resources and services in Romwe

In Zimbabwe, more has been written on women and agriculture than on women and forestry and/or water. However, of late, the contribution of women and men as distinct social groups in the forestry and water sectors

is increasingly being recognized (Goebel, 1998; Cleaver, 1998; Mvududu, 1995). The role of women has received special attention because more women than men collect and use a variety of forest products (Fortmann & Bruce, 1993). Women are also more heavily involved and dependent on water resources than men (Sullivan, *et al*., 2001). Fortmann and Bruce (1993) observe that there is often a clear division of the use of trees and tree products according to gender. Women have the major responsibility for providing the household with tree products such as fuelwood, fodder and food. As a result, both they and their households suffer when they lose access to the trees that provide these products. Sullivan *et al*., (2001) highlight the important role that women play in ensuring the availability of water for domestic use in the household. Overlooking gender issues may produce a distorted picture in rural contexts where women and men in the same household may use the same natural resources for different purposes to fulfil their gender roles.

Despite women's role as primary natural resource users and managers, their entitlement to these resources is gained through marriage or some other male relation. Women's lack of formal rights to natural resources such as land was historically underpinned by the definition of their legal status as minors during the colonial period. Although women now enjoy majority status at eighteen years through the provisions of the Legal Age of Majority Act (1982), they are still not customarily allocated land in their own right. Upon the death of a husband a widow does not gain entitlement to the land in customary law but only keeps it in trust for the male heir, usually the eldest son (Goebel, 1998; Moyo, 1995b). She may even be chased away by the relatives of the deceased. Thus, women's access to resources tends to be dependent on their relationship with men.

To determine who has access to and control over resources in Romwe, access and control profiles[50] were developed (Table 6.1). Often, access to and control over resources may influence who participates in decision-making processes as well as in institutional structures that regulate access.

50 Each item for each individual household member was scored out of ten. This was done with a focus group of eight women and six men and there were discussions around each particular item until the group reached some consensus.

Table 6.1: *Access and control profiles in Romwe*

Resources	**Access**				**Control**				**Comments**
	M	W	B	G	M	W	B	G	
Dryland plots	9	6	1	1	10	5	0	0	Mainly elderly men control cropping fields. Women gain access to land mainly through marriage. This right is forfeited at divorce.
Project garden plots	3	10	1	1	4	10	2	2	Most plots are registered in women's names. Women have control over the plots.
Private gardens	5	6	3	3	6	8	3	3	Accessible to both women and men but women do most of the work. Children are often allocated small portions of the garden on which they grow crops of their own.
Grazing areas	10	10	10	10	9	5	2	2	For all non-sacred areas, everyone has equal access. Mainly controlled by men and the *sabuku*s.
Firewood	10	10	10	10	9	9	1	1	Few restrictions for domestic use and more for sale. Children are also expected to police collection.
Timber	10	5	5	0	10	1	1	0	Predominantly used and controlled by men.
Thatch grass	1	10	1	8	3	10	0	0	Women control thatch grass and negotiations are mainly between various collectors, who are women.
Mushrooms	1	10	0	8	1	10	0	0	Women control mushroom harvesting. Men were given a score because the *sabuku*, oversees, rule enforcement.
Barura Dam	10	9	9	9	10	7	1	0	Access to communal water sources is open to both women and men. Control is by men and elected people.
Borehole	10	10	10	10	10	10	1	1	Both women and men control use of boreholes. Children ensure users abide by the rules.
Private wells	9	10	10	10	10	9	3	1	Women have slightly better access to private wells for domestic uses. Well owners define users and uses.
Extension services	9	8	1	1	10	7	0	0	Extensionists tend to target men while NGOs work closely with women. Men control access to services.

For dryland plots[51] women have access to these through their male relations. While this fact cannot be disputed, there is need for a critical examination of the power relations within households and clan structures, which may indicate how, gender differentiation influences culturally constructed land tenure processes. As Moyo argues, the call for land titles in both communal and resettlement areas to be registered in the names of both the husband and wife focuses on an atomisation of land tenure towards individuals within households, rather than challenging wider rural power relations and power bases as well as the institutional framework within which these power relations are operationalised (1995b: 26). Regarding garden plots, women have more control over plots in communally owned gardens as compared to privately owned gardens. The two community garden projects in Romwe were established through external support from the CEH and CARE International. On average plots allocated to members are approximately 36 m^2 per plot holder in Chidiso while in Barura the plot sizes average 42 m^2 per member. Types of crops grown in the community garden include a variety of leafy vegetables such as rape, covo, cabbage and *tsunga*, tomatoes, onions and maize that is consumed as green mealies. Produce from community gardens is for both household consumption and sale. Surplus produce is sold at Museva business centre (approximately 7 km away) and at Ngundu growth point (approximately 12 km away). The community garden plots are registered in the names of the project members, the majority of whom are women. For example, in Chidiso project, out of 50 original members, 42 are women, while in Barura project out of 109 members, 96 are women. The plots can be leased out or inherited but 'officially' cannot be sold.

Given that the community garden plot holder has the right to lease or transfer ownership to children or relatives and the plot can be inherited by their children at the death of the plot holder, the plot holders have some autonomy over their plot. They can also make decisions regarding disposal of the plot, although decisions about what to grow are made by the group. Considering that women are the majority of plot holders, community garden projects are emerging as an important source of women's power as women have more formal control and decision-making authority over those plots than the arable drylands and privately owned gardens. An analysis of community garden project management structures, as will be shown later in the chapter, also reveals that women are the majority in the garden committees. Observations made at community garden project meetings revealed that women are influential in decision-making related to these projects. Thus it is not a matter of having women as figure heads in these management structures, but they are actively involved in decision-making processes, not overlooking other power dynamics that may be at play in any group interaction processes.

51 Dryland plot sizes range from 0.5 – 5 acres per household.

Regarding grazing areas, all household members are said to have equal access to grazing areas, but in reality, it is the livestock owning households that utilise the grazing areas the most. Considering that most livestock owners, especially for cattle, are men, this could explain why men have the most control over grazing areas. Women generally do not own cattle, but can own goats and chickens. In both the Shona and Ndebele cultures, women receive cattle from lobola paid for their daughters. This is a payment made to the mother by a son-in-law termed *mombe yeumai/inkomo yohlanga* (the cattle of motherhood). While women may keep these cattle, sometimes their husbands ask them to take them to their maternal homes, on the pretext that if they die, their relatives may claim the cattle. This could be seen as a way of limiting women's economic power by men, as cattle are considered an important wealth indicator in both the Shona and Ndebele cultures.

Women have better access to and control over woodland products such as firewood, thatch grass and mushrooms and this could be explained by their dominance in the collection of such products to fulfil their household responsibilities. Men mainly participate in firewood collection for commercial purposes, despite the illegality of such an activity as discussed in Chapter Five. Control over timber for construction is predominantly by men. Although commercialisation of timber for construction is said to be non-existent, in reality it happens in an indirect way because individuals are often hired to cut timber for other households. Thus in the process money changes hands.

Both women and men appear to have fairly similar access to and control over water resources unlike in the case of arable drylands and grazing areas. Because women are the major collectors of water as shown in Chapter Four, they tend to have a better say regarding water related decision-making processes. While both women and men have similar access to extension services, men are said to have more control especially in cases where the extension workers are male. If the extension worker is a woman, men are said to exert less control over women's interaction with the extension worker. This was confirmed by observations made while in the field when women would frequent the research campsite if female researchers were around and would rarely come to the campsite if only male researchers were around. During one field trip, some women were observed running to hide when they saw the researcher's vehicle approaching. The researcher decided to stop and find out what was wrong. The women came out from behind the bush and said they ran to hide because they thought it was the male researchers. During the household interviews, female enumerators were often welcomed by women who commented that it was good that the team had sent female interviewers 'otherwise if it was those boys we would not talk to them freely'. This in a way points to the importance of the gender of the extension officers with regard to women's participation in project activities and decision-making processes.

6.2.1 Gendered use of woodland products and resource areas in Romwe

To begin thinking about how gender influences institutions and related structures for community-based natural resource management, it is important to visualise the natural resource spaces that women and men use. In this study, this was done through mapping of resource areas and products so as to capture the complexity of woodland resource landscape. Often, the conception of natural resources such as woodlands is that of discrete areas of trees located away from human settlement. In the Zimbabwean communal lands, including Chivi district, this is not the case. The miombo woodlands, which are characteristic of the savannah region are comprised of different tree areas in and around human settlement, grazing and arable land and in the hill areas. Resource areas highlighted by the community members in Romwe include the mountains, riverine areas, edges of arable land and grazing areas. People collect a wide variety of woodland products such as poles, firewood, thatch grass, wild fruits, mushrooms, herbal medicines, and fibre from these areas (Table 6.2). Access to these resource areas is gendered as women and men have distinct uses of these areas and differential control over their resources. These patterns of resource use have implications for women's role in natural resource management institutions and related structures.

Some of the information presented in table 6.2 has been discussed in a different context in Chapter Four in which a description of the Romwe landscape is provided. Based on their roles and responsibilities, women and men have different mobility patterns, which reflect gender differences in resource use and other division of labour such as in agriculture and cattle herding. The differential use of particular resource areas and products found in those areas leads to the association of certain spaces as predominantly women's spaces and others as predominantly men's spaces. Women's spaces are not always clear-cut as is reflected in the gathering of non-timber forest products such as mushrooms, fruits and medicinal plants. These products are often collected in areas that are predominantly used by men such as Mapande mountain, which is used by men for grazing, poles and fibre. This has implications for woodland related management activities such as participation in the establishment and monitoring of resource management institutions. Despite this, women in the Romwe catchment are not actively represented in formal resource management institutional structures and are less likely to formally influence the establishment of institutions that regulate access to natural resources. Women therefore sometimes devise a variety of strategies that ensure their needs and interests are considered in resource management structures as well as contributing to the formulation and enforcement of resource use institutions.

Table 6.2: *Resource areas and gendered access to various products*

Resource Area	Products	Major users	Who controls	Rules governing access and management practices	Comments on rule adherence
Mapande range	Firewood, fibre, poles, mushrooms sacred pools	Women, men, boys	*Sabuku*s, chiefs and headman, FC	Do not criticise the mushrooms. Do not cut wet wood. Do not start bush fires.	Women no longer respect traditional beliefs such as not making bad comments about mushrooms due to Christianity. Men cut wet wood for poles, and the local leadership does not apprehend them. FC cannot enforce because of limited manpower. People adhere to the rule on forest fires.
Barura mountain	Grazing, fibre, poles	Everyone	*Sabuku*s, FC	Do not cut live trees. Do not start bush fires.	Rules are not always followed especially those relating to tree cutting as people do not have alternative sources of poles. Men sometimes cut wet wood for sale.
Romwe mountain	Poles, wood, grazing, and sacred pools	Women, men and boys	Ancestral spirits, headman	No bathing or laundry in the sacred pools. No cutting of wet wood.	Men cut wet poles in Romwe and women mostly collect dead wood. Headman appears to have lost interest enforcing the rules. Only elderly women past menopause were traditionally involved in rites at the pool.
*Chana cha*Romwe	Grazing & firewood,	Women, girls, boys	*Sabuku*s	No cutting of live trees and starting bush fires.	Rules adhered to because the hill is close to homesteads and people would easily see the offender.
Siyawaraira mountain	Grazing, poles, wood, mushrooms	Women and men	*Sabuku*s, headman and chiefs	No cutting of live trees. Do not despise mushrooms.	Men cut live trees for poles although they do not cut from one spot.
Chamanyoka hill	Fibre, poles, firewood.	Everyone	*Sabuku*s, all police	No cutting of live trees and starting bush fires.	Rules here said to be adhered to because hill is close to homesteads, thus making it easier to see offenders.
Magegesa hill	Poles, wood, grazing	Women, men, boys	*Sabuku*s, chiefs, FC	Do not cut live trees. Do not burn grass.	Rules on tree cutting not followed by men.
Grazing areas	Grazing, firewood, fruits	Women, men, & boys	*Sabuku*s, FC & Agritex	Do not burn grass. Do not cut live trees. Harvest ripe fruit only.	Children sometimes harvest unripe fruit because they are naughty.
Mawunga stream	Water, wood, grazing	Women and men	*Sabuku*s, DNR	No stream bank cultivation and grazing.	Both women and men do not follow this rule due to land shortage. DNR is not actively enforcing the rules and *sabuku*s say they are constrained by kinship ties.
Fields	Crops, fruits, grazing,	Everyone	Field owner	No use by outsiders during the cropping season.	These rules are highly enforced. There are a few cases of children stealing fruits in the fields during the cropping season.
Garden projects	Vegetables	Women	Elected committee	Grow agreed upon crops. Abide by the constitutions.	Respect for the constitutions varies from one project to the other. *E.g.* members of Barura garden appear to abide by their constitution and not in Chidiso garden.
Homesteads	Fruit trees	All	Owners	No stealing of fruits.	Rules adhered to. Community members tend to respect other people's spaces as well.

Of the various resource areas, the hill areas emerge as the most important as more kinds of products in relatively large quantities are being gathered from these areas. People also depend on a variety of areas for the same products, indicating the interconnected nature of the resource areas. For instance women collect firewood from Mapande range, Barura, Romwe, Siyawarayira, Magegesa, and Chamanyoka hills. Similarly, both women and men use the same areas for different resources. For instance, Mapande range is used by women for collecting mushrooms and firewood while men use it for collecting fibre, poles and hunting of small game.[52] Institutions regulating access to these resource areas are either area or product specific or can be justified by sacredness or civil contracts (Fortmann & Nhira, 1992). Fortmann and Nhira (*ibid*) suggest that utilization of woodlands in Zimbabwe's communal areas illustrates overlapping tenurial niches. The concept of tenurial niches is used to describe property relationships and not the physical characteristics of the land or vegetation. For instance, while mushrooms found on Mapande hill have specific rules governing their harvesting, the whole mountain range also has rules that govern its use. In this case, rules governing access to mushrooms in Mapande specifically affect women while the other general rules such as not burning the area apply to both women and men. These findings point to the fact that women and men share natural resource spaces although they use different resources and may therefore be differentially affected by rules of access.

Men are said to be more likely to break the rules regarding tree cutting because they prefer wet poles to dry poles for construction. As can be seen from Table 6.3, construction of structures was cited as the main reason why people break rules, followed by the need to generate income, activities that are predominantly men's activities according to the gender division of roles in Romwe. The third reason for breaking rules was that some people are just defiant, with various other reasons as can be seen in Table 6.3.

On the surface, men may appear to take a lead role in breaking rules as they are directly involved with tree felling for poles and wood for brick moulding and encroachment into grazing areas. Yet pressure to provide for their families and sometimes pressure from their wives may force them to break the rules. Women often collect dead wood for firewood. Often, women's roles can be met without cutting live trees whereas men's chores such as house construction can only be time consuming if wet wood is not used. Thus men are forced by the nature of their household responsibilities to cut wet wood. In some instances, men sell firewood while women predominantly collect wood for household use. Because men collect firewood for sale using scotchcarts, they need larger quantities of wood, which may not be easily found, if they concentrate on collecting dead wood. Thus men end up cutting wet wood to minimise the amount of time

52 Officially people do not acknowledge that they hunt small game. They tell you 'people steal small game but you should not write that down as it is like taking oneself to the police station after committing a crime'.

spent collecting firewood. Women collect head loads and thus find it easier to limit their harvesting to dead wood.

Table 6.3. *Reasons why people break woodland use rules*

Reason	**Number of respondents citing reason (N = 42)**	**Percentage of sample**
Need to construct structures	18	42.9
Cannot afford alternatives (*e.g.* wire, bricks)	2	4.8
Scarcity of resources	1	2.4
Commercial exploitation of resources	3	7.1
Brick firing encourages cutting of live trees	2	4.8
Christian influence	3	7.1
Poverty/people need money	6	14.3
Some people are just defiant	5	11.9
Don't know	2	4.8
Total	**42**	**100.0**

Men also play a larger role in sourcing land for the family. In the face of land shortage in the area, men have been found guilty of encroaching into some areas designated for grazing and woodland product collection. One example is that of a farmer whose use and privatisation of the common pool land resource in May 1999 resulted in conflict with the traditional leadership. In Tamwa village, the area above the Barura dam (which constitutes part of the dam catchment) was designated as a grazing area. Some local young men, however, claimed that the local *sabuku* had demarcated and reserved the area for his (the *sabuku*'s) sons to use as crop fields. One of these young men decided to clear that land for his crop field. He vowed to continue converting the grazing area as his own crop field even if the sabuku tried to stop him. This case is similar to other cases reported in Chapter Five involving a young man who established a well and a vegetable garden in a grazing area in Tamwa village in 1998. The *sabuku* is silent about the encroachment into the grazing areas and this has to a large extent weakened the position of local level institutions in resource management. The *sabuku*'s rules are sometimes broken because people feel they can afford to pay the fines, as they are often not very big fines, for instance for cutting a restricted tree individuals have often been fined Z$50 (US$0.90). The relatively low fines do not serve as a deterrent measure against potential offenders. In the majority of cases, interviewees first said rules are respected and adhered to but with further probing revealed that certain rules are broken as shown in Table 6.3.

6.2.2 Gender analysis of resource management institutional structures

This section discusses natural resource management institutional structures found in the study area from a gender perspective. The study analyses the form and nature of membership in these structures as well as investigating who are the influential members of the structures in decision-making regarding access to natural resources and understanding why certain individuals are more influential than others. Three main categories of structures that were found to be prominent in Romwe are explored, namely, the traditional authority, local government administrative structures and project related structures such as the garden committees. The gender composition of membership was found to vary from one structure to the other as shown in Table 6.4.

It is common to find women being elected into the position of treasurer in project related structures. This is because the position of treasurer is viewed as a 'trying' position that has to be given to a trustworthy person. Women are viewed as trustworthy with regard to management of money. The variation in the membership structures can be attributed to a number of factors that include the nature of the institutional structure's role in resource management, composition of membership in the various contexts, personalities involved and the nature of kinship ties and other social networks that influence decision-making processes.

Analysis of the composition of committees shows that most positions within these structures were obtained by local political elites at the expense of other social groupings. Because most project workshops are often run in English (although sometimes a mix of English and one of the local language is used) and project reports are written in English, community members may feel obliged to elect literate individuals, who may be able to represent the community at such meetings that are conducted in English. More often than not, individuals who are literate come from well-off families. Thus elected leadership may be skewed towards the more affluent members of the community. Committee members generally tend to be better placed as they have opportunities for more exposure than other community members. For example committee members often attend training workshops and other meetings, often held outside the village and may therefore be seen by other community members as assuming postures and behavioural patterns that project them as being superior to other villagers.

Table 6.4: *Membership in institutional structures in Romwe*

Institutional structure	Total members	Number of women	Number of men	Comments
Traditional authority[53]	6	0	6	Membership is all male. When asking people about the possibility of having a female kraal head, the first reaction was always surprise. They have never heard of a female kraal head.[54]
Village Development Committee	7	1	6	The woman in this committee was elected based on the set quota that specifies that there should be a female member in the VIDCO. There is one youth representative elected on the basis of the quota system.
Ward Development Committee	7	1	6	The role of the WADCO is not directly felt in Romwe. Only the councillor is known and recognised. When asked about WADCO members, most people did not even know their representatives.
Chidiso garden committee	4	3	1	This committee has been in place since 1991. At inception, there were 4 women and 2 men. One man who was the original secretary resigned in 1993 citing harassment by the vice chairwoman and was replaced by the vice chairwoman's sister-in-law. One woman who was a committee member also resigned the same year over some disagreement with the vice-chairwoman and she was not replaced. It is rumoured that the vice chairwoman has an affair with the chairman. The chairman also holds other respected positions in the village. The vice chairwoman probably uses her relationship with the chairman as her source of power.
Barura garden	7	6	1	The garden began operating fully in 1999. Membership in the garden is predominantly made up of women, as is the committee. The majority of the members are also plot holders in Chidiso garden.
Barura dam	7	1	6	A very influential *sabuku* in the area, who also holds the position of chairman in the Chidiso garden project, is the chairman of the Barura dam committee. The Barura dam was constructed in 1985 to harness water for livestock, thus the predominantly male committee. The Barura garden project committee, which is mainly made up of women, reports to the dam committee.
Catchment management	3	0	3	This committee is made up of the three *sabuku*s for the three villages that comprise the biophysical catchment.

53 Traditional authority covers the *sabukus*, headman and the chief. The chief is at the top of the hierarchy, followed by the headman, with the *sabuku* at the lowest point of the hierarchy. In the study site there are 3 sabukus (Tamwa, Sihambe and Dobhani), 2 chiefs (Madzivire and Nemauzhe) and one headman (Chikanda).

54 Lindgren (2002) discusses in detail the male dominance within the traditional leadrship using the controversial installation of a female chief in Matebeleland in Zimbabwe.

The following section analyses the gendered nature of the three broad institutional categories found in Romwe, namely the traditional authority, local government structures and NGO related project committees.

Traditional authority

Traditional authority positions are inherited and there is no history of women being for example, *sabuku*s. Similarly, the majority of the rules are not formal rules but more 'habits of the heart', fitting within the broader moral economy of the community. Frameworks for understanding rule formulation processes tend to fragment rules *e.g.* rules for water, grazing, and trees, yet the traditional rules for resource access are viewed in a more holistic manner within the broader way of life in the community. The traditional regulatory mechanisms include explicit and implicit rules and taboos.

There is some degree of social control over the traditional institutions and leadership. This occurs through reference to the power of the *vadzimu* (ancestral spirits) as well as other forms of social denunciation where decisions made by the traditional authority are not approved of. At the superficial level, traditional institutions may be seen as being oppressive to women due to lack of formal representation of women within their supporting structures, yet women often develop strategies for influencing the system or seek external intervention of NGOs, where they fail to exert their own influence. The Barura dam conflict discussed in Chapter Five illustrates some of the strategies used by women to ensure that they influence decision-making in relation to traditional institutions and natural resource management. In the Barura case, the garden project members, whose memberships are predominantly women, sought intervention of external agents when they felt disadvantaged by the traditional authority. Historically, traditional authority has been respected and rarely publicly challenged. With recent exposure to external NGO support, women now sometimes openly challenge certain decisions made by the traditional leaders. This case also illustrates that where women cannot employ internal strategies to influence decision-making processes, they rely on external development facilitators for support. In the Barura dam case referred to above, the women felt the traditional authority had treated them unfairly, thus they sought and received support from an external agent. An alternative would have been for the women to seek assistance from the *dare* (traditional village court), but there was no immediate assurance that their case would be treated positively as the *dare* is made up of elderly men only, who are unlikely to pass judgement in favour of women against a traditional leader. Women only participate as witnesses in the cases tried by the *dare*.

Local government/modern institutions

As discussed in Chapter One, the term 'modern' institutions in this thesis is used to refer to natural resource management institutions of the state such

as those instituted by the village development committees (VIDCOs) and ward development committees (WADCOs). In theory, VIDCOs and WADCOs are applauded as being truly democratic and allowing broad participation as individuals are elected into their positions. Yet in practice, these structures are upwardly accountable to the state and not downwardly accountable to the local community (Mandondo, 2001; Matondi, 2001; Ribot, 1999). A VIDCO consists of 7 elected committee members and represents about 100 households. Two of these 7 positions are reserved for the ruling party's women and youth leagues. The reservation of seats for women is often referred to as the quota system and this refers to the predetermination of women's representation in institutional structures. Because the majority of VIDCO chairpersons are men, and WADCOs consist of chairpersons of VIDCOs, male representatives dominate the WADCO membership.

Councillors are the chairpersons of the WADCOs and these represent the ward at RDC level. At the time of the study, the whole of Chivi RDC had only one female councillor (out of a total of thirty councillors) who represents a ward that is classified under the Small Scale Commercial Farming Areas (SSCFAs), that have a different set-up from the communal areas, under which the Romwe catchment falls. SSCFAs were designated during the colonial period as commercial farming areas for the upcoming elite of African origin (equated to blacks). Thus composition of settlers in these SSCFAs was mixed, with people originating from different rural areas where they had been identified as qualifying for small-scale commercial farming, the majority of whom had Master Farmer certificates. Master Farmer certificates are certificates that were given to farmers of African origin who would have taken some course on agricultural production and had the potential of producing crops at a small-scale commercial level and not just for subsistence as is the case in the communal areas. Thus traditional values and cultural beliefs in such farming communities tend to be less influential as compared to the communal areas. This may explain why a woman could be elected as councillor in this area, yet none of the communal area wards in the district have a female councillor.

The fact that one position in the VIDCO is reserved for women and another for the youth representative emanated from the numerous attempts by the government to make legal and institutional moves to promote gender equality (Jacobs, 1991). This was influenced by the socialist ideology of the revolutionary struggle and the role women played in the war of liberation. This early commitment to gender equality affected the formation of new local level institutions, thus often ruling party women's league and youth wing representatives were voted in or co-opted into the VIDCO. While women have a specified seat in the VIDCO and WADCO, it is important to note that numbers do not always mean effective representation. The process of voting for members of the VIDCO is done by show of hands and thus lacks any privacy. People may therefore be

influenced by show of hands to vote for someone, not because they want to but because of peer pressure.

In the Romwe catchment, the VIDCO was found to be inactive. For instance, the VIDCO held only two meetings during the research period where the process of decision-making could be observed. The first meeting was held to replace the VIDCO chairman who had died but this meeting was poorly attended. The second meeting was to compile a list of beneficiaries of the food-for-work programme. The food-for-work programme engages community members in projects such as road construction or rehabilitation in exchange for food. Such programmes have been found to be successful as long as there are material benefits. When such benefits run out, people stop participating. Thus, while we have women representatives in these committees, the committees do not do much, making it difficult to assess the women's level of contribution to decision-making. Setting a quota for women to be represented in resource management structures also does not translate into participation of women in decision-making. While this is the case, the quota system may be used as an entry point to involve women in formal decision-making processes in the modern resource management structures. The quota system needs to be complemented by capacity building among women through *e.g.* leadership training. Quota setting to facilitate women's representation in local structures may negatively influence people's perceptions about women's role in resource management institutional structures as community members seem to respect their own initiative in electing leaders more than external driven processes.

The rural district council expects the VIDCO to enforce woodland use rules at the local level. This was found not to be the case on the ground and the current VIDCO chairman says there is no incentive to enforce rules because they are not paid, yet the members sacrifice time they could spend in fields and other household chores attending RDC workshops outside the area. The current VIDCO chairman threatened the councillor with resignation if their need for allowances was not addressed. In talking to his wife during his absence, the researcher observed that the wife might have pushed him to resign. For instance, she pointed out that she did not support the idea of her husband continuing as chairman of the VIDCO because all the meetings that he has to attend at the RDC hold up their household work, yet there is no pay. Their main house was blown away by heavy winds in November 2000, but up to September 2001 at the time of the interview, the house had not been repaired. Furthermore, before her husband became chairman of the VIDCO, she used to go to Museva business centre, about 5 km away, to sell vegetables and tomatoes. Now that she has to do more work at home, she can no longer go to Museva and thus has very little income of her own.

NGO related project institutional structures

A number of structures set up by NGOs or other government departments were found in the study site. These include catchment management committees, dam management and garden committees. The process of establishing these structures theoretically involves democratic elections such as is the case with VIDCOs. Participants are free to choose people they want to be in committees and there are no pre-set conditions. NGO facilitators set the timeframe for the operation of these structures, which is often 2-3 years, but usually with the hope that they will be sustainable. In the majority of cases, election of members is done at community meetings. Similar to the VIDCO elections, voting during the project committee elections is done by show of hands. While this is considered a transparent process, the downside of this is that other people may vote in fear of being accused of voting for the wrong candidate and this may influence how some community members vote.

Committee members often attend training workshops and other meetings at hotels or other venues outside the village – they thus have more exposure and are sometimes seen as viewing themselves as superior to other people in the community. Innovators in the community are often elected into NGO facilitated institutional structures. An innovator is defined as someone who takes a lead in initiating activities either at household level or at community level, for example in the case of the community mobiliser she developed water harvesting techniques that no one in the community had done before and she also does some experimentation with different varieties of seeds in her crop field. Innovators are sometimes seen as being "too forward" especially if they are women and do not have husbands and it is believed this is a result of lack of control over them by a man, *e.g.* the community mobiliser who is a widow. A community mobiliser is an individual who is chosen to facilitate project activities at community level and operates as an assistant to the CARE International programme officer. CARE International appointed the community mobiliser, based on her innovativeness in her own household and fields. Some of the local perceptions of female innovators are illustrated in the case presented below:

Women leaders and innovators – the Romwe community mobiliser: One of the female leaders and innovators in Romwe is the community mobiliser for CARE International. She is a widow and her late husband was a soldier in the Zimbabwe national army. She is also a daughter-in-law of an influential kraal head Tamwa, is in her mid-40s and her household falls in wealth category one for the rich (see Annex 2 for the criteria of wealth ranking based on community perceptions of wealth). She owns a car, has positions in a number of committees and has attended many training workshops. She has primary school education and can therefore read and write. Her views are respected in community decision-making arenas but other community members do not copy all of her innovations. She often

stands up in village meetings and speaks out in a polite way. Being polite is a strategy that has worked in ensuring she is listened to as people respect her for being cool and to the point. She is a former committee member of Simudzirayi loan scheme as well as a former committee member of Chidiso garden project. Currently she spends much of her time at Barura garden. As a result of being innovative, she has diverted water from Barura dam spillway for her own use and has a flourishing 2-acre plot of vegetables, sugarcane, citrus fruits, and maize, which she crops all year round (outside the Barura garden). Other farmers once raised concerns that she was using community water from the dam for her own private use and she argued that she was only using water spilling on its own from the dam. She uses her open truck to ferry her produce to the nearby markets. At times she is thought to be selfish *e.g.* she attended a leadership course organised by IES, yet she had attended a similar course before organised by CARE International. The IES field based research assistant had suggested that she give other community members a chance, but she refused and attended the course herself. Overall, she is an innovative farmer who works with a variety of organisations on trials, *e.g.* maize seed trials with Seedco, drip irrigation with the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG), wheat trials and indigenous tree planting with IES. Because of being a progressive farmer, she interacts with many external agents that have predominantly male officers and thus has been accused of being a prostitute, especially by men in the community. This was confirmed by one sabuku who called the field based male IES research assistant and said to him 'My son, you have to be careful with some women that you work with. We know them they are not good. They have had love affairs with many people and they may disturb your work'. In checking with other women for their perspective on this, one married woman noted that "*Amai ava vanoshanda nesimba tese takatarisa. Hama dzavo nevanhu vane jealous vavakuti ifambi*' (This woman is such a hard working person. It is her jealous relatives who accuse her of being a prostitute[55]). Besides gaining power through her assets and other resources she owns, the community mobiliser also has alliances and networks that help her establish authority within formal decision-making arenas. She also projects the image of a subordinated woman and accommodates social expectations of her (self-image) in a non-threatening way for local men through her soft-spokenness. This allows her to ensure that her interests and those of other women are defended. Being soft-spoken is a strategy that helps her wield power without openly threatening the status quo.

Women in the NGO facilitated committees are proving to be very assertive. This may be partly due to the fact that membership in externally facilitated projects tends to be predominantly women and committee members receive formal training on leadership skills and also attend

55 Quoting Kabeer (1988), Agarwal (1994, p292) highlights a similar case where a widow in Bangladesh was accused of having an affair with her brother-in-law as a way of forcing her to move from the land she had inherited from her late husband.

confidence-building courses. To a large extent, intervention by NGOs has changed the institutional outlook in the Romwe area. Historically, women have been less assertive in formal decision-making arenas and less represented in local resource management structures. NGOs have created space for women's participation in resource management structures in Romwe through encouraging women's election into project committees. Although women have started off as leaders in projects with predominantly female membership, such as gardens, this may be a starting point for empowering women to be more active even in arenas that have a mix of women and men. Decision-making processes and participation in resource management in general may also be influenced by self-images that women and men have of each other and of themselves. The study therefore investigated the self-images of women and men in Romwe.

6.3 Self-images of women and men

The study investigated the perceptions that women and men have of each other as well as of themselves referred to here as self-images. The self-images of women and men influence the institutional framework and decision-making processes as they define who should make what decisions. These self-images often influence the establishment of management structures that are often put in place through the so-called democratic processes where people are voted into leadership positions. The majority of management structures in CBNRM, such as the catchment management committees, dam, borehole, garden and grazing committees as well as other externally facilitated structures such as the village and ward development committees use the system of elections to put in place the leadership of these structures. The self-images of women and men in a given community may influence which individuals are elected into leadership positions. Thus it was found important to assess the self-images of women and men in Romwe.

The groups that were involved in generating self-images comprised a mix of people with differing marital status including the married, single, widowed and divorced. The author is aware that if a similar exercise is done with groups divided according to marital status, a different picture may emerge. Given that the process of establishing institutional structures involves people with differing marital status *e.g.* in the election process, for the purposes of this study, the self-images were generated through these mixed groups. Ages of participants ranged from 25 years to 60 years. Two groups of fifteen women and twelve men separately generated the self-images. The question that was put forward to separate groups of women and men was 'If you hear the word woman/man what comes to your mind first?' The self-images generated appear to have been based on the household level, even though the question put forward to the groups was general and not specific to the household level. What happens at the household level often influences activities and decision-making processes

at the community level. Results from the group exercises are presented in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5. *Self-images of women and men*

When you hear the word "woman" what comes to mind first?	
Women's group: - Heavy workload - A home is a woman (*Musha mukadzi*) - Many problems that women face - Is paid *lobola*[56] (bride wealth) for - Responsible for the upkeep of the whole family - The beauty of a woman - Responsible for planning - Child bearing - Training & socialising children - Brings unity in the family - A married man is more respected - Hard life - Feeding children - Raising children - Family healthcare	*Men's group:* - Helper (*Mubatsiri*) - Responsible for cooking and healthcare - Responsible for laundry - Respected person (*mudzimai anoremekedzwa*) - Temptations (*mhosva*) - Looks after the home - Offering love (*kunyenga*) - I will be looked after - Child bearing - An associate - Feel happy (*kunzwa mufaro*) - *Lobola* - Parent - A home is a woman (*Musha mukadzi*).
When you hear the word "man" what comes to mind first?	
Women's group: - Breadwinner - Decision-maker (*Mutongi*) - Oppressor (*Mudzvanyiriri*) - Cares for the family - Planner - Leader (*Mutungamiri*) - Owner of everything - A harsh person (*hasha*) - Someone who controls - Head of the household (*musoro wemba*) - A home without a man is not respected	*Men's group:* - Problem solver - Breadwinner (*muriritiri*) - King -*ndiMambo* - Controller - Leader - The clan bearer (*Musikarudzi*) - Full of ideas - Fighter - Household head (*musimboti wemusha*) - A lot of power - Hunter - Friend (*sahwira*) -Dishonest – cannot be trusted - Hero (*Gamba*) - God's important creation (*Chisikwa chikuru*)

From the women's perspectives, emphasis is on the multiple roles that women play and the problems they encounter, while men are seen as leaders, decision-makers, and controllers. The women highlight their commitment to the survival of the family through their reproductive roles, that is, both the social and biological roles. In both women's and men's groups, the Shona expression '*musha mukadzi'* (a home is a woman) came

56 *Lobola* has been perceived as an instrument of 'buying women's rights and obligations' into clans and along with this perception goes the view that women do not 'naturally' hold land rights in their husbands' territories. Yet even in their maternal home areas women tend to be denied individual land rights. Thus women gain access to key productive resources such as land on the basis of patronage and the largesse of their husbands, fathers and other patriarchs (Moyo, 1995b).

out, which may be interpreted as some form of encouragement for women to accept their status and position in the society, as well as the nature of their workload. Sometimes the use of the concept of *musha mukadzi* is a social control mechanism to keep women happy in their position in relation to men in the household. The women's group seemed to realise the cultural necessity of a woman to a man (that a woman is paid *lobola* for). The women see a man as a person who controls household resources as well as its members. A man is the household head who has the interest of the family in mind when he is planning. The men's self-images also highlight the imbalance of power between women and men, with men having the upper hand. Women view men as oppressors and this may be related to the tendency by men to suppress women's views in formal decision-making arenas.

The self-images appear to be influenced by traditional values and cultural beliefs that influence practices and the patterns of interaction between women and men. Self-images of women from the men's group that portray a woman as a 'helper' substantiates men's views that women should abide by what their husbands or male relatives tell them to do. There is a general perception that a man who lets a woman make decisions is weak or has been given some love potion to tame him[57]. This was sometimes reflected in public gatherings such as village or project meetings where women's contributions to debates were not taken seriously except for a few prominent ones like the community mobiliser. Because the mobiliser (a widow) is one of the few exceptional women leaders in the community and also hard working in terms of agricultural production, when other community members refer to her they say 'that woman is a man in herself'. Sitting positions at community meetings are also influenced by the self-images of women and men and these were also observed during the study. The sitting arrangements tell a story about social relations in a given community. In Romwe, women sat on the ground while men sat on chairs, or other elevated positions at village meetings. This is perceived as the traditional or cultural way of doing things but it also signifies women's and men's different positions in community social and political interactions, with men often viewed as the dominant group.

Quotations from the bible were sometimes used to justify why women should not be in the forefront in decision-making processes. For instance, the men's group argued that a woman is supposed to be a helper to her husband because the bible in Genesis 2 verse 18 says when God created man, he said 'I will make him a helper fit for him[58]' and not what we see today where women go off trading to such far off places as Beitbridge (about 300 km from Romwe). Because most women in the village go to

57 Goebel (2002) documents perceptions on the use of husband taming herbs in a resettlement area in Zimbabwe. The husband taming herbs are designed to control husbands' behaviour and promote love and harmony in marriage (*ibid*: 463).

58 This quotation came from the man's group, which was raised during the plenary session.

one church or another, the belief that God created a woman to be a man's helper appears to be entrenched in the community although there are a few exceptional cases. The men's group noted that church is good because it teaches women to respect their husbands. While there was a general perception that men are supposed to be the leaders, the women's group also highlighted that this does not apply to all men because *vamwe varume mazita chete* (some men are just men by name). Such men cannot even fend for their families. Observations at community meetings revealed that some men are despised and sometimes when they stand up to speak, even women who are culturally expected to sit and listen when a man speaks, will grumble and make noises that will force that man to sit down.

The illustration of women going out of the village for trading purposes as something negative from the men's viewpoint may also influence who participates in community projects' leadership positions. This is because often people elected into leadership positions have to represent the village at project meetings and attend training workshops, the majority of which are held outside the village. Often training workshops *e.g.* on leadership and project management are held outside the village at venues deemed convenient for participants from different project sites in the district. This may restrict participation of married women, as their spouses may not be willing to let them attend such meetings. Besides, their household responsibilities of child caring may also be restrictive. Often the budgets for NGOs do not cater for women with small children who may need baby-sitting arrangements. Thus participation of potential female leaders with small children may be restricted if meetings and training workshops are held outside the village[59]. Because of such constraints, women elected into leadership structures tend to be single, widowed or divorced or those that have grown up children.

Further discussions around the women's and men's self-images helped explain the nature and patterns of interaction between women and men especially in public arenas. It was noted that at community meetings, women have a tendency to go with the wind – accepting ideas that often come from men. After community meetings, women often share their opinions on decisions taken and if they are not happy, they may just decide to ignore those decisions. It was common to see women congregating at some homestead before or after a meeting for tea. During the tea time, a diversity of issues are discussed and often some opinions may be formed even prior to a large community meeting. In some of the meetings attended, the researcher observed the proceedings in terms of who did most of the talking and whose views were taken on board and often it would be a few individuals from powerful kinship groups in the community. The majority of women would not be speaking out loudly although they

59 It is worth noting that restricted participation in workshops for women with small children does not apply to rural women only. This also applies to professional women as the author herself went through similar experiences.

sometimes grumbled where they did not agree with some point, but would rarely stand up and express their view. In asking some women after one community meeting why they did not express their views during the deliberations, some women gave the following responses.[60]

> "I wanted to speak. I was going to tell them the truth, they know me, I am not afraid. I raised my hand many times but no one gave me a chance to speak." Mbuya Simba[61], about 60 years old.
>
> "You don't dare to speak when they are speaking (referring to the members from a powerful kinship group – referred to as *Zvidza zvopo*). Today was nothing; often they are worse at other meetings. Once I tried to speak and I was threatened by one of them and I just sat down embarrassed. Now I just keep my mouth shut." MaiPeter, about 45 years old.
>
> "This family is really a problem (referring to a family that fall under the *Zvidza zvopo* group). I looked at you people from IES and I felt pity for you because you do not understand the politics here. You should not get angry at what they do – it is just politics." MaiLisa in her mid-thirties.
>
> **Source:** follow-up informal discussions after a meeting held on 16 February 2001 to discuss the community loan scheme.

Decisions made in public arenas are sometimes difficult to implement because women agree but when they get to their homes they convince their husbands to change their minds. The men's group discussion revealed that the problem with discussions at community meetings is that women sometimes behave according to the self-images *i.e.* perceptions of what women should or should not do in public and the gathering reaches some consensus and passes resolutions. But 'when each one of us goes home (in the bedroom), your wife will say to you, whatever you agreed on does not make sense and if you want to be part of those resolutions passed you may as well go and stay with the *sabuku* (or who ever was facilitating the meeting). That is why some things do not work in the village'. This comment was made in relation to discussions and resolutions that had been passed regarding strict enforcement of rules relating to use of woodland products following a spate of commercialisation of some products such as firewood by especially young married men who have limited livelihood options. While the men may want to stop the sale of wood, the need for

60 Quoted in Sithole's (2002) manual on making sense of micro-politics in multiple stakeholder groups.
61 Mbuya Simba is also referred to in Chapter Five in relation to her field expansion into a common pool woodland area.

survival and pressure from their wives to fend for their families may force them to continue.

Where men are culturally or traditionally considered 'leaders' (as portrayed in the self-images) in both public and private arenas, it becomes increasingly problematic for women to challenge the status quo in public or seek to achieve goals higher than those set for them predominantly by the male discourse. When women do challenge the existing order, for example, being innovators or 'good' leaders like the female community mobiliser, there is often some resistance from those who benefit from the status quo. Sometimes the women who challenge the existing order such as the community mobiliser through her leadership qualities and innovativeness, are accused of succeeding through illicit means. An implicit factor in the nature of relations between women and men is that cultural definitions of gender, as reflected in the self-images, are not only creations of one group and a manipulative aspect of social relations, but they are also useful mechanisms to keep checks and controls on some actors, either as individuals or groups.

The overall impact of the self-images discussed above regarding decision-making processes is that they restrict women's participation in formal decision-making arenas. Lack of participation in formal and public arenas does not necessarily imply women do not influence decision-making processes. Because women are often viewed as 'helpers', especially the married ones, they prefer to be quiet in formal arenas rather than being outspoken and risk being rebuked in public, yet they may influence their husbands in private arenas. This may explain why the majority of the outspoken women in public arenas are widows or single women[62] as the public arenas are the main opportunity for them to influence decision-making processes as they may have fewer opportunities to arm-twist men in the private arenas. Sometimes single women (either divorcees or those who have never been married) can be rebuked if they are too outspoken and told that is the reason why they are not married. This may restrict how much single women can say in public arenas. For example a former treasurer of a community loan scheme indicated at one meeting that she had records of who had repaid and who had not repaid the loans and wanted to read out the names. One member of a powerful kinship group in the area, who had not repaid stood up and told her to sit down and stop acting the wise one, adding that, that is why she does not have a husband. The woman cried and threw the books into the air indicating that she no longer wanted the treasurer position. None of the community leaders present challenged the man. Widows may therefore sometimes be better positioned in public arena decision-making than the single women.

62 About 25% of the household heads in Romwe are widows (Romwe Household Livelihood Survey, 1999-2000).

Besides influencing decision-making processes, the self-images also influence who does what in the household. For instance, married women are generally expected to contribute to the household requirements in small ways that do not threaten the male dominance. Usually men do not allow their wives to invest in big items such as buying cattle because if the woman dies, her relatives would want to inherit the cattle. Thus men prefer to have women spend their income on perishables such as the household food and kitchen utensils.

6.4 Social networks influencing resource management decisions

Social networks have recently emerged as an intriguing institutional arrangement whose influence on what goes on in the village with regard to access to woodland and water resources has often been overlooked. Cleaver (1998:350) argues that within the institutional literature, there is a tendency to concentrate on formal structures, committees, constitutions and property rights as mechanisms for reducing transaction costs and institutionalising cooperative interactions. Such a focus is viewed as being prescriptive, formalised institutional arrangements being considered more likely to be robust and enduring than informal ones. Yet in practice, there are a plethora of rural social networks with different forms, structures, and histories of existence. Social networks that were identified in Romwe are presented in Table 6.6.

The social networks identified during the study are not necessarily structured or tailored to suit natural resource management, but often have indirect influence on CBNRM institutions and could also be adapted for the purposes of woodland and water resource management. The majority of these social networks depend on uncodified rules and norms, some of which are based on regular practice in the everyday existence of villagers. Many of the villagers, especially women and other disadvantaged groups participate in a variety of social networks for livelihood sustenance within the rural landscape. In the case of Romwe, social networks and interactions were found to be relatively strong and are based on kinship ties, ethnicity, period of residence in the area, totem sharing and other various forms of social classification such as those described in Chapter Three. Matondi (2001) finds that in Shamva district in the Mashonaland province in north-eastern Zimbabwe, social networks and interactions are much stronger between people who share the same totem. It is worth noting that social networks and relationships are far from being deterministic as they are often influenced by micro-politics and availability of natural resources at a given time.

Table 6.6. *Examples of networks identified in Romwe*

Type	Participants	Function	Problem/Comment
Burial society	Older men and women	Help families during and after funeral with both material and moral support	These were originally informal but with the increase in deaths due to HIV/AIDS[63], now some have constitutions to ensure good management.
Work parties (*nhimbe*)	Women, men and youth	Assist in activities such as ploughing, weeding, harvesting, and spreading manure	Suffer from privatisation of labour by the rural elite.
Beer parties (*ndari*)	Older men and older women	Meetings during beer drinking parties Evolve from one household to another Entertainment sources	These are often a source of mobilisation for traditional leadership. Discussions from here may influence formal decision-making processes.
Well (*matsime)* meetings	Women and girls	Fetching water meetings Gossiping about diverse village issues	Not taken seriously by men, may influence formal arenas. May result in village conflicts.
Livestock herding (*madzoro)*	Men and boys	Labour mobilisation to assist each other with herding cattle	Confused by the elite who have capacity to hire paid labour.
Traditional rituals (*huruva*)	Older men and older women past menopause	Rain making ceremonies Where necessary, appeasing spirits	Do not have respect of the youth. Are sometimes viewed as beer drinking sessions.
Family friend (*sahwira*)	Men and women	Unrelated to family that help in various household errands	Fizzling out due to commercialisation.
Totem sharing	Both women and men	Unrelated people who share the same totem. Assist each other *e.g.* with draught power, food or labour	These are not very strong in Romwe and this can be attributed to mixed ethnicity of the catchment residents.
Religious networks *e.g.* church goers	Majority are women	Moral support during bereavement. Assist each other to meet household needs	These are quite important these days as a result of many deaths assumed to be HIV/AIDS related.
Tea groups	Women	Arenas for gossiping Provide moral support Often held prior to or after community meetings to reflect on deliberations	Discussions from these networks may influence formal decision-making processes. Often occur randomly – not planned in advance.
Kinship based cliques *e.g. zvidzazvopo*[64]	Both women and men	May be used to defend or consolidate kin-based interests	May be retrogressive to development or collective action initiatives.

63 58 of the 127 (46%) catchment households have lost one or more members of the family between 1997 and 2001.

64 See Chapters Three and Five for the discussion of social classification of households in Romwe.

While burial societies have a long history in Zimbabwe, an increase has been seen in recent years due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. People pay a joining fee and thereafter make monthly contributions. For example, in Romwe, the Dobhani village burial society had a monthly contribution of Z$2 (US$0.36) per member as of April 2002. The money contributed is used to cover most of the burial costs of the members or their immediate family. Often the money is used to buy food to feed people during the mourning days or buy a coffin, in cases where the bereaved family cannot afford to buy a coffin. By providing emergency financial and non-financial support, burial societies find practical ways to minimise social tensions and strengthen family and kinship relations. In the burial society community, the social process of providing emergency financial and non-financial relief is therefore more than an instrumental task; it is a nuanced cultural process that redefines kin and family social relations. Burial societies have traditionally been informal with members ranging from ten families and above. With the emergence of HIV/AIDS and increase in the occurrence of death, burial societies are becoming more formal with some establishing constitutions that guide their operations. The burial societies are said to be important especially by women who often have to carry the burden of taking care of people during funerals as members of these societies often come together and assist one another with work such as cooking, fetching water or firewood for the funeral. Relationships developed in these burial societies may influence decision-making processes at community level as views maybe based on cliques formed during interation in these informal arenas.

Another form of social networks found important for women are the work parties (*nhimbe*). These social networks are referred to as work parties because while people work hard, they also have a good time socialising during the process. These work parties are often organised around household activities such as agricultural production, ploughing, weeding, harvesting and so forth. This is a way of addressing labour shortages. Often an individual or household who organises a work party brews beer or prepares some food and invites other community members to participate in a particular activity. The composition of participants is based on other criteria that influence interaction in the village such as residence in the same geographical areas, being biologically related, or other forms of friendship. In Romwe, these work parties have of late been impacted upon by the privatisation of labour by the rural elite, who can afford to pay for labour. Thus the poor and those who cannot afford to hire labour tend to be impacted upon in a more negative way.

Beer parties are still important social networks where a diversity of issues are discussed. These are more widespread during the dry season (off peak agricultural season), especially during years of good harvest. It is believed that even the most shy person, after one or two beers, will open up and express their views. Often discussions from the beer parties may influence

decision-making processes that take place at formal community gatherings. It is mostly the older women and men who participate in these beer parties as younger women prefer to go to church instead. Beer parties were found to be more a source of mobilisation for traditional leaders' views and ideas as well as legitimation of leadership positions.

Water source meetings, *e.g.* at wells, boreholes and other water sources, are mostly networking arenas for women and girls because they collect water on a daily basis for domestic use. It is common to see women walking to water sources in small groups of twos or threes and during this time, there are many issues that are discussed and opinions may be formed around certain issues. Often women go to fetch water at similar times of the day, *e.g.* early in the morning or late afternoon. Thus there are often groups of women gathering at water sources during certain times of the day and a lot of gossip goes on at these informal meetings. Sithole (1997) documents in greater depth the role and importance of these informal meetings that take place at the wells. Sithole (*ibid*)'s study showed that during discussions at wells, if there is an issue at stake in the community at a particular time, women may strategise as to how they should respond to the issue and even suggest who should present the women's views in formal arenas. Thus in a way, the informal meetings at wells may influence what happens in the community at large. While these well meetings may be a source of power for women, often discussions from such arenas are viewed by men as 'women's gossip' and may therefore not be taken seriously by men. But these are important forums for women's networking. Scott (1985:282) notes that gossip may be some form of symbolic resistance. Gossip is said to be never disinterested, but rather it is a partisan effort by a group or faction to advance its claims and interests against those of others (*ibid*). For the weak, gossip may be a way of expressing their opinion, of contempt and disapproval while minimising the risks of identification and reprisal. This is because the source of gossip is often not known or cannot be identified.

Similar to work parties, group livestock herding arrangements (*madzoro*) serve the purpose of labour mobilisation. These are more common among the men during school term when adults have to herd cattle while children are at school. The village elites, who have the capacity to hire labour for livestock herding, have weakened these networks.

Traditional rituals include rainmaking ceremonies, appeasing the ancestral spirits, *masukafosholo* (literally translated, this means cleansing the tools used during a burial ceremony) or observing rest days following burial of a deceased relative. Christianity and modernisation have impacted upon and weakened traditional ritual networks. Rituals such as rain making ceremonies are no longer common. Other ceremonies like *masukafosholo* that are held after the death of a household member where beer has to be brewed and a beast slaughtered have also been impacted upon negatively by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Because households are losing members on a

more frequent basis (sometimes 3 members in a year), many households can no longer afford to host such functions, as it would mean slaughtering a beast on each occasion. Similarly, observing rest days after burial is no longer done because of the increase in the number of funerals. For instance, during the two weeks spent in the village for fieldwork, the researcher would attend about four to five funerals especially during 2000 and 2001. If the rest days were observed, this means farmers would not be able to engage in farming operations.

Family friendship (*sahwira*) and totem sharing often involve unrelated individuals. Family friendship involves long standing friends that help each other with household errands. In recent years, these have succumbed to commercialisation of *e.g.* labour. Totem sharing involves unrelated individuals who share the same totem and these often assist each other with draught power, food and other forms of material and moral support. The totem sharing networks were found to be not very strong in Romwe and this could be due to the mixed ethnicity and the history of in-migration into the area by people from different parts of the country, with different cultural backgrounds and beliefs. Religious networks are predominantly for women and these serve a variety of purposes such as moral and material support during bereavement. These have become even more important due to HIV/AIDS.

Tea groups are *ad hoc* gatherings often with no prior planning or arrangements. Sometimes women may be going somewhere and stop at one household to greet a friend or neighbour and end up having tea and some socialising. These are mainly women's networks and were found to be powerful in Romwe and they are arenas for strategising by women. For instance, some women were often seen drinking tea at the home of the Chidiso garden vice chairwoman and further investigations revealed that those women advise the vice chairwoman on what actions to take at community meetings. For example, in one instance, some women were seen drinking tea at the vice chairwoman's house prior to a meeting organised to discuss change in the leadership of Chidiso project. It is believed (by other project members) that those women advised the vice chairwoman to reject the proposition to change the leadership and they promised to support her views. This gave the chairwoman more courage to reject the idea at the meeting and the garden committee was retained. These tea groups also formed unplanned at the campsite when female researchers were around and these became a source of information and village gossip for the female researchers.

Kinship based cliques is a concept used to refer to the networks that form around kinship ties. These were more evident for kinship groups that are considered powerful in the village. These kinship cliques may be used to defend or consolidate kin-based interests and resource claims. Such networks could be retrogressive to development or collective action as was seen in the case of the Simudzirayi micro-credit scheme discussed by

Mutamba *et al*., (2000) and Sithole (2002). These kinship based associations, friendships and other networks presented in table 6.6 contribute to the formation of webs of interaction, which commit the actors involved to certain social groupings, and clusters where information is jointly processed and this may have some important influence on what happens in formal decision-making arenas. Specific scripts often produced and reproduced within these social networks contain informal regulations, social codes and the legitimation of discursive strategies. Women's commitments to specific networks shape their practices and influence their views of CBNRM initiatives and the related institutional framework within which CBNRM is implemented. The women draw upon these networks and rework them in response to their immediate needs and use them whenever possible to achieve certain levels of control.

6.5. Identifying women's niches in institutional processes

Recent perspectives on CBNRM initiatives question the representativeness of resource management institutional structures, especially at the local level (Narayan, 2000; Mukamuri, 2000). This literature argues that the more powerful members of a society may create institutions in order to regularise and entrench mutually beneficial relationships. Thus institutions do not necessarily serve the needs and interests of all, but only enough influential persons to ensure their preservation. Women and other poor groups are often excluded from formal natural resource management institutions, which may be influenced by the self-images of women and men. As a result, women have restricted access to key natural resources such as land. In such situations, women sometimes devise strategies (both intentionally and unintentionally) to ensure they gain access to key resources such as land. Some of these strategies identified in Romwe involved women participating in community projects such as gardens, where they are allocated plots in their own right and the plots are registered in their names. Thus through these projects, women 'own' land, a right that they are often denied when it comes to arable land for rainfed agriculture. There has been widespread investment in community garden projects by a number of NGOs throughout the country over the last decade (Drescher, 1998).

An important role of the community garden projects that has often been overlooked is their contribution to the social welfare and independence especially of women and children (Drescher, 1998). Examples of garden projects implemented elsewhere in Zimbabwe include, those facilitated in Mutoko district (in Mashonaland East province) by Coopibo a Belgian funded organisation, the Buhera district (Masvingo province) projects funded by Canadian Hunger Foundation and Zimbabwe Freedom from Hunger Campaign, United Methodist projects in Mutare district (Manicaland province), Oxfam Canada (country-wide), Christian Care in Manicaland, Mashonaland, Masvingo, Midlands and Matebeleland North provinces. These are just a few examples and it is worth noting that during

the course of the research, the author did not come across documentation providing a comprehensive list of garden projects in Zimbabwe. In Chivi district, CARE International also has a number of other garden projects besides those found in Romwe. At the time of the study, CARE International had assisted with the establishment of a total of thirty garden projects (linked to the rehabilitation of small dams for servicing the gardens) in the whole of Chivi district. Examples of garden projects found in Romwe are the Chidiso and Barura garden projects described below.

The Chidiso garden project: Membership in Chidiso is predominantly female and the members' own plots in their own right. Project members point out that they have benefited from the garden and collector well since they now have a perennial and reliable source of water. They also get cash income from the sale of vegetables as well as supplementing their dietary needs. Farmers participating in the garden are from the three biophysical catchment villages. While membership is predominantly women (42 women out of 50 plot holders), formal decision-making in this committee is dominated by the most influential sabuku in the catchment, who is the garden chairman, and the vice-chairwoman. It is rumoured that the chairman and vice chairwoman of the project have a strong personal relationship, thus decision-making is not transparent. The vice-chairwoman also belongs to a powerful kinship group[65] in the catchment. No one in the community wants to challenge members of this kinship group and the reasons given for this reluctance are that the family is well connected politically and they are also close kin to two of the three catchment sabukus. As discussed in Chapter Five, one of the four brothers from this family has usurped the position of one of the *sabuku*s. Another of the four brothers, a teacher and former councillor in the district also had political connections gained while he was councillor. In addition, the vice-chairwoman also has her own cliques of women (such as the tea groups that often congregate at her home) that she associates with and sometimes gets advice from them. For instance, one informant commented that, 'the vice chairperson has some people who discuss with her Chidiso project management and give her ideas on what decisions to make. When you see them drinking tea in her kitchen, you know that they are giving her advice' (informal discussion with the vice chairperson's daughter-in-law, 03/09/2001). All these different individuals involved create strong networks that influence decision-making processes in the catchment. The majority of the decisions relating to Chidiso garden are therefore often made outside the formal arenas and this has, for instance, given the two leaders for Chidiso garden the opportunity to push their ideas and interests forward. Reacting to this set up, some original members who are not happy with decision-making processes are now subletting their beds to 'tenants' because they do not want to give up their claims to the land in the garden, yet they refuse to be part of the garden decision-making process. At the

65 Members of this kinship groups are referred to as *Zvidzazvopo* (the powerful ones) and members from this group claim that no substantive decisions can be made without their involvement.

time of the study, approximately seventy percent of the plot users were tenants, but they do not have the right to vote. Therefore, they cannot influence decision-making processes. This may partly explain the persistence of bad leadership in Chidiso. The majority of the original members have moved to Barura garden where decision-making processes are said to be more transparent. In addition, the method of watering in Barura garden is a lot easier as they use a flood irrigation system, while in Chidiso they have to pump water from the borehole and carry it for a distance of about 500 metres. Similar to Chidiso garden, membership in Barura garden project is predominantly women.

The Barura garden project: The Barura garden project was established in 1998 with support from CARE International. Membership of the project is drawn from beyond the three Romwe catchment villages to include other social catchment villages. This is due to that fact that water used in the garden is from Barura dam, which caters for other villages outside the Romwe catchment area. At the time of the study, Barura garden project was more vibrant than Chidiso. Because the women are fairly represented in the Barura garden committee, they influence formal decision-making in the project. Female influential personalities in the area such as the community mobiliser, one of the wives of the late councillor, and a widow from Tamwa village are members of the Barura garden committee. There was less micro.politics recorded for Barura and this could be due to the infancy of the project.

Decision-making processes are complex and cannot be easily traced, especially where decisions are made outside formal arenas. For instance while the chairman of the Chidiso garden is a well-respected man in the area, it is believed that he is manipulated by the vice chairwoman. Despite such micro-politics, the author observed that garden projects are a niche for women to gain access to land that they can claim to be theirs. Although all communal lands in Zimbabwe officially belong to the state, at the local level, men 'own' land. Women gain access to land through their husbands or other male relation. Membership in the Chidiso and Barura garden projects accords women the opportunity to 'own' some piece of land as such land is registered in their own names. Thus women have become "official" owners of land portions, yet traditionally it is the men who own land such as fields and homesteads and also claim ownership of "bush land" near their homestead area. On divorce, if the woman remains in the village, she retains her ownership of the community garden project plot established through NGO support, yet the same does not apply to privately owned gardens and crop fields. This demonstrates the gradual erosion of total male land holding privileges during a time when women's gardening projects are on the increase. These findings concur with Schroeder's findings in the Gambia where women became landowners through the introduction of market gardening (1997:489). In the case of Romwe, women's economic status may be restricted by lack of access to vegetable markets and this may explain why men are less active in the gardening

projects. But for women, the gardens serve more than just an economic purpose, as the women become "official" landowners. Because membership in community gardening projects is predominantly women, this has also created an opportunity for women to gain access to leadership positions that they are highly unlikely to get in joint women/men projects. This can also be used as an entry point for building women's leadership capabilities that may later be broadened to other community arenas.

A recent strategy that has been used by women in Romwe to gain access to traditionally male decision-making domains is to penetrate spheres that are often viewed as male domains. This has been through planting of indigenous tree species traditionally used to meet male needs by participating in action research on trees. Tree planting in homestead areas, especially of exotic fruit trees used for family consumption and income generation is widespread in the Romwe catchment, yet there has been very little experimentation with planting indigenous tree species. The action research project involves experimentation with planting indigenous tree species and is facilitated by researchers from IES and the Department of Plant Ecology at Uppsala University in Sweden. The project started off with 48 participants (12 men and 36 women) in December 2000. Tree species planted were *mukamba* (*Afzelia Quanzensis*), *muuzhe* (*Brachystegia spiciformis*) and *mupfura* (*Sclerocaryia birrea*). These are tree species predominantly used by men in the area for poles and carving. It is interesting to note that women are enthusiastically planting these tree species traditionally believed to be needed for male chores such as carving and construction. The original species selection was project driven and not community initiated but participants have developed a lot of interest in the project. This group has no formal representative structure – but there is a high degree of information sharing among the group members. Participatory monitoring and evaluation sessions are done every six months

Women appear to have considered security and access to the trees in selecting sites for tree planting. Table 6.7 presents data on the reasons given by participants on site selection. Each responded, could give more than one answer, thus the total responses do not correspond with the total number of respondents.

From the results presented in Table 6.7, site selection appears to have been influenced by a variety of reasons that include security and control of resource access, replacement and conservation purposes, ecological similarity with observed natural conditions where the tree species normally grows, near water source, good soils and for shade and to serve as a windbreak. Among the women interviewees, security and control of resource access emerged as the top two reasons for site selection. This shows women are using the project to lay the foundation for claims to resource areas that they can later control.

Table 6.7. *Reasons for site selection for tree planting*

Reason for location	**Number of respondents (27 females and 8 males)**	
	Female	**Male**
Security, control of resource access	10	2
Replacement, conservation, prevent soil erosion	9	1
Ecological similarity with natural conditions	8	2
Near water source	2	0
Good soils	7	4
Shade/windbreak	12	4
Total responses	48	13

One of the major reasons given by women for participating in the tree research group besides gaining knowledge on the planting of indigenous trees is to be able to claim ownership of the land where they have planted their trees. Secondly, there is restricted access to use of the three tree species that the group is planting and the participants, especially women, indicated that once their trees are big, they would be able to use them without restrictions from anyone. The common response when asked about their visions for the trees they have planted was 'If my trees grow, I will have my own trees that I can use the way I want without anyone refusing me access to the trees'. Asked what they would do if their husbands divorced them considering that they may have to move to settle elsewhere and leave their trees, one woman said 'I will never leave this homestead, if my husband wants me to leave, he had better kill me here. If it were exotic fruit trees I would leave because those trees grow much faster and I could go and plant other trees whereever I go. But now, these indigenous trees are a lot of work and you have to be a very patient person to nurture them.' This in a way shows the determination the women in the action research have regarding ownership of the trees they have planted.

6.6 Summary

Power relations in local level institutions and related structures are gendered and also interwoven with other kinds of social relations such as kinship and interest group networks presented in Table 6.6. Other examples include the case of the vice chairwoman of Chidiso garden project who draws her power from social networks and kinship ties. For one to be able to understand the final decisions made, one needs an understanding of the broader community context and the micro-politics within the community. There is a need to adopt some research methodology that would allow one to make extensive observations as well as gather information relating to informal arenas. This calls for longitudinal studies that involve an extended stay in the community and participation in community activities such as church services, funerals and other social events. Similarly women's role in natural resource management decision-making processes cannot be easily

explored separate from other social interaction processes. For instance, marital status seems to be important, because most women in key decision-making positions, who are assertive, are predominantly widows or elderly single parents (*de jure* household heads, *e.g.* the community mobiliser, the Chidiso garden committee vice-chairwoman). Such a set up (where what happens in one arena affects other arenas) highlights the embeddedness of resource management institutions in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. There is therefore need to understand broader social relationships, interactions and power dynamics to be able to assess gendered decision-making processes.

The findings from this study also show that women and men share the same resource areas but use different resources as in the case of woodlands. These findings concur with Goebel's findings from a study carried out in the resettlement areas in Zimbabwe. The sharing of resource spaces is relevant to the use of woodlands where a variety of products are found in the same spaces. The relations between women and men in institutions involved in management of natural resources such as woodlands and water are not static. The power relations between women and men are constantly shifting as they are often negotiated and renegotiated in response to changing natural resource availability, needs and interests of the actors involved. For instance, the emergence of NGO facilitated projects has changed the nature of relations between women and men regarding access to land and sources of income. Whereas men have dominated land ownership, women are becoming land 'owners' in their own right through garden projects. As these relations are ever changing, the challenge facing researchers, is how to capture such continuous changes and their influence on decision-making processes that influence who has access to what natural resources. Women's bargaining power appears to be lower for woodland resources where access is more individualised and there is so much overlap in the areas and products used by women and men. For instance, in the hills, men predominantly collect poles while women collect firewood and mushrooms from the same areas. The women's bargaining power is much higher in the garden projects where they operate in groups and also the resource use areas are more discrete.

Decision-making arenas are not always public or formal. Informal arenas for decision-making also exist and they are very influential. For instance, when meetings are called, the agenda is not always formally announced but through the informal social and information networks in the village, by the date of the meeting almost everyone will know what will be discussed in the meeting and some decisions are even made prior to the formal meeting. The majority of women in Romwe do not seem to stand out at public meetings, thus they largely use informal means to control powerful male figures in the community. An example is the alleged strong personal relationship that a powerful and most respected village head in the area is entangled in, and this sometimes constrains his power to make certain decisions. Impromptu conclusions should not be drawn on the role of

women outside the public arena without in-depth analysis of informal processes and social interactions. In other parts of Zimbabwe (*i.e.* in the Zambezi Valley), the author found that there was minimal communication on the agenda of meetings prior to the meeting date, highlighting the need in those circumstances for women's participation in public forum decision-making processes, if they are to have any influence (Nabane, 1997).

While we have more women in garden project committees, analysis shows that the membership of these projects is predominantly women. This partly explains the number of women in these project committees. Despite the fact that gardens are traditionally viewed as women's domain, the problem of marketing and that there is little profit may have made men less interested in the projects. A similar conclusion may be drawn for the action research on trees project, where the benefits are long term and not assured. This study finds that participating in projects with membership that is predominantly female gives women access to natural resources that they would otherwise not have. For instance, membership in garden projects has given rise to new forms of property ownership by women such as being landowners in their own right. These findings contradict what Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen (2001) found in South Asia, where with the exception of female-headed farms, women often continued to be perceived as helpers of their husbands with limited sources of income of their own.

The cases presented in this chapter are examples of how informal and less recognised ways of participation in institutional structures for natural resource management may be a niche for increasing women's participation in decision-making regarding resource use and management. The dynamics of natural resource management cannot be understood if attention is restricted to the analysis of formal institutions and related structures. Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that lack of formal representation of women in resource management institutions does not imply that women do not influence what happens within the organisation. These findings concur with Jackson (1998) and Zwarteveen & Neupane (1996) who document that women have other informal ways of influencing what happens in formal decision-making arenas. But this is not to suggest that women's participation in formal structures and institutions is not important. Women's participation in formal resource management institutions is important because access to natural resources through informal means may not be secure. While a study undertaken by May (1979) found that women use hidden strategies such as withholding sex from men to make themselves heard, this study finds that women's strategies for influencing decision-making are becoming more visible with the emergence of non-governmental organisations. Where women feel they are unable to influence local level formal decision-making processes and institutional structures, they often seek external intervention by NGO officers.

CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter synthesises the findings of this study in a thematic manner that allows for reflection on the key issues relating to institutional processes in access to woodlands and water in Romwe catchment, southern Zimbabwe. Woodlands and water are important sources for rural livelihood systems in Zimbabwe as well as other southern African countries. The thesis examined the role of local level formal and informal institutions and related structures in the context of donor-funded CBNRM initiatives and how they influence access to and use of woodlands and water resources by various actors. In addition, the study explored the role of women in resource management institutional structures and decision-making processes. This study contributes to the growing number of studies focusing on institutional arrangements in common pool resource management and also on the role of women in these institutional processes. Some central themes run through the findings of the study and these are linked to the study objectives presented in Chapter One. These themes include, complexity of the natural resource landscape where there are multiple resource users and use boundaries, the existence of a multiplicity of resource management institutions and related structures with unclear mandates and jurisdictions, the micro-politics of participatory resource management approaches within the decentralisation discourse, the gendered nature of decision-making processes and institutional structures for resource management as well as conflicts that may emerge in the process of negotiating resource access and control by various actors. The chapter also makes some reflections on the methodological and theoretical frameworks adopted for the study.

Sources of livelihood in Romwe range from livestock and crop production, collection of woodland products such as timber for construction, poles, firewood, thatch grass, medicines, fibre and leaf litter as well as engaging in gold panning activities during drought years. This study shows how access to and control over these resources is mediated by a set of interacting and overlapping institutions, both formal and informal, which are embedded in the political and social life of the area. Certain natural resource use practices result in outcomes that may be detrimental to others' livelihood, such as encroachment by young couples into woodland areas for settlement and crop production, reducing the size and quality of the grazing areas. Other woodland resource uses such as the collection of fibre, medicines, leaf litter and mushrooms and domestic use of water are more mutually compatible. An understanding of social difference relating to resource access is essential if CBNRM interventions are to support the claims of those otherwise excluded, often by a dominant minority referred to in Romwe as the *Zvidzazvopo*.

A fundamental assumption in CBNRM and the decentralisation discourse is that a distinct community exists. This view has now been largely challenged (*e.g.* Campbell, *et al*., 2001; Guijt & Shah, 1998; James, 1999; Leach *et al*., 1999; Madzudzo, 2002; Mosse, 1994, Sithole, 1999). This thesis therefore does not belabour this point. It is worthwhile though to note that while other studies have questioned the notion of 'community' in CBNRM as relatively homogenous, with members' characteristics distinguishing them from 'outsiders', there has been very little shift in the way CBNRM is implemented. Similarly, while sometimes CBNRM facilitators have acknowledged social difference within communities, and explicit efforts are made, *e.g.* using participatory approaches to examine implications for project interventions on different actors disaggregated by age, gender and ethnicity, all too often there is an implicit assumption that the public airing of views is sufficient and that social consensus and solidarity will result (Goebel, 1998; Mosse, 1994).

From an actor-oriented perspective, which emphasises actors, action, agency and power relations, communities cannot be treated as static, rule-bound wholes, since they are composed of people who actively monitor, interpret and shape the world around them (Long & van der Ploeg, 1989; Long & Long, 1992). Such a perspective conceives of social change very differently from the CBNRM narrative of external intervention into a 'static' society or community. The actor-oriented approach does not reject the notion of community altogether, but rather contextualises it by describing a more or less temporary unity of situation, interest or purpose. For instance, in Romwe, at one time community is defined only as the three biophysical catchment villages, *e.g.* for timber harvesting and at other times community is defined in terms of the social catchment, comprising ten villages, such as for livestock watering at Barura dam or fibre and mushroom harvesting on Mapande mountain. Such shifts in the definition of community may be seen as actively created and recreated by various actors for particular (not necessarily shared) purposes and are also outcomes of dynamic interaction and negotiation between the different actors. This may have important implications for institutions regulating access to natural resources as they may constantly change in response to the negotiation processes.

While literature on institutional issues in CBNRM often refers to formal and informal institutions, the findings of this study show that the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions and structures is overemphasised in theoretical debates. In practice there are inter-linkages and overlaps that make the boundaries between the formal and informal institutions very fluid. The relations between these resource management institutions are influenced by a diversity of social, political, economic and power dynamics in a given community. Contemporary social theoretical accounts of power suggest that the questions of resource control as limited to an interrogation of formal versus informal authority systems may not be

the central axis of concern in institutional analysis. Rather, power is seen as capillary, acting in the daily enforcement of social and political practice, independent of the legal power of the formal institutions (Robbins, 1998:429). This approach therefore shifts analysis away from the dichotomy of formal and informal resource management institutions to a more fundamental inquiry into the nature and effectiveness of social power deployed through both the formal and informal authority systems of hegemony, domination and control (*ibid*). The distribution of power within and between various levels of society is central to the debate about decentralisation of natural resource management authority.

Although the merit of decentralisation in the context of CBNRM is now readily acknowledged and appreciated among environmentalists, researchers and development practitioners, there is still need to critically consider the effect of the so-called enabling or decentralised resource management legislation that seeks to empower local level resource users, managers and institutional structures. More often than not, such laws reinforce recentralisation of power in lower level state organs such as the Rural District Council (RDC), contrary to espoused notions of citizen participation and empowerment. In other cases, decentralisation processes impact negatively on power relations within the local community as most often village elites may influence the management processes for their own benefit. This may result in conflicts over resource access by the various actors. This study finds that legal resource management authority has not been devolved to levels below the RDC and this could be explained by the multiplicity of structures below the RDC with the potential of being empowered.

Conflicts over access to woodlands and water resources are expressed in various forms, which vary in space, time and level. The intensity of conflicts depends on the nature of the resource in question, the relationship of the actors involved and the history of natural resource access. The emerging conflicts in Romwe are about various actors negotiating access to and control over key natural resources that are important for survival in semi-arid regions. In some cases, the conflicts are rooted in historical narratives and other resource claims such as those based on length of residency in the area and other forms of social classification. Thus conflicts are not only fuelled by resource scarcity as often suggested in the CBNRM literature, but are influenced by historical claims, patterns of interaction and the power dynamics at play. Conflicts over woodlands and water are also about survival, leadership and institutional arrangements governing access to these resources and diversity of actors who may have differing interests in a particular resource. In the case of Romwe, more conflicts exist over woodlands and very few were reported for water resources.

7.2 CBNRM and the decentralisation discourse

In Zimbabwe, as in other southern African countries, decentralisation is now high on the agenda of the state, inspired in part by an international drive towards participatory natural resource management. This is an option that is seen as a potentially more ethical and effective alternative to centrally directed management of natural resources (Sayer & Campbell, 2002). Despite the envisaged merits of decentralised natural resource management, findings of this study and other experiences in Zimbabwe, suggest that the state is reluctant to fully relinquish power and control over natural resources. The state view of the appropriate management of resources appears to extend to local communities through a centrally directed structure and process. In the case of Romwe, there has been partial devolution of natural resource management to the local authority, the RDC and not to communities below the RDC. Effective control therefore is still largely vested in the state or bureaucracies under its direction such as the RDCs. A major challenge for the process of decentralisation is the identification and empowerment of institutional structures to fit more closely with local forms of resource management and control. A relevant question in Romwe where there is multiplicity of institutional structures, as in other sites where decentralisation processes are being facilitated is, what could be the appropriate resource management authority to which bundles of entrustments should be devolved?

Though advocates of decentralisation justify it on grounds of increased participation, efficiency and equity, quite often most efforts end up without increasing powers to some of the actors, particularly local communities (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). Interactive participation described by Agarwal (2001) as empowering is also difficult to foster where there is a history of actor conflict and confrontation. What is therefore apparent in current decentralisation of resource management initiatives appears to be a framework for management that reduces government spending and transfers responsibility to local resource users, yet the state maintains control (through the RDC) over key resources and/or decisions deemed important to natural resource management. The overall support for the policy on devolution, may improve the power relations among different actors in favour of the less privileged actors to make the playing field more level.

Theorists believe that downwardly accountable or representative authorities with meaningful discretionary powers are the basic institutional elements of decentralisation (Ribot, 2003 & 1996; Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). However, when examined in detail, community-based and decentralised forms of local natural resource management often lack representation, downward accountability and/or sufficient powers (Mandondo, 2000b; Matondi, 2001). In the case of Chivi district and Zimbabwe in general, decentralisation initiatives are transferring decision-making powers and management authority to various unaccountable local

bodies such as the RDC. For instance, contrary to establishing the institutional infrastructure for decentralised participatory natural resource management in Zimbabwe, most legislation re-centralises power at the RDC level, doing so at the expense of meaningful participation of local actors in natural resource management. Only the privilege of proposing development plans appears to have trickled down to the local level through institutional structures like the VIDCOs and WADCOs. Yet the approval of these plans is beyond the control of the local actors. The state and its closest actors such as the RDC and government extension departments retain the complementary roles of approval of the development plans proposed by local level actors, implementation and fiscal control. It is important to understand the impact of this contradiction between decentralisation, which the state aims to foster, and the re-centralisation of power at the RDC level which is actually taking place, on local level institutional structures for woodlands and water management as well as power relations determining access to these resources. Similar findings on recentralisation of management authority in bodies that are not locally accountable have been documented for other African countries such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon and the Gambia (Ribot, 1999; Schroeder, 1997). Many governments are devolving insufficient powers and benefits to motivate local actors and their institutional structures to carry out new environmental management responsibilities. In addition, the appropriate mix of powers and functions of different local actors is poorly defined. There is little empirical evidence or experience from which to derive the best local institutional arrangements or show which factors link decentralised resource management to improved social and ecological outcomes (Conyers, 2001; Ribot, 2003).

The re-centralisation of resource management power and authority at the RDC level is mainly through the RDC Act (1988), although other Acts such as the Communal Lands Act (1982), Parks and Wildlife Act (1975) and the Communal Areas Forest Produce Act (1987) discussed in Chapter Four also empower the RDC to be the overseer of natural resource use in the communal areas. The RDC Act (1988) was enacted based on the philosophy of decentralisation and provides structural and operational arrangements for rural local governance. The Act provides the legal basis for, among other things, the demarcation and establishment of the spatial units for rural administrative purposes. It also prescribes the structure of the RDC and the processes for constituting their membership, specifies the roles and responsibilities of the councils, which include the planning and implementation of development programmes and related taxing and fiscal authority and bestows on them minor legislative powers that enable them to enact by-laws that govern access to natural resources. Building on the views of Murombedzi (1992) and Mapedza & Mandondo (2001) it is here argued that the RDCs Act does not establish institutional infrastructure for decentralised natural resource management in Zimbabwe, but rather re-centralises power at the RDC level, thereby restricting meaningful participation by local level actors and their institutional structures. The Act

therefore to a large extent precludes decentralisation initiatives that entail devolution of management authority and power to the 'lowest accountable units' so that as Murphree (1991) suggests, 'authority gets linked to responsibility and cost gets linked to benefit'.

A variety of reasons have been given in the literature in an attempt to explain the tendency for re-centralisation of management authority at the RDC level. Murphree (1993:8) argues that RDCs have tended to retain authority, management and benefit, relegating to local communities the function of production because of the bureaucratic impulse by RDCs to retain authority, the necessity of councils to raise revenues following the enactment and implementation of the RDCs Act (1988) and the fact that councils do not trust local communities to make appropriate or 'right' decisions. Other authors (*e.g.* Mandondo, 2001; Ribot, 1999) argue that resource management authority has been re-centralised at RDC level because the process of decentralisation has been supply-led rather than demand driven.

Findings of this study suggest that the lack of further devolvement of management authority beyond RDCs to local communities could be a result of the multiplicity of institutional structures and jurisdictional fuzziness amongst various structures at the local level with the potential of being empowered to take full responsibility of resource management. For instance, between the two major institutional structures found in Romwe, the modern and the traditional structures, it is not clear to which structure management authority should be decentralised. This may also explain why NGOs tend to establish new structures that are project specific rather than working through existing structures. Given the multiplicity of institutions regulating access to woodlands and water resources at the local level, the question that needs to be addressed is not which institution is more suitable but rather how can the various institutions be operationalised in a more complimentary way. This may facilitate devolution of resource management to levels below the RDC and thus enable local communities to begin to trust state efforts at empowering them to manage their resources. Devolution of effective powers to levels below the RDC may facilitate participatory resource management processes. Current initiatives to foster participation have been complex as will be discussed below.

7.2.1. Participatory processes in decentralised natural resource management

The process of devolution entails placing resource management authority closer to local level actors, a complex process of empowerment in which individuals and their interests and aspirations are the building blocks on which democratic resource management is crafted. In the CBNRM literature, this process is assumed to foster interactive participation of local actors in resource management. It is easier to talk about the concept of participation than to achieve it. For example, there are as many interests

and aspirations as there are actors (as individuals or groups) and it is impractical to have each and every one of them participate in daily resource management decision-making processes. Electoral participation then becomes a proxy for democracy, since it is cumbersome to secure direct individual participation in daily decisions (Ribot, 1999). Political representation is therefore the primary justification for democratic decentralisation (devolution), since theoretically the elected representatives can then be held downwardly accountable to electoral majorities (Ribot, 1999). In practice however, electoral processes may not result in downward accountability.

In the case of VIDCOs in Romwe, as discussed in Chapter Six, electoral processes sometimes lack any regularity and more often elections are conducted in an unrepresentative manner, as few community members are involved in the election process. Furthermore, the elections are a public and open process whereby voters use a show of hands to choose their representatives and may therefore be influenced by peer pressure to vote for someone they would otherwise not vote for, if voting was done in a private way. In view of this, many recent analyses emphasise the need to pay careful attention to what lies beneath the surface of visible public behaviour. In public arenas, the less powerful groups or actors may seem to accept their own domination, but they always question it behind the scenes. According to Scott (1985), 'public transcripts' describe the open, public interactions between dominators and the oppressed *i.e.* the outer shell of power relations. Scott (*ibid*) uses the term 'hidden transcripts' to describe the critique of power that takes place backstage. The western notions of participation as open and public dialogue and action have often blinded development practitioners and researchers to the real dynamics of participation (Cleaver, 1998; Goebel, 1998; Jackson, 1998). This is because there has been emphasis on the visible and not the hidden spaces for participation.

The participatory resource management discourse assumes that: there is equitable power sharing among the various actors, all actors are aware of and want to exercise this power and that all actors consistently feel the need to participate in decision-making arenas (Sithole, 2001). Despite the stated intentions of participatory resource management, it is becoming clear that multiple actor initiatives do not deal well with the complexity of actor difference (Guijt & Shah, 1998; Campbell *et al*., 2001). Actors are neither homogenous in composition and concerns, nor are they necessarily harmonious in their relations.

Historically, local actors participated in the research and development process mainly as information givers. However, there has been a shift in the development paradigm to involve villagers in the development process as key stakeholders who play pivotal roles in shaping the way and manner in which change should be effected. But at the local level, actors are still sceptical and uncertain or unaware of the change in their role in modern

research and development. For instance, villagers in Romwe still view researchers as information gatherers who are often egoistic and use the 'valuable' information they get from local actors for the enrichment of their own intellectual desires. This perception was found to apply both at village and the RDC levels. As referred to in Chapter Three, people in Romwe expressed their hope that results of this study would inform them and help them in planning for the management of their resources. Similarly, at the RDC, the Chief Executive Officer expressed his concern that many research projects have been undertaken in Chivi district, but there is not a single research output at the RDC offices to show for all that research. This may be due to the fact that there are no systematic or formal feedback mechanisms between researchers, villagers and the RDC. While participation by villagers is important, on its own, it is not an adequate condition for genuine ownership of the research and development process by local actors as it may often turn out to mean the cooption of local elites purported to represent the interests of the community at large, yet they may be representing interests of a few particular groups.

As seen in the case of Romwe, during election processes, community members tend to elect almost the same individuals to different leadership positions as discussed in Chapter Five. Though necessary, regular elections and local decisions alone are not sufficient conditions for genuine empowerment and fostering participation in natural resource management by various actors. Sometimes, elections may entrench despotism (Mutamba *et al*., 2000). The work by Mutamba *et al*., (*ibid*) on committees and leadership in a community-based micro-credit scheme in Romwe, also depicts electoral cycles that always bring back traditional leadership, which arguably is not always democratic. The illustration of a variety of positions held by one sabuku presented in Chapter Five supports Mutamba *et al*.,'s findings. In order to be considered transparent in such contexts where one individual may hold several leadership positions, there is need for third party monitoring.

In Zimbabwe, funding from donor agencies is essential to cover the costs of facilitating participatory processes in CBNRM, as the government does not have resources for this. Financial and material assistance from NGOs and international donor agencies therefore complement government efforts at devolution. The danger with this set up is that an unhealthy dependency on these external funds is sometimes created, often resulting in the collapse of the initiatives when the funders withdraw (Shackleton & Campbell, 2001). Reliance on donor funding is also risky in the current political environment in Zimbabwe. This is because of donor scepticism in funding programmes in Zimbabwe and reduced allocations to especially forest sector portfolios, and increased competition for soft money among many natural resource oriented organisations over the years. In response to this, most NGOs involved in facilitating CBNRM programmes have realised that a single donor strategy is not sustainable. There is often need for a multi-donor strategy that provides fallbacks in funding support. The

challenge with a multi-donor strategy is that the various donors may have diverging interests and agendas and therefore it may be difficult for the CBNRM facilitators to meet the divergent donor expectations. Further, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are often hard pressed to demonstrate impact to the donor community whose expectations include a value for money and strict adherence to funding conditions. Given their reliance on donor funding, NGOs therefore tend to be upwardly accountable to the donors and not downwardly accountable to local communities.

NGOs and research institutes also have a key role in institutional strengthening and capacity building. Associated activities with the capacity building processes include training of local communities in natural resource management options, facilitation of exchange visits and field demonstrations to foster experience sharing at the local level, staff training and resource mobilisation. Despite these efforts at capacity building, environmental NGOs have been criticised for spending significant amounts of money and other resources on advocacy and awareness raising at the expense of implementation (Mandondo, 2002). Awareness raising is often aimed at influencing attitudinal changes and therefore usually precedes more active strategies like capacity building, and lobbying. Because of the invisible nature of its impacts, awareness raising is quite difficult to justify to donors especially in time-bound and goal oriented projects in which the emphasis is on delivery, which is partly why some people may see it as 'frustrating and taking time and resources away from implementation (*ibid*).

7.3 Institutional arrangements in woodlands and water management in Romwe

The institutional development for woodlands and water resource management in Romwe is marked by confusion. There are multiple structures operating at the same level, but guided by different policies and legislation, a major challenge for CBNRM initiatives at community level. These multiple structures have unclear mandates and overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities in resource management. This applies particularly to the parallel hierarchy formed by local government and the traditional authority systems. The result of this institutional ambiguity is a great deal of confusion on the ground, contestation and power struggles between structures and weakening of authority all round that often creates an institutional vacuum that can be exploited by those with vested interests. Policies that explicitly devolve power to communities and not RDCs may help avoid some of these complexities and associated conflicts. The challenge for decentralisation initiatives as discussed earlier in the chapter, is this multiplicity of structures at community level, which makes it unclear to which structure management authority should be decentralised. This institutional fuzziness has in many ways led to struggles for power and control over especially, woodlands resources, with certain sections of the

community aligning themselves with particular institutions that suit their needs at a particular time. The result is lack of legitimacy of any one institution as legitimacy shifts in different circumstances.

The post colonial era resulted in parallel or dual local authority systems consisting of the traditional authorities on one hand and the government established structures on the other. The dual structures compete with each other for power and influence, often resulting in a power vacuum that may be exploited by powerful vested interests. In some instances, potential conflict between modern and traditional structures has been avoided by incorporating traditional leaders into the new structures as discussed in Chapter Four. In other situations, traditional authorities have been deliberately excluded as being undemocratic, corrupt and agents of the previous regimes. The relationship between the traditional and modern structures is highly dynamic. The recent enactment of the Traditional Leaders Act (1998) may see the resurgence of power of traditional structures, but the new legislation has still not clarified the overlapping nature of traditional and modern structures.

Local resource management structures in general tend to be ineffectual. On the one hand, the legal local authority, the RDC is cash-strapped and the elected VIDCOs and WADCOs often lack legitimacy and motivation. On the other hand, the traditional leadership is weak from a history of being empowered and disempowered by government, modernisation and economic forces that undermine traditional values. There has also been rapid decrease in sacredness of landscape patches over the last few decades due to a variety of reasons including migration, Christianity *etc*. Sacredness is based on non-use rather than sustainable use and there is some evidence that protection of their sacredness may relate to their importance to local elites as sources of resources and power for social control (Mukamuri, 1995). Given the existence of RDCs, WADCOs and VIDCOs, the traditional authorities and the NGO engineered institutional structures, the question is, which management structure would be able to support community based management of woodland and water resources at the local level?

The complex institutional arrangements with many stakeholders and overlapping roles and mandates in Romwe may have negative effects on effective resource management. Institutional tensions and power struggles may be experienced both at local and national government levels due to a lack of clarity on the mandate guiding the different institutions and their relationship to one another. Ostrom (1992) stresses that institutional ambiguity, such as is currently the case in Romwe, regarding the roles of traditional and modern authorities, can be an important factor in disrupting local level management and can prevent revitalisation of common property systems.

7.3.1. The institutional engineering approach

The majority of CBNRM initiatives often establish new institutions and institutional structures for coordinating activities at the local level and monitoring use and management of resources at the local level. Emphasis is placed on what new institutions have to be created or put in place in order for assistance to become effective and sustainable (Havnevik, 2000b). The justification for this approach, *e.g.* drawing from the CAMPFIRE programme and the Resource Sharing Scheme in Zimbabwe has been that it is important to establish 'new' institutions that are neutral and not entrenched in current and historical micro-politics. This approach implicitly assumes that these 'new' institutions will be value free, consider views of diverse stakeholders, yet the fact that these structures are made up of local community members already makes their election or appointment in a way political. The use of a blueprint approach to institutional design and development has ignored the fact that because a particular set of rules work well in one setting, this does not guarantee that it will work elsewhere. As shown in the thesis, the interactions of various actors that have a stake in the natural resources, as they shape and/or are shaped by institutions are most often contextual. Adoption of blueprint approaches from one project to another is the framework that is used in the establishment of the majority of the management structures. For instance, in most cases, the committees that are established are identical and made up of seven members with similar positions defined including the chair and vice chairpersons, secretary and vice secretary, treasurer and two committee members. This is done without considering the relevance of each of those positions for a particular project. The institutional engineering approach may not be wrong if it is based on a deep understanding of the traditional or other institutional frameworks already in place on the ground. Depending on their character and density, social relations and networks may strengthen or weaken the newly established institutions.

The most common problems with the institutional engineering approach are that the committees that are established often are not accountable to the local population. Yet, it has often been argued that the committees that are established are representative of community interests as they are often put in place through election processes. Even where elected committees exist, they are rarely entrusted to represent local communities in significant matters of resource management. More often, these structures tend to represent a few interested actors under the control of the local elite. Furthermore, their powers remain highly limited or are circumscribed by central agencies. More often than not, these NGO facilitated committees are accountable to the NGO bodies rather than to their local constituency.

While there has often been institutional engineering in donor funded and state driven CBNRM initiatives, as is the case in Romwe, traditional institutions have remained influential. They are based on trust and

reciprocity, agreed norms and rules. This may explain why they have remained resilient despite the history of empowerment and disempowerment by both the colonial and postcolonial state. Trust is key to sustaining relationships because it lubricates cooperation and reduces transaction costs between people (Pretty & Ward, 2001:211). For instance, instead of investing in monitoring others, individuals are able to trust them to act as expected. Furthermore, traditional authorities are believed to be downwardly accountable to their constituency, unlike the externally facilitated institutional structures.

7.3.2. Institutional accountability

The need for downward accountability of resource management institutional structures has been emphasised in recent literature (Ribot, 2003 & 1999; Mapedza & Mandondo, 2001; Matondi, 2001). Insights drawn from this literature suggest that it does not matter whether an institution is formal or informal, has evolved internally or has been externally engineered. What matters is whether it is downwardly accountable or not. A major weakness of this literature is that it is not explicit on the mechanisms for achieving that downward accountability. There is need to take a closer look at the mechanisms for enhancing downward accountability. In establishing local institutions for decentralised and participatory woodland and water resources management, the objective is often to empower the most broadly representative and downwardly accountable local institutions (Ribot, 2003 & 1999).

Local institutional structures can be held downwardly accountable to local constituencies in a number of ways. The most commonly cited means of accountability are elections, yet in Romwe as discussed earlier, elections do not appear to be democratic. Thus elections alone are not sufficient since many elected officials are not accountable to their constituencies even when the electoral system is well crafted. Other means of ensuring downward accountability may include legal backing, third party monitoring by for instance, NGOs, media, participatory monitoring and evaluation, provision of information on roles and obligations of various actors including central government, local government reporting requirements and civic dedication. While not subject to elections (*e.g.* the RDC chief executive officer position), authorities appointed by central government can also be made more downwardly accountable, more democratic and therefore more apt to be socially and environmentally responsible through some of these mechanisms. The progressive and systematic application of these mechanisms could be a good alternative strategy for democratic reform where electoral mechanisms are threatening to the central state (Mandondo, 2000a). Ribot (2003) makes recommendations aimed at pushing the decentralisation experiment beyond the RDC level towards empowering institutional structures below the district level.

7.3.3. The role of women in decision-making and effect on institutional processes

In most societies, gender relations profoundly influence women's and men's decision-making ability and participation in leadership structures. Variations in levels of women's and men's participation in institutional processes from one community to another demonstrate that such activities are socially defined and not biologically determined. As a social construct, gender roles are malleable and potentially responsive to changes in natural resource management activities. Decision-making in CBNRM in southern Africa is often male dominated as a result of the patriarchal nature of most communities (Hunter, *et al*., 1990). If not facilitated carefully, development interventions may perpetuate and strengthen traditional relations of patriarchy to the disadvantage of women (Peluso, 1991). In Romwe, women were found to be more actively involved in decision-making processes and institutional structures that are established by NGOs and much less in traditional and other local resource management structures.

Analysing gender relations in decision-making processes within CBNRM institutions is a complex process and sometimes outcomes are resource specific (*e.g.* woodland use versus water use in garden projects). Decision-making is also influenced by many other factors, both related and not related to natural resource use such as kinship ties, age, the issue being discussed and the natural resource in question. In the case of women in Romwe, marital status seems to play a key role in determining their chances of being elected to committees as well as being listened to. For instance, widows and elderly single women tend to be given more positions in management structures as compared to married women or younger single women. Widows and elderly single women tend to stand up and speak out in public meetings. These findings concur with what Bradley (1991) found among the Luhya tribe in Kenya where older widows had greater decision-making power with regard to tree planting and disposal of woodlots than younger females.

In Romwe, women appear to have more bargaining power regarding access to natural resources if they operate as groups than as individuals. Regarding access to woodland resources, women were found to have less bargaining power because of lack of organisation, yet their bargaining power with regard to water use in relation to garden plots was much higher partly because they operate as groups. NGO facilitation in relation to garden projects has also led women into opportunities that were formerly not available such as holding key leadership positions and participation in income generation activities. Confidence building and leadership skills training provided by NGOs have facilitated women's active participation and not just numerical representation. Thus, while women have historically been less assertive in formal decision-making arenas and lowly represented in local woodland and water management structures, NGOs have changed

the institutional map in Romwe. Although women have started off as being more actively involved in leadership in structures for predominantly women's projects such as gardens, this may be a starting point for empowering women to be more active even in mixed male/female arenas. Although the process of change points to greater inclusion of women, men still have substantially greater control over resources through traditional institutions and their related structures. This also applies to VIDCOs and WADCOs where women's representation is based on a quota system and not being voted into positions based on their leadership qualities. Women's participation in decision-making processes also appears to be influenced by the self-images that women and men have for each other and for themselves as discussed in Chapter Six.

7.4. Negotiating access to natural resources

Whilst different resource users engage in negotiation processes to gain access to woodlands and water resources, negotiation platforms are not level (Steins, 1999). There are power differentials among the various actors and resource users. Negotiation arenas are therefore sites for struggle to gain control by various actors. The negotiation platforms are also very dynamic and contextual and as Berry (1993) puts it, no condition is permanent. Actors are constantly evaluating their positions and seeking maximum advantage in the process of negotiation. In the process of negotiation, conflict may inevitably emerge.

In recognition of the on-going struggles and conflicts that pervade natural resource access and control, development facilitators and researchers need to consider ways of facilitating processes of negotiation among various actors. The assumption here is that through negotiation, conflicts between different users' perspectives may be analysed and resolved in a collaborative way. It would be naive however, to assume that negotiation processes take place on a level playing field (Leach *et al*., 1999). The very idea of negotiation conjures up an image of parties equally able to voice their positions and argue for them, which is far from the reality in most situations confronted by CBNRM. Just as power relations pervade the institutional dynamics of everyday resource use, so would they pervade any negotiation process. Different social actors have very different capacities to voice and stake their claims. There is therefore need to consider power relations in any participatory resource management project and how this influences both formal and informal resource management institutions. These power relations may fuel conflicts over access to woodlands and water resources discussed in the following section.

7.4.1 Conflicts over access to woodlands and water resources

Conflicts over access to and control over natural resources have a long history in sub-Saharan Africa (Berry, 1992) and have sometimes been influenced by resource scarcity. Social differentiation is strongly expressed during times of scarcity as seen in the context of land shortage in Romwe. The reclassification of rights of access also emerges during times of conflict, *e.g.* Ndebeles and other immigrants in Romwe are regarded as 'outsiders' during times of conflict over resource access, yet they have resided in the area for more than 50 years. Historical narratives and social classification are tools used to justify claims over resource access and control. Different groups of people use a variety of narratives to justify their own interest regardless of the formal governance structures in place.

Tension between national and local objectives concerning conservation and local livelihoods sometimes interferes with the decentralisation of management authority over natural resources. Within the state-local tensions, there is a common 'tension between technocratic practices of development managers and the newly pluralistic political practices created by processes of democratisation (Shivaramakrishnan, 2000; Wollenberg *et al*., 2001). National technical objectives may prescribe how woodland and water resources can be used, while democratic objectives may call for local populations to set their own priorities for environmental quality and use. In both cases, there is a problem of articulation between national conservation objectives and local autonomy and this may lead to some tension.

While water is an important commodity in semi-arid regions, there were fewer conflicts identified in relation to water use and management. This could be related to people's perceptions of security of tenure over water and general adherence to rules of access. There is also a clear definition of who uses which water sources and for what purpose. One major conflict over water reported during the study concerned the Barura dam. When people's perceptions of water availability shifted as water levels were going down following poor rains during the previous year, this led to increased competition over use of water from the dam. Overall, there was more compliance with rules governing access to water resources at the time of the study, which could be the reason why fewer conflicts were experienced over water resources as compared to woodlands.

7.5. Methodological reflections

This thesis has explored interactions and relations between various institutions and actors in woodland and water use in the Romwe CBNRM initiatives. The study reveals that social interactions and relations are highly dynamic, often difficult to predict and embedded in culture and belief systems of the local community. Institutional interactions and relationships are sometimes subtle and ambiguous, presenting some methodological challenges. The processes through which these relations

are formed are of low visibility and their everyday nature means methods that are employed to investigate such processes should be sensitive to the continuous shifts. Recognition of these challenges should influence or have a bearing on the choice of methods by the researcher. Important variables that need to be considered in choosing methods to be employed include:

a) The recognition of various arenas where decision-making takes place.
b) Understanding the actors' identity and social context.
c) Familiarity with the study area and actors (*i.e.* the need to understand cultural norms, practices and values).
d) Adoption of locally meaningful disaggregation *e.g.* for wealth related variables.
e) Qualitative data of high 'quality' that will capture dynamism.

Given that natural resource landscapes are arenas for competition and negotiation, among different actors, social groups and categories, CBNRM initiatives have to deal analytically not with a monolithic entity, but with a set of institutions that are subject to being continuously redefined. The methodological challenge is to devise analytical means that capture such processes and allow us to unravel the dynamic contradictions rather than to merely note their pervasive character (Peters, 1984:29). Political ecologists have attempted to develop analytical tools that capture the dynamic nature of institutions and reveal how institutions are made and remade through resistance and interpretation by individual actors and are lodged in a large political economy where the disempowered are often deprived of crucial resources in the daily struggles over property rights.

A participatory research methodology was adopted for this study for two main reasons. First, the research methodology engages the respondent actively in the research process through the use of open-ended participatory methods such as focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews and group discussions. Secondly, participatory research assumes that the research process will empower participants and lead to follow-up action. This places ethical demands on researchers who use participatory methods for academic and policy research. The participatory approach was useful in this study because the methods used generated valuable insights into the multiple meanings, dimensions and experiences of access to natural resources. The findings of this study show that participation of different groups is often an outcome of social processes that are constantly changing depending on the socio-cultural, political and economic context. It is worth noting that the process of relationship mapping in the analysis of resource management institutional dynamics is quite complex and time consuming.

This research was conducted within a broader development project. The development aspects within the broader project therefore took care of developmental related expectations that may have emerged from the participatory research process. Most CBNRM initiatives operate through project-based approaches. Restricted project time frames constrain tracking

of processes across temporal scales, whilst conditionalities associated with donor support inevitably erode autonomy. Another methodological challenge relates to the geographical coverage of CBNRM initiatives. The majority of the CBNRM programmes are implemented at localised sites, which often constrains the generalisation of lessons learned across spatial dimensions.

7.6. Theoretical reflections

There are a number of factors that limit the implementation of CBNRM in Zimbabwe's communal areas and these factors are not addressed adequately in the common property resource theory that informs CBNRM implementation. These factors are related to policy, local institutional dynamics, natural resource characteristics and dynamic household strategies for accessing resources. There is need for a more nuanced understanding of the characteristics of common pool resources and the nature of users, if the paradox between theory and practice is to be understood. There is also need for a more nuanced description of property rights, denoting a shift from simplistic classifications into four broad categories, namely, common property, private property, open access and state property, to a detailed understanding of each landscape unit or resource in terms of such characteristics as excludability use designation, duration of use, transferability of user rights and/or ownership, operational requirements, control and security (Kundhlande and Luckert, 1998). The CPR research needs to pay more attention to spatial contexts and temporal contexts including history, micro-politics of resource use and transaction costs. Almost all natural resources are constantly rotating from one phase to another in terms of ownership, *e.g.* at one point, a resource is common property and then open access or private property and then common property as in the case of ownership of crop fields. Classification of natural resources under the four broad common property regimes is therefore a theoretical ideal as real life cases like the Romwe catchment show that there are common-property-like and open-access-like scenarios.

Considering that CBNRM is informed by debates around use and management of common property and common pool resources, prospects for the existence of robust institutions for woodlands and water resources are examined against the design principles for robust institutions described by Ostrom (1990). As discussed in Chapter Two, a design principle is an element or condition that helps to account for the successes of institutions in sustaining the common pool resources and gaining compliance of generation after generation of appropriators of the resource (Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom (*ibid*) states that robust and long-term institutions are characterised by most of the design principles, while fragile institutions are characterised by only some of these principles. Failed institutions are characterised by very few of these design principles. Robust institutions may help to regularise irrational or unpredictable behaviour on the part of resource users. The analysis of the institutional set up for the management

of common pool woodlands and water resources in Romwe was to a large extent informed by these design principles. Thus the relevance and/or non-relevance of the design principles in Romwe is discussed in the following section.

7.6.1. Applicability of the design principles for robust institutions

Ostrom (1990) proposes eight design principles that have influenced institutional reform towards CBNRM. These design principles suggest that for common pool resource management institutions to be robust, there is need to have in place, clearly defined boundaries, congruence between benefits and costs of resource management, collective choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms, autonomy and nested enterprises. Each of these design principles is discussed below in relation to the findings of this study.

Clearly defined boundaries

This principle suggests that the resource must have clearly defined boundaries and these should be sufficiently distinct that users can determine the limits and exclude non-members. Findings of this study discussed in Chapter Four show that there is a lack of fit between resource use, traditional villages and administrative boundaries. While this applies to both woodlands and water resources, user groups were more clearly defined for water resources than for woodlands. In relation to use of water sources, both private and communal, there are shifting use boundaries based on the type of use, season of the year and whether it is a drought year, yet despite these shifts, water source users appear to be clear regarding who uses what water source during which season and for what purpose. Unlike Sithole (1999) who finds that in north eastern Zimbabwe, local people regard water as a resource 'available to everyone and belonging to God' this was not the case in Romwe. In Romwe, water is regarded as 'life' and access should not be denied to anyone, but there are rules and regulations that regulate access to both private and communally owned water sources. These rules of use depend on availability, location and the type of ownership of the water source. While some water sources are held privately, there are many institutional arrangements, predominantly informal, that are entered into through which resources are shared (*e.g.* water sources) and/or leased (*e.g.* garden plots). In some instances, private water sources may be shared by kin and in others sharing extends to other non-kin households. There is reciprocity of these sharing arrangements as private water source owners may also be accorded access and/or use of other resources that they may not own such as land or draught power.

The findings for water sources regarding boundaries for resource use were somewhat different from those for woodland resource areas and specific products. In the case of woodlands, while a village that falls in the social catchment may be accorded access to a grazing area within the

Romwe biophysical area, these members may also collect resources such as mushrooms, honey or fibre during the process of grazing their livestock, although they may not have specifically been granted access to those resources or products. Monitoring collection of products in the woodlands was said to be difficult due to, for example, location of some woodland areas far from settlement areas. Water sources are located within settlement areas where there is often movement of people, making it easier to identify transgressors. For water, there was more adherence to rules regulating access and use, yet for woodlands, there was less adherence and very little enforcement of the rules regulating access. These findings on the definition of resource use boundaries relating to woodland use concur with what Mandondo (1997) reports for Nyamaropa communal lands in Nyanga district, eastern Zimbabwe, where he finds that woodland resource use boundaries are fuzzy and overlapping. As discussed in Chapter Four, woodland resource areas, have boundaries that are constantly shifting and negotiated, influencing who has access to what woodland products or areas, yet institutional jurisdictions for the management of these resources are fuzzy. This fluidity of woodland resource use boundaries suggest that, rather than defining resources as physical spaces, these resources should be defined as landscapes that are negotiated and renegotiated by different actors over time and in varied social contexts. This dynamism of resource and boundary definition challenges conventional attempts at land use planning for rural contexts where the tendency has been to demarcate areas as specifically for settlement, arable, grazing and woodland areas.

As discussed in Chapter Four, resource use boundaries in Romwe are not conducive to CPR management of woodlands. Modern administration and traditional village boundaries do not match the biophysical boundaries and for each woodland resource, there is a different spatial pattern of use. Boundaries are generally porous, open to individual interpretation and to contestation and are changeable. It is difficult to see how boundaries can be clearly defined as suggested in the design principles (Ostrom, 1990). Any attempts to harden the boundaries, are likely to be frustrated by local people or user groups or may fuel local conflicts. With the emergence of CBNRM, researchers and NGOs have also unconsciously created ‘communities within communities’ by defining communities or user groups that they want to work with versus the larger community. A major challenge faced by CBNRM facilitators therefore is facilitating woodland and water management under CPR conditions when there is lack of clearly defined resource use boundaries. This is further complicated by the lack of congruence between the biophysical and social boundaries. The call for clearly defined boundaries also appears to contradict the nature of common pool resources whose access is determined by the institutional framework in place. Common pool resources are said to be characterised by two attributes, ‘the difficulty of excluding non-members from benefiting from a good and the subtractability of the benefits consumed by one individual from those available to others (Ostrom, *et al*., 1996). Yet the design principles on boundaries call for clearly defined boundaries.

Because there is multiple layering of user rights over a resource, which changes over time depending on the prevailing pressure and condition of the resource, it is difficult to establish use boundaries for a resource like woodlands that comprise a myriad of products that can be harvested. Boundaries are soft and porous allowing use of resources by people living in other villages that are far from the resource. In the case of water, it was found that proximity to a privately owned water source was no guarantee of access to rights for a full range of services from the water source. Other criteria for determining access such as social networks were applied.

Congruence between benefits and costs

This principle concerns congruence between rules that assign rights and those that assign costs. In this case, appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision of rules requiring labour, materials and/or money (Ostrom *et al*., 1994). Unless the number of individuals authorised to use a common pool resource is so small that their harvesting patterns do not adversely affect one another, at least some rules related to how much, when and how a product can be harvested are usually designed by those using the resource. Findings of the study do not reveal much congruence between the benefits and costs of management due to the overlapping nature of resource use and fuzzy institutional jurisdictions. It is not clear how, for instance, people from social catchment villages can contribute to the management of resources in the biophysical catchment that they are accorded access to, by the three biophysical catchment villages. It would have been worthwhile to investigate what local people think about the management of resources that they might use but which are located outside their village boundaries. This would provide some insights as to the effects of resource sharing across villages on the management of those resources.

Collective-choice arrangements

This principle states that most people who can be affected by harvesting and protection rules should be included in the group of actors who can modify these rules. Common pool resource institutions that comply with this principle are better able to tailor rules to local circumstances, since the individuals who directly interact with one another and with the physical world can modify the rules over time to fit them to specific characteristics of their setting. Chapter Six, which discusses decision-making processes and actor participation in institutional structures, shows that not all users have a say in what rules are made. There is varied involvement of actors such as women and men in different kinds of rule formulation processes. Chapter Four also shows that sometimes, local people are not involved in the formulation of rules that affect them, if these rules are formulated by higher-level authorities. For example, local actors were not involved in the formulation of the Chivi RDC by-laws, even though there could be avenues for them to be. In traditional authority systems, rules, norms and sacred

control, the public also has very little say in the ways rules are formulated. However, through consultation with traditional leaders, some of these rules are relaxed or reinterpreted. Another broad category of rules is that formulated by project related structures, which are often in the form of constitutions. There was evidence that these rules are developed with wide participation of project members, although there are committees who work closely with patron NGOs. These patron NGOs often play an advisory role in the formulation of these rules and may influence what rules are adopted.

Institutions for water that were in use and adhered to at the time of the study appear to have emerged locally, with little external interference and were working satisfactorily. On the contrary, institutions for water emanating from the institutional engineering approach such as the borehole committees were found to be less effective. Their existence is acknowledged but people do not see them as being effective because in most cases there is little that they do. For instance the Chidiso borehole committee has failed to repair one of the two pumps that broke down in 1998 and even by June 2002 at the conclusion of the fieldwork for this study, the pump was still not functional.

Monitoring

The fourth design principle states that there should be monitors who actively audit physical conditions and use behaviour and are at least partially accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves. Findings from Romwe presented in Chapters Four and Five show that there is ineffectual monitoring by the two broad institutional structures responsible for especially woodland management, namely the state related agencies (formal) and traditional structures (informal). State related structures such as VIDCOs and WADCOs are not accountable to the users and therefore even where these structures attempt to monitor resource use, they tend to be accountable to the state organs such as the RDC and not to the local resource user or actors. This may alienate them from the resource users with whom they reside and therefore they may prefer not to monitor adherence to rules and regulations. Designated monitors within the traditional system, *e.g.* the sabuku's police, were found to be relatively more effective than the formal ones that fall under the local authority, the RDC. But their position has been weakened over the years by competition from monitors who are supported by the state system such as DNR, VIDCOs and the WADCOs or other structures that have been established through NGO support such as the catchment management and dam committees. Thus, this design principle was applicable to a large extent within the framework of the traditional authority system, as the *sabuku*'s police (the monitor) is often also a user and is accountable to other users and the traditional leaders based locally rather than being accountable to an external agency.

Graduated sanctions

This principle suggests that users who violate rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions depending on the seriousness and context of the offence. Graduated sanctions in state systems were enforced by the RDC through fines, with VIDCOs and WADCOs responsible for reporting offenders to the RDC. Because the fines are paid to the RDC and are not ploughed back to the community from which the fine was paid, there was no incentive for the VIDCOs and WADCOs to forward names of offenders to the RDC. Penalties for breaking rules are also very low, thus encouraging people to break rules as most of them can afford to pay the fines as well as make a profit. Traditional graduated sanctions were found to be applied, but not in a consistent manner. For instance, environmental conditions such as drought or annual seasonal variations often resulted in the relaxation or reinterpretation of some rules. The context surrounding the offence was found to be important too and determined the variability of fines imposed.

Conflict resolution mechanisms

This design principle states that users and their officials have rapid access to low cost, local arenas to resolve conflicts among users and/or between users and officials or leaders. Because of the existence of a multiplicity of institutions and institutional structures that influence access to especially woodland resources, users may act strategically and find low cost conflict resolution options. Some of the resolutions effected, especially by traditional leaders who sometimes pass inconsistent resolutions as discussed in Chapter Five, may fuel conflicts or may legitimise actions or practices prohibited by other institutional structures. In other cases, conflicts tend to be protracted as users switch from one structure to another to seek arbitration. As illustrated by the Mafeha case in Chapter Five, people may oscillate between institutional structures, favouring those that they feel may make a better judgement over their case.

Minimal recognition of rights to organise (autonomy)

This principle states that the rights of the users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental bodies and users have long-term tenure to the resource. As discussed in the thesis, there is a multiplicity of institutions involved in woodlands and water use, both formal and informal. The importance of informal, non-codified institutions has sometimes been ignored, yet these are the most used by local actors. Within project committees, there is more autonomy, as the right to organise is often not challenged by either the traditional leaders or state authorities. But the committees' autonomy exists in relation to the patron NGO. The eighth design principle, nested enterprises, is said to apply to resources that are parts of larger systems. In this case, appropriation, provision, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises. This design principle was not tested

in Romwe because the resources analysed were not considered as parts of larger systems.

The design principles were found to be generally more relevant to water resource management and less applicable to woodland resources. For water resources, resource users and the nature of their use are clearly defined, for instance there were specifications that village X uses water for livestock watering only during the dry season or during a drought year and village Y uses water for irrigation and other specified uses. Water is a more discrete resource even though its uses are diverse and this may explain why user groups and boundaries are more clearly defined and rules are adhered to. Patterns of water use and groups of users are relatively fixed although there is room for flexibility. Unlike in the case of woodlands, use boundaries were not contested for water resources. This could also be related to the fact that the majority of water sources except for Mawunga stream and natural springs were established through some investment such as labour, time or other material resources. Thus potential users, who did not contribute towards the establishment of the water sources, have less room to challenge or claim ownership over water sources such as the dam, boreholes and deep wells. Yet for woodlands, contestations could be on the basis of the resources being natural, God given and no one having invested any material resources in their development (Gerhardt & Nemarundwe, forthcoming). There is general adherence to rules for accessing various water sources even though the rules are not written down, and there appears to be a high level of awareness of the rules among community members.

Design principles are less applicable for woodlands because resource use and users' boundaries are fuzzy, fluid and often contested and institutional jurisdictions are also unclear. There are diverse woodland product uses by different groups and villages but these uses are not clear and are very dynamic. Thus unlike for water resources, it cannot be categorically said this village uses poles only or grazing only. An individual can come into the area to harvest poles but in the process get fibre, fruit or pick mushrooms. Rule enforcement is therefore more complex for woodlands than for water resources. Ownership and/or user rights in woodlands are highly contested. Social classification and historical narratives were used to justify claims over woodland resources. In times of social stress, social classification such as the notions of *Voho* (the ruling clan), *Zvidza zvopo* (those closely related to the ruling clan but not direct descendants), *Vawuyi* (new comers) and *Vechirudzi* (aliens of foreign origin, *e.g.* Malawians) discussed in Chapters Three and Five becomes much stronger. When there is less tension, other kinds of classifications such as those related to gender, age or wealth are more at play. Historical narratives are also used to justify claims over both resource ownership and leadership positions. The highly contested nature of woodland resources could be due to the fact that woodlands are linked to land. As a result of land shortage in Romwe, both in terms of quantity and quality, there has been an increase in cases of

encroachment into woodland areas for purposes of settlement and agriculture. This has reduced the size of grazing land, affecting mostly cattle owners. The majority of those who are affected by the land shortage are the newly married young men. The government fast track resettlement programme had raised the hopes of these young men to 'own' land, but from experiences of those who have been to the newly acquired commercial farms (*e.g.* the cases presented in Chapter Four), their hopes are still to be fulfilled.

Drawing from the foregoing discussion, it would appear as if the relevance of the design principles for woodlands in contexts like Romwe is limited. Ostrom (1990) states that systems that are characterised by some of these principles are fragile, while failed systems are characterised by very few of these principles. In this characterisation, woodland management systems in Romwe, would be described as failed systems, yet as has been demonstrated in this thesis, these resources are not truly open access systems as the various management regimes in place have some elements of common property regimes. There is clearly a lack of congruence between theory and empirical evidence. Much more attention therefore needs to be paid to realities on the ground and the characteristics of a particular natural resource to inform theory. The comparative analysis of woodland and water management systems in Romwe seems to point to the fact that the characteristics of a resource are important in the analysis of the applicability of design principles for robust institutions for common pool resource management. The development of the design principles was in the context of water resources and this may partly explain their relevance for water institutions in Romwe and not for woodlands. Woodland management is riddled with more complexity when compared to water resources.

Other questions that remain unexplored in the CPR literature include the question whether all commoners are equal and whether they have similar interests in the implementation and protection of community property rights. How is the local flow of power regulated or disrupted through CPRM? How are local institutions situated within the larger political economy? The discourse on common property also needs to recognise that rural people use both private and communal resources. The categorisation of property rights regimes into four broad categories *i.e.* state property, private property, common property and open access may lead to a misconception that there are clear cut divisions between the property regimes, yet there is often overlap across the regimes. Different tenure systems can apply in one locale simultaneously or at different times.

7.6.2 The actor-oriented and actor-network approaches

The study also used the actor-oriented approach to examine the diversity of actors and institutional structures involved in community-based resource management. The actor-oriented approach to institutional analysis was found useful in seeking to elucidate how social dynamics influence woodland and water resource management activities of diverse groups of people, and how these activities in turn help to produce and shape particular kinds of environment. For instance, rather than framing woodland resource management problems simply in terms of aggregate population pressure on a limited natural resource base, an actor-oriented framework was useful in that it considers the role of diverse institutions in mediating the relationships between different social actors and different components of the local natural resource landscape. The insights derived from such an analysis could help target external interventions more effectively, whether the objectives are to protect and to promote access rights or security of tenure of particular social groups or foster particular CBNRM outcomes. Such forms of intervention may involve a much more diverse range of institutions than the CBNRM institutional engineering process has acknowledged. An understanding of this complex set of institutional relationships, by making conflicts and synergies more explicit, is a vital precursor to the exploration of options for the management of woodland and water resources at the local community level.

The actor-oriented perspective begins with the idea that different social interactions develop and change depending on the context and natural resource at stake. This approach places emphasis on the role of human agency and thus it is important in the analysis of how individual actors and or resource users strategise or position themselves strategically in relation to other actors as a way of ensuring that their interests and needs are catered for. The actor-oriented approach was therefore also useful in unravelling the processes of negotiating resource access for different members of the community. Given that its main emphasis is on human agency, which is often equated to the agency of the individual, this approach was less useful in the examination of social networks for resource access that were found to be important in determining who could access what natural resource at a given time. Thus, for exploring such relationships, the actor-network approach was adopted. Using an actor-network perspective, the study further examined the role of social networks within the institutional framework for woodlands and water.

To understand how different actors' practices are embedded in and help to shape the range of formal and informal institutions necessitates an actor-oriented approach to the analysis of institutions (Long & Long, 1992; Long & van der Ploeg, 1989; Villarreal, 1994). This view is augmented by Leach *et al*., (1999) based on findings from three case studies undertaken in the Eastern Cape's Wild Coast area in South Africa, Wenchi district in Ghana and Udipur district, Rajasthan in India. Leach *et al*., (1999: 238) found the

actor-oriented approach useful in the analysis of the embedded nature of formal and informal institutions and in exploring institutional change in an historical perspective. This study found the actor-oriented approach useful in the analysis of the roles of various actors in governing access to woodlands and water resources at the local level.

An actor-oriented approach to institutional analysis adopted for this study highlights relations of power among various resource users. This approach sees institutions as outcomes of negotiations among social actors, involving power relationships and debates over meaning (Leach, *et al*., 1999; Peters, 1984). Rather than existing as a fixed framework, institutions are constantly made and remade through people's practices and interactions. Just as power shifts between various institutional structures, so too do the allegiances of various actors as groups or individuals, suggesting that at any given time, there is a complex network of alliances and relationships between institutional structures and local people. Social networks and other relationships are very contextual and dynamic and therefore difficult to predict, making the definition of appropriate management structures problematic. The dynamism challenges prescriptive institutional engineering approaches facilitated by NGOs and state agencies. Social networks, which fall under informal institutions, are also embedded in the local context and culture. Owing to the embeddedness of informal institutions, institutional change in a given community may be a slow process, even if formal institutions such as legal frameworks, macro-economic policies and political regimes change much quicker.

The actor-oriented approach adopted in this study was also useful in unravelling various actors' perceptions regarding the issue of boundaries. If such an approach is adopted by technocrats and policy makers, it may help them see beyond the physical boundaries when drafting crucial policies and regulations guiding natural resource use so they take cognisance of the multiple interests of different people claiming access to the natural resources. This observation runs contrary to the recommendation of the LTC (1994) suggesting that physical boundaries should be drawn between villages.

7.7 Conclusion

Many challenges for the implementation of decentralisation policies through CBNRM still exist and there are also many lessons still to learn. Each situation is unique and influenced strongly by a variety of contextual factors such as the power dynamics, micro-politics at play or characteristics of the natural resource being managed. It is therefore important that facilitators of CBNRM initiatives are not too prescriptive in determining what works and what does not work. Possibly, one of the most important lessons for policy makers, practitioners and researchers is the need to be flexible and recognise CBNRM as a dynamic process in which different issues, concerns and power-plays emerge as the process unfolds and the

system evolves and adapts to accommodate new institutions and the related power shifts.

The institutional framework governing access to and control over resources, the motivational dynamics and power relations, which operate create different dynamics that must be considered when analysing institutions for woodland and water resources management in semi-arid conditions. Traditional institutions, as represented by traditional leaders, were found to be more influential and considered more legitimate at the local level. This study therefore advocates for building on the legitimacy of the traditional institutions, but infusing some democratic orientation into these institutions. While the traditional authorities were more favourable to the community members at the time of the study, the traditional leadership needs some capacity for facilitating collaborative resource management, and participatory processes in natural resource management to ensure that not only dominant groups such as the elite villagers dominate decision making processes.

Characteristics of the natural resource in question may influence the effectiveness of resource management institutions. Ostrom's design principles highlight the need for clearly defined resource boundaries, congruence between benefits and costs, collective choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms and autonomy of the resource users and their institutional structures, if collective action for resource management is to be sustainable. This study however finds that investment in the development of a resource in terms of time, labour or other material resources also influence whether institutions are adhered to or not. For instance, for water resources where there has been some investment, there was more compliance with rules, yet this was not the case for woodlands that are considered as a God given resource. Furthermore, perceptions about resource availability or scarcity are also an important determinant influencing whether institutions are adhered to or not. It is important to note that availability of a resource is not only measured in terms of quantity of the resource but the quality of the resource is equally important. If a resource is perceived to be available and there are secure rights of access to the resource, there is generally less competition and fewer contestations over the resource, often resulting in fewer challenges over institutions for resource management. This study finds that in cases where there are multiple and competing claims and contestation over resource access and control, as in the case of woodlands, management institutions tend to be much weaker.

Through the actor-oriented and actor-network approaches, this study has attempted to provide a dynamic perspective on the role of local level institutions in people-environment relations within the context of decentralisation of natural resource management to the local level through CBNRM initiatives. Diverse institutions, both formal and informal and often acting in combination (given their overlapping jurisdictions), shape

the ways in which actors, differentiated according to gender, age and wealth access, derive livelihoods from woodlands and water resources, and in doing so, influence the changes in the landscape. As people interact with each other in relation to natural resource use within a given institutional framework, their actions and interactions may over time serve to reproduce particular institutions or they may serve to alter them. By seeing the people-environment relations from the actor-oriented and actor-network frameworks, this study offers some fundamental challenges to the ways in which 'community' institutions are often viewed in the literature surrounding CBNRM and this has some implications for development planning and practice including:

1. Institutional engineering within CBNRM based on the implicit assumption that democratically elected and empowered community institutional structures are the main vehicle for CBNRM activities is challenged. In reality, institutional engineering may be a reflection of the institutional complexity within which woodland and water resources are accessed.
2. Multiple institutions are involved in woodland and water management and most of these are not dedicated to the purposes of managing these resources only. They regulate access to many other resources and govern many other arenas of social interactions *e.g.* kinship and other social networks.
3. Amidst this multiplicity of institutions for natural resource management, different people rely on different institutions to support their claims to woodland and water resources. In most cases, a combination of a set of claims supported by different institutions is used.
4. Many of the institutions operating at community level, especially in the context of water use, are informal and consist more in the regularised practices of particular actors and are not in any fixed form. Yet local community members perceive these informal institutions as being more effective compared to the formal ones. Many of the informal institutions are highly dynamic, changing over time as actors alter their behaviour to suit new social, political, economic and ecological circumstances. Externally facilitated institutional structures may miss or reduce the flexibility that is inherent in informal institutions.
5. Understanding social difference and diversity of natural resources management institutions, which define different actors' (such as women's and men's) access to resources, points towards possibilities for more strategic specificity in CBNRM initiatives. For instance, if certain institutions are identified as supporting the interest of certain actors, or as contributing to the desired goal of CBNRM, then they may be targeted by policy in strategies of institutional capacity building.

In traditional resource management institutions and decision-making processes, women have often been sidelined. This has also been the case in formal institutions and decision-making processes that are backed by the state or state agencies such as the RDC. The facilitation of CBNRM by NGOs appears to have empowered women to be more actively involved in resource management decisions as well as improving women's access to land and water. This in a way is changing the institutional map at the local level, with women playing a much bigger role than has historically been the case. Provision of training in leadership skills and confidence building workshops by NGOs, have facilitated this process of empowering women.

While efforts are being made to decentralise management of woodlands and water resources, this study concludes that there is in general insufficient local control over the management of natural resources, influence over policy and policy-making processes, administration and legislation pertaining to natural resource management. A number of contradictions exist in the initiatives that aim to foster decentralised participatory resource management at the local level and these include, state (central) control versus decentralised control, statutory rights versus customary rights, few uses and resource users versus many and diverse uses and users without clearly defined mandates and jurisdictions, modern resource management knowledge systems versus traditional knowledge systems and formal versus informal institutions.

There are four emerging themes from this study that need more attention. These are, the perception of traditional authorities as being more legitimate in the eyes of the local people despite their history of empowerment and disempowerment; accountability of resource management structures; the relevance of the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions and related structures; and the recentralisation of legal management authority for natural resources at the RDC rather than devolution to levels below the RDC.

The traditional institutions and related structures appear to enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the local people, yet from the colonial period, the liberation war and the post independence periods, they have undergone phases of empowerment and disempowerment by the various governments of the time or forces at play during a particular phase. During the colonial period, the structure of the traditional authority system was altered by the introduction of the position of sabuku for efficiency in tax collection. During the liberation war, the traditional authorities were weakened as the liberation war fighters stripped them of their powers and also built up a view against the traditional leaders as being sellouts and supporters of the colonial government. Following independence in 1980, traditional authorities were further weakened by the introduction of the VIDCO and WADCO structures. Yet at the local level, people appear to still consider traditional leaders more legitimate. There is need to further investigate why the traditional institutions and related structures have remained powerful in

the face of the different processes of empowerment and disempowerment during the various time periods.

Accountability has also emerged as an important issue in the process of decentralising resource management. There appears to be general agreement in the literature on decentralisation that there is need for downward accountability of resource management structures (Mapedza & Mandondo, 2001; Matondi, 2001; Ribot, 2003 & 1999). The assumption in this literature advocating for downward accountability of natural resource management institutional structures is that this would foster active participation of local actors in the management of their natural resources. A major challenge is that, this literature does not discuss the mechanisms to achieve downward accountability. This study was not able to pursue issues relating to accountability and therefore recommends that research be undertaken to investigate what mechanisms can be put in place to ensure that there is downward accountability of resource management structures.

More often, CBNRM literature refers to formal and informal resource management institutions and related structures discussed in the thesis. Given the overlapping mandates and membership in the institutional structures often classified as formal or informal, a key question that emerges relates to the relevance of the dichotomy between the formal and informal institutions. Recent literature argues that it does not matter whether an institution is formal or informal, what matters is whether the institutional structure is better able to manage resources and also whether it is downwardly or upwardly accountable. This study began by using the dichotomy between the formal and informal, but with the results pointing to the fluid nature of boundaries between these structures, further studies would generate insights on whether this dichotomy is useful or not.

Last but not least, this study, similar to other studies that have been done in Zimbabwe (*e.g.* Murombedzi, 1992; Mandondo, 2001), finds that the legal authority for the management of woodlands and water resources has not been devolved to levels below the RDC. Rather the legal mandate for the management of these natural resources has been recentralised at RDC level through various legal instruments such as the Rural District Councils Act (1988) and the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (1982 revised in 1987). There are a number of explanations given in the CBNRM literature and these include, the bureaucratic impulse by organisations such as the RDC to retain management authority (Murphree, 1993) and that the decentralisation process has been supply-led rather than demand driven (Mandondo, 2001; Ribot, 1999). Findings of this study suggest that recentralisation of resource management authority at the RDC level could partly be a result of the existence of a multiplicity of structures involved in resource management below the RDC. It is therefore not clear to which structure management authority should be devolved. Further studies need to be undertaken to identify mechanisms for ensuring that management authority is further devolved beyond the RDC.

REFERENCES

Abercrombie, N. 1988. The *Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*. Penguin. London.

Abrahams, R. (ed). 1985. *Witchcraft in Contemporary Tanzania*. African Studies Centre. Cambridge.

Acheson, J.M. 1989. 'Management of Common Property Resources'. In S. Platter (ed). *Economic Anthropology*. Stanford University Press. Stanford.

Admassie, Y. 1995. *Twenty Years to Nowhere: Property Rights, Land Management and Conservation in Ethiopia*. Department of Sociology, Uppsala University. Uppsala.

Agarwal, B. 2001. 'Participatory Exclusions, Community Forestry and Gender Analysis for South Asia and a Conceptual Framework'. *World Development*. Vol. 29, No. 10, pp 1623-1648.

Agarwal, B. 1997a. 'Environmental Action, Gender Equity and Women's Participation.' *Development and Change*, Vol. 28, pp 1-44.

Agarwal, B. 1997b. 'Gender, Poverty Interlinks: Regional Variations and Temporal Shifts in Rural India'. *World Development*, Vol. 25, No.1, pp 23-25.

Agarwal, Bina. 1994a. *A Field of One's Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

Agarwal, B. 1994b. 'Gender, Resistance and Land: Interlinked Struggles over Resources and Meanings in South Asia'. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*. Vol. 22, No. 1, pp 81-125.

Agarwal, B. 1992. 'The Gender and Environment Debate: Lessons from India'. *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp 119-158.

Agrawal, A. and C.C. Gibson. 1999. 'Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation'. *World Development*. Vol. 27, No. 4, pp 629-649.

Agrawal, A. and J.C. Ribot. 1999. 'Accountability in Decentralisation: A Framework with South Asian and African Cases'. *Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. 33, (Summer) pp 473-502.

Apthorpe, R. and D. Gasper. 1996. *Arguing Development Policy: Frames and Discourses*. Frank CASS & EADI. London.

Arnold, J.E.M. 1998. *Managing Forests as Common Property*. FAO Forestry Paper, no. 136. Rome.

Arnstein, S.R. 1969. 'A Ladder of Participation'. *Journal of American Institute of Planners*'. July 1969, pp 216-223.

Bachrach, P. and M.S. Baratz. 1970. *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice.* Oxford University Press. New York.

Balland, J-M. and J-P. Platteau. 1996. *Population Pressure and Management of Natural Resources.* FAO Economic and Social Development Paper No. 139. FAO. Rome.

Barnes, C., E. Keogh, N. Nemarundwe, and L. Nyikahadzoi. 2002. *Micro-Finance and Mitigation of the Impacts of HIV/AIDS: An Exploratory Study from Zimbabwe*. MSI. Washington D.C.

Bassett, T. 1993. 'Introduction: The Land Question and Agricultural Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa'. In T. Bassett and D. Crummey (eds). *Land in African Agrarian Systems*, University of Wisconsin Press. Madison, pp 3-34.

Bassett, T.J. 1988. 'The Political Ecology of Peasant-Herder Conflicts in Northern Ivory Coast'. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 78, pp 453-472.

Bassett T. and D. Crummey (eds). 1993. *Land in African Agrarian Systems*, University of Wisconsin. Madison.

Bates, R.H. 1995. 'Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: An Assessment of the new Institutionalism'. In J. Harris, J. Hunter and C.M. Lewis (eds). *The New*

Institutional Economics and Third World Development. Routledge. London, pp 27-48.
Beach, D.N. 1973. 'The Shona and the Ndebele Power'. Henderson Seminar No. 26. Department of History, University of Rhodesia. Mimeo.
Beach, D.N. 1971. 'The Adendorf Trek in Shona History'. *South African Historical Journal*, No. 3, pp 30-48.
Bebbington, A. 1994. 'Theory and Relevance in Indigenous Agriculture: Knowledge, Agency and Organisation'. In D. Booth (ed). *Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice*. Longman. Harlow, pp 202-225.
Berger, P.L. and T. Luckman. 1968. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Anchor Books. New york.
Berkes, F. and T. Farvar. 1989. 'Introduction and Overview'. In (ed) F. Berkes. *Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development*. Belhaven Press. London, pp 1-17.
Berry, S. 1997. 'Tomatoes, Land and Hearsay: Property and History in Asante in the Time of Structural Adjustment'. *World Development*, Vol. 25, No. 8, pp 1225-1241.
Berry, S. 1993. *No Condition is Permanent: The Social and Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. University of Wisconsin Press. Madison.
Berry, S. 1992. 'Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land'. *Africa*, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp 327-355.
Berry, S. 1989. 'Social Institutions and Access to Resources'. *Africa*, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp 41-55.
Biggs, S. and H. Matsaert. 1998. 'An Actor-oriented Approach for Strengthening Research and Development Capabilities in Natural Resource Systems'. Paper presented at the Monitoring and Evaluation mini-conference, 25-26 August 1998. Overseas Development Group, University of East Anglia. Norwich.
Bourdillon, M. 1987. *The Shona Peoples: An Ethnography of the Contemporary Shona, with Special Reference to Religion*. Third Revised Edition. Mambo Press. Gweru.
Bradley, P. 1991. *Woodfuel, Women and Woodlots*. Vol.1. Macmillan. London.
Braedt, O. and W. Standa-Gunda. 2000. ´Woodcraft markets in Zimbabwe´. *International Tree Crop Journal*, No. 10, pp 367-384.
Bratton, M. 1994. 'Peasant and State Relations in Post-Colonial Africa: Patterns of Engagement and Disengagement'. In J.S. Midgal, A. Kohli and V. Shue (eds). *State Power and Social Force: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, pp 231-255.
Bromley, D.W. (ed). 1992. *Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy*. ICS Press. San Francisco.
Bromley, D. W. 1991. *Environment and Economy: Property rights and public policy.* Blackwell Publishers. Cambridge.
Bromley, D.W. and M. M: Cernea. 1989. *The Management of Common Property Natural Resources: Some Conceptual and Operations Fallacies*. World Bank Discussion Paper 57, World Bank. Washington, D.C.
Bruce, J.W. 1986. *Land Tenure Issues in Project Design and Strategies for Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*. LTC Paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Madison.
Bryant, R.L. 1997. *The Political Ecology of Forestry in Burma* 1824-1994. C.Hurst. London.
Bryant, R.L. 1992. 'Political Ecology: An Emerging Research Agenda in Third World Studies'. *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp 12-36.
Bryant, R.L. and S. Bailey. 1997. *Third World Political Ecology*. Routledge. London.
Burns, T.R., T. Baumgartner and P. Deville. 1985. *Man, Decisions and Society: Theory of Actor-System Dynamics for Social Scientists*. Studies in Cybernetics No. 10, Gordon Breach. New York.

Butterworth, J.A. 1997. *The Hydrology of a Dryland Catchment in Southern Zimbbabwe and the Effects of Climatic and Land Use Change on Shallow Groundwater Resources*. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of Soil Science, Univeristy of Reading. UK.

Byron, N. 1997. 'International Development Assistance in Forestry and Land Management: The Process and the Players'. *Commonwealth Forestry Review*. Vol. 76, pp 61-67.

Callon, M. and J. Law. 1997. 'After the Individual in Society: Lesson on Collectivity from Science, Technology and Society'. *Canadian Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 22, No. 2, pp 165-182.

Campbell, B. M., W. de Jong, M. Luckert, A. Mandondo, F. Matose, N. Nemarundwe and B. Sithole. 2001. Challenges to proponents of common property resource systems: Despairing voices from the social forests of Zimbabwe. *World Development*, Vol. 29, No.4, pp 589-600.

Campbell, B.M., S. Jeffrey, W. Kozanayi , M. Luckert, M. Mutamba and C. Zindi. 2002. *Household Livelihoods in Semi-Arid Regions: Options and Constraints*. Center for International Forestry Research. Bogor.

Campbell, B., N. Byron, P. Hobane, E. Madzudzo, F. Matose and L. Wily. 1999. 'Moving to Local Control of Woodland Resources: Can CAMPFIRE go beyond the mega-fauna'. *Society and Natural Resources*, Vol. 12, pp 501-509.

Campbell, B.M., I. Grundy and F. Matose. 1993. 'Tree and Woodland Resources: The Technical Practice of Small-scale Farmers'. In P.N. Bradley and K. McNamara (eds). *Living with Trees: Policies for Forestry Management in Zimbabwe*. World Bank Technical Paper No. 210, pp 29-62.

Carney, J. and M. Watts. 1991. 'Manufacturing Dissent: Work, Gender and the Politics of Meaning in a Peasant Society'. *Africa*, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp 207-241.

Carr, D. 1986. *Time, Narrative and History*. Indiana University Press. Bloomington, Indianapolis.

Cavendish, W. 2000. 'Empirical Regularities in the Poverty Environment Relationship of Rural Households: Evidence from Zimbabwe'. Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford. Oxford.

Cernea, M.M (ed). 1985. *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*. Oxford University Press. New York.

Chambers, R. 1995. *Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality Counts*? UNDP. New York.

Chambers, R. 1993. *Challenging the Professions: Frontiers for Rural Development*. Intermediate Technology Group. London.

Chambers, R. 1992. *Rural Appraisal: Rapid, Relaxed and Participatory*. IDS Publications. Brighton.

Chambliss, W. J. 1999. *Power, politics and crime*. Westview Press. Boulder, Colorado.

Cheater, A. P. 1986. *Social Anthropology: An Alternative Introduction*. Mambo Press. Gweru.

Cheneaux-Repond, M. 1992. The economic and social situation of widows and divorced women on a resettlement scheme in Zimbabwe'. In J. Stewart (ed). *Working papers of Inheritance*. Women and Law in Southern Africa research project working paper number 5, pp 22-52. Harare.

Clarke, J. 1997. *Building on Indigenous Natural Resource Management: Forestry Practices in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands*. Forestry Commission. Harare.

Cleaver, F. 2000. 'Moral Ecological Rationality, Institutions and Management of Common Property Resources'. *Development and Change*, Vol. 31, pp 361-383.

Cleaver, F. 1998. 'Incentives and Informal Institutions: Gender and the Management of Water.' *Agriculture and Human Values*, Vol. 15, pp 347-360.

Cleaver, F. 1994. 'Water as a Weapon: The history of water supply development in Nkayi district, Zimbabwe'. *Environmental History*, Vol. XVII, pp 313-333.

Cleaver, F. and D. Elson. 1995. *Women and Water Resources: Continued Marginalisation and New Policies.* Gatekeeper series no. 49. International Institute for Environment and Development. London.
Clegg, S.R. 1989. 'Circuits of Power: A Framework for Analysis'. In *Frameworks of Power*. Sage Publications. London, pp 187-240.
Clyde, Kluckman. 1962. *Navaho Witchcraft*. Beacon Press. London.
Cohen, S..S., J.W. Dyckman, E. Schoenberger and C.R. Downs. 1981. *Decentralisation: A Framework for Policy Analysis*. University of California Press. Berkeley.
Coleman, J.S. 1994. *Foundations of Social Theory*. The Belknap Press. Cambridge.
Conyers, D. 2001. 'Whose Elephants are they? Decentralisation of Control Over Wildlife Management through the CAMPFIRE Programme in Binga District, Zimbabwe'. Working Paper No. 31, World Resources Institute. Washington D.C.
Corell, E. 1996. 'Water as a Source of Conflict: A Case Study of India'. *IRD Currents*, No. 12, pp 21-24.
Cornwall, A. 2001. *Beneficiary, Consumer, Citizen: Perspectives on Participation for Poverty Reduction*. SIDA Studies No. 2. SIDA. Stockholm.
Cousins, B. 1997. 'How do Rights Become Real? Formal and Informal Institutions in South Africa's Land Reform'. *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp 59-68.
Cousins, B. 1992. 'A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Communal Grazing Regimes'. In B. Cousins (ed). *Institutional Dynamics in Communal Grazing Regimes in Southern Africa*. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare, pp 13-38.
Cousins, B. 1989. 'Community, Class and Grazing Management in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands'. In B. Cousins (ed). *People, Land and Livestock*. GTZ and CASS, Univeristy of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Cox, R. 1987. *Production, Power and the Third World Order*. Columbia Press. New York.
Daniels, S. and G. Walker. 2001. *Working through Environmental Conflicts: The Collaborative Learning Approach.* Praeger. Westport, CT.
Denzin, N.K. and Y.S. Lincoln (eds). 2000. 'Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research'. In N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds). *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks. London, pp 1-28.
Derman, B. 1999. *Democratising Environmental Use? Land and Water in Southern Africa at the end of the Century*. Department of Anthropology and the African Studies Centre, Michigan State University. Michigan.
Derman, B. and C. Nhira. 1998. *Preliminary Reflections on a Comparative Study of the Mazoe and Mupfure Pilot Catchments in the context of Zimbabwe's new Water Act*. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Dore, D. 2001. 'Transforming Traditional Institutions for Sustainable Natural Resource Management: History, Narratives and Evidence from Zimbabwe's Communal Areas'. *African Studies Quarterly* http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a1.html. Accessed in November 2002.
Drescher, A.W. 1998. *African Home Gardens: Self-Management of Sustainable Production Systems and Strategies of Food Security in Zambia and Zimbabwe*. www.geoagraphie.unifreiburg.de/ipj/forschung/ap1/publications/summarydrescher.html.
Dudley, E. 1993. *The Critical Villager: Beyond Community Participation*. Routledge. London & New York.
du Toit, R.F., B.M. Campbell, R.A. Haney and D. Dore. 1984. *Wood Usage and Tree Planting in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands: A Baseline Survey of Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices*. Report for the Forestry Commission of Zimbabwe and the World Bank Resource Studies. Harare.

Dzingirai, V. 1998. *Human Migration and Natural Resources Management in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands*: The Case of Binga. DPhil Thesis. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Dzingirai, V. 1994. 'Politics and Ideology in Human Settlement: Getting Settled in the Sikomena Area of Chief Dobola'. *Zambezia* XXI (ii), pp 167-175.
Escobar, A. 1988. 'Power and Visibility: Development and Invention of Management of the Third World'. *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 3, pp 428-443.
Etzioni, A. 1992. 'Normative-affective Factors: Towards a New Decision-making Model'. In M. Zey (ed.) *Decision-making: Alternatives to Rational Choice Models*. Sage Publications. Newbury Park.
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1937. *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azan*de. Clarendon Press. Oxford.
Fairhead, J. and M. Leach. 1995. 'False History, Complicit Social Analysis: Rethinking Some West African Environmental Narratives'. *World Development*. Vol 23, No. 6, pp 1023-1035.
Fairhead, J. and M. Leach. 1996. *Misreading the African Landscape: Society and Ecology in a Forest-Savanna Mosaic*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
Field, B.C. 1991. 'The Economics of Common Property: A review of two recent books'. *Natural Resources Journal*, Vol. 30, pp 239-252.
Fisher, R. 1992. 'Local Organisations in Community Forestry'. In C. Veer and J. Chamberlain (eds). *Local Organisations in Community Forestry Extension in Asia*. FAO. Rome, pp 48-61.
Flick, U. 1998. *An Introduction to Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Applications*. Sage Publications Inc. London.
Folke, C. and J. Colding. 2001. 'Traditional Conservation Practices'. *Encyclopaedia of Biodiversity*. Vol. 5, pp 681-693.
Folke, C., L. Pritchard Jr., F. Berkes, J. Colding and U. Svedin. 1998. *The Problem of Fit between Ecosystems and Institutions.* International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP). Working Paper No. 2. Bonn.
Fortmann, L. 1995. 'Talking Claims: Discursive Strategies in Contesting Property'. *World Development*, Vol. 23, pp 1053-1064.
Fortmann, L. and C. Nhira. 1992. *Local Management of Trees and Woodland Resources in Zimbabwe: A Tenurial Niche Approach*. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Fortmann, L. and J. Bruce. 1993. 'Tenure and Gender Issues in Forest Policy' in P.N. Bradley and K. McNamara (eds.) *Living with Trees: Policies for Forestry Management in Zimbabwe*. World Technical Paper No. 210, pp 199-210. Washington D.C.
Foucault, M. 1982. 'The subject and power'. In D. Hubert and R. Paul (eds). *Michael Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, pp 208-226.
Foucault, M. 1979. *Discipline and punish: The birth of prison.* Penguin. London.
Frost, P. and A. Mandondo. 1999. *Improving Rural Livelihoods in Semi-Arid Regions through Management of Catchments*. IES, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Gaidzanwa, R. B. 1988. *Women's land rights in Zimbabwe: An overview*. Rural and Urban Planning Occasional paper no. 13. University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Gaidzanwa, R.B. 1995. 'Land and the Economic Empowerment of Women: A Gendered Analysis'. *Southern African Feminist Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp 1-12.
Gerhardt, K. and N. Nemarundwe. Forthcoming. 'Local Knowledge of Indigenous Tree Planting and Management in Miombo Woodlands in Zimbabwe'. Department of Plant Ecology. Uppsala University. Uppsala.
Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Polity Press. Cambridge.
Gilles, J. L. and D. Jamtgaard. 1981. 'Overgrazing in Pastoral Areas'. *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp 129-141.

Goebel, A. 2002. 'Men These Days, They are a Problem. Husband Taming Herbs and Gender Wars in Rural Zimbabwe'. *Canadian Journal of African Studies IRCEA* 36, No. 3, pp 460-489.
Goebel, A. 1999. 'Then it's Clear who Owns the Trees: Common Property and Private Control in Social Forest in a Zimbabwean Resettlement Area'. *Rural Sociology*. Vol. 64, no.4, pp 625-641.
Goebel, A. 1998. 'Process, Perception and Power: Notes from 'Participatory' Research in a Zimbabwean Resettlement Area'. *Development and Change*, Vol 29, pp 277-305.
Goetz, A. M. 1996. *Understanding Gendered Institutional Structures and Practices at the Macro,Meso and Micro Levels*. Mimeo. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.
Gombe, J.M. 1995. *The Shona Idiom*. Mercury Press. Harare.
Gordon, H.S. 1954. 'The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery'. *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 62, pp 124-142.
Gore, C. 1993. 'Entitlement Relations and Unruly Social Practices: A Comment on the Work of Amartya Sen'. *Journal of Development Studies*. Vol. 29, No. 3, pp 429-460.
Grimble, R. and K. Wellard. 1997. 'Stakeholders' Methodologies in Natural Resource Management: A Review of Principles, Contents, Experiences and Opportunities'. *Agricultural Systems*, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp 173-193.
Guha, R. 1990. 'Towards a Cross-Cultural Environmental Ethic'. *Alternatives*, Vol. 15, pp 431-447.
Guijt, I. 1994. 'Making a Difference: Integrating Gender Analysis into PRA Training'. *RRA Notes, No. 8, Special Issue on Training*. IIED. London.
Guijt, I. and M.K. Shah (eds). 1998. *The Myth of Community: Gender Issues in Participatory Development*. Intermediate Technology Publications. London.
Hahn, T. 2000. *Property Rights, Ethics and Conflict Resolution: Foundations of the Sami economy in Sweden*. Department of Economics. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. Uppsala.
Hammersley, M. and P. Atkinson. 1983. *Ethnography: Principles in Practice*. Tavistock Publications. London.
Hanna, S., C. Folke, and K-G Maler (eds). 1996. *Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment*. Island Press. Washington D.C.
Hapgood, D. (ed). 1969. *The Role of Popular Participation in Development*: Report of a Conference on the Implementation of Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act, June 24 to August 2, 1968. The MIT Press. Cambridge.
Hardin, G. 1968. 'The Tragedy of the Commons'. *Science*, Vol. 162, pp 1243-1248.
Hasler, R. 1993. *Political Ecologies of Scale and the Multi-Tiered Co-Management of Zimbabwean Wildlife Resources under CAMPFIRE*. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Havnevik, K. 2000a. 'Introduction'. In K. Havnevik (ed). *The Institutional Context of Poverty Eradication in Rural Africa*. Nordic Africa Institute. Uppsala.
Havnevik, K. 2000b. ´The Institutional Heart of Rural Africa: An Issue Overlooked'. In K. Havnevik and E. Sandstrom (eds). *The Institutional Context of Poverty Eradication in Rural Africa.* Nordic Africa Institute. Uppsala.
Havnevik, K. 1997. *Research Programme on the Land Question in Eastern and Southern Africa.* Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. Uppsala.
Havnevik, K.J. and M. Hårsmar. 1999. *The diversified future: An institutional approach to rural development in Tanzania*. Expert Group on Development Issues (EGDI). Stockholm.
Helmsing, A.H.J. 1991. 'Transforming Rural Local Government: Zimbabwe's Post-Independence Experience'. In N.D. Mutizwa-Mangiza and A.H.J.

Helmsing (eds). *Rural Development and Planning in Zimbabwe*. Gower Publishing Company. Aldershot.
Herbst, J. 1990. *State Politics in Zimbabwe*. University of Zimbabwe Publications. Harare.
Hill, K. 1996. 'Zimbabwe's Wildlife Utilisation Programmes: Grassroots Democracy or an Extension of State Power'. *African Studies Review*, Vol. 39, pp 103-123.
Hulme, D. and M. Murphree. 2001. 'Community Conservation in Africa: An Introduction'. In D. Hulme and M. Murphree (eds). *African Wildlife and Livelihoods: The Promise and Performance of Community*. James Currey. Oxford, pp 1-8.
Hunter, M., R. Hitchcock, and B. Wyckoff-Baird. 1990. 'Women and Wildlife in Southern Africa'. *Conservation Biology*. Vol. 4, No. 4, pp 448-451.
ILO. 1992. *Towards Action Against Child Labour in Zimbabwe*. Jongwe Press. Harare.
Jacobs, S. 1991. 'Changing Gender Relations in Zimbabwe: The Case of Individual Family Resettlement Areas', in D. Elson (ed). *Male Bias in the Development Process*. Manchester University Press. Manchester, pp 51-82.
Jackson, C. 1998. 'Gender, Irrigation and Environment: Arguing for Agency'. *Agriculture and Human Values*, Vol. 15, pp 313-324.
Jackson, C. 1996. 'Rescuing Gender from the Poverty Trap'. *World Development*. Vol 24, No. 3 pp 489-504.
James, W. 1999. 'Empowering Ambiguities'. In A. Cheater (ed). *The Anthropology of Power: Empowerment and Disempowerment in Changing Structures*. Routledge. London.
Jewitt, S. 2000. 'Unequal Knowledge in Jharkhand, India: De-Romanticising Women's Agro-ecological Expertise'. *Development and Change*, Vol. 31, pp 961-985.
Jiggins, J. 1997. 'Women and the Re-Making of Civil Society'. In J. Burbidge (ed). *From the Bottom Up: Participation in the Rise of Civil Society*. PACT, for the Institute of Cultural Affairs International. New York.
Jiggins, J. 1994. *Changing boundaries: Women centered perspectives on population and the environment*. Island Press. Washington D.C.
Kabeer, N. 1988. *Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought*. Verso. London.
Keely, J. and I. Scoones. 2000. *Environmental Policy Making in Zimbabwe: Discourses, Science and Politics*. Institute of Development Studies Working Paper No. 116. Sussex.
King, L. 1994. *Inter-Organisational Dynamics in the CAMPFIRE Program*me. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Klooster, D. 2000. 'Institutional choice, community and struggle: A case study of forest co-management in Mexico'. *World Development*, Vol 28, No. 1, pp 1-20.
Kohnert, D. 1996. 'Magic and Witchcraft: Implications for Democratisation and Poverty-Alleviation Aid in Africa'. *World Development*, Vol. 24, No. 8, pp 1347-1355.
Krige, J.D. 1947. 'The social function of witchcraft'. *Theoria*, Vol. 1, pp 8-21.
Kriger, N. 1992. *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
Kundhlande, S. 2000. 'Implementing natural resource management by-laws and legislation/policies: Opportunities and Constraints'. In J. Siamachira (ed). *Natural Resource Management and Sustainable Livelihoods: Compatibility or Conflict*? Intermediate Technology Development Group Southern Africa. Harare.
Kundhlande, G. and M.K. Luckert. 1998. *Towards an Analytical Framework for Assessing Property Rights to Natural Resources: A Case Study in the Communal Areas of Zimbabwe*. Department of Rural Economy, University of Alberta, CA, Staff paper no. 98-05.

Lan, D. 1985. *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*. James Currey. London.
Land Tenure Commission. 1994. *Report for the Inquiry into Appropriate Land Tenure Systems*. Zimbabwe Government Printers. Harare.
Latour, B. 1986. 'The Powers of Association'. In J. Law (ed). *Power, Action and Belief*. Routledge. London, pp 264-280.
Law, J. 1997. 'Topology and the Naming of Complexity'. Centre for Social Theory and Technology home page http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/stt/staff/jl/pubs-JL2.htm. Accessed in November 2002.
Law, J. 1992. 'Notes on the Ordering of the Actor-Network: Ordering Strategy and Heterogeneity'. *Systems Practice*, Vol. 5, pp 379-393.
Lawry, S. 1989. *Tenure Policy Toward Common Property Natural Resources*. Land Tenure Centre Paper No. 134. University of Wisconsin-Madison. Madison.
Leach, M. 1994. *Rainforest relations: Gender and resource use among the Mende of Gola, Sierra Leone*. Edinburgh University Press for the International African Institute, Edinburgh.
Leach, M. and R. Mearns. (eds). 1996. *The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment.* The International African Institute in Association with James Currey. Oxford.
Leach, M., R. Mearns and I. Scoones. 1999. 'Environmental Entitlements: Dynamics and Institutions in Community-Based Natural Resource Management'. *World Development*, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp 225-247.
Leach, M., R. Mearns and I. Scoones. 1997. 'Challenges to community-based sustainable development: Dynamics, entitlements and institutions'. *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp 4-14.
Lele, Uma. 1975. *The Designing of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa*. The John Hopkins University Press. London/Baltimore.
Li, T.M. 1999. 'Images of Community: Discourse and Strategy in Property Relations'. *Development and Change*. Vol. 27, pp 501-527.
Lindgren, B. 2002. *The Politics of Ndebele Ethnicity: Origins, Nationality and Gender in Southern Zimbabwe*. PhD Thesis, Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology. Uppsala University. Uppsala.
Little, P. D. 1994. 'The Link Between Local Participation and Improved Conservation: A Review of Issues and Experiences', in D. Western and R. M. Wright (eds). *Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-based Conservation.* Island Press. Washington D.C., pp 347-372.
Ljung, M. 2001. *Collaborative Learning for Sustainable Development of Agri-Food Systems*. SLU Agraria No.308. Uppsala.
Long, N. 1992. 'From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case from an Actor-oriented Sociology of Development'. In N. Long and A. Long (eds). *Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development*. Routledge. London.
Long, N. 1984. *Creating Space for Change: A Perspective on the Sociology of Development.* Wageningen University of Agriculture. The Netherlands.
Long, N. 1977. *Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development*. Tavistock. London.
Long, N. and A. Long. 1992. *Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development*. Routledge. London.
Long, N. and J.D. van der Ploeg. 1989. 'Demythologising Planned Intervention: An Actor-oriented Perspective'. *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. XXIX, (3/4) pp 226-249.
Lovell, C., C.H. Batchelor and P.J. Chilton. 1999. *Community Gardens: Using Limited Ground Water Resources. Centre for Ecology and Hydrology*. London.
Luckert, M. 2000. Personal Communication. University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Luke, S. 1977. *Power: A Radical View*. Macmillan. London.

Mackenzie, F. 1991. 'Without a Woman There is No Land: Marriage and Land Rights in Smallholder Agriculture'. *Resources for Feminist Research*. Vol. 3/4, No. 19, pp 68-74.
MacPherson, C. B. 1978. *Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions*. University of Toronto Press. Toronto.
Madriz, E. 2000. 'Focus Groups in Feminist Research'. In N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds.) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks. London, pp 835-850.
Madzudzo, E. 2002. *Outcomes of CBNRM Programmes: A Case Study of the CAMPFIRE in Bulilimamangwe District of Zimbabwe*. PhD dissertation. Roskilde University. Denmark.
Magadlela, D. 2000. *Irrigating Lives: Development Intervention and Dynamics of Social Relationships in an Irrigation Project*. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Wageningen University. The Netherlands.
Makumbe, J. Mw. 1998. *Democracy and Development in Zimbabwe: Constraints of Decentralisation*. SAPES Trust. Harare.
Makumbe, J. Mw. 1996. *Participatory Development: The Case of Zimbabwe*. University of Zimbabwe Publications. Harare.
Mamdani, M. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of the Late Colonialism*. Princeton University Press. Princeton.
Mandondo, A. 2002. 'Analysing the Role of Forestry Networks in Africa.' Unpublished report. Center for International Forestry Research. Bogor.
Mandondo, A. 2001. 'Allocation of Governmental Authority and Responsibility in Tiered Governance Regimes: The Case of Chivi Rural District Council Landuse Planning and Conservation By-laws'. *African Studies Quarterly*. http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a3.htm.
Mandondo, A. 2000a. *Situating Zimbabwe's Natural Resource Governance Systems in History*. Center for International Forestry Research Occasional Paper No. 32. CIFOR. Bogor.
Mandondo, A. 2000b. *Management and Ecology of Indigenous Woodlands in Nyamaropa Communal Lands, Nyanga District in Zimbabwe*. PhD Thesis, Department of Biological Sciences, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Mandondo, A. 1998. *The Concept of Territoriality in Local Natural Resources Management and its Implication on Livelihood in Nyamaraopa Communal Land*. IES, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Mandondo, A. 1997. 'Trees and Spaces as Emotion and Norm Laden Components of Local Ecosystems in Nyamaropa Communal Lands, Nyanga District, Zimbabwe'. *Agriculture and Human Values*. Vol. 14, pp 352-372.
Mandondo, A., B. M. Campbell, M. Luckert, N. Nemarundwe, W. de Jong and W. Kozanayi. 2001. *Transacting Institutional Change in Contexts of Complexity: Experiences from Chivi District in Zimbabwe*. IES/CIFOR. Harare.
Mapaure, I., A. Mapaura and J.A. Butterworth. 1995. *Romwe Catchment Study, Zimbabwe: Effect of Land Management on Groundwater Recharge and Implications for Small Scale Irrigation Using Ground Water*. Baseline Vegetation Survey. Institute of Hydrology. Oxfordshire.
Mapedza, E. and A. Mandondo. 2001. *Co-Management in the Mafungautsi State Forest Area of Zimbabwe: What Stake for Local Communities*? CASS, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.
Massey, D. 1991. 'A global sense of place'. *Marxism Today*, June, 1991, pp 24-29.
Matondi, P. B. 2001. *The Struggle for Access to Land and Water Resources in Zimbabwe: The Case of Shamva District*. Ph.D. Thesis, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. Uppsala.
Matose, F. 2002. *Local People and Reserved Forests in Zimbabwe: What Prospects for Co-management?* DPhil Thesis. University of Sussex. Brighton.

Matowanyika, J.Z.Z. 1991. *Indigenous Resource Management and Sustainability in Rural Zimbabwe: An Exploration of Practices and Concepts in Commonlands*. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Waterloo. Waterloo.
May, J. 1979. *Social Aspects of the Legal Position of Women in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.* MPhil Thesis submitted to the Centre for Inter-Racial Studies. University of Rhodesia. Salisbury.
Mayer, P. 1954. *Witches: Inaugural Lecture*. Rhodes University. Grahamsatown.
Mazarire, G.C. 1999. 'Women, Politics and the Environment in Pre-Colonial Chivi 1840 to 1900'. Paper presented to the Women and the Environment Conference, Monomotapa Crown Plaza, 5 August. Harare.
Mbizvo, C.L. and J.C. Mohammed. 1993. *The Institutional and Legal Framework of Natural Resource Management: Local Level Natural Resource Management Project, Makoni District*. Stockholm Environment Institute. Working Paper No. 3. Stockholm.
McCay, B.J. 1996. 'Commons and Private Concerns' in S. Hanna, C. Folke, and K-G Maler (eds). *Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment*. Island Press. Washington D.C., pp 111-126.
McCay, B.J. and J. M. Acheson. (eds). 1987. *The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources*. University of Arizona Press. Tucson.
McGregor, J. 1995. 'Gathered Produce in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas: Changing Resource Availability and Use'. *Ecology of Food and Nutrition*. Vol. 33, pp 163-193.
McGregor, J. 1991. *Woodland Resources: Ecology, Policy and Ideology: An Historical Case Study of Woodland Use in Shurugwi Communal Area, Zimbabwe.* PhD Thesis. Loughborough University of Technology. Loughborough.
Meinzen-Dick, R.S. and M. Zwarteveen. 2001. 'Gender Dimensions of Community Resource Management: A Case of Water Users' Associations in South Asia'. In Arun Agrawal and Clark. C. Gibson (eds). *Communities and the Environment: Ethnicity, Gender, and the State in Community-Based Conservation*, pp 63-88.
Meinzen-Dick, R. and M. Zwarteveen. 1998. 'Gendered Participation in Water Management: Issues and Illustrations from Water Users' Associations in South Asia'. *Agriculture and Human Values*, Vol. 15, pp 337-345.
Meinzen-Dick, R.S., L.R. Brown, H.S. Feldstein and A.R. Quiusumbing. 1997. 'Gender, Property Rights and Natural Resources'. *World Development*, Vol. 25, No. 8, pp 1303 -1315.
Mies, M. and V. Shiva. 1993. *Ecofeminism*. ZED Books. London.
Mohamed-Katerere, J. 2001. 'Participatory natural resource management in the communal lands of Zimbabwe: What role for customary law?' *African Studies Quarterly*, http://web.Africa.efl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a7.htm. Accessed in Nov. 2002.
Moore, D. S. 1996. *A River Runs Through It: Environmental History and the Politics of Community in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands*. CASS Occasional paper & Institute of International Studies. Harare.
Moore, D.S. 1993. 'Contesting Terrain in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands: Political Ecology, Ethnography and Peasant Resource Struggles'. *Economic Geography*, Vol. 69, No. 4, pp 380-401.
Morawski, J. 1997. 'The Science Behind Feminist Research Methods'. *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 53, pp 667-681.
Morgan, D.L. 1988. *Focus Groups as Qualitative Research*. Sage Publications. Newbury Park, CA.
Moriarty, P. 2000. *Integrated Catchment Management and Sustainable Water Resource Development in Semi-arid Zimbabwe*. D.Phil. Thesis, University of Reading. Reading, UK.

Moriarty, P. and C. Lovell. 1998. *Groundwater Resource Development in the context of Farming Systems Intensification and Changing Rainfall Regimes: A Case Study from Southeast Zimbabwe*. AgREN Network Paper No. 81, pp 15-21. ODI, London.
Moser, C.O.N. 1993. *Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training*. Routledge. New York.
Mosse, D. 1997. 'The Symbolic Making of a Common Property Resource: History, Ecology and Locality in Tank-Irrigated Landscape in South India'. *Development and Change*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp 467-504.
Mosse, D. 1994. 'Authority, Gender and Knowledge: Theoretical Reflections on the Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal'. *Development and Change*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp 497-526.
Mosse, J.C. 1993. *Half the World, Half a Chance: An Introduction to Gender and Development*. Oxfam. Oxford.
Moyo, S. 1995a. *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*. SAPES Trust. Harare.
Moyo, S. 1995b. 'A gendered perspective of the land question'. *Southern African Feminist Review*, Vol 1, No. 1, pp 13-31.
Moyo, S., P. Robinson, Y. Katerere, S. Stevenson and D. Gumbo. 1991. *Zimbabwe's Environmental Dilemma: Balancing Resource Inequities*. ZERO. Harare.
Muchena, O. 1994. 'The Changing Perceptions of Women in Agriculture'. In M. Rukuni and C.K. Eicher (eds). *Zimbabwe's Agricultural Revolution*. University of Zimbabwe Publications. Harare.
Mukamuri, B.B. 2000. 'Local Institutions and Management of Indigenous Woodland Resources in Zimbabwe', in P. Virtanen and M. Nummelin (eds). *Forests, Chiefs and Peasants in Africa: Local management of natural resources in Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mozambique*. Silva Carelica 34. University of Joensuu. Joensuu, pp 15-33.
Mukamuri, B.B. 1995. 'Local Environmental Conservation Strategies: Karanga Religion, Politics and Environmental Protection'. *Environmental History*. Vol. 1, pp 297-311.
Mukamuri, B.B. and W. Kozanayi. 1999. *Institutions Surrounding the Use of Marketed Forest Products: The Case of Berchemia Discolor, Warburgia Salutaris and Adansonia Digitata*. IES Working paper. IES, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Mukamuri, B.B., F. Matose, and B.M. Campbell. 2000. *Rural Institutions: Contextualising Community-Based Management of Natural Resources in Zimbabwe.* IES, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Mukonyora, I. 1999. 'Women and Ecology in Shona Religion'. *Word and World*, Vol. XIX, No.3, pp 276-284.
Murdoch, J. 1998. 'The Spaces of Actor-Network Theory'. *Geoforum*. Vol. 29, No. 4, pp 357-374.
Murombedzi, J. C.1994. *The Dynamics of Conflict in Environmental Management Policy in the Context of CAMPFIRE*. PhD Thesis. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Murombedzi, J.C. 1992. 'The Need for Appropriate Level Common Property Resource Management Institutions in Communal Tenure Regimes'. In B. Cousins (ed). *Institutional Dynamics in Communal Grazing Regimes in Southern Africa*. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare, pp 39-58.
Murombedzi, J.C. 1991. *Decentralising Common Property Resources Management: A Case Study of the Nyaminyami District Council of Zimbabwe's Wildlife Management Programme*. IIED Paper No. 30. London.
Murphree, M.W. 2000. *Boundaries and Borders: The Questions of Scale in the Theory and Practice of Common Property Management*. Paper presented at the Eighth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP). Bloomington, Indiana.

Murphree, M.W. 1994. *The Role of Institutions in Community-based Conservation*. Theme review paper presented at a workshop on Community-based Conservation held between 18-22 October 1993. Washington D.C. pp 423-427.
Murphree, M.W. 1993. *Communities as Resource Management Institutions*. IIED Gatekeeper Series No. 36. IIED. London.
Murphree, M. W. 1991. *Communities as Institutions for Resource Management.Institutions*. Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Murphree, M.W. and D. H. M. Cumming. 1990. *Savana Land Use: Policies and Practice in Zimbabwe*. Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Mutamba, M., W. Kozanayi, and B.M. Campbell. 2000. *Report on the Simudzirayi Micro-credit Scheme*. Institute of Environmental Studies Report, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Mvududu, S.C. 1995. "Gender Concerns in Indigenous Woodland Management". In C. Nhira (ed). Proceedings of the Conference on Indigenous Woodland Management. CASS Occasional Paper Series NRM. University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Nabane, N. 1997. *A Gender Sensitive Analysis of a Community-based Wildlife Utilisation Initiative in Zimbabwe's Zambezi Valley*. Unpublished MPhil. thesis. Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Narayan, D. 2000. *Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?* Oxford University Press (for The World Bank). Oxford.
Narayan, D. 1997. *Voices of the Poor: Poverty and Social Capital in Tanzania*. Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs Series No. 20. The World Bank. Washington DC.
Narayan, D. 1996. *The Contribution of People's Participation: Evidence from 121 Rural Water Supply Projects*. ESD Occasional Paper Series No. 1. The World Bank. Washington D.C.
Nemarundwe, N. Forthcoming. Social Charters and Organisation for Access to Woodland Resources in Chivi District, Southern Zimbabwe. *Society and Natural Resources Journal.*
Nemarundwe, N. 2001. 'Institutional Collaboration and Shared Learning for Forest Management in Chivi District, Zimbabwe'. In E. Wollenberg, D. Edmunds, L. Buck, J. Fox, and S Brodt. (eds). *Social Learning in Community Forest Management: Linking Concepts and Practice*. Center for International Forestry Research. Bogor.
Nemarundwe, N. and W. Kozanayi. 2003. Institutional Arrangements for Water Resource Use: A Case Study from Southern Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol, 29, No. 1, March 2003, pp 193-206.
Nemarundwe, N., M. Mutamba and W. Kozanayi. 1998. *An Overview of Woodland Utilisation and Management in three Communal Areas in Zimbabwe: Results of Participatory Rural Appraisal Research in Chivi, Mangwende and Gokwe South Districts*. IES Special Report, No. 16. IES, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Nhira, C. 1994. *Indigenous Woodlands Usage and Management in Kanyati Communal Area, Zimbabwe. With Special Reference to Common Property Issues*. Unpublished DPhil Thesis. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Nhira, C. and L. Fortmann. 1993. 'Local Woodland Management: Realities at the Grassroots'. In P.N. Bradley and K. McNamara (eds). *Living with Trees: Policies for Forestry Management in Zimbabwe*. World Bank Technical Paper No. 210, pp 139-155.
North, D. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

Olesen, V.L. 2000. 'Feminisms and Qualitative Research into the Millennium'. In N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds.) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks. London, pp 215-255.
Olson, M. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
Ostrom, E. 1999. *Reformulating the Commons*. Centre for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change. Indiana University. Indiana.
Ostrom, E. 1997. *What Makes for Successful Institutions to Govern Common-pool Resources*. Centre for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change. Indiana University. Indiana.
Ostrom, E. 1992. The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival and Performance of Common Property Institutions'. In D.W. Bromley (ed). *Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy*. Institute of Contemporary Studies Press. San Francisco, pp 293-318.
Ostrom, E. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.* Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
Ostrom, E. and E. Schlager. 1996. 'The Formation of Property Rights' in S. Hanna, C. Folke, and K-G Maler (eds). *Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment*. Island Press. Washington D.C., pp 127-156.
Ostrom, E., R. Gardener and J.M. Walker. 1994. *Rules, Games and Common Pool Resources.* Ann Arbor. Michigan.
Ostrom, E., L Schroeder and S. Wynne. 1993. *Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure, Policies in Perspective*. Westview Press. Boulder.
Peluso, N. 1994. *The Impact of Social and Environmental Change on Forestry Management: A Case Study from West Kalimantan, Indonesia*. FAO. Rome.
Peluso, N. 1992. *Rich forests, poor people: Resource control and resistance in Java*. University of California Press. Berkeley.
Peluso, N. 1991. 'Women and Natural Resources in Developing Countries'. *Society and Natural Resources*. Vol. 4, No. 1, pp 1-3.
Peters, P. 1992. 'Manoeuvres and Debates in the interpretations of land rights in Botswana'. *Africa*, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp 413-434.
Peters, P. 1984. 'Struggles over water, struggles over meaning: Cattle, water and the State'. *Africa*, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp 29-49.
Pierre, J. and B.G. Peters. 2000. *Governance, Politics and the State*. Macmillan. London.
Plant, G. and J. Plant (eds). 1992. *Putting Power in Its Place: Creating Community Control*. New Society Publishers. Philadelphia.
Platteau, J-P. 1996. 'The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment'. *Development and Change*, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp 29-86.
Platteau, J-P. 1995. *Reforming Lands Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues of Efficiency and Equity*. Discussion Paper No. 60. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). Geneva.
Poats, S.V. 1991. *The Role of Gender in Agricultural Development.* Issues in Agriculture No. 3, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. Washington D.C.
Police Outpost. 1999. A Police Magazine, January 1999 Edition.
Pretty, J.N. 1995. 'Participatory Learning for Sustainable Agriculture'. *World Development*, Vol. 23, No. 8, pp1247-1263.
Pretty, J. and H. Ward. 2001. 'Social capital and the environment'. *World Development*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp 209-227.
Pretty, J.N., I. Guijt, J. Thomson, I. Scoones. 1995. *Participatory Learning and Action: A Trainer's Guide*. IIED. London.

Ranger, T. 1999. 'Women and Environment in African Religion: The Case of Zimbabwe'. Paper presented to the Women and The Environment Conference, Monomotapa Crowne Plaza, 5 August. Harare.
Ranger, T. 1993. 'The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa', in T. Ranger and O. Vaughan (eds). *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene*. Macmillan Press. Oxford, pp 62-111.
Ranger, T. 1985. *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*. James Currey. London.
Reynolds, P. 1991. *Dance Civet Cat: Politics of Child Labour in the Zambezi Valley*. ZED Books. London.
Ribot, J.C. 2003. 'Democratic Decentralisation of Natural Resources: Institutional Choice and Discretionary Power Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa'. *Public Administration and Development*, Vol. 23, No. 1.
Ribot, J.C. 1999. 'Decentralisation, Participation and Accountability in Sahelian Forestry: Legal Instruments of Political-Administrative Control'. *Africa*, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp 23-65.
Ribot, J.C. 1998. *Integral Rural Development: Authority and Accountability in Decentralised Natural Resource Management*. Africa Technical Division Working Paper. The World Bank. Washington D.C.
Ribot, J.C. 1995. 'From Exclusion to Participation: Turning Senegal's Forestry Policy Around?' *World Development*, Vol. 23, No. 9, pp 1587-1599.
Ribot, J.C. and N. Peluso. 2001. *A Theory of Access: Taking Property Out of Place*. World Resources Institute. Washington D.C.
Richards, P. 1983. 'Ecological Change and the Politics of African Landuse'. *African Studies Review*, Vol, 26, No. 2, pp 1-72.
Roark, P. 1984. 'Women and Water'. In P. Bourne (ed). *Water and Sanitation: Economic and Sociological Perspectives*. Florida Academic Press. Orlando, pp 49-67.
Robbins, P. 1998. 'Authority and Environment: Institutional Landscapes in Rajasthan, India'. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp 410-435.
Rocheleau, D. 1995. 'Gender and Biodiversity: A Female Political Ecology Perspective'. *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp 9-16.
Rocheleau, D. 1991. 'Gender, Ecology and the Science of Survival: Stories and Lessons from Kenya'. *Agriculture and Human Values*. Vol. 8, pp 156-165.
Rocheleau, D. 1987. 'Women, Trees and Tenure: Implications for Agroforestry Research and Development'. In J.B. Raintree (ed). *Land, Trees and Tenure*. Proceedings of an International Workshop on Tenure Issues in Agroforestry. LTC. Wisconsin, Madison.
Rocheleau, D. and D. Edmunds. 1997. 'Women, Men and Trees: Gender, Power and Property in Forest and Agrarian Landscape'. *World Development*, Vol 25, No. 8, pp 1351-1371.
Rondinelli, D.A. 1983. *Development Projects as Policy Experiments*. Routledge. London.
Roe, E. 1995. 'More Than the Politics of Decentralisation: Local Government Reform, District Development and Public Administration in Zimbabwe'. *World Development*, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp 833-843.
Roe, E. 1991. 'Development Narratives or Making the Best of Blueprint'. *World Development*. Vol. 19, pp 287-300.
Rubin, J.Z., D.G. Pruitt and S.H. Kim. 1994. *Social Conflict: Escalation, Statement and Settlement*. McGraw-Hill, Inc. New York.
Runge, C.F. 1981. 'Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context'. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. November issue, pp 595-606.

Ryan, G.W. and H.R. Bernard. 2000. 'Data Management and Analysis Methods'. In N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds.) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks. London, pp 769-802.
Sayer, J.A. and B.M. Campbell. 2002. *Future Harvests: Local Livelihoods and the Global Environment*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
Schmidt, E. 1992. *Peasants, Traders and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe – 1870 to 1939*. Baobab Books. Harare.
Schoffeleers, J.M. 1979. 'Introduction'. In J.M. Schoffeleers (ed). *Guardians of the Land: Essays on Central African Territorial Cults*. Mambo Press. Gwelo, pp 1-46.
Schroeder, R. 1997. "Reclaiming Land in The Gambia: Gendered Property Rights and Environmental Intervention". *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* Vol. 87, No. 3, pp 487-508.
Schroeder, R. 1993. 'Shady practices: Gender and the political ecology of resource stabilisation in Gambian garden/orchards'. *Economic Geography*. Vol. 69, No. 4, pp 349-365.
Scoones, I., C. Chibudu, S. Chukura, P. Jeranyama, W. Machaka, B. Machanja, B. Mavedzenge, M. Mombeshora, M. Mudhara, C. Mudziwo, F. Murimbarimba and B. Zirereza. 1996. *Hazards and Opportunities: Farming Livelihoods in Dryland Africa: Lessons from Zimbabwe*. ZED Books. London.
Scoones, I. 1996. 'Politics, Polemics and Pasture in Southern Africa'. In M. Leach and R. Mearns (eds). *The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment*. James Currey. New Hampshire, pp 34-53.
Scoones, I. and F. Matose. 1993. 'Local Woodland Management: Constraints and Opportunities for Sustainable Resource Use'. In P. N. Bradley and K. McNamara (eds). *Living with Trees: Policies for Forestry Management in Zimbabwe*. World Bank Technical Paper No. 210, pp 157-193.
Scoones, I. and K. Wilson. 1989. 'Households, Lineage Groups and Ecological Dynamics: Issues for Livestock Development in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands'. In B. Cousins (ed). *People, Land and Livestock*. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare, pp 17-22.
Scott, J.C. 1990. *Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden Tra*nscripts. Yale University Press. New Haven.
Scott, J.C. 1986. 'Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance'. In J.C. Scott and B.J.T. Kerkvliet (eds). *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South East Asia*. Frank CASS & Comp. Ltd. London.
Scott, J.C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.* Yale University Press. New Haven.
Scott, J. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*. Yale University Press. New Haven.
Scott, W.R. 1995. *Institutions and Organisations*. Sage Publications. London.
Shackleton, S. and B. Campbell. 2001. *Devolution in Natural Resource Management: Institutional Arrangements and Power Shifts. A Synthesis of Case Studies from Southern Africa.* USAID SADC NRM Project no 690-0251. Harare.
Shackleton, C.M., S. E. Shackleton and B. Cousins. 2001. 'The Role of Land-based Strategies in Rural Livelihoods: The Contribution of Arable Production, Animal Husbandry and Natural Resource Harvesting in Communal Areas in South Africa'. *Development Southern Africa*. Vol. 18, No. 5, pp 581-604.
Sharp, R. 1992. 'Organising for Change: People, Power and the Role of Institutions' in Johan Holmberg (ed). *Policies for a Small Planet from the International Institute for Environment and Development*. Earthscan. London.
Shepsle, K.A. 1989. 'Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach'. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 1, pp 131-147.
Shipton, P. and M. Goheen. 1992. 'Understanding African Land Holding: Power, Wealth and Meaning'. *Africa*, Vol 62, pp 307-326.

Shiva, V. 1988. Staying Alive: *Women, Ecology and Survival in India*. Zed Books. London.
Shiva, V. 1987. 'The Violence of Reductionist Science'. *Alternatives*, Vol. 12, pp 243-261.
Shivaramakrishnan, K. 2000. 'Crafting the Public Sphere in the Forests of West Bengal: Democracy, Development and Political Action'. *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp 431-461.
Simbolon, I.J. 1998. *Peasant Women and Access to Land: Customary Law, State Law and Gender-Based Ideology, the Case of Toba-Batak (North Sumatra)*. PhD Thesis. University of Wageningen. The Netherlands.
Sihlonyane, M.F. 2001. 'The Rhetoric of the Community in Project Management: The Case of Mohlakeng Township'. *Development in Practice*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp 34-44.
Sithole, B. Forthcoming. 'Becoming Men in Our Dresses!' Women's Involvement in a Joint Forestry Management Project in Mafungautsi, Zimbabwe. In C.J. Colfer (ed). *No Fair! Enhancing Equity in Forest Management*. Chapter 13. CIFOR. Bogor.
Sithole, B. 2002. *Where the Power Lies: Multiple Stakeholder Politics over Natural Resources – A Participatory Methods Guide*. CIFOR. Bogor.
Sithole, B. 2001. 'Devolution and Stakeholder Participation in the Water Reform Process in Zimbabwe'. *African Studies Quarterly* www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5.htm Accessed in November 2002.
Sithole, B. 1999. *Access to and Use of Dambos in Communal Areas of Zimbabwe: Institutional Considerations*. Unpublished PhD Thesis. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.
Sithole, B. 1997. *Contested Domains: The Study of Water and Settlements in Dande.* CIRAD Guruve Biodiversity Project Report. Guruve Rural District Council & CIRAD. Guruve and Montpellier.
Sithole, B. and B. Edziwa. 1999. 'Ignorant Farmers or Ignorant Extension? *Zimbabwe Science News,* Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp 35-42.
Spradley, J.P. 1979. *The Ethnographic Interview*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. New York.
Stake, R.E. 2000. 'Case Studies'. In N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds). *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks. London, pp 435-454.
Steins, N. 2002. 'Understanding Platform Processes Through ANT'. In C. Leeuwis and R. Pyburn. *Wheelbarrows Full of Frogs*. Koninklijke Van Gorcum BV. The Netherlands, pp 407-420.
Steins, N. 1999. *All Hands on Deck: An Interactive Perspective on Complex Common-Pool Resource Management Based on Case Studies in the Coastal Waters of the Isle of Wight (UK), Connemara (Ireland) and the Dutch Wadden Sea.* Wageningen Agricultural University. The Netherlands.
Steins, N., V. M. Edwards and N. Röling. 2000. 'Re-Designed Principles for CPR Theory'. *The Common Property Resource Digest*, No. 53, pp 1-4.
Stockholm Group for Studies on Natural Resource Management. 1988. *Perspectives on Sustainable Development: Some Critical Issues Related to the Bruntland Report*. Stockholm studies in NRM, No. 1. Stockholm.
Stocking, M. 1996. 'Soil Erosion: Breaking New Ground', in M. Leach and R. Mearns. (eds). *The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment.* The International African Institute in association with James Currey. Oxford, pp 140-154.
Sullivan, C., M. Mutamba, and W. Kozanayi. 2001. *Water Use and Livelihood Security: A Study of Rural Households in Southern Zimbabwe*. Centre for Ecology and Hydrology. Wallingford.
Swallow, B.M. 1990. *Strategies and Tenure in African Livestock Development*. Land Tenure Center, paper 140. Land Tenure Center. University of Wisconsin. Madison.

Thomas-Slayter, B. and D. Rocheleau. 1995. *Gender, Environment and Development in Kenya: A Grassroots Perspective.* Lynne Rienner. Boulder, CO.
Toure, O. 1988. 'The Pastoral Environment of Northern Senegal'. *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 42, pp 32-39.
Turner, M.D. 1999. 'Conflict, Environmental Change and Social Institutions in Dryland Africa: Limitations of the Common Property Resource Management Approach'. *Society and Natural Resources*, Vol. 12, pp 643-657.
Uphoff, N. 1991. 'Fitting projects to people' in M.M. Cernea (ed). *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*. Oxford University Press. New York.
Uphoff, N. 1986. *Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Source Book with Cases*. Kumarian Press. West Hartford, Connecticut.
Uphoff, N.T., J.M. Cohen and A.N. Goldsmith. 1979. *Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation: A State of the Art Paper*. Cornell University Rural Development Committee, Monograph Series No. 3. Cornell.
Varughese, G. and E. Ostrom. 2001. 'The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Eevidence from Community Forestry in Nepal'. *World Development*, Vol 29, No. 5, pp 747-765.
Villarreal, M. 1994. *Wielding and Yielding: Power, Subordination and Gender Identity in the Context of a Mexican Development Project*. PhD Thesis. Wageningen University of Agriculture. The Netherlands.
Villarreal, M. 1992. 'The Poverty of Practice: Power, Gender and Intervention from an Actor-oriented Perspective'. In N. Long and A. Long (eds). *Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development.* Routledge. London, pp 247-267.
Warner, M. and P. Jones. 1998. *Assessing the Need to Manage Conflict in Community-based Natural Resources Projects*. ODI, Natural Resources Perspectives, No. 35.
Weber, M. 1962. *Basic Concepts in Sociology* Free Press. Illinois.
Weber, M. 1957. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*. Free Press. Illinois.
Wekwete, K. H. 1990. 'Constraints to Planning for Socialism in Zimbabwe'. In P. de Valk and K.H. Wekwete (eds). *Decentralisation for Participatory Planning?* Gower Publishing Company. Aldershot.
Whatmore, S., M. Terry and P. Lowe. 1994. *Gender and Rurality: Critical Perspectives on Rural Change Series*. David Fulton Publishers. London.
White, S. 1996. 'Depoliticising Development: The Uses and Abuses of Participation". *Development in Parctice*, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp 6-15.
Whitlow, R. 1988. *Deforestation in Zimbabwe: Some Problems and Prospects*. Natural Resources Board. Harare.
Wollenberg, E., J. Anderson and D. Edmunds. 2001. 'Pluralism and the Less Powerful: Accommodating Multiple Interests in Local Forest Management'. *International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology*, Vol. 1, No. 3-4, pp 199-223.
World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. *Our Common Future*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
Wunsch, J.S. 2001. 'Decentralisation, Local Governance and the Democratic Transition in Southern Africa: A Comparative Analysis'. *African Studies Quarterly*, http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v2/v2ila2.htm. Accessed in Nov. 2002.
Wyckoff-Baird, B. 1994. *Women and Water Lilies*. World Wide Fund for Nature. Windhoek.
Yin, R.K. 1994. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Sage Publications. London.
ZERO. 2001. *2000 Annual Report*. ZERO. Harare.
Zwarteveen, M. 1995. *Linking Woman to the Main Canal: Gender and Irrigation Management*. IIED. London.

Zwarteveen, M. and N. Neupane. 1996. *Free Riders or Victims: Women's Non-Participation in Irrigation Management in Nepal's Chhattis Mauja Irrigation Scheme*. Research report no. 7. IIMI, Colombo. Sri Lanka.

Annex 1: Woodland Resources Tenure Survey[66]

1. Comprehensiveness: Rights of Harvest[67]: *What can be harvested?*

Resources/Products	Designated Areas			
	Household Plots[68]	Community Woodlands[69]	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas[70]
Plants (all plants in each category except)[71]. (for sacred areas, all species allowed) Exotics				
Indigenous Fruits				
Indigenous Other				
Animals (livestock for households plots, wildlife for woodlands) (sacred areas, species allowed)				
Water				

2. Exclusiveness: Rights of harvest: *Who is allowed to harvest?*
Only household members (HH); Only kraal members (KM); Adjoining kraals (AK); Open access (OA); Other (O): explain.

Resources/Products	Designated Areas			
	Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas
Plants Exotics				
Indigenous Fruits				
Indigenous Other				
Animals				
Water				

3. Use Restrictions: Are Landuse changes allowed? Under what circumstances?

Current Use:	Changeable to:			
	Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas
Household Plots	----------			
Community Woodlands		----------		
Riverine Areas			----------	
Sacred Areas				----------

66 The concept behind the structure of this survey was that rules governing use may vary according to designated area, or by resource. Accordingly, for most of the characteristics, the information was gathered within a table that captured both of these sources of variation.

67 Comprehensiveness could include management rights as well as harvesting rights. However, management rights arise out of incentives to capture benefits from investments, influenced by a number of factors including other property right characteristics.

68 Household plots include gardens, fields and homestead areas.

69 Community woodlands include open, flat areas as well as wooded hilly areas.

70 Sacred areas may lie within household plots or woodlands, but are delineated as distinct areas with distinct rules within these other designations.

71 The study identified what is harvested from the PRA exercises and thus in the tenure survey focus was on what cannot be harvested.

4. Duration: Are there designated time endings on rights held in: (If so, indicate how long)

Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas

May rights be leased for a specific period of time in: (If so, indicate typical lease period*)*

Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas

5. Allotment Type: Are rights area based (AB), volume based (VB) or both (B)?

Resource/Products	**Designated Areas**			
	Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas
Plants Exotic				
Indigenous Fruits				
Indigenous Other				
Animals (livestock for household plots, wildlife for woodlands) (for sacred areas, all species allowed)				
Water				

6. Size: (Volume or Area): Is there a size limit? What are the range and average of sizes?

Resource/Products	**Designated Areas**			
	Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas
Plants Exotic				
Indigenous Fruits				
Indigenous Other				
Animals (livestock for household plots, wildlife for woodlands) (for sacred areas, all species allowed)				
Water				

7.1. Transferability: Of Rights: Can the rights be sold (S) or leased (L)?

Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas

7.2 Transferability: Of Products: *Can the products be sold?*

Resource/Products	**Designated Areas**			
	Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas
Plants Exotic				
Indigenous Fruits				
Indigenous Other				
Animals (livestock for household plots, wildlife for woodlands) (for sacred areas, all species allowed)				
Water				

7.3 Transferability: Of Rights in the event of death: *Who inherits the rights…. If the husband dies?*

Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas

If the wife dies?

Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas

7.4 Transferability: Of Rights in the event of divorce: *Who receives the rights in the event of divorce?*

Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas

8. Payments: Are there required payments for rights to harvest and/or manage property?

Products	Designated Areas								
	Household Plots			Community Woodlands			Riverine and Sacred Areas		
	Who Pays	Who Collect	How much	Who Pays	Who Collect	How much	Who Pays	Who Collect	How much
Plants Exotic									
Indig. Fruits									
Indig. Other									
Animal									
Water									

9.1 Operational Requirements: Harvesting: What rules govern the harvesting of crops or products?

Resource/Products	**Designated Areas**			
	Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas
Plants Exotic				
Indigenous Fruits				
Indigenous Other				
Animals (livestock for household plots, wildlife for woodlands) (for sacred areas, all species allowed)				
Water				

9.2 Operational Requirements: Management: What rules govern the management of crops or products?

Resource/Products	**Designated Areas**			
	Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas
Plants Exotic				
Indigenous Fruits				
Indigenous Other				
Animals (livestock for household plots, wildlife for woodlands) (for sacred areas, all species allowed)				
Water				

10. Operational Control: How are the rules governing the harvesting, management and protection of crops and products enforced?

Resource/Products	**Designated Areas**			
	Household Plots	Community Woodlands	Riverine Areas	Sacred Areas
Plants Exotic				
Indigenous Fruits				
Indigenous Other				
Animals (livestock for household plots, wildlife for woodlands) (for sacred areas, all species allowed)				
Water				

Annex 2: Local Perceptions of wealth criteria and wealth groups in Romwe

Wealth class	Criteria/wealth indicators	Number of households
1 – Rich (*Vanowanisisa)*	Type of main house – brick and tin roof/asbestors Dryland farm size – 3-5 ha Have access to remittances Number of cattle – 8 and above Number of goats – 15 and above Agricultural implements – ox-drawn plough, some have cultivators, hoes Other assets – scotch cart, wheelbarrow, some have cars, radio. *Vanodya vachiguta* (they eat well) Children go to boarding schools	20
2 – Average (*Vanowana*)	Type of main house – pole and dagga (few with tin roof) Dryland farm size – 2-3 ha Have access to remittances Number of cattle –4 - 7 Number of goats – 6 and above Agricultural implements – ox-drawn plough, hoes Other assets – scotchcart, wheelbarrow, radio but some have problems buying batteries *Vanechikafu chakakwana* (they have enough food). Children complete primary school and go to day secondary schools as they cannot afford boarding schools	40
3 – Poor (*Vanoshaya*)	Type of main house – pole and dagga and thatch grass Dryland field – 1-2 ha except for *sabuku*s with 3-5 ha Very few have access to irregular remittances Cattle – 1-2 Goats – 1-5 Agricultural implements – hoes and no ox-drawn plough Other assets - some have wheelbarrows *Vanotamburira chikafu* (They struggle to get food) Children finish primary school and become herd boys or maids. Cannot afford secondary school fees	54
4- Very poor (*Vanoshayisisa*)	Type of main house – pole and dagga, and thatch grass. Some have no main house and use kitchen as bedroom. Dryland – average of 0.5. ha No remittances Depend on *maricho* (piece jobs) No cattle Agricultural implements – hoes only No big household assets *Vonorarama nekupema* (often have to beg for food) Children drop out of primary school and become herd boys or house girls or engage in *maricho*	13